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
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The Westward Movement



THE COLONIES AND THE REPUBLIC

WEST OF THE ALLEGHANIES
1763-1798

*WITH FULL CARTOGRAPHICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
FROM CONTEMPORARY SOURCES*

BY

JUSTIN WINSOR

BOSTON AND NEW YORK
HOUGHTON, MIFFLIN AND COMPANY
The Riverside Press, Cambridge

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SIR HENRY W. DYKE ACLAND, BART.,

K. C. B., D. C. L., LL. D., F. R. S.,

HONORARY PHYSICIAN TO HIS ROYAL HIGHNESS, THE PRINCE OF WALES.

MY DEAR SIR HENRY, —

When a few days ago at the Bodleian you addressed a party of sixty American librarians, you showed what I have long known, that you have a kind appreciation of my countrymen, with some of whom your friendship has lasted from the time when you accompanied the Prince of Wales to the States in 1860.

You have since then traversed our land on other visits, during which you have evinced to me your interest in our history, particularly when some years ago we together looked over the ground hallowed by the devotion of Lady Harriet Acland.


I therefore like to connect your name with this book, which is a story of how much of our territorial integrity we owe to British forbearance, when the false-hearted diplomacy of France and Spain would have despoiled us.

Ever your friend.

A handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Justin Courtenay". The signature is written in a cursive style with a large, sweeping initial 'J' and a long, horizontal flourish at the end.

GREAT MALVERN, WORCESTERSHIRE.

August 8, 1897.



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THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT.

CHAPTER I.

AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY.

THE public and secret treaties of 1763 left France without a foothold on the American main. By the terms of the Peace of Paris, the Bourbon flag fluttered in the islands of St. Pierre and Miquelon. The suspicion of what lay beyond these little fishing stations at the entrance of the Gulf of St. Lawrence had two centuries and a half before prompted the ambition of France to penetrate the continent by the great river of Canada. A century later her pioneers, following that current to its upper sources, had passed on to the Mississippi, which forms the central artery of the continent. Here, a third of the way across the land's broad expanse, and not suspecting the greater distance beyond, France had nurtured the hope of ascending the western affluents of that parent stream, till she had compassed, with her survey and jurisdiction, a greater France, stretching from the Alleghanies to the South Sea. This expectation had been dashed. Where she had counted upon seeing her royal standard shadowing soil and native alike, her flag was now seen drooping at a few posts beyond the Mississippi, and awaiting the demands of Spain to lower it.

During the period which followed the Treaty of Ryswick (1697), a scheme had often been broached among the English, but had never prospered, which looked to thwarting the policy of France in the Great Valley. This was to unite England and Spain in a movement to drive the French from the continent, and divide the northern parts of the New World between their respective crowns. This conjunction had now come to pass, but not by any such international pact.

In the same treaty of 1763, Great Britain had acknowledged a limit to the western extension of her seaboard colonies by accepting the Mississippi River as a boundary of her American possessions. The Atlantic colonies, with their impracticable sea-to-sea charters, took no exception to such a reasonable curtailment of their western limits; but when the king's proclamation followed, and the colonies found themselves confined to the seaward slope of the Appalachians, their western extension made crown territory to be given over to the uses of the Indians, and all attempts to occupy it forbidden, — there were signs of discontent which were easily linked with the resentment that defeated the Stamp Act. So the demand for a western existence was a part of the first pulsation of resistance to the mother country, and harbingered the American Revolution.

To keep the opposition, which had thus been raised, within bounds, and once more to apply a territorial check, the Quebec bill, in 1774, afforded one of the weighty charges, colored with current political rancor, which made up the Declaration of Independence. Britain had always denied that New France could cut athwart her colonial charters by any natural, geographical definition and extend to the Ohio and Mississippi; but in the Quebec bill it served her purpose to assume that Canada had of right that convenient extension.

In the war which ensued, Virginia took the lead which she had always taken in respect to this western region, and her expedition under George Rogers Clark rendered it easier for the American commissioners, who negotiated the treaty of 1782, to include this ample domain within the American union. In doing this they loyally defeated the intrigues of all the other parties to the general treaty, — France, whom in the earlier war, with England's help, the colonies had overcome; England, from whom, with French assistance, they had gained their independence; and Spain, whose insidious and vacillating policy they were yet further and successfully to combat. Each of these powers had hoped to curtail the ambition of the young Republic. Vergennes had succeeded in crippling England, but he feared the stalwart figure of the young nation born of England's misfortune. He was ready, if he could, to use England in her new complacency to cripple the youthful America.

The treaty of Independence was not so effective but that

there soon followed other efforts to prevent for a while the rounding out of the Republic to its legitimate bounds. England, on the side of Canada, and Spain, on the side of Louisiana, sought to regain something they had lost. The retention by Great Britain of the lake posts, including as they hoped the lake front, though with some show of right, was disgraced by base intrigues with Kentucky. All her schemes were brought to an end by Jay in the treaty of 1794. The occupation of the eastern bank of the Mississippi from the Yazoo country, southward, by Spain, and the plotting of Miró with Wilkinson and his associates to establish a Spanish protectorate south of the Ohio, were defeated at last by the treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795.

Adding the time which was necessary to carry out these treaties, it is now an even hundred years since the title of the United States to this vast region lying between the Appalachians, the Great Lakes, and the Mississippi was unmistakably confirmed. For more than thirty years after the peace of 1763, the colonies and the Republic struggled to maintain the American spirit on this eastern-central area of the continent. Independence achieved, for twelve or fifteen years the United States strove to round out its territorial promise. The history of this western region during all these years was constantly moulded by its geography, and it is the purpose of the present volume to show the ever varying aspects of this struggle.

To establish what was called the Property Line was the first signal step taken in behalf of the seaboard to assert a right to enter upon this territory, and to that initiatory measure we devote the opening of the story.

CHAPTER II.

THE PROPERTY LINE.

1763-1764.

Two years before the Treaty of Paris (1763), James Otis had argued in Boston against issuing Writs of Assistance to detect evasions of the revenue. A service of law, which in England had been constantly accepted, aroused in an unwilling people a rebellious spirit. How to restrain this threatening impulse was already a serious question; and there was regret with some that Canada had not been left at the peace in French hands, to remain a menace to the colonies, and hold them dependent on England's protection.

The existence of this recalcitrant temper had been often cited in the arguments of those who preferred Guadaloupe to Canada in the settling the account with France. Lookers-on in the colonies, like Kalm, had perceived the force of this view. Choiseul saw it, and predicted the fatal outcome of England's final choice. Vergennes, chagrined at the drop in political influence which France had experienced, welcomed this hope of disaster to an ancient rival of France, which her sacrifice of Canada might produce.

Colden and others in the colonies were conscious that the loyal subjects of England must face new hazards when the British flag was hoisted at Quebec. This New Yorker represented to the Board of Trade in London that New England was the nursery of this threatening passion, and that it was necessary, if her republican hopes were to be chilled, to curtail the Yankees' bounds by extending New York to the Connecticut River. In September, 1764, word reached Albany that the king in council had stretched the jurisdiction of New York over what is now known as Vermont. Francis Bernard went farther. He not only urged this extension to the Connecticut, but he wished that the boundaries of the rest of New England should

be redistributed, in a sort of gerrymandering way, so as to insure a government majority in every part, and during 1766 and 1767 he was in close correspondence with the home government on this point.

Murray, who had been appointed governor at Quebec in October, 1763, did not reach his post till August of the next year. It was not long before he was making reports to the home government which were startling on two points. One was that the British then in Canada "were the meanest and most immoral people he ever saw, while the [French] Canadians were frugal, industrious, and moral, and had become reconciled to the English rule." The report also anticipated the action which, ten years later, the daring of the seaboard colonies forced the English ministry to take in the Quebec bill. Murray's proposition was to annex the region lying beyond the Alleghanies to Canada, as a means of overawing the older colonies. The gentleness of Murray with the Canadians was in rather painful contrast with Gage's plan of using them against the Indians. He advised Bradstreet (May 3, 1764) "to employ them in every service that can render them the most obnoxious to the Indians. Whatever is to be done most disagreeable to the Indians, let the Canadians have a large share in it. This will convince them, if anything will, how vain their hopes are of success from that quarter." If this policy was inspired by the home government, as well as another policy which was aimed at the repression of the natural subjects of the crown, one could well have predicted the later alliance of 1778.

A recent historian, in his *Expansion of England*, speaks of the prevalence in the mother country at this time of a "not unnatural bitterness," which accompanied the fear that Britain had enabled her colonies to do without her. Seeley once again, writing of the century of English history from Louis XIV. to Napoleon, advises the English reader to recognize the fact that his country's real history during this interval was in the New World, where England successively fought France and her own colonies, in the effort to sustain her power. With this in mind, the student of British rule would not find, he adds, "that century of English history so uninteresting."

The fall of New France had produced sharp effects upon the

relations of America and England. The war had increased the British debt by £350,000,000. The rights of the mother country, which affected the commerce and industry of her colonies, were at this time both brutal and mercenary. Viscount Bury says: "It may fairly be stated that the advantage reaped by a few shipowners from the operation of the navigation laws was purchased by an actual money expenditure of more than £200,000,000, in less than half a century." England was content to let the American pioneers break out the paths for a newer and perhaps greater Britain; but it was her policy first of all to make these plodders of the wilderness pay tribute to the stay-at-home merchant. That such injustice was according to law and precedent did not meet the questions which the Americans raised,—questions such as are constantly needing adjustment to newer environments.

The population in the seaboard colonies was doubling, as Franklin computed, in twenty-five years. The bonds of inter-colonial sympathies were strengthening, and the designations of New Englander and Virginian were beginning to give place to American. With these conditions among the colonists, it was not unnatural that a proposition of the ministry to tax them on a system repellent to colonial views created distrust. A period of doubt is always one of rumors. Bernard's plea for readjusting the New England bounds made John Adams and others suspect that the British government intended to revoke the colonial charters and make the colonies royal provinces. The terms of the royal proclamation of 1763, which Gage received in New York on November 30, indicated, as already said, that under the new dispensation the westward extension of the colonies' bounds would be curtailed by the mountains, and the spaces of the Great Valley would be confirmed to savagery. There were further symptoms of this in the movement now going on in Pennsylvania to induce the king to recompense its proprietary and make it a royal domain. The king might indeed be preferable to a stubborn master.

If the heady motions of the ministry were without tact, there was some warrant for its belief that the colonies, despite acts of trade and navigation, were prosperous enough to share the burdens of the mother country. Maryland and Virginia were dispatching large shipments of wheat to England. Philadel-

phia alone, the readiest port for shipping such products as came over the mountains, was now sending abroad four hundred vessels annually carrying exports to the value of £700,000. New England built and sent across the sea for sale fifty ships a year.

If such things indicated to the government a source of revenue, it was beginning to warn some observers that the colonies had it quite within their power to sustain a practical autonomy. When, in 1762, the ministry secured an uncompromising adherent in making William Franklin the governor of New Jersey, the act had no such effect upon his father, and it was not long before Benjamin Franklin was warning the ministry that "grievous tyranny and oppression" might drive his compatriots to revolt. The colonies had indeed struggled on, in facing the French, without cohesion; but injustice — and it mattered little whether it was real or imagined — was yet to bind them together, as the dangers of a common foe had never done.

The immediate struggle over the Stamp Act, which was closed by its repeal in 1766, produced for a time at least that political quiet which induces enterprise. The attention of the pioneers was again drawn to the western movement, and the humane spirit once again dwelt on the prohibition which the luckless proclamation of 1763 had put upon the ardent pioneer. Bouquet, falling in with the views of the ministry, was now urging that all grants west of the mountains should be annulled. This would include the abolishment of the Ohio Company, and would very closely affect the Virginia gentlemen.

It was also Bouquet's opinion that the policing of this western wilderness and the enforcement of the proclamation should be intrusted to the military. There was need of it. Since Governor Penn in June, 1765, had again opened the Indian trade by proclamation, the packmen had crossed the mountains, and a following of vagabonds was occasionally provoking the Indians to retaliate for the wrongs which were done them. Thus occasional scenes of devastation on the frontiers of Pennsylvania and Virginia were calling for mutual explanations between the white and the red man; still the great body of the Indians had, since the close of Pontiac's war, ceased their havoc. The trouble was mainly with the whites. "I am really vexed," wrote Gage to Johnson (May 5, 1766), "at the behavior of the lawless banditti upon the borders; and what aggravates the

more is the difficulty to bring them to punishment." There was a limit to the Indian forbearance, but there were ten years yet to pass before the warwhoops of the Dunmore turmoil awoke the echoes of the Ohio woods.

During this interval the main dispute of the frontiers, between the home government and the natives, was how to protect the hunting-grounds of the tribes and at the same time give some scope to the ambition of the pioneer. Sir William Johnson, as Indian agent, had faced hard problems before; but he never had a more difficult question than that which now confronted him. The French had indeed publicly withdrawn from the situation, but he could not divest himself of the belief that they were still exerting a clandestine influence, which was more difficult to deal with. A part of this influence lay in the experiences of the Indians with the French. "When I was in Canada," said Gage, "I could not find that the French had ever purchased land of the Indians, — only settled amongst them by permission and desire." Again he writes to Johnson, "We are plagued everywhere about lands. The French had never any dispute with the Indians about them, though they never purchased a single acre; and I believe the Indians have made difficulty with us because we have gone on a different plan."

Things had now come to such a pass on the frontier that Johnson saw the necessity of establishing some definite line of separation between the colonies and their Indian neighbors, and of maintaining it. When a savage said to him that the English always stole the Indian lands by the rum bottle, Johnson knew well all that it implied. With a purpose on each side, the one to sell and the other to buy, and with liquor as the bartering medium, nothing could shield the Indian from wrong. In order to make a beginning in the interests of right and to promote peace, Johnson dispatched George Croghan to England to sound the government on the project of such a line; and while Croghan was there Johnson instructed him to memorialize the Board of Trade about the desirability of securing land south of the Ohio to satisfy the demands of the Ohio Company, and the claims of the soldiers enlisted by Dinwiddie in 1754, under a promise of land. Preliminary to this, and for the purpose of bringing the Indians to terms of mutual confidence

among themselves, Johnson had exerted himself to make peace between the leading tribes of the North and South. The Virginians, as Gage wrote to Johnson some time before (March 3, 1766), were intent on such a plan, hoping thereby to prevent the Cherokees taking revenge on the Iroquois, for some murders committed by the young men of the latter. In December, 1767, three Cherokee chiefs presented themselves at Johnson Hall, on this errand. The Iroquois were summoned, and on March 4, 1768, the friendly pact between them was made.

The movement for this boundary settlement had in the start a greater impulse at the South than at the North. It had for some time devolved upon John Stuart, as the Indian agent for the southern colonies, to deal with the Cherokees in matters touching both the whites and the savages. He had brought about a conference at Augusta, where the Creeks had ceded some territory to Georgia "in proof of the sense they have of His Majesty's goodness in forgetting past offenses."

As it happened, the irresponsible conduct of the Carolina traders was rendering it necessary to act promptly, particularly if peace was to prevail among its tribes, since the whites always suffered in such times. The rivalry of the French had much conduced in the past to make the English liberal in their gratuities. That open rivalry failing, the generous habit of the English had slackened, and the Choctaws had not failed to remark upon it. The French at New Orleans used this neglect to point a moral for the occasion.

The inroads of the whites upon the tribal territories had always been a source of alarm to the Indians, and Stuart had, in August, 1765, urged restraining them by a fixed line. We find, in 1766, that a deputation of Indians was in England, pleading with the government against the injustice of the colonists; and this may have had something to do with the repeated warnings which Stuart received in 1766 to avoid an Indian rupture. The instances of encroachment were cumulative, but the Indians took new alarm when these trespasses seemed to be made on a system, as was implied in the movement to extend the province bounds to the west. This purpose had been in part determined upon to protect the few settlers who were well within the

Indian territory. The bounds of South Carolina had been already pushed upon the country of the Catawbas, and in April and May, 1766, there had been preliminary surveys towards the Cherokees; but in December, the running of the line had been postponed till the spring, and when completed it was not carried to the North Carolina limit.

Governor Tryon had succeeded Dobbs in the executive chair of North Carolina in 1764, and it fell to him to handle this question of bounds, as it did later some more serious questions. In February, 1767, Shelburne had advised him to deal tenderly with the Indians, for tidings had reached the ministry of what he thought unaccountable risks which the people of the back country were taking in their treatment of the Indians. On the 1st of June, Tryon met the Cherokees at Tyger River, and he had what was called "a straight and good talk" with them. There were mutual phrases of concession, and each confessed that it would be much easier to live in harmony, but for the "rogues" on either side. A line planned in October, 1765, was considered, and on June 13 it was agreed upon. This line, beginning at Reedy River, ran north to Tryon Mountain, which is described as being within three or four miles of the springs of the streams flowing towards the Mississippi. Thence the line ran to Chiswell Mines, and along the Blue Ridge, east of north, sixty or seventy miles. On July 16, the decision was made public, and all who had settled beyond were warned to withdraw by New Year's of 1768. It was further determined that no grants should be made reaching within a mile of the line.

There was still the region back of Virginia and extending to the Ohio, which it was even more necessary to bring under control. Hillsborough had instructed Stuart to force the Cherokees, who were the main southern claimants of this region, to an agreement. This agent met the tribe at Hardlabor, S. C., on October 14, 1768. These Indians professed to hold the territory east and north of the Cherokee [Tennessee] River — their usual route to the Mississippi — as a hunting-ground, but were content to yield all east of the Kanawha, from its mouth upwards, and on this basis the treaty was made. This decision was approved by the Board of Trade and recommended to the king. This was necessary, as it threw open to the pioneers

the valley of the Greenbrier and other eastern affluents of the Kanawha on the west of the Atlantic divide, and was thus at variance with the royal proclamation. It was at once so far established as a "ministerial line" that Hillsborough included it in the prohibition which he had attached in April to the line farther south, when he warned all who should transgress by passing it. He had already informed Stuart that the king would never consent to new grants below the Kanawha, and might recall some already made. This meant much, for the king's "friends," under Grafton, had come into power, and it seemed they were to be his thralls, not his advisers.

This definition of bounds by the Kanawha was only less offensive to Virginia than the proclamation of 1763 had been, for it was still a virtual curtailment of her territorial pretensions. Washington and others interested in the Ohio Company had looked upon the proclamation as simply an ostensible show of words for satisfying the Indians without really abridging the rights of the colony. A pact of the government with the Indians, as the Hardlabor agreement had been, was somewhat more serious, and it was not long, as we shall see, before this difficulty was almost entirely removed.

There was among the colonists of the Old Dominion a marked difference of character between the tide-water people and those who had crossed the mountains, or had entered the Shenandoah Valley from the north. Burnaby, who had traversed the colony a few years before, had found "a spirit of enterprise by no means the turn of Virginia;" but he derived his opinion from his intercourse with the large landed proprietors near the Atlantic rivers. These found nothing more exciting than their Christmas revelries, their hunts in the wilderness, their county politics, and their annual shipments of tobacco at the river fronts of their plantations. They showed little disposition to develop the country away from their own neighborhoods. While, however, this was true of most of the gentlemen of the lower country, there were a few among them quite ready, as we shall see, to act in the faith which Burnaby shows he imbibed, when he speaks of the Potomac as a water-way to the great divide, and "of as great consequence as any river in America."

But the development of the frontiers of Virginia was not

dependent on the tide-water gentry and their inferior servitors, but rather upon the virile folk, particularly the Scotch-Irish, who had brought the valley of Virginia into subjection, and were now adding to their strength by an immigration from Maryland, Pennsylvania, and north Virginia. These, crossing the divide by Braddock's road, were pushing down the Monongahela, and so on to the Ohio country. They carried with them all that excitable and determined character which goes with a keen-minded adherence to original sin, total depravity, predestination, and election, and saw no use in an Indian but to be a target for their bullets.

No region in North America at this time had the repute of being so inviting and fertile as this valley of the great eastern tributary of the Mississippi. In 1765, the present town of Pittsburg had been laid out at the forks of the Ohio, two hundred feet from the old fort which had sprung in air from a mine, at the time of Forbes's approach in 1759, and of which we have a relic of Bouquet's enlargement in a brick bastion, still or of late preserved as a dwelling in the modern town. The place was now the centre of a frontier vigor, which kept pace with the growing influence of the anti-Quaker element in the province. It was to this latter conservative and sluggish faction that the Germans mainly adhered. These were in large part a boorish people, impregnated with the slavish traits of the redemptioners; good farmers, who cared more for their pigs than for their own comfort, uniting thrift with habits that scorned education, clannish, and never forgetful of the Rhine. They with the Quakers had made a party in the government, which, from principle and apathy, had in the late war sorely tried the patience of Franklin and those jealous of the credit of the province. There had already begun to appear a palpable decline of the Quaker power before the combined energies of the Philadelphia traders and the frontier woodsmen, with not a little assistance from the enlightened activities of the better class of Germans. It was the energy of this restless faction which induced Burnaby to speak of the Pennsylvanians as "by far the most enterprising people of the continent." He contrasted them with the Virginians, who, though having every advantage of easier communication beyond the mountains, had shown much less spirit.

From Pittsburg the current of the Ohio carried a depth of three feet for seventy-five miles, to a settlement of some sixty native families, known as the Mingo town. This was the only cluster of habitations at this time between the forks and the rapids at the modern Louisville. Beyond this Indian town, the water was deep enough. The variegated banks, with the windings of the current, offered, as Colonel Gordon, a recent voyager, had said, "the most healthy, pleasant, commodious, and fertile spot of earth known to European people," and a little later it was represented to Hillsborough that "no part of North America would require less encouragement for the production of naval stores and raw material for manufactures in Europe." Such praise as this was later to reach a wider public in Thomas Hutchins's *Description of Virginia*, etc., when published in London. This topographer had been a captain in Bouquet's army, which put an end to the Pontiac war. He first surveyed the country through which Bouquet marched in 1763-64. We have a map, which is the result of his observations at that time and on later visits.

The movement by the Monongahela and by the valley of Virginia had naturally opened the way into what is now Kentucky and Tennessee. All this had alarmed the Indians, and in April and May, 1768, about 1,100 warriors of the Iroquois, Delawares, and Shawnees, beside women and children, assembled at the instigation of George Croghan at Fort Pitt. "With this string of wampum," said that interpreter to them, "I clean the sweat off your bodies, and remove all evil thoughts from your minds, and clean the passage to your hearts. . . . With this string I clean your ears that you may hear." Then followed apologies for the murder of certain Indians by wicked whites. Another propitiation was made. "With this belt I clean the blood off the leaves and earth, whereon it was sprinkled, that the sweet herbs may have their usual verdure." Beaver, a Delaware chief, replied: "Take hold of the end of this belt, which we may stretch along the road between us, in order to clean it of the briars and brush, that we may all travel it in peace and safety."

There was next a little altercation between a Shawnee and an Iroquois chief. The Shawnee wished the English to pull


down their forts, and thought that the boats which the English were building signified an evil purpose of going in them down the river. The Iroquois stood for the English, and advised them to hold the forts they had taken from the French. When it was proposed to send messengers to the interlopers on the Monongahela at Red Stone and warn them off, the Indians refused to lend a hand in the ejectment. The Shawnees again made bold to dispute the Iroquois pretensions to the Ohio country. So the symptoms were clear that trouble could easily be fostered in the valley, and during the previous summer some Indians had stopped the bateaux of pioneers, and the river route was in general made dangerous by the mutual hostilities of the Cherokees and the northern tribes.

In December, 1767, the Board of Trade had deemed the Kanawha River an equitable limit for the English settlements. Such a limit, restricting what Hillsborough judged the dangerous extension of agriculture, also met the approval of that minister.

Franklin, now in London as the agent of Pennsylvania, pointed out to the government how delays were only making the colonies drift into a savage war. Shelburne was soon moved to action, and in April, 1768, Gage, who had received Shelburne's instructions to run the line, forwarded them to Johnson with a suspicion that it would be difficult to satisfy the demands of New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, in whatever line was run. Gage had already urged, in February, that the plan had been satisfactorily carried out at the south by Georgia and the Carolinas.

The task of establishing such a line imposed difficulties upon the negotiator. Johnson had only recently had difficulty in getting the Indians to consent to the running of the line between Pennsylvania and Maryland beyond the mountains, and he felt sure that both French and Spanish were endeavoring to entice the Ohio tribes to a counter conference on the Mississippi. When Johnson had first broached the subject of a line at a conference of Iroquois in the spring of 1765, he had found some difficulty in bringing them to his conception of what such a line should be. When the Indians had made some concessions, he was obliged to confess he had no authority to settle the question. Accordingly, after three years of delay, during

which the ministry had been instructing him to keep a peace with the Indians, and with some untoward happenings in the interval, it was not without misgivings that Sir William, accompanied by two hundred boats of merchandise for presents, reached Fort Stanwix on September 20, 1768. Prominent



NOTE. — This map is a section of Guy Johnson's map of the Fort Stanwix line, sent by Sir William Johnson to Lord Hillsborough, and reproduced in *Docs. rel. to the Colon. Hist. of N. Y.*, vol. viii. p. 136.

among his advisers in attendance were Governor Franklin, Guy Johnson, and George Croghan. The Indians assembled so slowly that it was October 24 before it was deemed prudent to open the conference. By this time it was certain that nearly thirty-two hundred cavernous mouths were to be fed, and that other entertainments must be provided with equal prodigality. Johnson, indeed, soon found that there was difficulty in getting a sufficient allowance from the treasury at headquarters, owing to the great cost of quartering troops in Boston, now going on to meet the rebellious manifestations of that community. So the seven weeks of feasts and talks went on. Thomas Walker had come with authority from Virginia to undo the Stuart treaty and the Kanawha line, if he could. There were other delegates from New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, together with a number of agents representing the traders who had suffered losses in the Pontiac war.

This large assembly of savages was, in fact, a considerable part of the whole number of tribes interested in the outcome of the conference. Johnson at this time estimated that the Iroquois numbered perhaps ten thousand souls, and of these two thousand could be considered warriors. Their allies could furnish probably another two thousand, made up among others of three hundred Shawnees from the Ohio country, six hundred Delawares from the Susquehanna, and two hundred Wyandots from Sandusky. These four thousand Iroquois and dependents, so great had been their losses, were probably not more than half as many as the Ottawa confederacy. This larger amalgamation of the savage power, including the Twightwees and Miamis, hemmed in the others on the west, and blocked the way to the Mississippi. Johnson now reckoned them at eight thousand warriors, of whom about three thousand were on the Detroit River. He makes no mention of any tribes in what is now Kentucky, and Croghan seems to confirm the belief that the territory between the Ohio and the Tennessee was destitute of savage dwellers, and this was the region now the particular object of negotiation.

It was not till November 5 that a conclusion was reached at Fort Stanwix, when, in consideration of a considerable sum of money, the Indians consented to a line, beyond which the English agreed to prohibit settling. The Iroquois chiefs signed with the colonial delegates; but the Delawares and Shawnees, though assenting, were not allowed to sign, since they were dependent upon the Iroquois.

The territory which was thus alienated was vested, under the terms of the treaty, in the crown, and could only be occupied by royal grant. It was soon claimed that, so far as these lands were concerned, the royal proclamation was annulled.

Johnson, in directing the negotiations, had exceeded his authority, and, as the Virginians claimed, he had thwarted the purposes which Dr. Walker had been sent to advance. Johnson had been directed to confirm Stuart's line by the Kanawha, and to yield to the Cherokee pretensions as respects the territory west of that river. The Iroquois, however, asserted their rights in this region against the Cherokees, and Johnson thought it imprudent to arouse their resentment by declining their cession of it. Johnson satisfied his own conscience in the



[From the French translation of Hutchins, *Description topographique de la Virginie*, Paris, 1781.]

matter by recalling that the Cherokees some years before had recognized the Iroquois rights to it. He felt also that, by confirming it to the crown, the government would not be embarrassed in controlling its settlement as they liked. In this way what became later known as "The Property Line" practically gave Kentucky over to present occupation.



The region east of the Kanawha and west of the Monongahela had already two days before (November 3) been deeded by the Indians to Trent, as the agent of the traders, whose property in the recent war had been despoiled to an extent, as was contended, of £86,000. Out of this transaction difficulties soon arose. The Ohio Company held the land thus conveyed to be



map, improved, in the *Documentary Hist. of N. Y.*, vol. i. p. 587. The line reaching the Ohio at

included in their own prior grants, which were known as "Indiana," and stood in the names of Samuel Wharton, William Trent, George Morgan, and others. Virginia recognized no rights in it but her own, as coming within her charter, and she claimed that some of her own people had already settled within the disputed territory. All disputes were finally sunk in the troubles of the Revolution.

The line, as established at Fort Stanwix, followed up the Ohio from the Cherokee River, passed the forks, and went up the Alleghany to Kittanning. It then ran west to the most westerly branch of the west fork of the Susquehanna; thence over Burnet's Hills to Awandoe Creek, and so to the Delaware. It then ascended this river towards Owego and Wood Creek, and stopped at a point half way between Fort Stanwix and Lake Oneida.

The line, by reason of Johnson's independent action, was not approved by the king, but the government did not venture to invalidate it. When it thus practically became the law, new conditions arose. It opened a larger area to settlement than the royal proclamation had decreed, and vesting new rights in the crown, it was held by most, except the Virginians, to place a bar, to the extent of the territory ceded by the Indians, to the westward claims of Virginia.

This line of demarcation between the Indians and the settlements was now unbroken from where it started at the earlier grant near Lake Ontario to the southern end of the Appalachians, except for an interval where the bounds back of South and North Carolina had not been made to join. This debatable ground remained for some time the scene of insecurity; the doubtful jurisdiction invited vagabonds and lawless traders, who traversed the country between the Catawbias and the Cherokees. It was of such hazardous conditions that Stuart, the Indian agent, spoke, when he commented upon the "rage for settling far back," which crowded settlers upon the boundary, and left the country scant of inhabitants on the way thither. "The Indians detest such back inhabitants," he adds, "which accounts for their reluctance to give up any of their lands, being anxious to keep such neighbors at a distance."

The dispute between the Iroquois and the Cherokees would, it was feared, seriously involve the interests of such as received grants in what are now the States of Kentucky and Tennessee. It was not long before Gage was warning Johnson of "an agitation among the Indians." That the Iroquois should have been paid for territory which the Cherokees claimed was galling to the pride of the latter.

The Cherokee [Tennessee] River bends near Cumberland

Gap, separated by a divide from the springs of the Kanawha. The area in controversy, including the valley of the Cumberland, lay between these rivers and the Ohio. The purposes of the home government and those of the pioneers regarding this territory were equally at variance, the one sustaining, in opinion at least, the treaty of Stuart, and the other that of Johnson. Gage was fully aware of the risks of occupying the region south of the Ohio. To do so, in his judgment, could hardly fail to bring on a war with the southern Indians. The ministry, in view of the opposition which had been developed to the royal proclamation, was not unwise in winking at what it dared not undo.

This opening of a fertile country to occupation induced the steady movements westward to and beyond Cumberland Gap which took place in the next few years. Dr. Thomas Walker, whose name is so often associated with these early movements, and who had been more or less familiar with Powell's Valley and the neighboring region for twenty years, soon secured a grant hereabouts. Throwing it open to the pioneers, a rush of settlers to occupy it followed. In the spring of 1769, there was a race of rival parties seeking to reach the spot first and secure the land. Victory came to Joseph Martin and his companions, and they were earliest squatted in the rich valley, shadowed with black walnuts and wild cherries, which lies between Cumberland and Powell mountains. The modern Martin's Station, where they pitched their tents, was on the hunter's trail to Kentucky, and twenty miles from Cumberland Gap. The situation, however, was precarious, for there were roving bands of southern Indians, who were incensed that the pledge given in the Stuart treaty had not been observed. While Martin and some of his people were exploring farther west, hostile savages swooped down on those in camp, and the settlement was broken up. There is no lack of suspicion that in this and other marauding, the vicious trader was supplying the barbarian with his gun and powder.

So it was that the proclamation of 1763 was practically defied, and the ministry had not dared to interpose its authority.

CHAPTER III.

LOUISIANA, FLORIDA, AND THE ILLINOIS COUNTRY.

1763-1768.

It is curious to find the French traveler, Pagés, in 1767, speaking of the Mississippi as bounding on New England! The reservation of the trans-Alleghany country to the Indians' use, by the proclamation of 1763, had not eradicated from the conceptions of the French the old sea-to-sea claims of the English charters. They had too long confronted this English pretension to do more than recognize the curtailment of their claims by making that river the western boundary of those colonies, as required by the recent treaty.

In the colonies themselves, the claim was certainly dormant. Massachusetts, for her rights, was abiding her time. Connecticut was even now, on the strength of such a title, claiming a portion of Pennsylvania, and for the next few years, in the struggle between the two provinces, the New England colony was to be in the main successful in sustaining her Susquehanna Company, though it was at the cost of life and property. Both colonies, in the effort to defend what they thought their own, had devastated homes and wasted crops, and each was alternately the aggressor.

Virginia was still vigilantly looking after her western interests, and she did it to some purpose ten years later, when her George Rogers Clark did much to save the Northwest to the young Republic. Franklin, in 1754, would have swept all such pretensions away by his barrier colonies. During the years that had intervened, he had not forgotten his purpose, as we shall see.

The peace of 1763 had had its effect upon the Indian trade of the far West. The English seaboard merchants had become conscious how much this traffic had slipped away from their

western agents. Such diminution had been the subject of repeated representations. George Croghan was explaining it to General Gage in New York and to Dr. Franklin in London. Carleton complained that French and Spanish traders were gathering furs within twenty leagues of Detroit. Gage commented upon it to Conway, and hinted at the clandestine ways which were used by the Indians and French. Sir William Johnson also found artifice in the French methods, but it would seem to have been nothing more than that the traders got tenpence a pound more for skins in New Orleans than in any British market.

The unwelcome outcome of the business was the preëminence which the new settlement at St. Louis, under French enterprise, was likely to acquire. Hutchins speaks of the site of the new town as "the most healthy and pleasurable situation of any known in this part of the country," and hither (he adds), "by conciliating the affections of the natives," the French traders have drawn the traffic of the Missouri, Mississippi, Wisconsin, and Illinois rivers away from the English posts. St. Louis had become in a few years a town of about one hundred and twenty stone-built houses. The occupants of these dwellings, including a hundred and fifty negroes, numbered about eight hundred. Not far off was Ste. Geneviève, a place of more than four hundred inhabitants. These two settlements constituted the only French villages on the western bank of the Mississippi. Neighboring, but on the eastern bank, and so within the English jurisdiction, were some three hundred more French, with a serving body of nearly as many blacks. These were the communities which were seeking to turn the Indian products into channels which would carry them down the Mississippi on their way to the sea. The French Canadians, who were now looking to the English to protect their western trade, complained that unless the English were more enterprising and built new posts, the Indian trade toward the Mississippi would all slip away. Neither did the English, who were now coming into Canada in order to reap a harvest in the fur trade, view the conditions with more complacency. Carleton, who had ruled in Quebec since September, 1766, opened a correspondence with Johnson in order to seek a remedy, but Gage saw it was simply a game of sharp practice at which both

sides were privileged to play. When it was reported to him that the French and Spanish were endeavoring to lure the savages to their interest, he replied that "we have no reason to reproach them, as we aim at the same thing," and he spoke the truth. He was quite as complacent when one warned him of the Indians' efforts to embroil the English with the French. "They might well like to do it," he said, "for our quarrels are the Indian harvests."

The trade of that part of this distant country lying west of the Lake of the Woods had been drawn in large part to the English factors at Hudson's Bay. From Lake Superior the traders were already pushing to Rainy Lake, and by 1770 they had established posts on Lake Winnipeg and beyond, as well as farther south on the upper branches of the Mississippi.

Trading west of Detroit had been prohibited except by license, and under such a privilege Alexander Henry had enjoyed the freedom of Lake Superior. But police control in such conditions was impossible, and it was not unlikely that the trader without a license turned his tracks down the Great Valley, rather than risk detection on the St. Lawrence. The English commander at Fort Chartres was always complaining that the traders on the opposite sides of the Mississippi acted in collusion. There were ninety carrying places between the Lake of the Woods and Montreal. It was not strange that the trading canoes were oftener seen gliding on the almost uninterrupted current of the Mississippi, where they were easily thrown into companionship with the French packmen, as far north as the Falls of St. Anthony and higher up. Such intercourse boded no good to the English.

Unfortunately, Major Rogers, their commandant at Mackinac, was hardly a man to be trusted. He had become badly in debt to the traders, and had schemes of detaching that post from Canadian control and using it to secure welcome and advancement from the French. This movement demoralized the Indians, and Gage soon found it necessary to instruct Johnson to use his interpreters to ensnare the traitor, and in December, 1767, he was arrested for treason.

The effect of Rogers's disaffection upon the Indians was to be dreaded, as convincing them of the weakness of the English rule and the ultimate return of the French domination. There


were too apparent grounds for believing in the hold which the French still had upon the Indians. Johnson assured Gage that the savages were as fond as ever of the French. "Whatever they ardently wish for, it is natural for them to expect even after several disappointments," said that observer. It seemed to the French themselves that the savages greatly desired a reinstatement of the French power.

To unsettle this savage regard for their rivals and to rehabilitate this Indian trade, so that the seaboard could profit by it, was now a vital question with the English. The obvious movement was to make the Illinois country subservient to such a purpose, just as the French in the earlier days had always made it. The author of a tract on *The Expediency of securing our American Colonies by settling the Country adjoining the River Mississippi* had, as early as 1763, pointed out how the forks of the Mississippi, as its junction with the Ohio was termed, covering a region stretching to the Illinois, was "the most necessary place of any in America, — the key of all the inland parts." Gage, on April 3, 1767, wrote to Shelburne that it was desirable to have an English fort at this point in order to control the dependent country; and just before Captain Harry Gordon, Chief Engineer of North America, had pointed out the situation of Fort Massac as admirable for that purpose. Beck, in his *Gazetteer* (1823), points out that the first settlements at Cahokia and Kaskaskia were made in the most fertile land in Illinois. They were upon a piece of alluvial land, later known as the American Bottom, whose existing aboriginal mounds showed that it had long before supported an affluent population. This region, lying between a range of bluffs and the river, extended north from Kaskaskia for a hundred miles, and contained an area of about five hundred and twenty square miles. It was mostly a treeless prairie, but there was a fringe of heavy timber along the river. Its very fertility rendered it miasmatic, but steady cultivation had improved its salubriousness. As an agricultural region, Hutchins called it "of a superior soil to any other part of North America" that he had seen. Carver tells us that this was the general reputation which the country bore.

During the years immediately following the peace, and particularly before the cession of the trans-Mississippi country to

Spain was known, there had been some confusion among the population, owing to a general exodus of the French across the Mississippi. The village neighboring to Fort Chartres had become almost depopulated in this way, and the flight of its inhabitants was not altogether untimely, in view of the speedy encroachments which the current of the river was making on the soil. The English a little later (1772) found it necessary to abandon Fort Chartres, "the most commodious and best built fort in North America," as Pittman called it, because the river had undermined its walls in places. To understand how the very qualities which rendered this bottom-land so rich made it also unstable, we find this fort, when it was rebuilt in 1756, two miles inland; at the time we are now considering, sixteen years later, it was partly washed away, while to-day the ruined magazine and the ragged walls are again more than a mile from the river. In 1772, a new defense, called Fort Gage, was built on the bluff opposite Kaskaskia, and thither the English garrison was transferred. There was need of it, if England was to give the region the protection it needed.

The Cherokees and Chickasaws, not long before, had invaded the country and committed depredations in the neighborhood of Kaskaskia. The native defenders, the tribes of the Illinois, had at this period lost their vigor. Early in 1768, or at least in time for Gage to have heard of it in New York in the summer of that year, — and this evidence seems better than what induced Parkman to put it a year later, — Pontiac had been treacherously killed in Cahokia. "The French at Illinois and Post Vincent," says Gage (July 15, 1768), "complain of our setting the Cherokees and Chickasaws to molest them, and that the death of Pontiac, committed by a Peorie of the Illinois, and believed to have been excited by the English to that action, had drawn many of the Ottawas and other northern Indians towards their country to revenge his death." Johnson, from reports which reached him, feared, as a consequence, another outbreak like the Pontiac war. But the Illinois were the only sufferers, and their misfortunes lay them open to the revenge of the Pottawattamies, the Winnebagoes, and the Kickapoos, and there was a direful scene of suffering at Starved Rock. To such "a poor, debauched, and dastardly" condition had these people come, who in La Salle's time had crossed from the west-



KASKASKIA AND CAHOKIA AND THE AMERICAN BOTTOM.

ern bank of the Mississippi and confronted the Iroquois, that Hutchins describes them as too indolent to obtain skins enough to barter for clothing.

Pittman's account of them is much to the same effect. He counts their male adults at three hundred and fifty, whom it

is a mockery to call warriors. If they slunk before the braver tribes towards the Wisconsin, they had, in the Miami confederacy, other warlike neighbors to repress them on the side of the Wabash. The white population of all this country, including that at Vincennes, was perhaps not far from two thousand, consisting almost wholly of French, who from ties with the Indians, or from habits of content, had not sought to escape the English rule, though they objected to serve as British militia. Perhaps English observers exaggerated their social degradation, but Lieutenant Fraser, who had just been among them, called them debauched and every way disgraced by drunken habits.

Such was the country, in climate, soil, and denizen, white and red, which was now attracting attention. Sir William Johnson was writing of its capabilities to the Board of Trade, and directing thither the notice of Conway. The reasons which he urged for making it the seat of a British colony were that an English population would prevent the practice promoted by the four hundred French families already there, of sending furs down to New Orleans. The commander at Fort Chartres had been unsuccessful in prohibiting this, and the Spanish traders went with impunity up the Illinois and Wabash rivers. General Gage asked Don Ulloa at New Orleans to prevent this, and a little later ordered armed boats to patrol the river to intercept the outlaws. Johnson's plan included the maintaining of English posts on the east bank of the Mississippi, the acquiring lands of the Indians and settling soldiers upon them, and the creation of a land company, which would agree to settle an occupant on every hundred acres.

Meanwhile, General Phineas Lyman, in behalf of some officers of the late war, was writing to Shelburne, and developing schemes by which he would establish colonies all along the Mississippi from western Florida to the Falls of St. Anthony.

The active mind of Haldimand worked over, as we shall see, the problem in his quarters at Pensacola, and he sent a plan to Gage, now in New York, who forwarded it to the home government. This plan outlined a military colony at the Natchez, and advocated the making of small grants of land to the Louisiana French along the river, in order to induce them to settle upon them and so escape a servitude to the Spanish, which had now become their palpable fate.

To understand the attitude of Haldimand's mind and the conditions which prevailed in the lower parts of the Mississippi, it is necessary to revert to the influences which the secret treaty of 1763 were exerting in that region.

New Orleans at this time contained, within a stockade having a circuit of about two and a half miles, not far from four thousand souls. This population for the most part was living in some seven or eight hundred dwellings, standing as a rule in gardens of their own. These houses, built of timber, with brick filling, were of a single floor, elevated about eight feet from the soil so as to furnish storage below. The wet ground, in fact, did not admit of digging cellars. The occupants of the outskirts were mostly Germans and Acadians, scattered along the river on both sides, nearly to the Iberville. Including these, the entire population of the town and its dependencies may have reached near ten thousand souls. In seasons of high water they were all living in some danger of inundation, for the rushing river at such times was only kept to its channel by an unsubstantial levee, which extended for about fifty miles up and down its banks.

Several travelers have left us their observations of New Orleans at a period just subsequent to the Peace of Paris.

Captain de Pagés, of the French navy, whom we have already mentioned, speaks of seeing Tonicas and Choctaws in the town, bringing fish, fruit, and game to barter for brandy and trinkets. The more active merchants, however, were rarely in the town except to replenish their supplies, and were usually up the river in search of peltry. They oftener than otherwise wintered on the St. Francis River, which entered the Mississippi on the western side, ninety miles below the Ohio. From this place they sent their furs and salted meats to New Orleans for a market. In the season of travel, they moved up the river in little flotillas of bateaux, which were generally of about forty tons burden, and were manned by eighteen or twenty hands. It took about three months to row, pole, and warp such crafts from New Orleans to the Illinois country, and the bargemen were often obliged at night to guard their camps from the attacks of the Chickasaws and other marauders. Arrived at the upper waters of the Mississippi, the packmen scattered along the various trails. They were found on the higher reaches

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of the Missouri, and were known to be in the habit of ascending that river three and four hundred leagues, gathering that trade of which the English were now so covetous. They went among the Sioux in the region west of Lake Superior. They even turned east towards Canada, and are thought to have instigated the savages of the Great Lakes to hostile demonstrations against the English. We find more or less contemporary testimony on these points in such observers as Lieutenant John Thomas, of the Royal Artillery, and Philip Pittman, who had passed from the Illinois region down the valley to Pensacola. But in March, 1764, a Colonel Robertson, who had just arrived at New York from New Orleans, assured Gage that the French in Louisiana were certainly not instigating the upper tribes against Detroit.

Pensacola was now become the centre of English interests on the Gulf shore, and had attained a prominence that it never had possessed under the Spanish rule. It had been promptly occupied by the English in 1763. The post then consisted of a high stockade, inclosing some miserable houses, and there were a few equally dismal habitations without the defenses. Such was the place where Bouquet, now a brigadier, had been put in command in August, 1765, as a fit field for his recognized abilities, and where the southern fever was in a few days to cut short a brilliant career. Whoever the commander, Pensacola was destined to be the centre from which the English were to control, as best they could, the conflicting interests of the neighboring tribes, and gain what advantage was possible from their treaty rights of navigation along the Mississippi. The principal savage peoples within the radius of this influence were the Choctaws, the Creeks, and the Chickasaws, and they presented some perplexing problems. The Choctaws were for a time distracted by the rival solicitations of the French and English and warring with the Chickasaws; but this conflict the English after a while checked, only to turn the Choctaws against the Creeks, now angry with the English traders, and discontented with the absence of gifts, which the French had taught them to expect of Europeans. In their restless condition they were marauding along the English borders, but they promptly disowned their young warriors if they were apprehended, — per-

haps more promptly than the English disowned the "crackers," as the lawless whites of the borders were called. The English would have been glad to play off some of the lesser tribes against both Choctaws and Creeks, but the Alibamons were flying north to escape the toils. The English even thought of luring the Natchez, because of their hatred of the French, to cross the Mississippi and stand as a barrier against their savage neighbors; but the scheme was hardly practicable. The Creeks growing troublesome, Governor Johnston, who had succeeded Bouquet, had determined, in October, 1766, to attack them, while Gage was advising that Johnston should draw in for safety his distant garrisons. When Johnston's purpose was known to the home government, it dreaded a general uprising of the tribes, and recalled him for his rashness. Haldimand was now ordered to take his place, and enforce a more peaceful policy. So one of the first matters to which the new governor, on his arrival early in 1767, directed his attention was how to divert from the lower Mississippi the trade of the Illinois country.

The obvious solution of this problem was to establish a post on the Mississippi, just north of the Iberville River, and then deepen the channel of that stream, so as to render its navigation easy and at all times certain.

This would carry the stream of traffic through Lake Pontchartrain to Mississippi Sound, and on to Mobile and Pensacola, which might thus be made to flourish at the expense of New Orleans. Already in March, 1767, Gage at New York had received reports of measures looking to this end, and had approved them.

The engineering feat was not an easy one, and its difficulties were palpable. When the Mississippi was at a low stage, the bed of the Iberville was twelve feet above it; in the season of freshets it was as much or more below, but the current was then all the more obstructed by driftwood. Three years before (1764), the English had made one futile attempt to divert the scanty flow of the great river so as to deepen the lesser channel. It now happened that before any serious effort could be made to attack the difficulty afresh, a new policy of strengthening the English garrisons at St. Augustine, Mobile, and Pensacola, in view of needing the troops to quell disturbances now brew-

ing in New England and likely to spread south, drew away the troops at the mouth of the Iberville and at the Natchez. On this policy Haldimand and the civil governor were at variance, and the general reported to Gage not only the bad effect on the Indians of the evacuation of the Mississippi posts, but the detriment it would prove to the trade which they had hoped to create. Aubry, the French governor at New Orleans, had not been unmindful of these events, and they gave him some relief from his anxieties as respects his English neighbors.

The hope of the English to possess New Orleans by some device had not been out of sight, even when the Iberville project seemed promising, for the outlet of the Mississippi was looked to as a means of lessening the financial obligations of the colonies to the mother country, which had accumulated between 1756 and 1765 to near £11,000,000. There was a prospect, if the mouth of that river was left in the hands of the French, that they would outrival the English in tobacco as they had in sugar, and cotton was just beginning to be an export from New Orleans. John Thomas, in his record of events, is confident that fifteen hundred English and two hundred Indian auxiliaries could conquer Louisiana. Haldimand was questioned by Gage as to the feasibility of such an effort. That officer thought it not a difficult task, and counted upon the readiness of the French inhabitants to throw themselves on the English side in case of a rupture with the Spaniards, which now seemed probable.

It is necessary to go back a little to see how this condition of a French antagonism to Spain had become supposable. At the beginning of 1764, Gage in New York had learned of the proposed change of masters in New Orleans, which had been assured by the secret treaty of 1763. "I have a very extraordinary piece of good news to tell you," Gage wrote to Johnson, January 23, "which is that the French are to cede all Louisiana to the king of Spain, by which we shall get rid of a most troublesome neighbor and the continent be no longer embroiled with their intrigues. The French minister has declared this to Mr. Neville, with the compliment that it was done purely to avoid future disputes and quarrels with the English nation. I don't know whether they are yet acquainted

with these resolutions on the Mississippi." They were not. The secret provisions for a transfer were not known in New Orleans till October, and a few months later, February 4, 1765, d'Abbadie, the French governor, died, and Aubry became the acting governor. In the following summer, he and the council received word from Havana that a Spanish commandant had been appointed, and would soon present himself at New Orleans. This official was Antonio de Ulloa, now a man of nearly fifty, who had acquired some name by being associated with a scientific expedition to the equator to measure the arc of the meridian. On March 5, 1766, he arrived at New Orleans and became aware of a strong opposition among the Louisianians to the intended transfer.

Some time before, there had been a large meeting in New Orleans, which resulted in a leading merchant — Milhet by name — being sent to France in the hope of inducing the government to revoke the treaty of cession. This messenger found Bienville in Paris, then a man of eighty-five, and with him he sought an audience of the king, which Choiseul managed to avert. It was a cherished hope of that minister, that the time was coming when France could be avenged upon England for all she had lost. In 1764-66, he had kept a spy, Monsieur Beaulieu, in the English colonies watching for events that he could take advantage of. Some time afterwards we know that De Kalb, on January 12, 1768, arrived in Philadelphia, to see how nearly ripe the colonial discontent was for that break with the mother country which Turgot believed imminent. The minister was again actuated by this same hope a little later, when Spain had secured herself at New Orleans, and he pointed out that her true policy was not to try to colonize Louisiana, for which she had no aptness, but to rule her new province so liberally, even to fostering it as a republic, that the Americans would be lured by sympathy to declare their own independence, — a movement that Choiseul had no hesitation in desiring at whatever cost.

It seemed at first as if Ulloa was going to impede such a tendency by acts of conciliation towards the unwilling French, but the atmosphere soon changed. He had brought with him two companies of infantry, but they were not sufficient to enforce authority, and it was evident that the French — neither

troops nor populace — would tamely submit to a change of flag. Indeed, Aubry was apparently the only friend whom the Spanish governor had found. Ulloa had tried in various ways to appease the opposition, and in May, 1766, he had issued a conciliatory order, permitting continued intercourse with the French West Indies; but within four months all such communication was interdicted.

Thus the situation became critical. The French were doubtless unfortunate; and Ulloa, put to the test, was shown to be destitute of tact, and in some acts seemed inhuman. Aubry was soon convinced of the Spaniard's inability to govern. With a hostile population of six thousand, not including blacks, — for Ulloa had ordered a census and obtained some definite figures, — it was clearly imprudent for him to set up his authority without further communication with his government. Aubry had had definite instructions (April 20, 1766) to cede the province, and in his intercourse with Ulloa was complacent, if not time-serving; but he was without the hardihood of character needed in such an emergency, either to make Ulloa banish his indecision, or to control the French. Accordingly, when Ulloa felt it prudent to retire to the Balize, Aubry soon followed him. Here the two made a documentary record of the transfer of government, but there was not the courage to publish it. Ulloa now established his headquarters on the opposite side of the stream from the French fort, which, in the growing of the delta seaward, was now two miles from the Gulf, when, in 1734, it had been built directly upon the open water. At that time, the island which Ulloa now occupied did not exist.

In December, 1767, Jean Milhet returned from France, and declared that there was to be no effect from the colony's protest. The immediate result was that Aubry and Ulloa agreed upon a plan of joint rule till their European masters could interpose more effectively. Detachments were now sent up the river to establish three posts, the better to patrol the river and to be prepared for decisive action, and when the Spaniards deserted from Ulloa's regiments, French were enlisted to take their places. One of these detachments was at the mouth of the Iberville, opposite the position which the English later tried to occupy. Another was opposite Natchez, and a third was at the mouth of the Missouri. All these posts were distinct

obstacles to the English project of securing the trans-Mississippi trade; but the forts were too far apart for mutual support in any contest with the English. Gage had already determined on a stricter observation of the river, and had ordered the arrest of all French traders found on its eastern banks; and before August, 1768, he had sent a message to Ulloa of his purpose.

Events which were taking place in Boston — royal regiments landing under cover of shotted guns — prefigured the coming revolution of the English colonies, and the tidings were to carry joy to Choiseul's heart. A fear of this outbreak had necessitated, as we have seen, the evacuation of the British posts on the Mississippi, and it had proved the best protection of the Spaniards. The attitude which the Louisianians were now assuming showed doubtless some of that revolutionary fervor which characterized the New England patriots. Indeed, Aubry suspected that it was not so much devotion to France as a desire for independence which was now impelling the growing discontent. He even informed his government that some of the imprudences of Ulloa might drive a part, at least, of the French over the river to the protection of the English flag.

The stubbornness of Ulloa brought a natural result when, in October, 1768, a conspiracy organized in secrecy, in which some of the leading colonists were concerned, broke forth. The crisis was reached. Ulloa fled to a frigate in the river, and before the month was closed the Supreme Council decreed, notwithstanding Aubry's protest, that the Spaniards must leave. On October 31, Ulloa sailed out of the river, and on December 4, 1768, he announced the result to Grimaldi, the Spanish minister.

Such a daring act on the part of the council needed explanation, and this body dispatched a messenger to Paris to make a representation. Ulloa was in advance, and when his report was made known in France, it was not an unwelcome thought to the enemies of England that revolutions were contagious, and that the English colonies were growing ripe for the infection. Though such encouraging sentiments were lacking, the French government itself proved steadfast in their obligations with Spain.

As soon as the Louisianians became aware by a return message that there was no hope in Paris, they turned to the English in Florida for sympathy and aid, but got none.

The anxious days slipped on, and in July, 1769, it was known in New Orleans that O'Reilly, an Irish Catholic in the Spanish service, with a fleet at his back, had arrived at the Balize. The next day, this Spanish commander sent to the town instructions committed to him for Aubry. He informed the French governor at the same time of his purpose to assume command, whatever obstacles were interposed. He had three thousand troops to add weight to his determination.

The town grew excited over the news. White cockades appeared on the streets. There was prospect of trouble. La Frenière, and other leaders of the conspiracy which had sent Ulloa off, recognized the gravity of the situation, and successfully exerted themselves to allay the excitement. To help restore confidence, these conspirators, now more prudent, went down the river to welcome the new governor.

The way seemed open for a peaceful occupation. It was hoped the past would be forgotten. But appearances were ensnaring. O'Reilly reached the town on August 17, and on the next day Aubry made a formal surrender.

The purpose of O'Reilly was for a brief period cloaked; but in the end La Frenière and the other conspirators were seized and executed, while still others were imprisoned. By the latter part of November, 1769, the new government was in possession everywhere. O'Reilly's conduct was doubtless shaped by his instructions, and Jay, who later knew him in Spain, thought him "a man of excellent abilities, and possessed of great knowledge of men as well as of things."

O'Reilly had found the English merchants in complete control of the commerce of New Orleans, and he took immediate measures to dispossess them, and to cut off English communications across the Mississippi. As soon as Gage had heard of O'Reilly's success, he congratulated himself that if he could only spread the tidings among the Western Indians, he could effectually dispel their hopes of further French aid.


While the Spaniards were thus endeavoring to form a barrier against the English, they were dispatching messages to the Indians of Florida, — a region to whose loss, under the treaty of 1763, they had not become reconciled. These added new difficulties to those which beset the loyal officers of the British

crown all along the Gulf and Atlantic coast. They had little time to think further of the forcible acquisition of New Orleans, for the prowling savages were hanging about their interior posts, so as to compel their abandonment, one by one. The Tombigbee fort was evacuated in the spring of 1768, and not an armed station now protected the English traders in the upper country. A wavering and sinister policy, as Adair complains, had well-nigh alienated all the neighboring tribes from the English, and made it a common reproach among them to be an ally of that treacherous race which sold firearms to friend and foe alike.

Meanwhile the new political commotions in the older English colonies were checking the unfolding of English power on the Ohio and by the Illinois. To such projects we must now turn.

Governor Franklin of New Jersey and Sir William Johnson, feeling with their Tory instincts full confidence in the maintenance of the royal power on the seaboard, were together planning the establishment of a colony in the Illinois region. To advance their schemes, Sir William addressed the ministers and Governor Franklin wrote to his father, then in London, who, from his important services in the recent war, was recognized even there as a man of influence. The elder Franklin proved an earnest advocate of the new measures, which were not unlike in their purpose the project of barrier colonies, to which he had committed himself at the time of the Albany congress in 1754. The expectation at first was to buy needed territory from the French settlers, and Franklin marked out for Lord Shelburne the limits that were proposed on the small-scale map which makes a part of Evans and Pownall's larger sheet. This plan of compensation was soon abandoned, and the government was petitioned for a grant. General Gage and a body of Philadelphia merchants joined the others in this new memorial. Their aim was to acquire a tract of 63,000,000 acres stretching from Lake Erie to the Mississippi, and bounded in one direction by the Fox and Wisconsin rivers and on the other by the Ohio, Wabash, and Miami (Maumee). Against the eastern bounds of the proposed colony, and along the Wabash and Miami, lay a French population of some five or six hundred, which were grouped at Vincennes, and at Forts Ouiatanon and Miami.

*A SKETCH
of the Upper Parts
of CANADA.*



A CORNER MAP IN EVANS AND POWNALL'S LARGE MAP.

These settlers were in the main agricultural, and gave much of their labor to the vine ; while they varied life with an occasional hunting season. They had pined under the change of flag much less than the French, nearer the Mississippi, and had in fact established family ties with the neighboring Indians, which served to bind them to the soil, and there was indeed much in their country to attract. Wharton had said of it in 1770 : "The Wabash is a beautiful river, with high and upright banks, less subject to overflow than any other river (the Ohio excepted) in this part of America. It is navigable to Ouiatanon, 412 miles, in the spring, summer, and autumn, with battoes drawing about 3 feet of water. Boats go 197 miles further to the Miami carrying place (nine miles)."

The severest wrench to the feelings of the French, whether here or along the Mississippi, came with the establishment, under orders from Gage, of a court and jury according to English usage, whither all causes were to be taken. The change from the civil law of the French, applied by judges in their own villages, was a dismal reminder of their new allegiance to a distant master.

The project of a new colony, which should seek to harmonize conflicting interests, give a stable government to the uncertain French, and protect the trading body, appealed variously to those who were lookers-on or had responsibilities. Some like Lord Clare looked to it, as he told Franklin, solely with a view to securing the country against a possible revolt of its French inhabitants. Such also was, in effect, the opinion held by Haldimand, studying the problem at Pensacola, and dreaming of the reciprocal interests of his own province and the upper Mississippi. He had urged his view upon Gage, and had expressed the belief that such a post on the Illinois could be made to sustain itself by agriculture. Shelburne fell in with the broader views which were pressed by Franklin, and so became in a way the sponsor of the project when he laid the scheme before the Board of Trade in October, 1766, who, if constant to the views which they had expressed more than once during the last twenty years, might be reasonably expected to favor the project.

It was held by the sponsor and advocates that such a colony would raise up a population to demand British manufactures ;

that by it the fur-trade could be wrested from the French and Spanish ; that its settlements would serve as a barrier against the Indians ; that the country could provision the forts ; and that it would be the means of giving a civil government to the French people now scattered there, and repining under the martial law.

Such views, however, availed nothing. The Lords of Trade in March, 1767, reported adversely on the project. They held that such a colony could but poorly answer the end for which colonies should be created. A pamphleteer of the time clearly defines the views, current not only with the Lords of Trade, but with the generally conservative, better-class English subjects.

"A colony is profitable," says this writer, "according as its land is so good, that by a part of the labor of the inhabitants bestowed on its cultivation, it yields the necessaries of life sufficient for their sustenance ; and by the rest of their labor produces staple commodities in such quantity, and of such value, as brings for the mother country, in the way of commerce and traffic, all manufactures necessary for the proper accommodation of the colonists, and for the gradual improvement of the colony, as the number of people increase." Believing in such conditions, Hillsborough, the first colonial secretary, contended that Murray's scheme of extending Quebec to the Mississippi was the only prudent measure. Indeed, in his conservative view the object of colonization being "to improve the commerce, navigation, and manufactures of England, upon which her strength and security depend," the creating of colonial power distant from the sea, and causing delay in communication, was expressly detrimental to public policy and an unwarranted charge upon the public treasury. Further there seemed, in his judgment, no occasion to annul the proclamation of 1763, in order to promote settlements which were certain in the end to make their own wares instead of buying them from the mother country. Such sweets of commercial independence, once tasted, were sure, he contended, to create a desire for political autonomy. Further, he argued, there were no people to spare for building up an effective colony, and Ireland, in particular, ought not to be depopulated in the interests of such a settlement, while the seaboard communities of America needed, as he thought, rather to be strengthened than depleted. In his counter arguments Franklin had depended, not so much

upon drawing his colonists from the border settlements, as securing them in the more distant plantations like Connecticut; and he and many others felt sure that the efforts of the ministry to keep settlements on the Atlantic slope and to increase the growth of Florida and the maritime provinces would certainly be thwarted by the climatic conditions of those regions.

To Hillsborough's plea for a restriction of manufactures, Shelburne replied that an active people cooped up by the mountains was much more likely to engage in handicrafts than if allowed to subdue a virgin soil like that beyond the Alleghanies. Wynne argued the point in his *British Empire in America* (1770). "Great Britain," he says, "a country of manufactures without materials; a trading nation without commodities to trade upon; and a maritime power without either naval stores or sufficient material for shipbuilding, could not long subsist as an independent state without her colonies." He then argues that to secure intervals for the soil to lie fallow required, for a country aiming to subsist by agriculture alone, that such laborers should have on an average forty or fifty acres of land. In fact, some of the seaboard colonies had no more than ten or twenty acres to the man. Prohibit such colonies from sending their surplus population beyond the mountain, and you force them, he said, to live in part by manufactures, and prepare the way for independence. That it is not possible to restrain a people hungry for land is indicated, he further said, in the continual disregard which had been shown to the proclamation of 1763.

No such arguments, however, prevailed, and the ministry were supported in their conservative views generally by most of the royal governors, and by prerogative men in the colonies. The opponents contended that a purely military control of such distant regions was best adapted to retain the French settlers in subjection. Amherst was urging such establishments, not only on the Mississippi, but on the Ohio and at Detroit.

Early in 1768, the movement lost force, Franklin bowing to the will of the ministry; but Lyman, who had been a strenuous advocate and impatient at the obstacles, had already intimated a willingness to proceed without the sanction of the government. More prudent council, however, followed, and the project before long took another shape.

CHAPTER IV.

THE KENTUCKY REGION.

1767-1774.

THE prohibition of settlement under the royal proclamation of 1763, after five years of mingled distrust and indifference, had been practically annulled over the greater part of Kentucky by the treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768. Washington had always under his breath called that edict "a temporary expedient to quiet the Indians. It must fall, of course," he said, "when the Indians consent to our occupying the lands." In anticipation of such consent he had, in 1767, taken into his confidence an old acquaintance, Colonel Crawford, who was now living on the Youghiogeny. It had been agreed between them that Crawford should proceed quietly beyond the Monongahela as if bound on a hunting expedition, and select and define the most desirable lands. The object of secrecy was to prevent rivalry, and while Crawford inspected and surveyed the lands, Washington was to bear the cost as well as the fees for subsequent patenting. He avowed his purpose to secure pre-emption of large areas, of compact acreage and as near Pittsburg as possible. Such a frontier service meant not a little risk, for the Indians were everywhere jealous of the encroachments of the whites. Charles Beatty, who at this time was traversing the country west of Fort Pitt, encountered the signs of devastations at all points, and even the Chippeways were known to be plundering the bateaux on the Ohio. It was one of the strongest grounds of remonstrance against the royal proclamation, that it prevented settled ways and police control over a region where the government was powerless to bar out adventurous and vagrant occupants. The House of Burgesses in Virginia were representing to the king that, if settlements were not permitted, this over-hill country would become "the resort of fugitives and vagabonds, defiers of law and order, who in

time might form a body dangerous to the peace and civil government of this colony."

The royal proclamation had been a part of the policy of the government to strengthen, by turning the current of population thither, the newly acquired provinces of Nova Scotia and the Floridas. Still the Board of Trade had not yet taken the adverse stand which it later assumed towards the trans-Alleghany movements, and though prepared to check settlements in so remote regions as the Illinois country, were not quite ready to deny the possibility of a westward extension to the seaboard colonies, if made by easy advances beyond the mountains.

The pioneers were, in fact, well on their march. We have seen how, in 1767, their movements had alarmed the Indians, and Croghan had tried to quiet the tribes in a conference at Fort Pitt in May, 1768. Gage had little confidence in the results. "When the proposed limits shall be fixed," he said, "I despair not of living long enough to hear that the frontier people have transgressed them;" and there were, he felt, difficulties ahead in the determination of the Indians not to allow settlers on the prescribed lands till they were paid for them. Johnson, while he was arranging for the gathering of the tribes at Fort Stanwix in the autumn of that year, had been fearful lest Colonel Cresap's purchasing Indian lands near the Greenbrier River, during the previous season, would disturb the tribes. But the daring hunters had gone much farther west. James Smith, now a man of thirty, who had passed his early manhood in captivity among the savages, was at this date spending eleven months in coursing the valleys of the Cherokee and Cumberland rivers, — the earliest, perhaps, except one Henry Scraggins, a hunter, to traverse this region. William Bean and his family had built a hut on a branch of the Watauga, — the first permanent habitation in the northeast corner of the modern Tennessee. Further south, James Harrod and Michael Stover had ventured to the neighborhood of the modern Nashville.

But fate was playing with a more famous name. The prominence which Daniel Boone maintains in this western story is due to his own recitals as preserved by his contemporaries. The honest habit of his talk is not completely hidden in the ambitious tone which Filson has given to Boone's language, in his early account of Kentucky. Boone's rugged, but tender

personality was hard to shroud. We see his tall and slender figure, too muscular to be gaunt. His eyes idealized his head. He was old enough at five-and-thirty for a ripened manhood to make him thoughtful. His experience had both toughened his sinews and made his senses alert. Any emergency brought



DANIEL BOONE.

him well-nigh to the normal perfection of a man. His kindness draws us to him. His audacity makes us as confident as himself. Naturally, what we know of him are glimpses at his best, but we imagine for a background the dreary monotony of the wilderness. Such a character becomes subdued to the landscape about his figure. His fringed hunting-shirt, belted so that

its ample folds carried his food, may be ragged ; his leggins may be tattered by the brush ; his moccasins cut by the ledge ; his knife clotted with the blood of a wolf ; but the rich copse and the bounding elk share our scrutiny with his person, and we look to the canopy of magnolia, laurel, and ash, to the spread of the buckeye and graceful catalpa, to the foaming stream and the limestone vagaries, — and all that the man stands for in bravery and constancy is mated with the enchantments of nature.

John Finlay, a trader from North Carolina, had before this thriddled the Cumberland Gap, and trudged on to the striking scenes on the Kentucky River. Impressed with the country, he had returned to the banks of the Yadkin, and had there imbued Boone with a desire to go thither too. The two, with some companions, started to make a new trial of the region. It was in the later spring of 1769 that Boone with James Robertson, a young Scotch-Irishman, stood on a mountain path and looked down upon the rapid flow of the Watauga, winding in its rich valley, two thousand feet above the sea. We shall see that this first sight of the vale of the Watauga was not forgotten by Robertson and Boone. Two years' further wandering beyond, amid newer delights in the landscape, carried them back to the Yadkin valley in the spring of 1771, with instant purposes and resolves.

While these tentative efforts were making by wandering hunter and trader, projects of larger scope were developing. In 1769, Dr. Lee of Virginia, with thirty-two other Americans, — Washington coöperating, — and two Londoners, were organized as the Mississippi Company, and were petitioning the crown for a grant of some back lands to the extent of two and a half million acres. Gage, who was watching the movement, advised (November 9, 1769) that the new province be put on a military basis, as a barrier between the present provinces and the Indians. Lee's application was in effect pigeon-holed by the Board of Trade, while, under other influences, a better recognition was made of a rival movement. This was a project of speculators, mostly Americans from north of the Potomac, — a combination not unlikely to incite the jealousy of the Virginians. The petitioners included among them a London banker,

Thomas Walpole by name, who was so put in the front of the negotiations that his name became attached to the scheme. Franklin and Governor Pownall were the two most conspicuous advocates from the colonies. The stock of the company was divided into seventy-two shares. Pownall intended that the government of the new colony should be modeled upon the charter of Massachusetts, whose workings he had known. The company craved permission to buy of the Indians two million four hundred thousand acres of land, situated between latitude 38° and 42°. In general terms, the tract they desired lay west of the Alleghanies and south of the Ohio, and above the boundary of North Carolina. It was bounded on the west by a line drawn from the Ohio opposite the mouth of the Scioto to Cumberland Gap. These limits covered the tract called "Indiana," which the traders had bargained for at Fort Stanwix in recompense for their losses in the Pontiac war. These sufferers now petitioned the king to be otherwise recompensed. The bounds also embraced the patent of the old Ohio Company, and it was a point of grievance with the members of this older company that the new organization should be "indebted to discoveries made at the expense of the Ohio Company." Colonel George Mercer, who was in London watching the interests of the Ohio Company, failing to receive instruction for which he had applied, finally agreed, on his own responsibility, to merge that company's interest in the new project, so that the old Virginia claimants received a thirty-sixth part of the shares in the Walpole Company. By the end of that year (1770), Colonel Mercer wrote to Washington that he had prevailed upon the new company to allow out of their intended grant two hundred thousand acres, which, under a proclamation by Governor Dinwiddie, had been granted to Washington and the soldiers who served with him in the opening campaign of the recent war.

By these measures there was gained a certain solidarity of interest, needful in negotiating with the government. An opposition to the project, not unexpected, as in the contest for the Illinois colony, was headed by the colonial minister.

Lord Hillsborough — representing under Lord North a Tory government destined to last for nearly a half century — made an adverse report to the king in council on behalf of the Commissioners of Trade and Plantations. This report enforced

what was called the "two capital objects" of the royal proclamation. These were, first, to keep the colonists within reach of the trade of the mother country, and, second, to hold them in due subjection. Any permission to settle the reserved Indian territory would be detrimental to these aims. The report was, of course, as we see it now, a failure to discern the inevitable expansion of the British people. As the contest moved on, no one in the discussion warmed with the throes of prescience more effectively than Edmund Burke. "Many of the people in the back settlements," he said, "are already little attached to particular situations. Already they have topped the Appalachians. From thence," he went on to say, with scant knowledge of the country, "they behold an immense plain, one vast, rich, level meadow." He intimated that such a population, if alienated, might turn upon the oppressor. They could elude any police in flying from section to section, if grants were denied them. Such independence, he said, "would be the hapless result of an endeavor to keep, as a lair of wild beasts, that earth which God by an express charter had given to the children of men." There happened, when he was speaking upon the point in Parliament, to be a season of want among the English communities. He used it with effect. "The scarcity which you have felt would have been a devastating famine, if this child of your old age, with a Roman charity, had not put the full breast of its youthful exuberance to the mouth of its exhausted parent." At another moment, making it the occasion for a graceful compliment to Lord Bathurst, as having a memory to cover the interval, Burke reminded the House that in 1772 the trade of England with the American colonies alone was nearly what it had been in 1704 with the entire world.

Hillsborough said that the timely supplies to which Burke referred were practically interdicted by the distance and by the tardy service of transportation over the mountains. It was asserted, in reply, that produce could be carried from the Ohio country by the river, and over the passes to tide-water at Alexandria, cheaper than it could be hauled from Northampton to London. Flour, beef, and naval stores could be floated down the Ohio to Florida and the West Indies easier than they could be taken to such markets from New York or Philadelphia; and if forwarded by river and sea to those ports from the Ohio, it

would cost but half the expense of land carriage. It was said that to go by sea from Philadelphia to Pensacola took a month, and it took no longer by the river from Pittsburg. The Ohio, said Franklin, is navigable for large boats at all times, and from January to April it can carry vessels of large tonnage. Since the war, he added, the distance by a new road from Fort Cumberland to navigable water over the mountains has been reduced from seventy to forty miles. Thus easy is it, he reasoned, to put this temperate and much-producing region into close communication with the sea, — a region that has its silkworm and the mulberry, flax and cotton, for the manufacturer, hemp and iron for naval stores, and grapes and tobacco for the solaces of life.

No such statements availed, however, to swerve Hillsborough from his position. Lord Dunmore did much to strengthen the opposition when he wrote from Virginia that any such grant would be sure to bring on an Indian war.


These were two years of uncertainty in London. It seemed at times as if the applicants would get their grant, but every period of hope was succeeded by another of disheartenment. Meanwhile on the Ohio and its tributaries events were going on which made the decision less dependent on the government. Already in 1770, settlers were moving steadily on, and there was a proposal in the air to found a colony on the lands ceded at Fort Stanwix and call it Pittsylvania. The packhorse and the shirt of jeans, buckskin leggings scraping together with lithe steps, were seen and heard everywhere along the route, whether by Fort Bedford and Loyalhannon, or by Fort Cumberland and Redstone old fort. Plunging into the shelter of the large timber of the Kanawha and its branches, startling the elk, the bear, and the wild turkey, often following the beaten "traces" of the buffalo, the pioneers opened of themselves the paths which Captain Legge had thought to have done by an organized company of axemen. Blazing a tree near a spring, they marked it with a date and the acreage, and established the tacitly recognized "Tomahawk Claim;" on clearing and planting, they established what passed under the designation of a "corn title." Sometimes adventurous parties of hunters pushed on even so far as the Green River and the mouth of the Cumberland, and wandered about the site of the modern Nashville.

The Walpole movement found little favor in Virginia. This combination of northern interests ignored the claim of Virginia to a western extension under her charter. If this expansion was not maintained, her right to give patents of this over-mountain domain was lost. Hillsborough, in July, 1770, had notified the Virginia authorities of the movement, but in their reply in October they made no protest, and acknowledged that "when that part of the country shall become sufficiently populated, it may be a wise and prudent measure." Before it became known that provision had been made to preserve Dinwiddie's grant to the soldiers of the late war, there was a strong feeling of injury in which Washington shared. Moreover, the claims of the Cherokees — who were to be appeased by the recognition, for they had been of late, as Cameron the Indian agent discovered, in a hostile mood — had been espoused by Virginia against the pretensions of the Iroquois as recognized at Fort Stanwix.

While the Walpole petition was pending in London, and before Mercer's message about the engulfing of the old Ohio Company in the new project had been received, Washington started west to take for himself a new look at the country. He left Mount Vernon on October 5, 1770, and in a little more than a week was with Crawford on the Youghiogeny. He had various motives, — one was to see land which Crawford had already selected for him, another was to understand better the difficulties of the portage connecting the Potomac and Ohio, so as to further the trade of what he called "a rising empire."

Near Redstone old fort, at the head of navigation on the Monongahela, where for some years the authorities had been trying unsuccessfully to oust the settlers, he found that Michael Cresap had built himself a house. Here he talked with that frontiersman about what he then supposed was the injury to his comrades of 1754, in their rights being covered — at least to the extent of four fifths — by the proposed Walpole grant. He looked upon himself as in some degree — so he had written in April to Lord Botetourt — "the representative of the officers and soldiers who claim the right to two hundred thousand acres of this very land." Settlements at this time had fairly

NOTE. — The opposite view of Pittsburg is from the *Atlas of Collet's Journey in North America*.



begun along the Monongahela, and two years later occupancy was in full progress, and was stretching on to Laurel Ridge. Most of the settlers were coming by the Braddock route, which Washington had followed, but a lesser number poured in by the Pennsylvania route from Bedford and Ligonier.

On October 27, 1770, Washington was at Fort Pitt, now garrisoned by two companies of Royal Irish. He found rows of traders' houses along the Monongahela side, but the most active of the packmen were evidently the Pennsylvanians, diverting the trade over the gaps toward Philadelphia, while they met the Indians in Virginia territory south of the Ohio. This, with the neglect which the petition of the Lees and himself had received, could but convince Washington that the interests which supported Forbes and Bouquet in preferring a new route over the hills, ten years and more ago, were not short-lived. These rival agencies were further kept alive by the controversy over counter claims to this over-hill country about the forks of the Ohio. Everything was favoring the prominence Pennsylvania was now acquiring among the older colonies. From 1771 to 1773, something like twenty-five thousand Presbyterian Scotch-Irish arrived at either Philadelphia or Newcastle, and they added greatly to the sturdier stock of the colony. Franklin, now in England, was considering how the prosperity of the colony could be increased by a system of canalizing her rivers.

This western contest of Pennsylvania with Virginia was an evil destined to be surmounted, but during these years when Westmoreland County was formed, it proved irritating and even dangerous. Both colonies had, after the treaty at Fort Stanwix, been issuing warrants for the same territory, while they bid against each other by alternately lowering the selling price.

Washington, leaving Pittsburg in October, 1770, went with a party down the Ohio to the Kanawha, and early in November he was examining the land about that stream. Returning to Pittsburg, he gave an entertainment at an inn in that place, and here met for the first time a nephew of George Croghan, Connolly by name, who, as a creature of Lord Dunmore, became a few years later notorious in furthering his lordship's schemes in this region in opposition to the claims of Pennsylvania. This land dispute turned upon the meaning to be given to the rather impracticable definition of Penn's charter for his

western bounds, — five degrees west of the Delaware, a stream of in-and-out reaches. It was of importance for Pennsylvania to hold the forks within her jurisdiction, which it could do if Pittsburg could be made to lie within a westward curve to match a similar bend of the Delaware. To accomplish this, it was claimed by Croghan that certain interested parties, working with Scull's map of the province, undertook to misplace the forks to accommodate that locality to some favoring curve. Such an act, if fraudulent, wronged in its consequences the new Walpole colony by depriving it of so eligible a site as the forks.

No one since Weiser's death had been so important a mediator with the Ohio tribes as Croghan. Gage was writing of him: "Croghan is generous; gives all he has, and whilst he has anything to give the Indians will flock about him." The new patentees had made it for Croghan's advantage to watch their interests at the forks. He had thought that their lands would find purchasers at £10 the hundred acres, and half-penny sterling quitrent. When he had offered some of his own lands, lying between the Monongahela and Raccoon Creek, to Washington, that vigilant speculator refused the chance because of the unsettled conditions, both as regards the controverted bounds of Virginia and Pennsylvania, and the pending Walpole grant, all of which might affect Croghan's title as derived from the Indians. Still Washington did not hesitate to add to his own rights under the Dinwiddie proclamation by buying similar claims of others, and when he died, nearly thirty years later, his will shows that he still owned various lots on the Kanawha, aggregating nearly fourteen thousand acres in four parcels, beside a fine area above the modern Charleston, which he and Andrew Lewis had secured after being attracted by a bituminous spring upon it.

When it was known that the Dinwiddie grant was preserved, Washington, who had returned to Mount Vernon by the first of December, 1770, sent Captain William Crawford in the following May to mark out its bounds. Washington's journey had convinced him that the wagon road then in use, extending about two hundred miles from where it left the Monongahela to Alexandria, could be shortened to sixty and perhaps to twenty miles, if the Potomac could be made navigable by some system



curves corresponding to those of the Delaware River.

At the same time Washington represented that a report of the ultimate success of the Walpole petitioners was gaining ground notwithstanding the opposition of the Board of Trade. The advocates had carried the question to the king in council, and on July 1, 1772, Franklin read before that body his masterly answer to Hillsborough's objections. Franklin's statement was an emphatic denial of the Virginian claim to a western extension, for he held that the Alleghanies bounded the province, while the rights of all the colonies were derived from the Iroquois cession of lands, which they had obtained by conquest from the Shawnees.

He was in due time answered by George Mason, in behalf of the Virginians. The Iroquois argument had been often used against the French, and it indicated how the policy of the ministry had changed since the war, that it was now necessary to use this reasoning against the government's position.

Treaties with the southern Indians, held at Hardlabor in 1768, and again at Lochaber, in South Carolina, October 18, had acknowledged that the Cherokees' right to this region towards the Kanawha was superior to that of the Iroquois, but

that tribe got no recognition from Franklin, and a large emigration had already begun to flow west, looking to the security which the treaty of Fort Stanwix gave them. Franklin said that he relied, to keep up this western exodus, "on the voluntary superflux of the inhabitants of the middle provinces."

The brothers Zane had built their cabin at the mouth of Wheeling Creek, the first white man's habitation, perhaps, in that section of the wilderness. Franklin reckoned that not less than five thousand families, averaging six heads each, unable to meet the demands of the large landowners east of the mountains, had before this sought lands on the Ohio. This computation did not include several thousand families which had passed the gaps, but had tarried within the proposed limits of Pennsylvania.

Among these last, in 1769, had been Zeisberger and his Moravians, but in 1772, to escape the troubles of Pennsylvania with the Susquehanna Company, they had pushed up the west branch of the Susquehanna in search of a new home. We have Bishop Ettwein's journal of their flight. Having worshiped for the last time in their old church, on June 11, 1772, they began their wearisome march. On July 18, they were climbing a precipitous mountain "to a spring, the headwaters of the Ohio." "Here," says the bishop, "I lifted up my heart in prayer as I looked westward." The band was probably now on the north branch of the Mahoning, an affluent of the Alleghany. They floated down the stream to Beaver Creek, and in August they had laid the foundations of a white settlement in Ohio, on the "second bottom" of the Tuscarawas valley (Muskingum), amid its walnuts and sycamores, its cedars, locusts, and laurels.

Such was the varied complexion of the emigration which Burke had perceived that it was impossible to withdraw, and against which Gage's proclamation was to be so fruitlessly directed. Instead of threats, these people needed protection and the service of a stable government. This population, as Franklin argued, was now become, in part at least, "so ungoverned and lawless" that nothing but some sort of subjection to the forms of government could prevent an Indian war. There was a tendency, in all considerations of the government about America, to delay, but Franklin's urgency and arguments at last

prevailed, and on August 14, 1771, the king, in council, approved the Walpole grant. The immediate result was that Hillsborough, who in the beginning was desirous of pushing the advocates to larger demands than they thought prudent, and apparently with a purpose in this way to compass their ultimate discomfiture, now resigned in disgust. After this, Franklin's reply, having accomplished its purpose, disappeared from the book-stalls. The effect in America was only the beginning of new delays. A message was at once sent to Sir William Johnson, who instructed Croghan to cause "the different nations and tribes to be made acquainted that it was His Majesty's pleasure to form a new colony or settlement in Ohio."

This movement had been sedulously watched in Virginia, not only by those who sought the cover of a Virginia patent to these same lands, but there is some reason to believe it had been observed by Dunmore in no friendly spirit to the claims of the soldiers. In the spring of 1773, Dunmore and Washington had planned a journey beyond the mountains, but the governor went finally alone. In an interview which he had with Crawford, the governor promised to issue to Washington a patent for lands at the mouth of the Kanawha, "in case the new government did not take place before he got home." Washington, meanwhile, had found much discouragement in all his Ohio plans. Crawford was obliged to inform him that he had to work hard to keep squatters off the property which had been surveyed for him, and that nothing but hiring men constantly to occupy a claim was sufficient to prevent intruders building houses upon it.

We find Washington accordingly prompted to turn to other claims, which the proclamation of 1763 had reserved for the participants in the war, and he thought for a while of the possibilities of patenting lands in Florida, amid those "scorching and unwholesome heats" of which Franklin had of late been writing.

Meanwhile, the new Company of the Ohio was nurturing larger views, and on May 6, 1773, the king in council extended the bounds of the projected government, now spoken of as Vandalia, to the line of the Kentucky River. Already the brothers McAfee were preparing to take squatters' rights along this stream, near where Frankfort now stands, whither the

traces of the buffalo had led them, through the uninhabited limestone region. Not far from the same time, Captain William Thompson, an agent for the war claimants in Pennsylvania, had sent a party along the Kentucky, and these had reported that the lands were the finest they had ever seen, and likely soon "to sell at twenty-five shillings an acre."

The attractive aspect of this country was now well understood, adorned as it was with broad-leaved trees without underbrush, with ripening grass beneath the shade showing blue to the distant eye, with the earth teeming from a fertility that was constantly nurtured by the decay of the underlying rock, and with occasional broad stretches, where the trees had been burned and vast herds of buffalo roamed.

This extension of the grant had rendered the mouth of the Kanawha more central than before, and strengthened the opinion which Washington had held, that it was the natural seat for the new government. Towards the middle of May, it became common talk in Pittsburg that Dunmore had granted patents for the two hundred thousand acres due to Washington and his comrades in the neighborhood of the Kanawha, and Croghan wrote to Wharton about it and said, "It is creating great confusion on the frontier, both among the whites and the Indians." The tribes had been taught to look upon the projected colony as an alternative which could be turned to their advantage in the recompense they expected for their lands. The Shawnees, in particular, were aroused, and considered the Virginia claims inimical. Frontiersmen so experienced as Dr. Walker were advocating an escape from conflict with the Cherokees by turning their thoughts to western Florida. This large grant of the soldiers, already recognized, as we have seen, by the Walpole Company, produced new difficulties by its very extent. With an eye to improvements, Washington sought to have it surveyed so as to include as much tillable ground as possible. He soon discovered from the reports which he received that he must secure it in at least twenty different localities, unless he was content to include contiguously large unproductive mountain areas. It is not easy from Washington's letters always to distinguish which of these western lands he had patented as a private venture from his claims either under the Dinwiddie or the later royal proclamation. By July, 1773,

he had certainly got such hold of more than twenty thousand acres of these Ohio valley lands as to warrant an advertisement of them in the *Maryland Journal*. These lands were among the first surveyed, and he describes them as "by the beautiful hand of nature almost fit for the scythe." To render them more attractive to settlers, he represents that in due time the land carriage to them by the Monongahela route would be reduced to a few miles.

Just what these lands were is not clear, but it is apparent that Washington had secured the favor of the royal governor, and was willing to profit by it to the exclusion of his war-time comrades, if his caution to Crawford to be discreet in speaking of the patents will bear that inference. Dunmore had said (September 24) that he did not intend to make any grants on the Ohio under the proclamation of 1763, but at the same time Washington believed the contrary, and that these grants were to be made below the Scioto, on the supposition entertained at that time that the meridian of the Scioto was to be the western limit of Vandalia.

A certain Captain Thomas Bullitt, in company with one Hancock Taylor, was at this time moving down the Kanawha and the Ohio, locating prospective towns on a grant of over a thousand acres, awarded under the Dinwiddie proclamation, one of which included the present Charleston on the Kanawha. Bullitt was invested by the College of William and Mary, one of its prerogatives, with the authority to approve surveys, and had thus become conspicuous in these western movements, though there were complaints that when wanted, to give such approval, he was not always to be found. He was, as it seems, moving on about his own business, and as the summer wore on, Taylor and he had separated at the mouth of the Kentucky, and while Taylor went up that stream, making survey about the modern Frankfort, Bullitt went on to the rapids of the Ohio, and laid out the plot for a settlement where Louisville now stands, the first regular town mapping in Kentucky. The spot was not occupied till two years later, though, on a lot above the falls, John Cowan had built a log house in 1774.

Washington had instructed this same Bullitt in September, 1773, to survey for him a tract of ten thousand acres, as far below the Scioto as it may be necessary to go to get good

bottom-lands in one, two, or three lots. He had already bought out the rights of Captain Stobo and Lieutenant Van Braam, other soldiers of the recent war, which, added to his own claim for five thousand acres, made up the ten thousand held by him under the Dinwiddie proclamation. But the destiny of this Ohio country turned, it was thought, upon the future of the Walpole movement, and the delays in organizing the government of the colony on the spot — Dartmouth seems on May 17, 1773, to have offered Major Legge the governorship of some new colony on the Ohio, with a salary of £1,000 — were greatly embarrassing to Croghan, who at Pittsburg was acting, as we have seen, as its agent.

Haldimand had arrived in New York in July, 1773, to succeed Gage in the chief command in North America. He was early made aware of the stream of settlers passing down the Ohio to the lower parts of that river, and Croghan had reported how Bullitt and others were "going down the river with numbers of people to settle the country, which, they were informed by the king's message, was not to be settled." General Bradstreet had not long before bargained with the Indians for a tract of three hundred thousand acres, but the Board of Trade had refused confirmation of an act "which cannot be reconciled with the spirit and intent of the king's instructions." Haldimand urged Sir William Johnson to take steps to stop such infringements of the royal proclamation, but that Indian agent felt himself powerless, with no government on the river to enforce the prohibition. This lawless influx had begun here and there, as in Bradstreet's case, in private purchases from the Indians. Such clouded titles led Chief Justice Marshall, at a later day, when the United States succeeded to the royal rights, to invalidate claims well earned by the hardships of pioneers.

By December, 1773, Croghan is representing "the emigration as surprising. I am told [he says] that there can't be less than sixty thousand souls settled between Pittsburg and the mouth of the Ohio, — so that the policy of the people in England in delaying the grant of the new colony, in order to prevent emigration, answers not their purpose, as it does not prevent the settling of the country."

The delays further produced much discontent among the

Indians, eager to profit by the settlement. Croghan says that these anxious savages flocked by hundreds to Pittsburg, expecting food and gratuities. The leaders of the colony had promised their agent what was needed for this hospitable purpose, but they forgot their pledge, and Croghan complains that the Indians were "eating up what he had gathered for the winter's use of his family." To give the presents which were necessary, he says, he was forced "to pawn what little plate he had and some other valuable things."

While the company held back and left its agent in this unseemly plight, private enterprise revived with the spring (1774). During the winter Washington had been considering a plan of bringing over two or three hundred Palatines to Alexandria, and passing them over the mountains to settle his lands. He sought information as to the best measures to that end, hoping to "give up indentures and make them freemen and tenants" as soon as they could raise a crop of corn. He proposed to remit their rent for four years if they took uncleared land, and for two years if there was a house on it and five acres cleared. His inquiries did not encourage him. The Palatines preferred Pennsylvania with greater religious liberty, and did not look kindly upon the Episcopal tithes to be encountered under Virginia rule. The restrictive navigation laws were also in the way, for these people were to be shipped from Holland, and outward cargoes for payment must incur charges in England by transshipment there. This led Robert Adam to suggest that Washington might find it less burdensome to get Scotch or Irish, or even convicts and indentured servants might be more handily found in Baltimore. By spring the obstacles seemed no less, and on May 1 we find the scheme laid aside. Washington had reckoned that he had land enough for three hundred families; but the outcome of all his plans was that two small parties of servants and hired men went over the mountains, and were soon scattered.

In April, John Floyd led a surveying party down the Kanawha, and did some surveying for Washington and Patrick Henry. Simon Kenton and a party were strolling near the lower Blue Licks. Both parties, however, soon discovered indications of the rising Indian war. During the early summer

(1774), James Harrod and a party of forty laid out in central Kentucky the town of Harrodsburg, not the earliest settlement of the future State, but the first to have in it, perhaps, the elements of perpetuity, with all the initial flourish of a tomahawk claim and a patch of corn.

The year wore out, and nothing was done to relieve the anxiety either of Croghan or the soldiers. The king turned a deaf ear to the urgency for dispatching a governor to the new colony; and Dunmore dallied, as Washington alleges, for "other causes" than procrastination in considering the soldiers' grants. Political events strained the relations of the mother country and the colonies, and in April, 1775, the first gun at Lexington in Massachusetts pushed all into the limbo of forgotten things. While the news of the conflict near Boston was still fresh in London, Walpole did not despair (May 30) of those "better times on which the country now depends for its preservation."

CHAPTER V.

THE QUEBEC BILL AND THE DUNMORE WAR.

1774.

IN 1774, there came for the first time a sharp conflict between Virginia and the home government as to jurisdiction over the territory north of the Ohio. The interpretation which Virginia had always given to the very obscure definition of her bounds in the charter of 1609 had been long denied by France, and when that contested region was wrested from France, the peace of 1763 had limited its western extension by the Mississippi. The royal proclamation, which soon followed, had prevented the pushing of the settlements thither, but had not given it over absolutely to other jurisdiction. Ten years or more later, while Virginia was waging war against the savages thereabouts, to enforce her claim and protect her settled frontiers, the British Parliament strove to put a limit to her territorial pretensions in this direction by giving the Quebec government an absolute jurisdiction over the region. There were other purposes, both ostensible and latent, in this legislative movement, which were entered upon to curb not only Virginia, but the other seaboard colonies, in an inevitable westward march.

Ever since Carleton had been in command in Quebec, he had felt the necessity of yielding something more to the French Canadians than had been allowed by the capitulation at Montreal in 1760, and by the acts of 1763. He contended that a further concession could alone make them good British subjects, and that a guarded revival of French law, customs, and religion, while placating one hundred and fifty thousand Catholics of the province, — as Carleton counted them, though his estimate is probably much too large, — would not seriously impair the fortunes of four hundred Protestants, their fellow-subjects. In 1770, Carleton had gone to England, leaving in his place Cramahé, a Swiss Protestant in the English service.

During the four years of his absence, Carleton was in occasional consultation with the ministry about what seemed to him some needed transformation of the government of the province. This consideration was at times affected, and perhaps shaped, by petitions of the Canadians, not largely signed, and forwarded by Cramahé. They touched the restoration of the French laws and a rehabilitation of the Catholic religion.

While such questions were in abeyance, the revolutionary commotions in Boston did not fail to render of doubtful continuance the loyalty of the seaboard colonies, now numbering probably, according to the most careful estimates, considerably under three millions of people. If such disaffection could not be stamped out, it became a question of restraining it by territorial bounds, and covertly if not openly. This danger had already delayed the entire fulfillment of the Vandalia project south of the Ohio. It was known that there was a tide of immigration rolling along the Ohio, and, in spite of the agreement at Fort Stanwix, threatening its northern banks. It was necessary, then, to find some barrier to check the current, lest it should buoy up and carry along the seething commotions of the seaboard. No such barrier was so obvious as that which the French had attempted to maintain in the recent war, — the line of the St. Lawrence and the Alleghanies. To make this barrier effective, it was necessary to consolidate, as far as possible, the region behind it in a single government. Murray and his successor, Carleton, had already urged an extension of their executive authority from Quebec westward, and the opportune time had come for doing it, under an ostensible plea of regulating the fur trade of the region. If the traders were gratified by such professions, the debates and remonstrances show that the proposed reinstatement of the Roman Church and the suppression of English law drew out fervent opposition; and there is, moreover, no evidence that the Canadians themselves, as a population, felt any elation over the prospect. This may have been due in some part to a latent sympathy among them with the revolutionary classes of the older colonies, — a sympathy with which Congress, as it turned out, blundered in an attempt to deal.

A new petition from Canada, dated February, 1774, and signed by only sixty-five persons, asked for a restoration of the

"old bounds of Canada," over which the English and French had so long disputed, and the ministry in granting it were ensnared into the somewhat ridiculous acknowledgment of what they had formerly denied. To restore such limits, however, would please the Canadians and some fur traders, and became a good cloak for ulterior purposes respecting the seaboard colonies.

The jealousy of New York was aroused, and for a while it was uncertain if the western part of that province would not be sacrificed to the ministerial purpose. New York owed it to Edmund Burke that this territory was saved to its jurisdiction.

Immediate opposition naturally came from the Petms, whose proprietary rights would be curtailed, and from Virginia, whose royal governor, interested with many of her people in land schemes in the Illinois country, was already preparing for an invasion of the territory. The movement for a colony north of the Ohio, over which Franklin and Hillsborough had contended, had come to naught, much to the relief of Virginia; but here was a project seeking the active sanction of Parliament, and likely to thwart any purpose which her royal governor might have of issuing patents to this very land.

Dunmore, the governor, was a man not easily balked. He had already taken possession of Fort Pitt despite the protests of Penn, and was determined to hold it as a gate to the over-river country of Virginia. This precipitate conduct had alarmed Haldimand, the military head of the continent, lest the distractions of this intercolonial land-dispute should embolden the savages to take an advantage. Both sides arrested settlers engaged in vindicating their respective colonies, and the trouble had become so alarming in the spring of 1774 that surveyors of both sides were rushing to the contested region, and plotting their claims.

This dispute, serious enough in itself, was embittered by the craft of Connolly, the creature of Dunmore, and complicated beside by the diversity of individual claims, whether based on Indian deeds or tomahawk titles, or on the assertion of might against right. The spring of 1774 led to renewed negotiations between the colonies in the midst of mutual criminations. Penn offered the calculations of Provost Smith of the college at Philadelphia and of Dr. Rittenhouse, that Pittsburg was


at least six miles within the bounds which he claimed, and in May, James Tilghman and Andrew Allen, commissioners sent by Penn to Williamsburg, offered as a compromise a curved line for the western boundary, parallel to the tortuous course of the Delaware. Dunmore insisted that the five degrees of longitude should be measured on the 42° parallel, and that a meridian boundary line should be run at the western end of this measurement. Neither side would yield, and Dunmore continued to issue patents covering the controverted area.

The Indians, observing this antagonism, and disappointed that the delay in the organization of the Vandalia colony had deprived them of purchase money for their lands, and fearing to lose them through occupation by rival claimants, grew troublesome along the frontier. One Walter Kelly had hutted his family on a creek up the Kanawha, eighty miles from a stockade of the Greenbrier Company, which was the nearest support. Warnings, which were bringing nearly all the remoter settlers under cover, were neglected, and Kelly's little home was devastated by ruthless Shawnees. But such was the fearlessness of the frontier that two brothers, Morris by name, soon occupied the same spot, and planted a family stock, where it flourishes to-day.

This baleful condition of the border was not altogether unwelcome to Dunmore. It gave the color of necessity to a proclamation (April 25, 1774) ordering the militia to be in readiness. By this force he might intimidate Pennsylvania, punish the Indians, and maintain the sovereignty of Virginia beyond the Ohio.

A few score men, land-grabbers and adventurers, had already assembled at the mouth of the Kanawha, and a hunting party sent out by them had been attacked by wandering Shawnees. As the spring wore on, these bold fellows at the Kanawha, animated by a desire for revenge, resolved on a sudden onset upon the Indian towns on the Scioto, in the disputed territory. They sought a famous frontiersman, Michael Cresap, and made him their leader. He had only recently moved to the upper Ohio from the frontier of Maryland. There was also in their number a young and daring spirit, George Rogers Clark, who

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page, based on information afforded by General Richard Butler, is taken from Crèvecoeur's *Lettres d'un Cultivateur*, vol. iii., Paris, 1783.



had been brought thither to look after a grant which he had obtained at Fish Creek. This body of borderers, with its impromptu organization, was further recruited at the site of the modern Wheeling by additional hotheads, with whom it mattered little whether the stories of murders, which were increasing, were of whites by savages, or of the Indian by the frontiersman, — and there was no dearth of either kind of tale. Ebenezer Zane, the principal settler of this spot, had made here a tomahawk claim in 1769, where he was joined the next year by his brothers, Jonathan and Silas. There was at this date (1774) a number of log houses clustering about those of the Zanes.

The hotheads were counseled to be prudent by the leader of this settlement, and Cresap seemed inclined to be cautious, but the trepidation was too widespread for perfect restraint. One observer tells us that in a single day a thousand bewildered settlers crossed over the Monongahela towards the east, and the whole country was finally stripped of inhabitants, except they were "forted."

The war, if it came, was sure to have one advantage for the whites, and that was the single and unhampered purpose of Virginia to maintain her own, and this she was prepared to do without the aid of her neighbors.

Sir William Johnson, in New York, was doing his best to hold back the Iroquois, but that part of these confederates which had advanced into the modern State of Ohio could not be restrained from making common cause with the Delawares and Shawnees.

Logan was one of these migrated Iroquois, and it was his fate to become the pivot of events. He had been bred at Shamokin, and had long been known as a friend of the English. A small camp of his family and followers, on the north side of the Ohio, crossing the river to get rum, was set upon and killed by some lawless whites. Indian runners spread the news of the massacre, and Logan was soon, with such a band as he could gather, spreading devastation along the Monongahela and Holston, — and Dunmore's war was begun.

The country north of the Ohio, where Dunmore expected to operate, was designated in the Parliamentary bill, now near its passage, as "heretofore a part of the territory of Canada."

This phrase struck sharply at the pride of Dunning and others, jealous of English honor, and Lord North at one time proposed to leave the words out. It was urged by the opposition that under such an acknowledgment, if the time should ever come for France to regain Canada in a diplomatic balance, she could fairly contend for this conceded limit. While this apprehension strengthened the opponents of the bill in England, the news of its progress through Parliament brought other fears to land speculators in Virginia. Some travelers and adventurers in the summer of 1773 had, under the lead of one William Murray, formed a company at Kaskaskia which became known as the Illinois Land Company, and with these the governor and various gentlemen of tide-water Virginia were associated. They had bargained with the Indians for large tracts of land, bounded by the Wabash, the Mississippi, and the Illinois, and the deed had been passed. Was their purchase now imperiled by this bill? What was to be the effect of the measure upon the French traders and denizens of that country, and upon their relations to the Indians?

The French on the Wabash and beyond, occupying lands which the royal proclamation of 1763 had pledged to the Indians, had been for ten years a source of perplexity to the commanding general in New York. In September, 1771, Gage had reported that the tribes thereabouts were constantly imperiling the English traders, and "it is natural to suspect," he says, "that the French instigate the Indians against us to keep the trade to themselves." He then intimates that it may become necessary to dislodge the French at Vincennes. Early in March, Gage received royal orders to warn the French at that place to remove immediately, and it is for us, he adds, "to let the neighboring Indians know that we shall have traders among them to take the place of the French." In April, 1772, Gage issued a proclamation of his intent to remove all settlers from that country, English as well as French. They were given time to withdraw voluntarily. The warning was a cruel one to the French, who had enjoyed unquestioned homestead titles for seventy years. When their protests were sent to New York, Gage dallied in his decision. This gave time for the resignation of Hillsborough, forced by Franklin, to throw the control of the question into the tenderer hands of Lord Dart-

mouth, and the poor French were respited. They went on, pursuing their avocations, hunting and trading, and Patrick Kennedy, who was at this time exploring the Illinois, reports meeting them on its banks. It seems clear that the routes from Detroit, the home of the congeners of these Illinois French, were constantly traversed by these people, either by the Maumee or the Illinois River, — a journey in either case of near nine hundred miles to the Mississippi, often the depot for their furs. Haldimand, in succeeding Gage, opened communication with their western aliens. He had advised Gage that it would be difficult to controvert their land titles. Now under Dartmouth's orders he had cautioned the English commander at Fort Gage to be conciliatory towards them. A little later, Haldimand was endeavoring to get more direct information of their condition. He was instructing Lieutenant Hutchins to leave Pensacola and take the route north by the Mississippi, so as to bring him reports. Later still, he sent Lieutenant Hall to placate the Indians and prepare the French settlers for the stabler rule of the new bill. Gage, in London, was not less anxiously consulting with North and Dartmouth, and conferring with Carleton about its provisions. Haldimand was meanwhile constantly reporting new disorders on the Ohio, with a suspicion of French intrigue behind the savage irruptions, and there was need of haste in applying the assuaging effects of the bill. But its opponents were questioning the scheme because they thought it hopeless and unpatriotic to check an inevitable westward progress. Haldimand understood the real purpose of its promoters, when he said that the bill was aimed at preventing the Americans getting possession of the continent. Lord Lyttelton recognized the fact that to confine the Americans by such a barrier was to thwart their contest for empire. Wedderburn said distinctly that it was one object of the bill to prevent the English settling in that country, and that the new barrier would allow "little temptation" to send settlers north from the Vandalia grant.

It was not only this territorial expansion of Quebec, but the concessions which the bill made to French Catholics, greater than any English Romanist could dare expect, and the grant of French law in British territory, which increased the steady aversion to it of English merchants, and which aroused the lord

mayor and magistrates of London, because they supposed it imperiled British honor. For the seaboard colonists to enter that territory and find French law instead of English law, and to encounter an established Catholic religion, was not likely to strengthen the loyalty whose decadence the ministry was deploring in the older colonies. "Does not your blood run cold," said Hamilton, "to think that an English Parliament could pass an act for the establishment of arbitrary power and popery in such an extensive country?" However politic the modern historian may think this rehabilitating of French customs to have been for the vastly preponderating French element north of the St. Lawrence, to include the Ohio country in such provisions is not approved even by such defenders of the ministerial policy as Kingsford, the latest historian of Canada. There is indeed little to support the charges that the bill was but the first step in reducing "the ancient, free, Protestant colonies to the same state of slavery," by setting up "an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule in these colonies." These were phrases used by Congress in an address to the people of Great Britain a few months later (October 21, 1774), and still more solemnly in the Declaration of Independence. They were simply loose sentences used for political ends. The Parliamentary opposition, which was dignified by the support of Chatham and Burke, never ventured to think of any such effect on the Atlantic side of the Alleghanies from these untoward provisions, whatever the bravado utterances of Thurlow may have indicated. "I do not choose," said Burke at one time, "to break the American spirit, because it is the spirit that has made the country."

The bill was introduced on May 2, 1774, into the House of Lords, weary with the long sessions which the discussion of the Massachusetts coercive acts had caused. It went to the Commons, and passed that body on June 13, while Logan was rendering an Indian war in the designated region inevitable, and was sent back with amendments to the Lords. In this body, by a vote of fifty to twenty in a house that seated five hundred and fifty-eight members, and after the season was so far advanced that many peers had gone to their estates, it was passed on June 18, and four days later was approved by the king. In this way the government stultified itself.

Before the news could reach Virginia, but while the prospect seemed certain that such a bill would become law, Dunmore, on July 12, instructed Andrew Lewis to descend the Kanawha with a force and cross the Ohio into the Shawnee country. Meanwhile, Major Angus McDonald passed the mountains with a body of militia, and, moving down the Ohio to the modern Wheeling, he found himself in command of about seven hundred sturdy fighters. Here, with the aid of the Zanes and following plans suggested by George Rogers Clark, he built Fort Fincastle, later known as Fort Henry. Towards the end of July, he dropped down the river to Fish Creek, whence he made a dash upon the Shawnee villages on the Muskingum, — creating the first success of the war.

Dunmore himself had left Williamsburg on July 10, and by the last of September he was at the head of about thirteen hundred men at Fort Fincastle. He kept out some experienced scouts, Clark, Cresap, Simon Kenton, and Simon Girty among the number. He sent Crawford forward to build Fort Gower at the mouth of the Hockhocking.

The Indian agents, Johnson and his deputy, Croghan, — who was now living on the Alleghany just above the forks, — watched this war of Virginia and the Shawnees with solicitude. Sir William got his tidings of it through the Iroquois, and they associated all the barbarity of the whites with the name of Cresap. Logan certainly agreed, as his famous speech shows. Rev. William Gordon had some time before transmitted to Dartmouth what purported to be a letter addressed by the French king to the Six Nations. In this they were told to keep up their courage, and they would, as they found opportunity, enter Canada with eighty ships, while “an equal number entered the Mississippi to the aid of his southern children.” The English were well aware of the uncertainties of a general savage uprising, with France on the watch. “There is too great a spirit in the frontier people for killing Indians,” said Croghan, “and if the assembly gives in to that spirit, instead of securing the friendship of the Six Nations and the Delawares by negotiation, no doubt they will soon have a general rupture.” He adds that the Six Nations have tried to prevent the war with the Shawnees. With such an Iroquois as Logan aroused, there was little chance of peace.

The real stroke of the war came on the very site of the contemplated capital of Vandalia, in the angle formed by the junction of the Kanawha with the Ohio, — Point Pleasant, as it was called. The conflict here was the most hotly contested fight which the Indians ever made against the English, and it is all the more remarkable as it was the first considerable battle which they had fought without the aid of the French. Lewis, on arriving at the spot, learned from Dunmore's messages, which the governor's scouts had hidden near by, that the governor with his forces would be on the Ohio at a point higher up, where Lewis was instructed to join him. The next day new orders came, by which it appeared that Dunmore intended to turn up the Hockhocking River, and that Lewis was expected to cross the Ohio and join him in the Indian country. When Lewis was thus advised, his rear column had not come up, and his trains and cattle were still struggling in the wilderness. The force which he had with him at Point Pleasant was a motley one, but for forest service a notable body, and not a frontier settlement but had contributed to it. There were in it Shelby, Christian, Robertson, and Morgan, — heroic names in these western wilds.

While Lewis was making ready to obey orders, a squad of men, out hunting, discovered that a horde of Indians was upon them. Cornstalk, a Shawnee chief, had divined Dunmore's plan, and, with a strategic skill unusual with Indians, had crossed the Ohio for the purpose of beating his adversary in detail. The opposing armies were much alike in numbers, say eleven hundred each, — perhaps more, — and in forest wiles the difference was hardly greater. Cornstalk soon developed his plan of crowding the whites toward the point of the peninsula. Lewis pushed forward enough men to retard this onset, while he threw up a line of defense, behind which he could retire if necessary. He sent, by a concealed movement, another force along the banks of the Ohio, which gained the Indians' flank, and by an enfilading fire forced the savage line back. In the night, Cornstalk, thus worsted, recrossed the Ohio.

Meanwhile, Dunmore, ascending the Hockhocking, marched towards the Scioto, making some ravages as he went. Cornstalk, after his defeat, had hurriedly joined the tribes opposing Dunmore, but he found them so disheartened by his own dis-

comfiture that he soon led a deputation to Dunmore's camp and proposed a peace. The governor, hearing of Lewis's approach, and not feeling the need of his aid in the negotiations, and fearing that the elation of the victorious borderers might disquiet the now complacent tribes, sent messages to Lewis that he should withdraw, which Lewis reluctantly did. A treaty followed. All prisoners were to be given up; all stolen horses returned. No white man was to be molested on the Ohio, and no Indians were to pass to its southern bank. It was also agreed — in mockery, as the tribes must have felt — that no white man should cross to the north. Four chieftains were given to the whites as hostages.

Logan kept aloof, and was sullen. He was a fighter and not a councilor, he said; but he sent in the speech to which reference has been made, an eloquent burst of proud disdain, if we can trust the report of it. His string of scalps had satisfied his revenge.

There were acts on Dunmore's part, such as his failure to succor Lewis, and his refusal to let him share in the treaty, which, when his conduct and that of his minion, Connolly, were later known in his eagerness to quell the patriotic uprising in tide-water Virginia, led many to suspect him of treachery in the negotiation with the Indians, and of a purpose to secure them to the royal side in the impending revolutionary struggle. There is no evidence that, at the time, this distrust prevailed. As late as March, 1775, the Virginia Assembly thanked him for his success. Yet it is true that he had, before he entered upon his campaign, dissolved the Virginia Assembly in May, 1774, in disapproval of their votes of sympathy for oppressed Boston.

Dunmore had, indeed, obtained all he hoped for by bringing peace, in reëstablishing a new hold for Virginia upon the territory, which, as he later learned, was on the first of the following May to pass, by action of Parliament, under a new jurisdiction. The grasp which Virginia had now taken had cost her £150,000, but it was to be of great importance in the coming struggle with the king, for she had administered a defeat to the Indians, which was for some time to paralyze their power in that region. It was a grasp that Virginia was not to relax till she ceded her rights in this territory to the nascent union when the revolt of the colonies was ended, — a hold that

before long she was to strengthen through the wisdom and hardihood shown in her capture of Vincennes.

Before the battle of Point Pleasant had decided the fate of the Indians, the passage of the bill, which in early summer had created so little attention in Parliament, was met in London by "a prodigious cry" in September,—a clamor that William Lee, then in England, did his best to increase by "keeping a continual fire in the papers." The bill was not to go into effect till the spring of 1775, and Carleton having returned to Canada, Dartmouth, in January, sent him instructions about putting it in force. The minister's letters must have crossed others from the governor, informing him of the opposition to the bill even among the French people of the province, and of the measures which the revolting colonies were taking to gain the Canadians to their cause. In Montreal the bust of the king had been defaced.

Already in the previous September, Congress had reëchoed the "prodigious cry" of London, and had declared the re-establishment of the Catholic religion in Quebec to be "dangerous in an extreme degree;" but this mistake in language was discovered, and John Dickinson drafted for that body a conciliatory address to the Canadians, which, in March, 1775, Carleton informed Dartmouth the disaffected on the St. Lawrence were printing and distributing in a translation. Within a year the lesson of prudence had been forgotten, and singularly enough while Congress (February, 1776) was appointing a commission, with one Catholic member (Charles Carroll) and a Catholic attendant, to proceed to Montreal, the ardent Huguenot blood of John Jay had colored an address of Congress to English sympathizers by characterizing the Catholic faith "as a religion fraught with sanguinary and impious tenets." It was only necessary for the loyal Canadians to translate and circulate Jay's imprudent rhetoric to make the efforts of the commissioners futile. Congress again grew wiser when it framed the Declaration of Independence, and Dr. Shea has pointed out that the allusion to the Quebec Bill in that document is "so obscure that few now understand it, and on the point of religion it is silent."

Congress thus failed to undo the Quebec Act by gaining the

people it was intended to shield; and it was left for Virginia, under a pressure instigated by Maryland, to do what she could to make the territory, of which Parliament would have deprived her, the nucleus of a new empire beyond the mountains.

England stubbornly adhered to her efforts to maintain the act north of the Ohio, as long as the war lasted. Before the actual outbreak, Franklin, in his informal negotiations in London, had told the ministry that there could be no relief from the dangers of "an arbitrary government on the back of the settlements" but in a repeal of the Quebec Act. He claimed it to be the right of the Americans to hold the lands which the colonists had acquired from the French, while at the same time it was their duty to defend them and set up new settlements upon them. Dunmore was naturally of another mind, and we know that after his treaty was made he schemed with the Delawares and the ministry to get a royal confirmation to that tribe of the country north of the Ohio and east of the Hockhocking, as a ready means to bar out the Virginians.

CHAPTER VI.

SOUTH OF THE OHIO.

1769-1776.

Numerous rivulets, springing along the Blue Ridge in North Carolina, and broadening as they leap down the slopes, ultimately gather and flow towards the sea in two principal streams, — the Yadkin and the Catawba. There was a Scotch-Irish stock in this mountainous region, which was proving difficult for Governor Tryon, the royalist executive of that province, to manage. This recalcitrant spirit of independence found an attractive seclusion in the free wilderness life which returned hunter and adventurer pictured beyond the mountains. One of these restless spirits dwelling on the Yadkin has already been presented to us in Daniel Boone.

In the valley interposing between the Blue Ridge and Iron Mountain, — the present western boundary of North Carolina, — a network of small streams unite and flow north to the Kanawha and Ohio. Other spraying threads of glistening life, drawing into a single channel, break through the Iron Mountain, when, increased by various tributaries, it becomes known as the Watauga, an affluent of the Holston, one of the chief branches of the Tennessee. To the valley of this stream, lying in what is now the northeast corner of the State of Tennessee, Daniel Boone had come, as we have seen, in 1769. There was soon after planted across the Indian war-path which this valley afforded — up and down which the northern and southern Indians had for years followed one another — the first permanent settlement beyond the mountains south of the Virginia grants. William Bean had built himself a cabin here, and his son was the first white child born in Tennessee. The communications of the region were easiest from Virginia and down the tributaries of the Kanawha.

On October 18, 1770, a treaty of Virginia with the Chero-

kees, made at Lochaber, in South Carolina, had extended the bounds of the Old Dominion so far westerly as to correspond in the main with the present eastern line of Kentucky. Virginia thus secured from the Cherokees, in the very year in which their famous Sequoyah, the subsequent inventor of their alphabet, was born, their rights to much the same territory which had been ceded by the Iroquois at Fort Stanwix in 1768. If the southern bounds of Virginia ($36^{\circ} 31'$ north latitude) were where these Watauga people supposed, this Cherokee cession covered their valley, and they were under the protection of Virginia laws, so far as those ordinances could prevail in so distant a region. The new Lochaber line began at a point on the Holston — into which the Watauga flowed — and extended northward, and there was little knowledge of what it encountered, till it struck the mouth of the Kanawha, whose springs were adjacent to those of the Watauga. The line really threw the upper parts of the valley of the Big Sandy River and the southwest angle of West Virginia — excepting the extreme point of that angle — into the conceded territory. The main object of the treaty was to placate the Indians for the encroachments along the alluvial bottoms of the Kanawha, which the surveyors had been making in that region under the Fort Stanwix grant. That concession of the Iroquois had proved extremely irritating to the Cherokees, because it assumed to deal with their territory.

Before the truth about the latitude of the Watauga settlement was known, there was a significant immigration thither, bringing upon the stage of western settlement some notable personages. In 1770, a supple and robust young man, whose blue eye had the alert habit of a hunter, and whose native air of command attracted notice wherever he went, and perhaps the weightiest man of all these trans-Alleghany pioneers, passed that way, bound on further explorations. In him, James Robertson was first introduced to the little stockaded hamlet, where a few hardy adventurers were breasting the wilderness. The next year (1771) he came among them again, this time resolved to stay, for he had brought with him a train making sixteen families, whom he had induced to enter upon this new world. It was after the battle of the Alamance (May 16, 1771), where Tryon's force had dispersed the Regulators, — a body of asso-

ciates against horse thieves and tax-gatherers,— and some of that disaffected body, eager to find other control than a royal governor, were in this emigration. Robertson built himself a cabin on an island in the river, and events soon placed him in the forefront of a little colony, organized on manhood suffrage and religious liberty. In it he acquired leadership, though he was more deficient in education than was usual with pioneers, for he was only beginning to acquire the penman's art.

In the same year (1771), Jacob Brown had formed a settlement on the Nollichucky, a branch of the Holston next south of the Watauga, and it was he who, on the discovery being made, by the surveyors extending the southern line of Virginia, that both of these settlements were without the government of Virginia, entered into an agreement with the Cherokees, by which the joint communities, now numbering eighty souls, secured a lease of these valleys, in consideration of six thousand dollars' worth of goods, for a term of eight years. By this they avoided such an infringement as a purchase would be of the proclamation of 1763.

These little communities, thus thrown out of the control of Virginia, and having no connection with North Carolina, though within her charter limits, were placed in much the same condition in these western wilds that the Mayflower pilgrims were in a hundred and fifty years before, when, stranded beyond the patent of Virginia, they were forced into forming a compact of government.

It was thus, in the spring of 1772, that Robertson undertook a leading part in making what was called the Watauga Association. This was a combination of the people of the Watauga, Carter's, and the Nollichucky valleys, under written articles, for civil government and the protection of law. It was also a union, based on necessity and the Indian consent. With these environments they were ready to face the demand for their removal made by Cameron, the British Indian agent, on the ground of their defying the royal proclamation. The government, which the articles instituted, proved rugged enough to survive all strains that were put upon it for six years. In August, 1776, the association petitioned the North Carolina Assembly to be allowed to come under its protection. This paper is still existing in Sevier's handwriting. They professed

a desire "to share in the glorious cause of liberty" with their brothers on the seaboard. In 1778, the region was organized as Washington County in North Carolina. This change brought but slight disturbance to the existing forms of government.

That this little republic of the wilderness lasted so successfully was indeed owing to the character of the men who formed it. While in the throes of birth, the little community welcomed to its shelter two other remarkable persons. Captain Evan Shelby was a frontier cattleman of no uncertain character, whose Welsh blood had been invigorated by his mountain career. John Sevier brought to the wilderness a handsome mien, which befitted his gentle Huguenot blood. His life as an Indian trader had given him an eager air, but a certain self-conscious dignity beamed from his blue eyes, and waves of brown hair haloed a well-poised head, carried erect, and showing a countenance lightened at times with gleams of merriment. He was now not more than six and twenty years old, with a life of striking incident and humane interests still before him. He was, says Phelan, the "most brilliant military and civil figure" in the history of Tennessee. In these three men, Robertson, Shelby, and Sevier, the Watauga settlement was fortunate in these formative days, for being without the pale of established civil control, the colony became easily the asylum of vagabonds and culprits escaping justice by flying over the mountains. With such intestine disturbances, and with the savages about them, the character of its chief rulers could be the only security which such an isolated community could possess. No copy of their self-imposed constitution of restraint has been preserved; but we know enough of the workings of their simple government to see how the laws of Virginia, so far as applicable, with an executive committee to enforce them, and a sufficient method of record for lands, sufficed to answer all requirements. It was the earliest instance of a government of the people by the people, and under a written compact, beyond the mountains, and was established by men of American birth.

In the year 1773, following this organization, Boone headed a party and started west. He had with him the first women and children who had passed the Cumberland Mountains. They passed beyond all civilization after they had tarried for a brief interval among a few families settled west of the Holston and

along the Clinch River, the other principal fork of the Tennessee. It was in September, 1773, when Boone and his adventurous families were joined by a band of hunters, and the company numbered eighty when a few weeks later (October 10) they were attacked in Powell's valley by the Indians. In the fight they lost enough to discourage them, and so turned back to the settlements on the Clinch. It was now apparent that an Indian war was coming, and in the following spring (1774) the signs of it were everywhere, as has been depicted in the preceding chapter. There were at the time various stray wanderers, hunters, and surveyors, pursuing devious ways, or squatted here and there throughout this remoter country. Now that Lewis, as we have seen, had been ordered with the Virginia forces down the Kanawha, and since the gage of war had been accepted, Boone was sent to ~~phrid~~ this country and give warning. He and his companions found Harrod, McAfee, and their company just beginning a settlement at the modern Harrodsburg. After Boone's caution, they abandoned their purpose. Other parties of whites, which they encountered, were informed of their danger. Boone's farthest point was the rapids of the Ohio. After an absence of sixty days and more, during which he had covered over eight hundred miles, he returned to his friends on the Clinch.

Lewis's victory at Point Pleasant in October, 1774, rendered the navigation of the Ohio comparatively safe, and opened the way for easy transportation to the regions of the lower Cumberland and Tennessee. The blow which the savages had received proved enough to paralyze them for a while, and Kentucky, at this particular juncture, owed much to this respite. The new opportunity encouraged a movement which for a time promised to regulate the western emigration on a more extended scale than had been before attempted. The reports which Boone had made of this western region had aroused many, among others Colonel Richard Henderson, a Virginian, now about forty years old. It was under his direction that a company had been formed in North Carolina to buy land of the Indians and establish a colony beyond the mountains. In the early days of 1775, Martin, with a party of eighteen or twenty, had built some cabins and a stockade at what was later known

as Martin's Station, about fifty miles beyond the Clinch River hamlet. The McAfees, about the same time, began a settlement on Salt River. Benjamin Logan had in another region begun a fort, to which the next year he brought his family. On March 18, James Harrod and a party of fifty reoccupied the ground which he had abandoned on Boone's warning in 1774.


This reoccupation of the region was in progress when Henderson and eight other North Carolinians, on March 17, 1775, at Sycamore Shoals on the Watauga, concluded a treaty with the Cherokees, by which they acquired the Indian title to about one half of the modern State of Kentucky and the adjacent part of Tennessee lying within the southerly bend of the Cumberland. The ceded territory was bounded by the Kentucky, Holston, Cumberland, and Ohio rivers, and received the name of Transylvania, — the particular grounds for bestowing which name, beyond its apparent meaning, are not known. The negotiation was not a sudden dash of business, for twelve hundred savages looked on and increased the usual Indian deliberation. They heard the speeches on both sides. One harangue, at least, from the Indians was a mournful protest against the white man's encroachments. The purchaser's blandishments at last prevailed, and for £10,000 worth of goods the instrument conveying not far from eighteen million acres of territory received the assent of Oconostota, an aged chief. The Raven and The Carpenter, other head men of the tribe, also joined in the conveyance. Two days later, the Watauga associates, with less regard for the royal proclamation than before, by the payment of £2,000 worth of merchandise, converted their existing lease into a purchase, and threw their interests into the general scheme.

When a successful termination of the negotiation seemed certain, and a week before the deed was signed, Boone started under Henderson's direction to open a trail to the Kentucky, blazing and clearing a way which eventually was known as The Wilderness Road. It formed a connection between Cumberland Gap and the remoter borders of the new colony. He was attacked on the way (March 25), losing some men, but pushing on to a level bit of ground, with sulphur springs near by, he halted. Here, on April 18, he began a fort which took the name of Boonesborough. It served for the protection of the

score of companions which he had with him. Henderson later joined the little post, adding about thirty new men for the garrison, and, to give life to the movement, opened a land office.

On May 23, there was a meeting of delegates in the fort. This assembly adopted some laws, including one for improving the breed of horses, and stands for the first legislative body which was ever held beyond the mountains. Henderson, as the moving spirit in this action, was credited with having "epitomized and simplified the laws of England." The population at that time throughout this district was variously estimated at from one hundred and fifty to three hundred, including land jobbers, squatters, and domiciled settlers, with as yet but few women among them. These scattered knots of people had such contact with the old plantations as could be made through the more easterly hamlets on the Watauga, Nollichucky, and Clinch rivers. They formed a wedge of civilization,

thrust between the Cherokees on the one hand and the Shawnees on the other. Adventurous spirits among them were pushing reconnoissances along many a tributary stream of the principal rivers. It seems pretty clear that if there was an excess of Scotch and Teutonic blood in this body of pioneers, there was a preponderating influence of English spirit. This dominant mood kept the varied racial impulses to a single purpose, and at a convention held at Pittsburg, May 16, 1775, it gave an unmistakable support to the revolt which was now gaining head on the seaboard. Just before this, one Charles Smith found rebellious sentiments prevalent in this region, and advised Dartmouth that the coming of eight or ten thousand Irish in one year, "uncultivated banditti," was in large part the source of such disloyalty. That English



BOONESBOROUGH FORT.

[From James Hall's *Sketches of History, Life, and Manners in the West*, Philadelphia, 1835. There were blockhouses at the angles (1 is Colonel Henderson's, with his kitchen at 3). At the corners and at the gates (9) were stockades (2 2, etc.). The intervals were filled with cabins, presenting blank walls to the enemy.]

minister obtained much the same advice from the Bishop of Derry, who told him that nearly thirty-three thousand "fanatical and hungry republicans" had gone thither within a few years. The over-mountain country was doubtless attracting a fair share of this rampant overplus of Ireland.

In the autumn of 1775, there were marks of a determinate future in this pioneer life. Boone, much to the colony's loss, had gone back to North Carolina during the summer, and now in September, returned to his stockade with his wife and children. There were in his train the families of various others, who like himself were seeking new homes. The influence of all this was most fortunate.

There was, meanwhile, a purpose in the older communities to hold the course of the Ohio against any force which the troublous times might array. In September, the Virginia militia had taken possession of Fort Pitt, and outposts were established at Fort Henry (Wheeling) and at Point Pleasant.

Henderson's scheme, with its feudal tendencies, was proving inopportune. He was, as one observer said, "a man of vast and enterprising genius," but an exacting domination made him enemies. Some who had been his adherents petitioned the Virginia Assembly to be relieved of the oath of fealty which he had exacted. The proprietors under his grant met in September, 1775, and memorialized Congress for admission to the united colonies. They claimed a title to their lands acquired in open treaty "from immemorial possessors." They appealed for countenance to Jefferson and Patrick Henry, but got no encouragement.

Dunmore, who had now become active on the royal side, was as impatient of Henderson's projects as the patriots were, and fulminated a proclamation against him for his contempt of the royal prohibitions, and for affording "an asylum for debtors and other persons of desperate circumstances." Governor Tryon, of North Carolina, who had himself been ambitious of territorial dignities and a baronetcy, was as prompt as Dunmore in launching his disapprobation. The obstacles on all sides were more than Henderson could overcome, and his project was abandoned, though there was later, as we shall see, an effort made in Congress to effect some equitable provision for his out-

lay. "His scheme," says John Mason Brown, "was the last appearance on American soil of the old idea of government by lords proprietor. It was too late for success."

In April, 1775, Dunmore had threatened to incite a servile insurrection in the east; and in May he informed the home government that he was planning to arouse the western Indians.

Dr. Connolly, then at Pittsburg, had already been instructed by Dunmore "to endeavor to incline the Indians to the royal cause," and Connolly succeeded so far as to induce the tribes to transmit a large belt to the governor. While Connolly was doing this he was in correspondence with Washington, and learned from him "that matters" on the seaboard "were drawing to a point." As the summer wore on, Connolly found that the same sort of danger as on the coast — which in June had driven Dunmore on board a British frigate at York — grew apace along the frontiers.

On June 30, the Continental Congress had set up three Indian departments: the northern, including the Six Nations and tribes at the north; the southern, embracing the Cherokees and other tribes farther towards the Gulf; while the middle department had its central point at Pittsburg. Here three commissioners, later appointed, were expected to deal with the tribes and counteract the sinister efforts of the royalists. Dunmore, who had expected at this time to meet Indian delegates at Fort Pitt, so as to ratify the treaty which he had made in 1774 at Camp Charlotte, found it prudent not to trust himself on such a mission. The Virginia Assembly sent instead James Wood, with Simon Girty as guide, to seek the Indians and keep them quiet. Their efforts were effective enough to induce the tribes (October) to decide for neutrality.

The outbreak near Boston in April had precipitated the inevitable. A band of hunters, encamping on a branch of the Elk-horn in the Kentucky wilds, hearing of the act of war on Lexington green, gave that name to the spot on which they were, and the name survives in Kentucky, as in Massachusetts, to attest the brotherhood of the hour. It was another manifestation of this fraternal sympathy which made Franklin bring forward his plan of confederation. The same sympathy prompted Thomas Paine to say that "nothing but a Continental form of gov-

ernment can keep the peace of the Continent." It gave the Tories of the frontiers occasion to feel the coercive power of the men who were shaping the political views of the West in a convention at Pittsburg. It made Michael Cresap enlist his old companions of the frontiers, and march them to Boston.

A narrative of Connolly has been preserved, which shows his movements during the summer and autumn. He had been in Boston, and had there planned with General Gage — who had arrived in that town in May, 1774 — a movement which Dunmore had hoped to assist in carrying out. In November, he was in Williamsburg in conference with Dunmore, now sheltered on his man-of-war. It was then arranged that Connolly, accompanied by Cameron and Smyth, — who has left an account in his *Travels*, — should make a "secret expedition to the back country," going in a flatboat up the Potomac, and thence passing by the Ohio, Scioto, and Sandusky to Detroit. They started on November 13. It was expected that a considerable force would gather at Detroit, some coming from the Illinois. In the spring this little army was to advance by Presqu'Isle to Pittsburg and crush the rebellion thereabouts. Leaving a garrison here, it was intended to take and fortify Fort Cumberland and seize Alexandria, to which point Dunmore was to come with a fleet. A successful result would have cut off the southern colonies from the northern. They had provided that if Pittsburg succeeded in resisting, the force should fall down the Mississippi, collect the garrison at Fort Gage (Illinois), and on reaching New Orleans take transports to Norfolk, where Dunmore would await them.

The plan soon miscarried through Connolly's sending a letter of effusive Toryism to Pittsburg, and the later recognition of him at Hagerstown on November 19, 1775, by an officer just from the American camp before Boston, who had seen him on his recent visit to that vicinity. While being conducted east, he managed at Fredericktown, in Maryland, to write to McRae, who was in Pittsburg, telling him of his capture, and that their "scheme" must fail, and directing McRae to go down the river, warning by messenger the commander at Detroit and in the Illinois, and then to descend the Mississippi and return by water to Virginia.

Connolly's companion, Smyth, managed to escape, but was recaptured, and found to be bearing other letters from Connolly, further attesting his intrigues.

The arrest of Connolly probably deferred for two years the active participancy of the Kentucky settlers in the war on the western borders. There were lying along the western frontiers from New York to the Mississippi, at this time, a body of Indians that might perhaps have furnished ten thousand braves to any hostile movement which enlisted their sympathies. As it turned out, there was little Tory influence for these two years brought to bear upon them, and Zeisberger and Kirkland, by their missionary efforts, held in restraint at least the western Iroquois and the Delawares.

While Connolly was arranging in Virginia for this north-western movement, Colonel Henry Hamilton, formerly a captain in the fourteenth regiment, had been put by Carleton in command of Detroit. This town and its dependencies stretched up and down the river, with a population mainly French and perhaps two thousand in numbers. Only four days before Connolly left Williamsburg, Hamilton had reached (November 9, 1775) his post. He soon made up his mind that it was simply a question whether he or the Virginians should first secure the alliance of the savages. There is little doubt that either side, British or Americans, stood ready to enlist the Indians. Already before Boston the Americans had had the help of the Stockbridge tribe. Washington found the service committed to the practice when he arrived at Cambridge early in July. Dunmore had taken the initiative in securing such allies, at least in purpose, but the insurgent Virginians had had of late more direct contact with the tribes, and were now striving to secure them, but with little success. It was evident, with Hamilton in command at Detroit, and with the lurking enmity subsisting between the savages and the frontier pioneers, that in the end a conflict must come.

Had Dunmore's plan been successful at the north, a counter plan, which we shall see was developed later, might earlier have found a body of British troops with Indian allies marching from the Gulf, up through the country of the Creeks and

Chickasaws, and gaining their assistance in an attack upon the back country of Virginia and Carolina.

To make any such project effective, it was necessary for the English agents among the Indians to accustom the tribes to a policy quite different from that which had fostered dissensions among them, in order to turn their savage wrath from the colonial borders. The political revulsions on the seaboard had convinced the British commanders in America that instead of repelling the Indians from the Appalachian border, as of old, it was become politic to mass them and hurl them against it. This change of front in the Indian agents created some suspicion in the savage breast. The Creeks particularly were wary, and some of them had already lent assistance to the rebellious colonists.

Of the thirty thousand to thirty-five thousand warriors which it is estimated there were at this time living east of the Mississippi, there were nearly ten thousand among the southern tribes which Stuart was intriguing to combine. Among them the Cherokees, a mountain folk, had lost something of their old prominence through their long wars. They had been forced by the Creeks to make common cause with them in land treaties with the English, having in this way joined them in June, 1773, at Augusta (Georgia) in ceding something like two million acres on the Savannah, stretching towards the Oconee. In this way the two tribes had striven to liquidate, by what they received for the lands, the claims against them of the English traders.

The Chickasaws were less numerous, but they maintained their old reputation as hard fighters. The Catawbas, who in times past had so defiantly stood their ground against the Iroquois, were now reduced so much as to be of little moment in any enumeration. The Choctaws were nearest the Spaniards, and a ruder people than the other tribes; but the Creeks were certainly the most powerful of all. Early in 1772, they had resisted all importunities of the northern tribes to make common cause with them; yet for some years they had given the borderers of Georgia and Carolina much ground to dread their treacherous savagery. They had, however, been quiet since October, 1774, when they had been forced to a peace. Under Stuart's instructions, the personal assiduity of his lieutenant

Cameron was doing much to band all these southern tribes in the British interest, though Cameron himself felt some compunctions in urging them to actual conflict. The Americans, by an intercepted letter, learned that the British agents had been instructed to maintain "an immediate communication with our red brothers," through Florida.

The British ministry had planned an attack on Charleston (S. C.) for the early summer of 1776, and Germain had directed Stuart, in conjunction with the loyal borderers of Carolina, to time an Indian rising so as to produce a distraction among the rebellious Carolinians at the same time. Stuart formed, as the ministry intended, a double base at Mobile and Pensacola; he carried thither a supply of ammunition, to be conveyed thence into the Indian country, and so make up to the tribes the resources from which they had been cut off by the attitude of the revolting Georgians and Carolinians. It was a game at which both sides could play, and Wilkinson, the American commissary, was doing what he could to secure the neutrality, if not the active aid of the savages, by a rival distribution of rum and trinkets, — a measure that before long Germain was asking Stuart to copy. That agent, coursing through the up-country, says that he encountered on the Tennessee River several boats, conveying settlers from the Holston to river sites as far down the Mississippi as Natchez, whither, it was no unusual complaint at this time, persons flying from justice betook themselves, mingled with others who fled from the turmoil which the war was creating on the seaboard. Stuart thought that the present exodus was helped by the promised neutrality of the Creeks and Cherokees.

Stuart wrote to the colonial secretary that this apathy of these tribes did not disturb him, for he had no doubt that, when the pinch came, the savages could be induced to aid the British.

Early in 1776, Stuart had confidently reported that everywhere the Cherokees were painted black and red for war, and that the rebels had succeeded in enticing only a few of their head men to meet commissioners at Fort Charlotte.

Nothing was stirring the southern tribes so effectually as northern emissaries, who brought tidings of a widespread purpose among the Indians beyond the Ohio to make common cause with the British against the colonial rebels. These mes-

sengers also alleged that the French in Canada, appeased by the Quebec Bill, were assisting them. These northern delegates, particularly the Delawares, assured their southern kinsfolk that their fathers, the French, who had been long dead, were alive again, and were quite a match for the four or five thousand armed provincials which they had seen or heard of at Pittsburg and in other posts on the way.

There was indeed a long-cherished purpose, on the part both of the home government and of Carleton at Quebec, that the movement upon the southern frontiers should be supported by an equally hostile demonstration along the borders of Pennsylvania and Virginia. The task of arousing these northern tribes, as it happened, was not so easy as to fire the southern Indians, for the lesson which Lewis had given them at Point Pleasant was not forgotten.

Hamilton, the new commander at Detroit, possessed of verbal instructions from Carleton, had reached that post in November, 1775, and it was soon a struggle between him, instructed to mass the Indians for a raid of the borders, and Morgan, the American agent for the Indians, whose task was to detach the Indians from the British interests. Morgan had succeeded Richard Butler in charge of the Indians of the middle department in the previous April, and found for his support at Pittsburg a Virginia company under Captain John Neville. In June, he had sent messengers to the Shawnees and Wyandots to meet him in council, and in October, he got together some six or seven hundred Mingoes, Shawnees, and Delawares, and exacted from them a promise of neutrality. Hamilton's influence was too great with the Ottawas, Wyandots, Pottawattamies, and Chippewas for Morgan to prevail upon them to join in the pact.

The retreat of the Americans from Canada had made it possible for Carleton in June to send word to the western stations that he no longer needed their help. This gave Hamilton the freedom he desired, and he notified Dartmouth that he and his Indians were ready for the contest. He says that an embassy from the eastern tribes to the great western confederacy had just been at Detroit with a belt, and that he had torn it before their faces. These messengers were an Englishman, a Delaware

chief, and Montour, the half-breed. They had brought a copy of the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, and from this Hamilton had learned of the action of Congress on July 4, and how the Declaration of Independence had declared his dependent braves "merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions," — a description which he knew how to reveal to his Indian allies.

Meanwhile, the savage conflict had been precipitated at the south. The Cherokees had decided upon war, and they had reason to count upon aid from the very tribes which Morgan was striving to coerce. As early as May, 1776, Stuart had sent warning messages to the Watauga settlements, declaring what they might expect if they encouraged rebellion. These colonists at once drew in their outposts, and sent to Virginia for reinforcements. In June, the blow fell. The Powell valley community was raided and broken up, and there was alarm throughout the various Tennessee settlements, now numbering perhaps six hundred souls. The main assaults were from two bands moving at the same moment, and counting, perhaps, three or four hundred each. The borderers fortunately had received warning of the point of attack from a friendly half-breed woman. The threatened neighborhoods had therefore ample time to draw their dependents within their stockades. Such a force, "forted" at Eaton's Station, aroused by the devastations of an approaching band, sallied on July 20, one hundred and seventy in number, and marched to confront it. The whites had encountered only a small party of savages, and, while returning, were near the Long Island Flats of the Holston, when the Indians, supposing them on the retreat, fell impetuously on their rear, but not before the borderers had time to deploy. A sharp contest followed and the enemy fled, only four of the whites being hurt.

The same day, another body of savages attacked the stockade at Watauga, where James Robertson commanded and Sevier was second. The fort held one hundred and forty souls, of whom forty were fit to fight. The enemy hung about the spot for three weeks, and then retreated, just as there appeared a force of three hundred men to succor the besieged. These two movements were the principal ones, intended as a diversion to

assist the British attack on Charleston, but they were ill-timed. Parker, the English admiral, had been repulsed at Fort Moultrie nearly a month earlier, so these savage demonstrations failed in every way to advance the British plans, and in the end left the southern colonies free to retaliate upon the Cherokees, the head and front of the harrowing work along the borders.

The united tribes of this nation, so long the allies of the English against the French, had been stirred by Stuart and Hamilton's friends among the Ohio Indians to these acts of hostility, and were destined to have their power completely broken. The Cherokee people were grouped in three settlements. Their lower towns lay against the South Carolina frontiers, and could send between three and four hundred men upon the warpath. The middle towns farther north, joined with their villages in the mountain valleys, were more than twice as powerful; while the over-hill settlements, the most northern of their positions, were nearly as strong for defense as the middle towns. Accordingly, the several sections could furnish, perhaps, two thousand braves for a campaign, and the more remote districts of the same stock might add enough to make their available fighting force not far from two thousand five hundred.

Respecting the retaliatory campaign of the whites which we are now to touch upon, there is much confusion of statement among those who have in large part told the story from hearsay, and there are few contemporary records to help us to a certainty as to dates, movements, and numbers. In the leading features of the campaign, however, there is little obscurity. The patriots in Georgia appear to have been the earliest to move. In March (1776), Colonel Bull, with a force of militia, had marched toward Savannah to overawe the Tories, and he is said to have had some Creeks in his ranks, for that tribe had of late been propitiated by a show of justice on the part of the Georgia authorities in the punishment of offenses committed against members of their body. In July, Governor Bullock was preparing a force to invade the lower Cherokee lands, and under Colonel Jack about two hundred savages devastated some of their hamlets on the Tugaloo River.


While this was going on, General Charles Lee, now in command at Charleston, begged (July 7) the Virginia authorities to league the southern colonies in a joint expedition, and on the


30th, Congress recommended such a project to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. The Virginians were quite ready for their task. Jefferson, in August, was urging a foray into the heart of the Indians' country, with a determination to drive them beyond the Mississippi. President Page began preparations, and notified the governors of the Carolinas that he was going to send a force against the upper towns of the Cherokees, and pressed them to attack the middle and lower towns. Colonel William Christian was selected for the command of the Virginia forces. He was joined, as he went on, by a company from Pennsylvania under Martin, and by some recruits from the parts of North Carolina contiguous to the Virginia bounds. His force grew to be some two thousand strong. A trader, Isaac Thomas, served him as guide. His plan was to rendezvous on the Holston, and on October 1, he started with such other contingents from Watauga and the Tennessee settlements as could be recruited. His expectation was to reach Broad River on October 15, where he looked for resistance. His orders were to make a junction with General Rutherford, who commanded a North Carolina force, moving at the same time; but his communication with him failed, and on October 6, he wrote to Governor Henry that Rutherford might possibly be fortunate enough to reach the over-hill towns before him, and begin the work of devastation. Christian reached the Broad River a little ahead of his expectations, and crossed it by an unfamiliar ford in the night. He now found that the Indians had fled and lay in force before their towns, at a distance of four or five days' march. Early in November, he reached the towns, without a battle, and began destroying cabin and crops. For two weeks he was thus employed, and then, forcing the Indians to a truce and exacting an agreement from them to meet commissioners and arrange for a permanent peace in the spring, he began his return march. He had not lost a man. His force was generally impressed with the attractions of this over-hill country.

During this march he had not seen or heard of Rutherford, who, with an army of two thousand men and a train of supplies, had started from the head-streams of the Catawba on September 1. He is thought to have had with him a small body of the vanishing Catawbas. He kept about a thousand of his

most effective troops and a small body of horse well ahead, and making a forced march, he found the Cherokee towns abandoned. He had expected to meet here Colonel Andrew Williamson with a force from South Carolina, but that failing, he ravaged the valley towns alone, and then pushed over the mountains and made havoc among the middle towns. He escaped on the way an ambush which had been prepared for him, by reason of taking an unaccustomed path. Returning on September 18 to the middle towns, he met the South Carolinians there. Williamson had, since the early days of August, been leading a force of some eleven or twelve hundred rangers among the lower towns, burning and destroying all he could. He now pushed ahead by the route which Rutherford had avoided and fell into the ambush. He was staggered for a while, but rallying his men, he drove the savages back and crossed the mountains successfully. Rutherford coming on, the two devastated the settlements, and late in September turned back. Here, again, a fearful penalty had been imposed upon the enemy, and the largest force of all the Cherokee bands had been brought to obedience, though they had inflicted more loss upon Williamson than any other contingent had suffered. His casualties counted up on October 7, when he reached Fort Rutledge on his return, ninety-four in killed and wounded.

The whites could reckon as the outcome of the campaign the almost complete prostration of the Cherokee nation. It proved an effectual warning to the neighboring tribes, and a respite for the frontiers. The government at Philadelphia were as much relieved as the frontiers, and the Committee of Secret Correspondence wrote to their agents in Europe that "they had now little to apprehend on account of the Indians." The whites had established new and enlarged bounds to the territory open





for their occupancy. They had brought the Tennessee settlements well within the jurisdiction of the older governments, and Watauga, as we have seen, was now ready to be annexed to North Carolina. During the next year (May 20 and July 20, 1777) definitive treaties were made by which lands on the Savannah were ceded to Georgia and South Carolina, and on the Holston to North Carolina and Virginia. The Chickamauga tribe of the Cherokees refused to join in the cessions, and moving down the Tennessee, a hundred miles below the mouth of the Holston, they settled on what is known as the Chickamauga Creek. Other sections of the nation withdrew from immediate contact with the English. Though humbled

they were not quelled, and the intermittent outrages which were reported in the settlements told how revenge still swayed them. Sevier and his rangers had enough to do in hovering about them to repress their audacity.

Of the two movements in the regions beyond the mountains likely to bring the claims of Virginia for a western extension to a sharp issue, — of which beginnings have been already sketched, — one was the resurrection of what was known as the Indiana grant. This had been made at the time of the Fort Stanwix treaty to an association of traders, seeking in this way to recoup themselves for losses incurred in the Pontiac war. Nothing had happened to make the grant of use, from the time it was secured in 1768 till the proprietors held a meeting in September, 1775. Four months later (January 19, 1776) they transferred their interests under this Indian title to three Philadelphia merchants, who not long after (March, 1776) determined to open a land office for the sale of the lands. With the unsettled quarrel which then existed between Pennsylvania and Virginia about their bounds, it was far from propitious for these merchants that their project must encounter the landed interests of a rival province. The new grantees were quite willing to make allowances to such settlers as were already in possession, but with the pretensions of Virginia to back them, these squatters did not propose to be mulcted at all.

Meanwhile, the people of the upper Ohio regions determined to bring an end, if possible, to the harassing complications imposed upon them by the rival States and aspiring companies. They sought (August, 1776) an autonomy of their own, by asking Congress to set them up as the State of West Sylvania. They claimed, rather extravagantly, that there were twenty-five thousand families between the mountains and the Scioto, and they would include them in a territory to be carved from Virginia and Pennsylvania beyond the mountains, and to extend well into Kentucky. The project failed, and three years later (1779) Virginia forced an issue by declaring the native title of the Indiana grant invalid. The Vandavia and Indiana companies memorialized Congress (September 14, 1779) against the Virginia pretensions. In the end Congress (1782) sustained the grant, and a new company took the question (1792)

to the Supreme Court of the United States. Here the cause lingered till Virginia secured a change in the Constitution. This, the eleventh amendment (1794), prohibited individuals of one State bringing suit against another, and the question dropped.

The other movement to effect Virginia's western claims was more rapidly closed, notwithstanding an attempt to bring it before Congress. This was the Transylvania project already traced in its initial stages. By the close of 1775, Henderson had established an agent at Philadelphia. In December, this person was reporting to his principal that John and Samuel Adams were agreed to induce Congress to give countenance to the new colony. Even Jefferson was quite willing to forget the charter limits of Virginia, if a firm government could be established at the back of that province, and its jurisdiction maintained as far as the Mississippi, in opposition to the provisions of the recent Quebec Bill. In such views he had a natural abettor in John Adams, who was anxious lest the British, reaching this western country by the St. Lawrence, should stir the tribes to embrace Dunmore's plan of harrying the country beyond the Alleghanies. It was in part this fear that had induced Congress, in March (1776), to send a commission to Canada, whose work, as we have seen, was so hampered by Jay's outspoken denunciation of the Catholic Church.

Jefferson, notwithstanding his sympathy with Henderson's movement, was not quite prepared to favor congressional recognition of the new colony until Virginia had first agreed to it. But he reckoned too surely upon Virginia recognizing that the borders needed any such sacrifice on her part.

The war with the mother country had gone too far to be controlled by any moderate faction. France had already made ready to afford the revolting colonies the pecuniary assistance which they needed. Events were fast drifting to the verge of independence, and there were warnings of it everywhere. A Scotch-Irish settlement at Hanna's Town in western Pennsylvania had but just (May, 1776) given encouragement to such a movement, and not far from the same time the loyalists of the Watauga settlement had been drummed out of the valley.

With the inevitable in view, Congress in May, 1776, had

called upon each State to set up a form of government sufficient for the crisis. In June, Fort Moultrie had been attacked, while Stuart sought, as we have seen, by an Indian uprising in the South, to make a diversion to assist the attack. Three days later, resolutions of independence were laid before Congress (June 7), and the die was cast. Within a week Virginia passed her declaration of rights, and two weeks and a half later (June 29) she adopted her constitution. This last document gave her the opportunity to make a solemn declaration of her territorial rights. It was the beginning of a long controversy, which settled the destiny of the American West. She recognized the diminution of her charter limits of 1609, so far as the subsequent grants to Maryland and Pennsylvania impaired them, but she insisted on her own definitions of those grants, and abated otherwise nothing of her trans-Alleghany claims. Jefferson shortly after tried to improvise a temporary line to divide the region on which Virginia disputed with Pennsylvania, but no line could prevent existing settlers of one province becoming occupants of the other. Maryland, meanwhile, had raised a question which was far-reaching. Congress on September 16, 1776, in decreeing grants of land for services in the army, put Maryland (being a province of definite western bounds) to a disadvantage as compared with Virginia as well as with other States, whose original charters gave them a western extension. So Maryland began that movement, in which in the sequel her persistency acquired that trans-Alleghany domain jointly for all the States.

Virginia herself removed all complications that the existence of such an independent government as Transylvania could interpose by declaring private purchase from the Indians without validity, and by promptly throwing the protection of her laws over the whole region. So Transylvania vanished, when all Kentucky was set up, December 7, 1776, as a county of the Old Dominion.

Two years later, in accordance with the recommendations of a committee headed by George Mason, Virginia made the Transylvania proprietors some recompense for legislating them out of existence, by making to them a grant of two hundred thousand acres, between the Ohio and the Greenbrier River. In accepting this the proprietors disavowed their Cherokee title. This

denial of autonomy to Transylvania was the beginning of a new life in the great forest-shaded country of Kentucky, where the limestone lay bedded below and the blue grass flourished above. Jefferson said that nothing could stay the tide of emigration. It was indeed not a little swelled by the timid and half-hearted in the patriot cause whom the war was turning away from old associations. Some northern Indians passing athwart the westward paths of these wayfarers were struck with the multitude of fresh tracks of man and beast. This emigrant march followed what was known as the Wilderness Road, — already referred to, — which, passing Cumberland Gap, proceeded, by the route which Boone had marked out, in a northwesterly direction to the great gateway of the enticing level lands of Kentucky. These began in the neighborhood of Crab Orchard, just short by a score of miles of the site of Danville, first laid out in 1784. Its course is at present intertwined with the modern railway. Not far away was Crow's Station, just coming into prominence as a sort of political centre of these distant communities. This vicinity was in the southeastern angle of a tract of country, roughly square, of about a hundred miles on each side, of which the three remaining angles were at the falls of the Ohio (Louisville), at the most northern turn which that river makes some twenty miles below Cincinnati, and at Limestone, the present Maysville, three hundred miles below Pittsburg and one hundred from Wheeling. So this fertile tract, with three of its angles touching the encircling Ohio, and a fourth at its mountain-gate, included the territory watered by the Licking and Kentucky rivers in their more level courses. These streams thrived a vast forest of broad-leaved trees, whose lofty trunks, unembarrassed by undergrowth, supported a canopy of verdure beneath which the country was easily traversed. The entrance for the overland pioneers near Crab Orchard was also the exit for nearly all who were returning to the Virginia settlements. In this way the traveler avoided the laborious pull against the current of the Ohio, whether bound for Pittsburg, or taking the alternative route up the Kanawha and Greenbrier. From near Crab Orchard, the pioneers seeking settlement turned much in the same direction in which the railways cross the country to-day. The borderer descending by the Ohio, and landing at Limestone, followed along the outline of this squarish tract to

Crab Orchard, and so could pass south to the Tennessee country, by what Evans and Gibson's map marked as "the only way passable with horses from the Ohio three or four hundred miles southward." The overland wanderer less often took this same route in reverse. Commonly he passed by another trail through Harrodsburg, and so crossed the Kentucky near Frankfort, and went on to the mouth of the Licking, opposite the later Cincinnati. A lesser number, probably, passed by a southwesterly curve, within sight of the mountainous barrier in that direction, and came upon the Ohio at the site of the modern Louisville. It was complained, as respects this latter spot, that a few gentlemen "had engrossed all the lands at and near the falls of the Ohio," which with the sanguine was likely to be "the most considerable mart in this part of the world."

CHAPTER VII.

THE FORTUNES OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

1766-1777.

THE war, which in the end had wrested the valley of the St. Lawrence from the French, and, as it turned out, had made the English share the valley of the Mississippi with the Spaniards, had in its beginning put an end to all schemes for penetrating the country lying west of the Mississippi and beyond the sources of the St. Lawrence. There was still the same uncertainty that there had always been regarding the sources of both these great rivers. It had been a question, even, if they did not unite somewhere, just as the waters of Lake Michigan and the Illinois commingled in the spring freshets. At all events, their sources might not be far apart. (Wynne, in his *General History of the British Empire in America* (1770), rather slurringly mentions a pretense that the St. Lawrence "was derived from remote northwestern lakes, as yet unknown to Europeans."

To solve this question and the other antiquated notion that there was, not far from these neighboring springs, yet another fountain, whose waters flowed to the Pacific, was a dream that had puzzled a Connecticut Yankee who had been brooding over the speculations of Hennepin, La Hontan, and Charlevoix. This man, Jonathan Carver, now four-and-thirty years old, was harboring some rather lordly notions of the future of the Mississippi. "As the seat of empire," he says, "from time immemorial has been gradually progressive towards the West, there is no doubt but that, at some future period, mighty kingdoms will emerge from these wildernesses, and stately palaces and solemn temples supplant the Indian huts." In this frame of mind, and three years after the Peace of Paris, he had determined to probe the great western mysteries, and started from Boston in June, 1766, on a quest for he hardly knew what. Arriving at Mackinac, the westernmost of the English posts, he

secured some goods for presents to the Indians and, on September 3, he proceeded by the Green Bay portage and, entering the Mississippi, turned north and, passing the Falls of St. Anthony, reached his northernmost point at the St. Francis River. When near the site of the modern city of St. Paul, he comprehended what he conceived to be the vantage-ground



JONATHAN CARVER.

[From his *Travels*, London, 1781.]

of that pivotal region of the northern valley of the Mississippi, with its down-current access to the Gulf of Mexico, and by the Iberville River to Mobile and Pensacola. Looking to the east, he dreamed of a water-way, yet to be made practicable, through the lakes to New York. Towards the setting sun, an up-current struggle along the Minnesota River might reveal some distant portage or centring water, whence a descending stream would carry the trader to the Pacific on his way to China. At a later day, Carver's heirs claimed that, as evidence of his confidence in the future of this spot, he had acquired from the Sioux a title

to the site of St. Paul, but unquestionable evidence of any deed was never produced. The British held it to be a transaction in contravention of the proclamation of 1763, and later, the United States, succeeding to all rights, through the Committee on Public Lands reported adversely on the claim in 1823 to the Senate of the United States. It was Carver's notion that the continent was broadest on the parallel which went athwart this commanding region, about the mouth of the Minnesota, which was almost midway in the passage from sea to sea. Here was destined to be a seat of British power. • One of his maps marks out a north and south belt, bounded by the Mississippi on the west and by the meridian of Detroit on the east, and stretching from the Chickasaw country on the south to the Chippewas and Ottawas on the north. Within this area he pricks out the bound of eleven prospective colonies of English. On the east, the Ohio and other tributaries of the Great River opened the way for these prospective populations to the passes of the Alleghanies and the old colonies of the seaboard. Carver found the country north of the Illinois and as far as the Wisconsin little known to the traders, and charged the French with having deceived the English about it in their maps. Farther north, up to the Mille Lacs region and the springs of the Mississippi, he still found the French maps at variance with the Indian reports.

It was here at the north, within a radius of thirty miles or less, that Carver placed the great continental divide, and in the midst of the best of hunting countries, where the white man had not yet penetrated. From this point, he said, one could go east by streams that connect with Lake Superior and the water-ways leading to the Atlantic. One went north from Red Lake through Winnipeg and the Bourbon River to Hudson's Bay, making the passage to Europe through Davis's Strait, as has been advocated in our day.

Just south of these northern springs lay the White Bear Lake, with a passage from it open to the Gulf of Mexico. In either direction there was a route of not far from two thousand miles, as he calculated, to the salt sea. Speaking of the contiguity of these sources, and referring to a belief, long current, of a common source for streams flowing to different seas, he says: "I perceived a visibly distinct separation in all of them, notwithstanding in some places they approached so near that

I could have stepped from one to the other." In one of his maps, close by this source of the Mississippi, Carver places a smaller lake, out of which flows the "Origan" River, — a name now first used, — which, becoming in its passage the great river of the west, — the ultimate Columbia, — debouches at last somewhat vaguely into the Pacific near the Straits of Anian, a supposable northwest passage, long known in speculations. This was to be the great western outlet of his manifold colonies of the Mississippi basin. This seaside spot was already preempted for the English, as he avers, by the discoveries of Sir Francis Drake, while to this distant west the trails of French fur-traders for nearly a century running from Prairie du Chien, near the mouth of the Wisconsin, had opened a land carriage in the same direction.

Carver himself explored but a single one of the western affluents of the Mississippi, and that was the St. Peter, as the Minnesota was then called. It was on this water among the Sioux of the plains that he passed the winter of 1766, and he says he found that the French had prejudiced that tribe against the English. Of the physiography of the more distant west, he gives us some hints as he got them from the savages, the marked feature of which is unbounded plains "which probably terminate on the coast of the Pacific." The spur of the Rocky Mountains discovered by Vérendrye is, to Carver's mind, nothing but an isolated "mountain of bright stones" lying north of the river of the west. It was in a lake near this mountain that he makes the Assiniboils River rise, which, flowing to Lake Winnipeg, is next carried on with a divided current, the one to Hudson's Bay and the other to Lake Superior. He hears of natives, living beyond this mountain, small of stature, using vessels of gold, and suggesting an emigration north from Mexico. With a mixed burden on his mind of speculation and knowledge, and having failed to receive the goods from Mackinac which he expected, Carver, in the summer of 1767, began to retrace his steps. After lingering some time at Lake Pepin he sought the Chippewa River, and ascending it, crossed a portage which took him by a descending stream to Lake Superior near its western end. Carver's observations put Lake Superior between 46° and 49° north latitude, not far from its true position, a correction of earlier English maps by something



CARVER'S COLONIES.

[From a "New Map of North America, 1778," in Jonathan Carver's *Travels through the Interior Parts of North America*, London, 1781. It shows also the connection of Lake Superior with the Lake of the Woods and Hudson's Bay (James's Bay).]

like eight degrees, while Kitchin, who a few years later, in 1774 and before Carver's maps were published, was out by nearly ten degrees, — both carrying the water by so much too far to the north. In contour and detail there had been up to this time no map of this lake so accurate as its first survey made by the Jesuits a century before. All the intervening maps had shown many islands spotting its surface. In Carver's time a similar ignorance of the interior spaces of the lake prevailed. It was due, perhaps, to the barkentines of the French keeping near the shores, and to the Indians' dread of enchantments with which they supposed such islands to be invested.

Passing through the Sault Ste. Marie in October, 1767, Carver moved eastward by the lakes, and after an absence of two years and five months reached Boston in October, 1768, having traversed, as he reckoned, a course of near seven thousand miles. He tells us that an English gentleman, Richard Whitworth, became so interested in the traveler's views of the way to find a passage from the Mississippi to the Pacific that, in 1774, he nearly perfected arrangements for doing it, in company with Carver himself and a party of fifty or sixty men, when the opening scenes of the Revolutionary War put a stop to the enterprise. A proposition made by Bernard Romans, in 1773, met with a like discouragement. Carver's narrative was not published till ten years later, in 1778, when his recital found neither England nor her colonies in any better position to profit by his experiences.

While Carver's book was still in manuscript, and he had been seeking government employ as an Indian agent in the region west of Lake Huron, the future of the Mississippi had been consigned to other hands than his prospective colonists of the eleven provinces.

Spain still controlled the French of Louisiana. In New Orleans this alien power had proved vexatious. In the upper parts of the valley the French had no love for the English; but it was a question whether the Spanish rule was not annoying enough sometimes to give some hope to Gage that a part, at least, of those who had fled across the river might return to the English. A few years after the English commanding general had expressed this anticipation, the progress of the American

revolt had interjected a vigilant power in the young confederation between the English on the one side and the French and Spanish on the other. Such conditions foreboded a new struggle for the possession of the Mississippi and its eastern affluents, but with complications greater than had attended the conflict which was ended by the Peace of Paris in 1763. It was once more a question, who should control or share the vast country lying between the Appalachians and the Great River? Each power entered upon the struggle with its own purpose. In the north, England early (1774) attempted a preëmption of the region above the Ohio through the Quebec Bill. France at once saw that the terms of that legislation recognized her own long-defended claim to include that territory within the bounds of Canada. It was plainly to be seen that such an acknowledgment might make it easier for France to wrest that country in its entirety from the grasp of England, if the fortunes of war should lay open to her the chances of a diplomatic triumph over England. In the south there were the rival interests of England and Spain. The possession of West Florida and New Orleans respectively brought these two powers into a dangerous contiguity. Events seemed tending to bring on a conflict, either at New Orleans or higher up the river. It was a question for the young Republic, if in these opposing interests, north and south, she could make good her territorial rights beyond the Alleghanies, to an extent equal to what, as colonies, she had contended for, and which the treaty of 1763 had recognized.

All these complications involved the relations of the American people not only to England, which was trying to subjugate them, but also to France, which was expected to assist them. It was a matter of more serious concern that the rulers of France had no intention of resisting England for any other purpose than revenge and profit to France. The relations of the young Republic to Spain were more embarrassing, for any assistance from that country depended upon the Bourbon compact between France and Spain proving broad enough to force the latter country into a war with England for the behoof of France in America. In this event, a common hostility to England might league the American republic and the Spanish monarchy.

In this impending struggle for the line of the Mississippi, as bounding the nascent commonwealth, America had military

resources almost ludicrously inadequate, and success was only to be acquired by using this Bourbon rivalry of England in such a way as would protect American interests.

Oliver Pollock, a native of Pennsylvania of Irish stock, had gone as a young man to Havana to engage in business, and removed, when he was about thirty years old, to New Orleans in 1767. Two years later, when O'Reilly took possession and the number of his troops produced a famine, this American merchant received a cargo of flour from Baltimore.

Prices of cereals were ruling high; but Pollock saw his opportunity, and publicly sold his produce at from half to two thirds of the current rates. The Spanish government marked its gratitude by giving Pollock a license of free trade with the colony for the rest of his life. The concession gave him a standing in New Orleans, which was of importance for Pollock's countrymen in the approaching crisis.

The Spanish authorities at this time were strengthening the ramparts of New Orleans, and were bringing succor nearer by opening a new route to Mexico, for it had not escaped them that England only needed a pretext to capture New Orleans if she could. The English reciprocated the anxiety, and found the Spanish possession of Havana a constant menace to Pensacola. Haldimand, when commanding at this latter post, had been made aware by Gage, writing from his New York headquarters, that it was wise never to let slip the purpose of seizing New Orleans, if opportunity offered. The canalization of the Iberville had not indeed proved a prosperous scheme for diverting trade to Florida, and the navigation of the Mississippi was but a vexatious privilege to the English. When there had been, in 1770, a passing diplomatic flurry with Spain, over the Falkland Islands, Gage had cautioned Haldimand to be prepared for a hostile movement, if there was any opportune turn of the negotiations. It had long been Gage's plan for stopping the clandestine traffic across the river by holding its mouth, which he contended was the only way in which the trade of the river could properly be developed in the English interest.

NOTE. — The opposite map is a section from a "Carte de la Floride, etc., pour le service des vaisseaux du Roi, par ordre de M. de Sartine, conseiller d'Etat, 1778," and shows Haldimand's Iberville route.



Much to the discontent of the British settlers at Natchez and elsewhere, he had refused, with New Orleans in Spanish hands, to maintain armed posts for their protection.

The English possessions in West Florida, as the bounds of that province had been defined, included the country about Natchez. The population in this region had been increasing since 1770. Some of the French in Louisiana, disaffected by the Spanish rule, had passed over the river to the English side; but the greater part of the increase had been emigrants from east of the Appalachians. Some had come from Pennsylvania and Jersey; others from Virginia and Carolina; but larger numbers had come from Connecticut, turning a current of emigration which, under more favorable circumstances, might have settled the Wyoming valley in Pennsylvania. General Phineas Lyman, whom we have seen in London a few years before unsuccessfully urging the formation of a colony in the Illinois country, had returned to New England in the faith that a grant which he had urged for the soldiers of the late war would be made on the lower Mississippi, under royal orders to the governor of West Florida. He had in December, 1772, asked Dartmouth to encourage their plan. With this expectation he had induced a body of "military adventurers" at Hartford to order a reconnoissance of their proposed home, and in 1773, Lyman and party sailed from New York for Pensacola. Here they found that no royal instructions had been received. Pending the expected arrival of such, Rufus Putnam, as topographer, headed a party to explore the Mississippi as far north as the Yazoo. The wished-for orders still not coming, the proposing settlers agreed to purchase a tract of land on easy terms. The result was that several hundred families, in May, 1776, came out from New England, only to find that even this arrangement had been forbidden by orders from England. So the struggling settlers found that they must shift for themselves. There were some among them who scantily sympathized with the political revolt in New England, and Lyman himself had congratulated the ministry that the "spirit of Boston" was not spreading. The new homes, which they too rosily pictured, were destined, they thought, to give them a release from the turmoil they had left. There was, however, enough of the revolutionary fervor of the Atlantic seaboard in others who had

settled there to make an important factor in shaping the destiny of this southern region.

We have seen that Hamilton at Detroit had had some success in counteracting the influence of Morgan among the northern tribes. Though the Delawares had mainly rejected his hatchet, the Shawnees and Wyandots had generally accepted it. A comparison of dates seems to show that Hamilton was acting in anticipation of orders which he had asked of Germain. These, when received (dated March 26, 1777), conformed to Hamilton's suggestions, and directed him to organize Indian raids against the American frontiers. We have his own statement, in the following July, that he had up to that date sent out fifteen distinct parties on such fiendish errands. The purpose of the minister was that those loyal to the crown among the frontier folk should be gathered in bands, and should be encouraged by a bounty of two hundred acres to each to aid in these marauding exploits. Dunmore had made out a list of such loyal adherents, as known to him, which Germain transmitted to Hamilton. The purpose of all this deviltry, except so far as they hoped to profit by the savage sympathy, was to distract the attention of Congress and diminish the numbers of Washington's main army.

The Kentucky posts, with a population, perhaps, of six hundred, and only a half of them arms-bearing, had grown confident in their seclusion. Morgan, who was now commanding at Fort Pitt, had represented to headquarters in January, 1777, that if militia were drafted to take the place of the garrisons at Forts Pitt and Randolph, the regular companies doing duty there could be sent to reinforce the eastern army. Such self-reliance gave Hamilton what he thought an opportunity. Some two hundred of his Indians crossed the Ohio. One horde unsuccessfully attacked Harrodsburg (March, 1777), the garrison receiving a few hours' warning. Another, consisting of about a hundred warriors, was repulsed at Boonesborough (April 24). Before May was passed, they again fell upon the stockade which Boone had erected, and began on May 30 a more protracted siege of Logan's Fort, — the modern Standford, — which ended only with the relief which Colonel Bowman and a hundred Virginians brought to it in August, as he was scouring the

country in search of the foe. The Indians contrived to convey Hamilton's proclamation to repentant rebels, by leaving it on the body of a man whom they had killed outside the fort.

By the first of June, 1777, Hamilton at Detroit and General Edward Hand at Pittsburg — now in command of the western frontier — were each developing their counter movements for the summer's campaign.

The Americans had begun preparations in the spring by sending Philadelphia boat-builders to the Monongahela, to make ready some bateaux. Early in the summer, American agents at the Holston River had sought to protect the valley approaches on that side by a pact with the southern Indians. The main outposts of Pittsburg, subject to Hand's control, were Fort Randolph on Point Pleasant at the mouth of the Kanawha, and Fort Henry at the modern Wheeling. Two hundred and fifty men of Colonel Wood's regiment were garrisoning these posts. Of the neighboring Indians only the Delawares continued friendly, and they were kept in restraint largely through the influence of Zeisberger, the Moravian.

The English were fortunate in holding Niagara, a position which, as Hutchins said of it, "secured a greater number of communications through a large country than probably any other pass in interior America," and it was here, just at this turn of affairs, that the Indians were gathering to assist St. Leger, in that attempt to aid Burgoyne which was foiled at Oriskany. Detroit, however, was the chief strategic point for the English; and Hamilton, now in command there, was later put, by orders from England, in chief control of the military affairs in the Ohio valley. His main business was to harass the frontiers, open communication with Stuart at the south, and watch the Spaniards beyond the Mississippi. His outposts were at Sandusky and about the headwaters of the Scioto, and he had succeeded, as we have said, in banding the Shawnees, Wyandots, and Mingoes in the British interest.

It was Hamilton's purpose, if possible, to organize a corps of chasseurs from the French settlers within his control, and to officer them from their own people. An English officer, Abbott by name, was early in the season started towards Vin-

cennes, with some such purpose. When he crossed the portage of the Maumee, he found five hundred Indians there ready for their savage raids. In the absence of any troops to support him, Abbott, who had reached his post on May 19, found that he had to yield to their exorbitant demands, and in July (1777), while he was stockading Vincennes, he found it necessary to bind the French settlers by an oath and forego the chasseurs. The other purpose of intercepting the American supplies by the river seemed hardly more promising. The cannon which he mounted were sent to him by the commander at Fort Gage in the Illinois country, to which the armament of Fort Chartres had been removed in 1772. This officer was Rocheblave, who had been for some time busy watching the Spanish at St. Louis, and trying to divine a purpose on their part which in his imagination took many shapes. He tried at times to induce the Kickapoos to unravel it, but it did not comfort him to find that these Indians were receiving messages from the "Bostonnais," as they called the Americans, and were communicating them to the Spaniards. Upon the Foxes both he and the Spanish governor played their wiles in the effort to gain them, and to the savages' advantage, no doubt. The Ottawas were urged to receive Spanish favors, so that they could fathom, by the opportunities which dependence could offer, the plots at St. Louis. Rocheblave seems to have made the best impression upon a vagrant horde of the Delawares, who frequented his post, and he reported that he felt he could depend upon them. But the belts which he found passing between the rebels and Spaniards on the one side, and the savages on the other, were a constant riddle to him. He had heard, moreover, that the Spanish commander had spoken knowingly of something that was to happen when the maize grew to be eighteen inches high. Certain French officers, too, were known to have Spanish commissions, and he found that, despite his endeavors, French aid was enabling the Americans to run supplies up the river.

During all this Hamilton had submitted to Carleton a plan for attacking New Orleans; but Carleton was cautious, and warned him not to be too provoking with his neighbors, but rather to be prepared to resist any attack from them. Hamilton replied that the Spanish hostility was confirmed, and they had begun to seize English vessels at New Orleans.

While the season closed at Kaskaskia with Rocheblave dreaming of a Spanish conquest and a governorship at New Orleans, some bloody work was going on around the little fort near Wheeling Creek. This stockade had been known as Fort Fincastle, till lately being improved (1776), it was renamed Fort Henry, after Patrick Henry, now governor of Virginia. General Hand had not succeeded in raising the two thousand men which he had hoped for his campaign, and with no more than eight hundred men on his rolls he had not felt strong enough to take the aggressive during the summer, and had accordingly kept himself rather on the defensive. He was, moreover, not quite sure of certain men who were about him. One of them, Alexander McKee, who had been deputy Indian agent under Sir William Johnson, was put under oath to have "no communication with the British." Simon Girty, who had also been arrested, had been wily enough to reëstablish himself in Hand's opinion. Girty had for some time absented himself, but in August some friendly Moravian Indians had come in, bringing word that Girty was leading a force thither, and that Fort Henry was to be the point of attack. This defense was an oblong stockade in open ground, inclosing about half an acre of ground, bastioned, and supplied with water. The occupants of the surrounding village were still in their cabins outside the walls; but scouts were out, and they had passed a quiet summer. As the season closed, confidence had been so far restored that some of the militia had gone home, and only two companies, of not over forty men in all, remained under Colonel David Shepherd. Hand did what he could to cover the inhabitants before the stroke came. During the night of August 31, from two hundred to four hundred of Hamilton's Indians — accounts differ — ambushed themselves near by, and threw the community into confusion the next morning by a sudden approach. There was time enough, however, to enable the outside settlers to get within the defenses before the attack began. The garrison made some hazardous sallies, much to its loss of numbers; but they served to keep the assailers at bay. The leader of the enemy, finding his followers discouraged, turned to destroying what he could in the surrounding village. Succor for the besieged arriving, he disappeared with his savages in the forest. There is a good deal of confusion in the accounts

which have come down to us, and though Wither says that Girty was the leader of the assault, it is by no means certain that he was present at all.

The whole region was soon alarmed, and Hand, uncertain for a while whether to make counter incursions, at last drew in the men from his lesser outposts. Kittanning, for one, was abandoned, and the season in this part of the valley ended with little hope.

The neighboring Delawares had proved steadfast, but a band of Shawnees adhering to Cornstalk had wavered. That leader and some of his people a little later ventured to Fort Randolph, where some militia, aroused by recent atrocities, ensnared and murdered them. It was hopeless to keep any of the Shawnees neutral after this.

The campaign of 1777, in Washington's loss of Philadelphia, had not been propitious for those struggling beyond the mountains, who were thus cut off from their main seaboard connections; but the defeat of St. Leger and the surrender of Burgoyne at the north had happily intervened to put a new aspect upon the contest of the trans-Alleghany country, where so much desultory warfare had of late confused the outcome.

CHAPTER VIII.

GEORGE ROGERS CLARK, ARBITER AND SUPPLIANT.

1776-1779.

IN the early part of 1776, George Rogers Clark had cast his lot among the Kentuckians. He found them living amid dangers and stirred by political unrest. Virginia, as the parent colony, was too remote to afford them protection. There were ugly rumors of savage contests in store for them through the concerted action of the British commanders at Detroit and Pensacola. There were those on the frontiers—and it suited Clark's nature to be in sympathy—who would not shrink from the responsibility of independent action; but a soberer judgment prevailed, and it was decided not to take any decisive step before the authorities at Williamsburg were informed of the situation. On July 17, 1776, delegates from these forest communities met at Harrodsburg and chose Clark and another to undertake such an embassy. The people had already, on June 20, drawn up a memorial, in which they affirmed that the "prime riflemen" of Kentucky were not a body whose aid should be declined in troublous times. They recognized that the colonies were drifting towards that independence of whose declaration it was too early then for them to have heard. The delegates found difficulty, without intimating an alternative of their own independence, to make the council listen to their demands for powder; but Patrick Henry, then governor, as well as Jefferson, George Mason, and George Wythe, threw a strong influence in favor of the frontiers, and the grant was made. On August 2, the Assembly was induced to declare the sovereignty of Virginia over the Kentucky region, and her purpose to protect it. Later, the legislature, on December 7, created the county of Kentucky.

During the spring of 1777, the tidings from the Indian country north of the Ohio had alarmed Colonel Crawford at


Fort Pitt. When the summer opened, Clark sent two young hunters to make their way to the Illinois settlements, and to discover the situation there. They reported on their return (June 22) that the French were in the main quiet in their villages, and that only a few of their young men were participating in the British and savage raids, which were directed from Detroit. These centres of the French population were, however, used as starting-places of these marauding parties. Clark was fired by these reports with a purpose to attempt the conquest of this region, and on October 1 he again left Harrodsburg for the Virginia capital. He tells us that he met on his way many adventurers struggling through the wilderness to find new homes. When he reached Williamsburg, he found the community rejoicing over the surrender of Burgoyne, — a good omen that gave him increased enthusiasm.

On December 10, 1777, Clark laid his scheme before the governor. In case of failure in the plan, he proposed to join the Spaniards beyond the Mississippi. The Virginia council having approved Clark's plan, on January 2, 1778, the governor gave Clark a colonel's commission, and committed to him two sets of instructions, one expressing a purpose to defend Kentucky only, and the other, which was to be kept secret, authorizing him to attack Kaskaskia. In both he was given authority to raise, west of the Alleghanies, seven companies of forty men each. He was to apply to General Hand, who, as we have seen, had been in command at Fort Pitt since June 1, 1777, for a portion of the stock of powder which had been brought up the Mississippi from New Orleans, and such other supplies as could be furnished. Twelve hundred dollars in paper were given to him, and he was told to draw for further sums on Oliver Pollock at New Orleans, who would be instructed to honor his drafts. The legislature of Virginia, as Jefferson, Mason, and Wythe in their letters of congratulation assured him, was expected to appropriate as bounty to each man three hundred acres of the conquered territory. So the whole movement was a Virginia one, intended to secure her dominion over what she believed to be her charter limits. The men were enlisted under the impression conveyed by his public instructions. Three companies were raised, one hundred and fifty men in all, and these were rendezvoused at Redstone on the Monongahela,

where the boats were assembled. In May, 1778, having beside his troops a train of adventurous settlers, Clark moved on to Pittsburg and Wheeling. At both these places he picked up supplies. At the mouth of the Kanawha he found reinforcements. On his way down the Ohio, some of the accompanying emigrants left him at points where they could easily enter the wilderness. Others remained on the flotilla till May 27, when he reached the falls, near the modern Louisville. Here they were landed on Corn Island, where the rushing river broke up the reflections of canebrakes, vines, and lofty trees. A stockade was built to protect the eighty settlers, and to furnish a storehouse for his excess of supplies. Ten of his soldiers were left as a guard. He had lost something by desertion on the way, and was glad of a small company from the Holston, which now joined him. They did not prove steadfast, however, for as soon as he made known his real instructions, they left him. His total available force had now been reduced to about one hundred and seventy-five men. If it had been larger, he might at once have advanced on Vincennes; but hoping for other accessions, he determined to go to Kaskaskia first.

While making his preparations to leave, intelligence of the French alliance reached him from Fort Pitt. It was good tidings which he hoped to break to the French at Kaskaskia with some effect. On June 24, he poled his boats up the river from the island in order to gain the main channel, and then, it being a high stage of the water, the flotilla shot down the rapids "at the very moment of the sun being in a great eclipse." It was a nearly total obscuration, and it was nine o'clock in the morning. It took two days to reach a creek just above Fort Massac, relays of rowers working day and night. He met on the way some hunters, who the week before had been in Kaskaskia, and engaged one or two of them as guides.

The men were landed, and there was not a horse or cannon among them to give a show of efficacy to the courageous little army. It was on June 26 that they began their march over a route of one hundred and twenty miles, the first fifty of which lay through a swampy country. The open prairie, which came next, encouraged them in their weariness. On the afternoon of July 4, they were within three miles of Kaskaskia, and their food was exhausted. That post was in command of Rocheblave,



[From Collet's Atlas.]

a French officer who had joined the British after they had occupied the region. To save expense, and without much apprehension of the exposure of the post, its garrison had been greatly diminished, and Rocheblave had been kept there to watch the country and report upon events. The men that were left to him were in the guard hall of the fort making merry in a dance when Clark, after dark, and accompanied by his men, suddenly sprung into their company. There could be no resist-

ance, and "the self-styled Colonel, Mr. Clerke," as Rocheblave reported him to Carleton, was thus easily put in possession of the post and of all within the town. The next morning the oath of fidelity was administered. After this the townspeople, whose spirits were distinctly gladdened by the news of the French alliance, were suffered to go about their business.

The successful commander now turned for sympathy to the Spanish over the Mississippi, with whom he opened communication. He found the commandant at St. Louis more than ready to countenance him. Wherever he turned, the French about him were ready to serve him. They had much disturbed Rocheblave of late by keeping up a trade with the Spaniards, which that officer was powerless to stop. With Kaskaskia in American hands, there was nothing to prevent such traffic across the Mississippi being carried on openly.

Clark went to Cahokia — to which he had sent Bowman and thirty horsemen on the first day of his occupation of Kaskaskia — and met the northern Indians, and though he ran some hazards and encountered some treachery, the French stood by him, and in outward seeming, at least, the tribes were gained over. He sent a commission to the chief of the distant Foxes, but the British intercepted it.

Gibault, a priest at Kaskaskia, in company with Dr. Lafont and a few others whom Clark could trust, was sent, on July 14, to Vincennes. Lieutenant Leonard Helm was also of the party, and was detailed to take the military command of the place. He administered the oath to those he found, and sent belts to the neighboring Wabash Indians.

Gibault returned to Kaskaskia on August 1, and reported his success. Clark now enlisted enough resident Creoles to supply the gaps in his companies, made by the expiration of the term of his three months' men. The men thus released were sent to Virginia under an officer, who also took charge of Rocheblave as a prisoner of war.

There soon arrived from St. Louis a man in whom Clark found a fast friend. This was François Vigo, a native of Sardinia, now a man somewhat over thirty years of age, according to the best accounts, though his gravestone makes him born in 1739. He had come to New Orleans in a Spanish regiment, early in the days of the Spanish control. After leaving the

army he turned trader, and had of late been living at St. Louis, where he had become a person of influence and property. Hearing of Clark's success, he had hastened to Kaskaskia to see him. Without the financial aid of Vigo at St. Louis and of Pollock at New Orleans, it is doubtful if Clark could have sustained himself in the coming months. Governor Henry had already directed Pollock to draw on France for money to be sent to Clark, and at a later day Clark gave an affidavit that he received Pollock's remittances in specie. In September, 1778, Pollock wrote to Congress that he had just sent a new remittance of seven thousand three hundred dollars to Clark. During that year he borrowed a large amount from the Spanish governor for like uses. Vigo let Clark have twelve thousand dollars, and took Clark's drafts on Pollock for that sum. When these drafts reached New Orleans, Pollock, who had been sending powder and swivels up the river to Clark, found himself obliged to raise money at $12\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. discount to meet the obligation. Later, Pollock drew on Delap of Bordeaux on account of a cargo shipped to that port, in order to amass funds for Clark's continued drafts. Fearing that the vessel might not arrive and Delap would dishonor his draft, he solicited Congress in April, 1779, to direct Franklin, then in Paris, to assume if necessary the burden. Transactions like these before the close of the war reduced Pollock to penury. When Vigo died at Terre Haute in 1836, neglected and childless, something like twenty thousand dollars which he had paid to Clark remained unsettled. Ten years later (1846), Vigo's heirs memorialized Congress for restitution, but with little effect. In 1848, a committee of the House of Representatives recognized the obligation. Here the matter rested till 1872, when Congress referred the question to the Court of Claims, which gave a decision in favor of Vigo's heirs. The government carried the case to the Supreme Court in 1876, when long-delayed justice was rendered, but the applicants who received, including interest, fifty thousand dollars, were mainly claim agents and lobbyists. The particular draft which was the basis of the suit was one drawn on Pollock, December 4, 1778, for \$8716.40, which Vigo had cashed.

While Clark was thus engaged securing funds, measures were in progress to organize the conquered territory under a

civil government. The provisions were quite at variance with the purpose which the English ministry had had in view in pushing through the Quebec Bill, and threw back the bounds of Canada, where both the colonists and the parent government had long, through many wars, insisted that they belonged. The Virginia Assembly, in the autumn of 1778, had here created the county of Illinois, and had given to Governor Henry the authority to raise five hundred men for its defense, and to keep open communication with and through it.

Henry selected, as governor of the new county, an active Virginian, who had gone, in 1775, to Kentucky, where he had played a part in the Transylvania movement, and had later been in Clark's command, — Captain John Todd. Henry sent him instructions which required him "to cultivate and emulate the affections of the French and Indians," to command the county militia, and to use them to assist Clark. Todd, on receiving these papers, returned to Virginia to perfect plans, and when he again reached Kaskaskia in May, 1779, he bore a letter of friendship to the Spanish governor at Ste. Genevieve, which he was expected to deliver in person. He was also enjoined to take under his special care the family of Rocheblave, now a prisoner in Virginia. In appointing the county officers, Todd was quite ready to give the French a large part of them, and he endeavored to fill the country with actual settlers, to the exclusion of speculators in land.

It was a relief to Clark to find the civil administration of the region in so good hands, for events were demanding his anxious attention.

All along the valley north of the Ohio, the American cause had not prospered, and in Kentucky there had been turmoil enough, though it was not always favorable to the British and their savage allies. During the summer there were bands of Tories, horse thieves, and other renegades, traversing the Tennessee country. The Watauga community, bestirring itself, had mustered and sent out two companies of militia. These effectually scoured the country, and those of the marauders who were not captured fled to the Cherokees, or escaped northward to the British.

There was now only a hunter's hut on the site of the later

Nashville, and perhaps a dozen families were clustered about Bledsoe's Lick, stockaded together and surrounded by Chickasaws. These were relieved. Farther north, however, at Boonesborough, Hamilton, through his rangers and savages, tried hard to deliver a serious blow.

Boone, who had been earlier captured at the Salt Licks, had been taken to Detroit, where Hamilton treated him considerately. Later he was carried into the Shawnee country a prisoner, and succeeded in ingratiating himself with his masters. Here he learned that Hamilton had gathered a band of over four hundred warriors, and was intending to let them loose upon the Kentucky settlements. In June, managing to escape, Boone reached his home in time to improve its defenses. The enemy not appearing, and anxious for definite knowledge, Boone started out with a squad of men to reconnoitre. He crossed the Ohio, and had a sharp conflict with the Indians on the Scioto. Learning that Hamilton's expedition was now on the march, led by both French and British officers and flying the flags of both, it soon became a race for the goal. Boone surpassed them in speed, and reached Boonesborough in time to drive in the cattle and dispose his forty effective men for the onset. He had a score other men not equal to a steady fight.

The enemy approached the fort on September 8, 1778, — if this is the date, for there is a conflict of testimony. The leader, whom Boone calls Du Quesne, but whom the English call De Quindre, demanded a parley. This was accorded by Boone, only to find it had been treacherously asked for, and he and his men, who went to the meeting, had a struggle to escape the snare. Gaining the stockade, the siege began, and lasted several days, till the enemy finally disappeared in the woods. This repulse and the raid of the Watauga men relieved the region south of the Ohio to the end of the year.

Farther east, however, results had not been so cheering. In May, 1778, Congress had voted to raise three thousand men for service on the western frontiers. It was hoped that it might prove practicable to push this force across the country south of Lake Erie and capture Detroit. General Hand was relieved, and General Lachlan McIntosh, a Scotchman, now somewhat over fifty years old, who had been with Oglethorpe in Georgia,

and had attracted Washington's attention, was assigned to the command at Fort Pitt. Washington, at Valley Forge, had ordered the Eighth Pennsylvania regiment, under Colonel Brodhead, to the frontiers, and the Thirteenth Virginia regiment, under Colonel Gibson, was directed to be in readiness. Virginia was at the same time expected to concentrate a large force of militia. This army, when ready, was to advance in two divisions of about fifteen hundred men each, — one by the Kanawha and the other by the Ohio, and to unite at Fort Randolph (Point Pleasant). News had already been received of an attack by two hundred savages, in May, at the mouth of the Kanawha, and later on the Greenbrier; but the assailants had been foiled at both places.

It was well into June, 1778, when McIntosh began his march, but the ravages which were taking place in the Wyoming valley rendered it necessary to detach for a while Brodhead's command. It was August when the general, with this diminished force, reached his headquarters at the forks of the Ohio. Before he was ready to move on, Brodhead rejoined him.

There were at this time three main posts west of the Alleghanies, — Forts Pitt, Randolph, and Hand; but there were beside nearly two-score movable camps of rangers, who were patrolling the border. McIntosh called them in, and hoped with his force thus strengthened to advance on Detroit. It was necessary to his plan to leave friendly tribes behind him, and at Pittsburg, on September 17, with a supply of ten thousand dollars' worth of presents, he began conciliatory methods with the Delawares, who were stretched along his expected path. The Moravians had pretty well established themselves among these Indians, though not so effectually but that a part of this heterogeneous people stood aloof in the British interests. The enemy had a firm foothold among the Shawnees who occupied the lower valleys of the Great and Little Miami and of the Scioto. The upper waters of these same streams were given over to the inimical Mingoes. Beyond these were the Wyandots on the Sandusky — not always steadfast in the English interests — and the Ottawas on the Maumee, whom Hamilton could better depend upon. McIntosh tried to gather these hostile tribes to a conference, but fewer came than he had wished. Nevertheless, he thought he had gained over enough for his

purpose, and the Shawnees had consented to his traversing their country. But in doing this he had lost time, and the season was become inauspicious for an active campaign. Accordingly he began the erection of a fort on the right bank of the Ohio, thirty miles below Fort Pitt, and near the mouth of Beaver Creek. Here, at Fort McIntosh, as he called it, he established his headquarters on October 8, 1778. It was a good position to afford succor, when necessary, to the settlements which had already begun to extend to the Muskingum, and thirty miles up that river. The new fort was the first built north of the Ohio, and McIntosh had, in and around it, a body of twelve hundred or more soldiers, mainly Virginians, — a larger number of armed men than had before operated in this country. His delay here in building what Brodhead, his successor, called a "romantic" fort was thought to have prevented the main object of his campaign, — the capture of Detroit.

McIntosh, checked in his advance as he was, had got far ahead of his trains. A herd of cattle, which was driven after him, did not come up till November 3, when there was still a lack in his supplies of salt and other things. Two days later, the general started again, but with cattle to drive and other obstacles, he made only fifty miles in a fortnight, and was then sufficiently ahead of his main supplies to cause alarm, for there were rumors of an opposing force. He was following pretty much the route which Bouquet had taken fourteen years before. He had not met the enemy; but fearing concealed dangers, and needing a nearer refuge than Fort McIntosh, in case of disaster, and believing in the policy of holding the country by a chain of posts, he built a stockade on the west branch of the Tuscarawas, an affluent of the Muskingum, and named it Fort Laurens, after the president of Congress. Its site was near the modern Bolivia and close to a spot where Bouquet had built a stockade, some distance above the Moravian settlements.

This was McIntosh's farthest point, and Detroit was safe, for, without supplies and the season far gone, there was no longer hope to reach his goal. He put a bold fighter, Colonel John Gibson, in command of the post, with a force of one hundred and fifty men, to be used, if possible, in another advance in the spring. In December, the general returned to Fort Pitt, put his regulars into winter quarters, and sent his militia to their

homes. The year had ended with the American hopes nearly dashed in the upper regions of the Ohio valley.

Farther west the enemy had made a bold stroke against Clark. It looked all the more serious, if the British attack on Savannah should succeed and they should hold Augusta, — as they later did, — since it gave them two bases, not so very remote from each other. From these, with their available forces strengthened “by redeeming the army of the Convention,” as Burgoyne’s captured troops were called, they hoped to make a counter movement south of the Ohio.

The expedition which once more gave them Vincennes, while McIntosh was inauspiciously withdrawing to Fort Pitt, was conducted by Hamilton without the approval of Haldimand, now commanding at Quebec. That general held that such a movement carried the invading force beyond the reach of aid, while the government’s policy had been to depend upon marauding parties. Hamilton himself had suggested this alternative course of flying bands early in the conflict, and Germain had ordered him, March 26, 1777, to pursue it. In June such orders were received at Detroit, accompanied by injunctions to restrain the barbarities of the savages. Such precautions were necessarily inoperative, and it might have been known they would be.

The responsibility for the use of Indians during the war is pretty evenly divided between the combatants. The practice of it, however, by the ministerial party meant attacks on women and children and the spoliation of homes. The practice of it by the Americans gave no such possible misery to an invading army, which was without domestic accompaniments. The use of the Stockbridge Indians during the investment of Boston doubtless antedated the employment of such allies by the royal commanders. On Gage’s reporting to Dartmouth this fact, the minister (August 2, 1775) told that general “there was no room to hesitate upon the propriety of pursuing the same measure.” The British government at the same time began the shipment (August, 1775) of presents to reward the constancy of the Indians.

It was on September 2, 1776, that Hamilton, writing from Detroit to Dartmouth, urged that “every means should be

employed that Providence has put into his Majesty's hands," — a sentiment which, later expressed by Lord Suffolk, brought upon him (November, 1777) the scathing rebuke of Chatham. Congress did not formally sanction the use of Indians till March, 1778, and then it was conditioned on Washington's judging it to be "prudent and proper."

Few if any British officers brought themselves so much under severe criticism for inciting savage barbarities as Governor Hamilton. He sang war songs with the braves, he made gifts to parties that returned with scalps; but that he explicitly offered rewards as an incentive to taking scalps would be hard to prove, though the Council of Virginia, after Hamilton became their prisoner, charged him with doing so. His glee at the successful outcome of savage raids was not unshared by many in the royal service. We have abundant testimony of this in the observations of John Leech and others while prisoners in the British posts. This gruesome hilarity was far, however, from being universal. Such a cynical Tory as Judge Jones shuddered at it. Lieutenant-Governor Abbott, at Detroit, in June, 1778, protested against the use of Indians, and urged only the securing of their neutrality. De Peyster at Mackinac once addressed a band of braves as follows: "I am pleased when I see what you call *live meat*, because I can speak to it and get information. Scalps serve to show you have seen the enemy, but they are of no use to me; I cannot speak with them." Even Hamilton himself at times grew tender, and on hearing that Haldimand had assumed command at Quebec, he hastened to inform him that the Indians "never fail [at his hands] of a gratuity on every proof of obedience in sparing the lives of such as are incapable of defending themselves."

In June, 1777, Hamilton notified Carleton of a coming Indian council, and told him that he could assemble a thousand warriors in three weeks, "should your Excellency have occasion for their services." Shortly after this, Carleton was relieved of all responsibility in the matter, as the conduct of the war about the upper lakes had, under orders from England, been put entirely in the hands of Hamilton. When this new governor reached Detroit to take command, he at once began the enrollment of five hundred militia.

At Detroit, Hamilton was advantageously situated for an

offensive war. A British fleet consisting of the "Gage," carrying twenty-two guns and swivels, beside various smaller craft, — it was less than ten years since the British had launched their first keel at Detroit, — had command of the lakes, and could keep the post at Detroit in communication with De Peyster at Mackinac and with the British commander at Niagara, the other strategic points on these inland waters. Unfortunately for Hamilton, there was more or less disaffection at and around his post, and the health of Clark was a common toast even in the press-gang, which he kept at work on the fortifications. The governor was never quite sure that somebody was not betraying his plans, nor was he certain that for a quart of rum an Indian would not carry tidings to General Hand, who was striving to open the road from Pittsburg to Detroit. Hamilton's force was perhaps five hundred in all, consisting of four companies of the King's Regiment under Lernoult, a single company of the 47th, and two companies of Butler's Rangers.

While Clark had been preparing to descend the Ohio, Hand with five hundred men had made (February, 1778) an incursion into the Ohio country, but his movement had only that kind of success which gave his expedition the bitter designation of the "squaw campaign." His purpose was to destroy some stores which Hamilton had sent to Cayahoga (Cleveland) as a base for a campaign against Fort Pitt, and in this he utterly failed.

Late in March, Hand was distressed at new developments. Alexander McKee, Simon Girty, Matthew Elliot, and others, had for some time been exciting suspicion at Fort Pitt, where they lingered, and at last they disappeared. There was little doubt they had gone over to Hamilton, and would try on their way to Detroit to turn the friendly Delawares against the Americans. They did this, though Heckewelder, the Moravian, was sent on their tracks to prevent it. This emissary found that the renegades had passed to the Scioto, and were doing further mischief among the Shawnees. It was early summer (June) when Girty and his companions reached Detroit, and found Hamilton in the midst of councils held with the Indians. On July 3, on presenting a battle-axe to a chief, the governor said, "I pray the Master of Life to give you success," and with such prayers he was sending out parties to intercept the boats ascending the Ohio with supplies for Fort Pitt.

Thus occupied, Hamilton might well have thought he was on the whole the master of the situation, when, on August 1, 1778, he received the news of the capture by Clark of Kaskaskia. He did not at once comprehend the character of the conquest. He supposed that the captors were a party from the flotilla commanded by Willing, whom he describes as coming "of one of the best families in Philadelphia, but of infamous character and debauched morals." He further suspected that the Spaniards had as much to do with the incursion as Willing had. He looked upon the Wabash tribes now as his main dependence in resisting further raids, and sent Celoron among them with a belt. In a letter which he wrote to Germain he piteously complains that there was not now a British fort or garri-son between the lakes and the Gulf. Haldimand, before he could have got intelligence from Hamilton, was already counseling him to use the tribes of the Wabash, and fill the Ohio valley with rangers, so as to keep communication with Stuart and the Cherokees. This plan was the gist of the British policy, and Haldimand, as soon as he learned how matters had gone with Rocheblave, was urging Hamilton to active endeavors; but he never quite approved permanent posts so far remote from the lakes.

As soon as more detailed news reached Hamilton about the real actors in the capture of Kaskaskia and Vincennes, he lost no time in planning a recapture. He was still somewhat distrustful of the French about his post, and felt that all traders were rebels at heart, and so he watched them warily. It was necessary that Stuart in the south should know his purpose, and he sent a verbal statement to him by a messenger, who was to seek that Indian agent by way of the Chickasaw country.

Hamilton at this time was dreaming of some large measures. He informed Haldimand that the forks of the Ohio should be seized and fortified, as well as those of the Mississippi at the mouth of the Ohio. The occupation of Vincennes he looked upon as but a first step to these plans. On September 28, 1778, he wrote to Haldimand that "the Spaniards are feeble and hated by the French; the French are fickle and have no man of capacity to lead them; the rebels are enterprising and brave, but want resources; and the Indians can obtain their resources but from the English, if we act without loss of time."

It was important to Hamilton's plans that De Peyster, at Mackinac, should coöperate with him, and that the rebels should not be allowed to obtain a foothold on the lakes in that direction. The commander at Detroit had sent off messages to Mackinac on September 16, asking De Peyster to send his Indians down the Illinois River by the Chicago portage.

Arent Schuyler de Peyster, of a New York family, a somewhat rattle-brained person, given to writing illiterate letters, but in some ways an enterprising and prudent commander, had been in charge at Mackinac since 1774. There had grown up about that post a considerable trade, and a portion of it in the direction of the Mississippi employed a fleet of sixty canoes. Lately, and in ignorance of Clark's success at Kaskaskia, De Peyster had allowed one Charles Gratiot to go down to the Illinois country for trade, where he found the rebels ready purchasers of his wares. De Peyster learned of the true state of affairs at Kaskaskia only a few days before Hamilton had dispatched his message to him, and on September 21, 1778, he wrote to Hamilton: "The rebels are so firmly fixed in Illinois that I fear if they are not routed by some means, the whole Mississippi trade is knocked up."

De Peyster, though he had feared an attack at Mackinac, met Hamilton's demand by dispatching Langlade and Gautier, with a band of Indians, towards St. Joseph, to create a diversion in Hamilton's favor. Their instructions were dated October 26. At that time Hamilton, well posted on the doings of Clark through an Ottawa chief, had already left Detroit. Before he started, he drew up his force on the common, read the articles of war, exacted a renewed oath from the French, and got Père Potier, "a man of respectable character and venerable figure," to give the Catholics a blessing.

On October 7, the invading force, consisting of about one hundred and seventy-five whites, regulars and volunteers, and three hundred and fifty Indians, left Detroit by the river. The flotilla, on its passage to the mouth of the Maumee, experienced such stormy weather that Hamilton in his anxiety suffered "more than can be expressed." That river was then ascended to the rapids, and above these obstructions they pushed on in boats, lightening them when it was necessary to pass the rifts. On October 24, 1778, they reached the nine-mile portage, and

carrying over this, they shot rapidly down the Wabash on a freshet which Hamilton had created by cutting the beaver dams.

The force was within three miles of Vincennes when Lieutenant Helm, still in command at that post, first obtained definite tidings of the approach, though he had been disturbed by rumors some days earlier.

Helm's men, who had been about seventy in number, began to desert under apprehension. We have a letter, which at this time he wrote to Clark, and which Hamilton later forwarded. In this he says he has only twenty-one men left. He continued inditing the letter till the enemy were within three hundred yards, and closes it with expressing a doubt if he had four men upon whom he could depend. Major Hay, representing Hamilton, had appeared in the place the day before (December 16), giving warning of the danger of resistance to the townspeople. On the 17th, Helm was summoned to surrender, and did so, — the usual story of his marching out with one man may perhaps be questioned. Two days later, the British oath was administered to the residents, numbering not far from six hundred souls, of whom a third were capable of bearing arms. The community doubtless included at other seasons some hunters and traders, who were absent at this time.

Almost the first act of Hamilton was to dispatch messengers to Stuart to propose a meeting of their respective forces in the spring on the Cherokee (Tennessee) River, whence, assisted by the southern Indians, the united detachments could harry the rebel frontiers. Hamilton also notified the Spanish commander on the Mississippi that while he and Stuart struck the Alleghany frontier, a force from Mackinac would sweep the rebels out of the Illinois country, and warned him that if he expected immunity from attack, he must not harbor the Americans.

In this defiant spirit Hamilton began to fortify himself, keeping only eighty or ninety men with him, beside some French volunteers. He sent his militia back to Detroit and scattered his Indians. In the spring, he counted on their rejoining him with other reinforcements.

The next year, 1779, opened with both parties anxious over the situation in the Ohio basin. The British, flanking it at Detroit, had by Hamilton's success pushed in a wedge at Vin-

cennes. The communications of this latter post were through a friendly country, but its situation was exposed, with such a vigilant foe as Clark observing it. Kaskaskia in American hands had tolerably secure communications with New Orleans, and it was neighboring to Spanish sympathizers. But the British enjoyed far greater facilities of relief by the lakes than could be given to Clark by the Mississippi.

Between the Wabash and the Alleghany there was a wide extent of country, inhabited in the main by those friendly to the British, though a portion of the Delawares still stood by the Americans, and there were symptoms of hesitancy on the part of the Wyandots. The advanced posts of the revolutionists in this direction were at Fort Laurens and at Point Pleasant, both in almost chronic alarm from the prowling savages.

The general suspense was to be broken by a fortunate movement from Kaskaskia. Clark had for some time been busy in gaining over the neighboring tribes, and in sealing his friendship with the Spaniards and French. His success in these endeavors had not led him to anticipate the daring incursion of Hamilton, which released the American hold on Vincennes. Clark's confidence in his immunity from danger appears in his letters to Governor Henry and to the Virginia delegates in Congress, whom he had addressed in November, 1778. Henry and Jefferson no doubt saw the great importance of sustaining Clark, for his success could but tell upon the ultimate negotiations for peace, and his continued hold on the Illinois country would work a practical annulment of the pretensions of the Quebec Bill. The Virginia Assembly proved itself ready to give Clark's men such encouragement as would come from a promise of bounty lands, and later (November 23) its records bore an entry of the formal thanks which they voted to the leader himself. To cause him to be unhampered by civic duties, the new county of Illinois had been set up. But a belief in the wisdom of this western campaign was not universal, and there were those who questioned the propriety of Henry's divergence from the single purpose of protecting the Kentucky and Tennessee settlements.

Clark, however, was to silence opposition by a brilliant stroke. While Hamilton at Vincennes was preparing his plans for the spring, Clark was devising a sudden move upon the enemy on the Wabash. A corporal and six men, deserting from

Hamilton in January, 1779, had brought Clark the confirmation of rumors, if not indeed the first news of Helm's surrender. Already Hamilton's Indian scouting parties were hovering about Kaskaskia, and one of them, under an Ottawa chief, barely missed Clark one day, when he was returning to Kaskaskia from Cahokia. But more comprehensive toils were threatening him and the American cause without his knowing it.

Hamilton's couriers had already come to a plan with the southern Indians for four separate movements. Kaskaskia was to be attacked for one. The Shawnees were to be assisted in an onslaught on Fort Laurens for another. A third was to combine the Wabash Indians in a promiscuous swoop. A fourth was to station other savages at the mouth of the Cherokee River to intercept any flotilla of supplies and men passing either way. To these several bands Hamilton was to supply British officers and a horde of Ottawas, Hurons, and Chippewas.

While Clark was brooding on his own projects and Hamilton was developing his plans, each in ignorance of the other's condition, Vigo had left Kaskaskia on December 18, 1778, before news of Hamilton's success had reached that place, in order to carry supplies to Helm. One of Hamilton's scouting parties captured him on the 24th, and he was carried into Vincennes as a prisoner.

Hamilton suspected that Vigo's professions of trade were a cover for other purposes, and kept him under arrest. Father Gibault interceded, and Vigo was set free on a promise that he would do nothing at Kaskaskia on his way back detrimental to the king's interest. Vigo avoided Kaskaskia, and went to St. Louis instead. It was not long before Clark knew from a source not difficult to divine that Hamilton had but eighty men with him. It was necessary for Clark to move quickly, and Vigo's readiness to back the American credit helped Clark to get his supplies for the march. Vigo himself came to Kaskaskia on January 29, 1779. A galley, carrying small guns and munitions, was dispatched on February 4, under the command of John Rogers, down the Mississippi and up the Ohio and Wabash to a point ten leagues below Vincennes, where it was to await the arrival of Clark with a force which was to march overland. The leader, with a band of one hundred and seventy — some accounts say two hundred — adventurous

spirits, American and French, began a day or two later his painful march of about one hundred and seventy-five miles. He had one hundred and twenty miles to go, in an inclement season, finding his way in parts through drowned lands, broken with ice. There were swollen rivers to cross, now by wading and now by ferrying. Supplies grew scant, and it was almost impossible to keep powder dry. If there is no exaggeration in Clark's narrative, there were times when he despaired of life; but "the finest stallion there is in the country," come of a New Mexican stock, bore the commander through, and his men followed him with dauntless pluck.

His course was at first northwest, and he probably struck the St. Louis trail near the modern town of Salem, following a trail which fifty years ago was still visible; and after this his track lay nearly east. On February 23, the weary and famished men, kept up by the inspiration of their leader, approached the town. The Wabash was flowing by it, through a broad three leagues of submerged country, making a picture of desolation. Clark sent in a scout to the French inhabitants, and his message was kept from the garrison. Lying concealed till after dark, and taking as guides five men, whom he had captured, he rapidly entered the town. A scouting party, which Hamilton had sent out three hours before, fortunately missed them. Clark told off a part of his force to occupy the town, while a band of riflemen approached the fort, — Sackville, as it was called, — and, throwing up some earthworks, established themselves within range. During the night, after the moon went down, the party which Hamilton had sent out got safely in. By daylight the assailants' trenches were near enough to annoy the garrison with the dropping fire of their rifles, for which the townspeople had made good Clark's damaged powder. They had also given the hungry troops the only good meal they had had for a week.

There was pretty soon a passing and repassing of flags, Helm, now on parole, bringing Hamilton's messages. Clark replied in a note which Haldimand, in sending it later to Clinton, called "curious for its impertinence of style." In a personal interview, the two commanders indulged in mutual crimination, and Hamilton was charged with a barbarous spirit. Clark was stubborn for an unconditional surrender,

and Hamilton manœuvred for some modification, but all to no purpose. Before the day was gone, the fort was surrendered, with nearly eighty officers and men. There had been little bloodshed, and Clark had only one man slightly wounded.

Three days later, on the 27th, the "Willing," as Rogers's galley was called, arrived. She had buffeted longer than was expected with the strong currents of the Wabash. She added forty-eight men to Clark's little army, with some small guns and swivels. Very soon Clark sent Helm and a detachment up the river, which succeeded in capturing a train, under an escort of forty men, which was bringing supplies and dispatches for Hamilton. The party returned to Vincennes on February 27. On March 8, Hamilton and such prisoners as were not paroled, accompanied by a guard, were started on their way to Virginia. It was a long journey, and at least two thirds of the route they made on foot. They reached Richmond in May, and brought the first news of Clark's success, his earlier dispatches having been intercepted. Hamilton remained in confinement at Williamsburg till October, 1780, when he was sent on parole to New York. Later, on July 6, 1781, he made a report to Haldimand, which is our main source for the study of these campaigns for the British side.

Two days after Hamilton had started, Clark wrote (March 10) to Harrison, the speaker of the Virginia Assembly, thanking him for the vote of thanks which that body had passed, and expressing his great satisfaction at the prospect of reinforcements. "This stroke will nearly put an end to the Indian war," he said, and he expressed the expectation of finishing it in two months, if amply supported by a new detachment. "I hope to do something clever if they arrive," he added, referring to his project of a march on Detroit. He did not attempt to disguise his purpose in a note which he addressed a few days later (March 16) to the commander at that post, to which he had sent others of his prisoners, who had taken an oath of neutrality. "My compliments to the gentlemen of the garrison," he says; "if they are building works, it will save us the trouble."

Clark, in this buoyant mood, leaving in Vincennes a garrison of some forty men, under Helm, took seventy or eighty others, and on March 20 embarked in the "Willing," accompanied by

five other armed boats. His purpose was to make ready in Kaskaskia for further movements in the spring. Arrived there, he prepared, on April 29, duplicate dispatches to Henry and Jefferson, describing his campaign, and these have come down to us. His earlier letters had been taken, as has been said, from his messenger near the Ohio falls, where a party of Hurons had waylaid their bearer.

But movements were already in progress south of the Ohio destined to cause disappointment to Clark. Cameron, now working in the British interests among the southern Indians, supposed that Hamilton was secure in Vincennes. He had already planned an inroad of Chickamaugas and other Cherokees on the Carolina border, to distract attention from Hamilton's contemplated raid over the Ohio. When James Robertson, the pioneer of the Cumberland region, heard of it, he sent warnings to the Watauga people. That hardy colony immediately sprang to the task which was implied. A considerable body of riflemen, under Evan Shelby, were, by April 10, on their way down the Clinch. A part of this force was a regiment which made up the five hundred men intended for Clark and his Detroit campaign. Their diversion to a new field was never atoned for.

Shelby's onset was rapid. He destroyed a large deposit of corn among the Chickamaugas, which had been gathered for Hamilton's intended invasion. He burned the towns of that ferocious tribe, and lost not a life amid all his acts of devastation. All immediate danger to the Kentucky settlements was now at an end.

During the respite a new immigration set in by the Ohio and the Wilderness Road, and to the number of eight or ten thousand souls a year, if statements of this kind are not in excess of truth. The Virginia surveyors, to help the influx, laid out a new road over the Cumberland Mountains towards "the open country of Kentucky," so as "to give passage to packhorses."

While this success of Shelby checked the southern Indians and dashed the hopes which the British had based on their advantage in Georgia, there was among the royalists in the north

great anxiety lest Clark's prestige and the use of Fort Laurens as a base for a new advance from Fort Pitt should together put in great hazard their signal position at Detroit. If lost, however, the blow would not be irreparable, for the Ottawa River route would still afford an easy communication with Lake Huron and the western tribes.

De Peyster at Mackinac did not hear of Hamilton's capture till about the time of Shelby's raid. Langlade and Gautier had just reached Milwaukee, or as some say St. Joseph, when the unwelcome tidings scattered their Indians. De Peyster's position was an embarrassing one, for his intentions to succor Vincennes had been utterly foiled. He felt constrained to protect his own post as well as he could, and to animate the Sioux against the French, in retaliation for their encouragement of the Americans.

Haldimand, at his remote headquarters, remained for some time in dread lest Clark would send a force against Mackinac. The British commanding general, in New York, was sending word west in February, 1779, before it was known that Vincennes was in danger, that one hundred and thirty carpenters and two hundred wood-cutters had been sent by the rebels over the mountains to open a way, and that every saddler in Philadelphia was hard at work making pack-saddles. We know that in May one hundred and fifty boat-builders were at work near Fort Pitt.

Lernoult, at Detroit, received word of Hamilton's capture on March 26, 1779. An interpreter, having escaped from Vincennes in the confusion, had carried the tidings. Lernoult felt apprehensive, at once, of the safety of the train which Clark had captured, and saw how the route by the Maumee was thrown open to the Americans. He promptly sent to Haldimand for aid. While troops were on the way thither from Niagara, and before they arrived, Clark, just about being relieved by Todd of the civil government, had made up his mind (April 29) that his available force was insufficient to advance, and so expressed himself to the governor of Virginia.

To add to Haldimand's anxiety, he was also uncertain about the fate of the Vincennes convoy, and knew how its supplies would aid Clark, if he had captured it. He was also painfully conscious how difficult it had become to satisfy the Indians

with the supplies and gratuities which Hamilton, in his confidence, had promised them. Farther than this, he was at his wits' end to know who among the French, and almost under his hand, was corresponding with the rebels, for a letter of Lafayette and D'Estaing's proclamation to his countrymen, which had been issued at Boston, October 28, 1778, were insidiously circulating among them, creating not a little responsive excitement, not only among the old Canadians, but among the Indians. If this sympathy should invite raids from over the border, Haldimand had scarce a thousand men to guard a multitude of points, and of these he had learned to place small confidence upon the German regiments.

Sending his aid, Captain Brehm (May 25), to Detroit to insure better information in that direction, tidings after a while reached Haldimand from the Scioto and Muskingum valleys, which showed that the war was again starting with the spring.

Colonel John Bowman, in May, had crossed the Ohio near the mouth of the Licking, with nearly three hundred Kentucky volunteers. He made a sudden dash upon a Shawnee town near the modern Chillicothe. Having burned the houses and secured some plunder, he returned. He had dealt a blow which disinclined the savages of the north to follow English leaders in a projected movement into Kentucky. So another concerted movement of the British was checked, for Cornwallis, after Lincoln's surrender at Charleston (May 12), had counted on sending a band of Tories to lead the aroused Creeks and Cherokees upon the frontiers of Tennessee, while the northern Indians came down on the other side.

Meanwhile, the American plans on the upper Ohio were not more successful. All through the spring of 1779, scalping parties of Wyandots and Mingoes had been prowling about the exposed fort on the Tuscarawas, and ambushing convoys from Fort Pitt. Twice in the winter the savages attacked the fort, and Gibson being warned by Zeisberger, the enemy were forced to retire through the stubbornness of the almost starved garrison, for McIntosh had failed to get in supplies by way of the Muskingum. The most strenuous effort of the enemy had been made in February, 1779, after Girty had intercepted some of

Gibson's letters. Captain Bird, of the King's Regiment, accompanied by Simon Girty and a few soldiers, now led a horde of savages. Starting up from a concealment near by, they surprised a party which Gibson had sent out, and gave the first notice of an investment of the fort. For nearly a month the blockade continued, and a few days after the enemy disappeared, McIntosh arrived with relief, and found the garrison living on rawhides and roots. On the general's return to Fort Pitt, he was soon relieved of the command of the department by his second in command, Colonel Brodhead, whom Washington had selected on March 5, 1779. The new commander assumed charge of the department with small confidence in the conditions which McIntosh's course had imposed, and with still less content with the huckstering element about Fort Pitt. "The cursed spirit of monopoly is too prevalent," he wrote (May 26), "and greatly injures the soldiers." At the end of May, he heard that Fort Laurens was again threatened, and was to be attacked "when the strawberries are ripe." He succeeded at once in throwing supplies into that fort, now garrisoned by a body of seventy-five men, though the country which the convoy traversed was swarming with Indians. But in August it was thought prudent to abandon the post.

The position of all the other forts in the department had been for some time precarious. In June, Fort Randolph at the mouth of the Kanawha was abandoned, leaving Fort Henry at Wheeling the most advanced post, while an inner line of stockades from Fort Ligonier to the new Fort Armstrong at Kittanning (built in June) were the chief protections of the frontier.

While the region north of the Ohio was thus abandoned, Shelby's rapid movements had quieted, for the most part, that south of the Ohio, and encouraged some adventurous frontiersmen to cross the river and seek lands among the Delawares, relying upon their friendship. Brodhead had little confidence in that incongruous people, and did what he could to prevent the risks.

In August, 1779, General Sullivan was well started on his exasperating inroad among the Iroquois lakes of New York, partly to punish the Indians for their treachery, and partly to render more open the communication with the West. His

devastation was ample, but its effect was not lasting. Some portions of the Six Nations were beyond his reach. Such were some of the Senecas and Munseys, whose lands stretched into the northwestern parts of the present State of Ohio. To make a diversion in Sullivan's favor, and similarly to chastise this portion of that people, Brodhead, by calling in his outposts and summoning volunteers from the county lieutenants, succeeded in gathering about six hundred men near Fort Pitt. The response for volunteers had not been as general as he had wished, and he gave as a reason that the people are "intent upon going to Kentuck;" but he succeeded in getting some, who, in the guise of Indians, were content to scour the country for scalps.

Brodhead had been anxious to start on this expedition so as to get some advantage out of two hundred of his men, whose term of service expired on August 10; but it was not until the 11th that he set out, and in such spirits that he hoped he would be allowed, after punishing the Senecas, to march on Detroit. He marched up the Alleghany, and set to work burning houses, and destroying cornfields, and gathering plunder, later to be sold for the benefit of his men. He had lost neither man nor beast when, on September 14, he was back in Fort Pitt, having temporarily, at least, quelled the savage temper in this region.

In October, he sent a force to drive off trespassers who had left the Monongahela and had crossed the Ohio, while he tried to persuade the Delawares not to molest any who escaped his vigilance.

He was still dreaming of an attack on Detroit, and in November he asked Washington's permission to make it before February, when the floods would interfere. He was advised by Washington to wait till spring, and gather supplies and information in the interim. It was discouraging when Brodhead heard of the death of David Rogers and the capture of the supplies which he was bringing up the river from New Orleans. If the reports which reached Fort Pitt were true, — and Brodhead had asked Zeisberger to get him information, — the garrison at Detroit counted but about six hundred, regulars and militia.

While thus neither McIntosh nor Brodhead had accomplished

much, there had been in Jefferson and others a larger confidence in the daring backwoods spirit of Clark. By July 1, 1779, Clark had returned to Vincennes, only to be disappointed in meeting there but one hundred and fifty of the recruits whom he had expected from Virginia, and but thirty of the three hundred Kentuckians who had been promised to him. With an inadequate force, he was not tempted to carry out "the clever thing" which he had set his heart upon, and so, in August, leaving Helm at Vincennes, he returned to the falls of the Ohio. Here he again raised the question of an attack on Detroit; but it was the opinion of his council of war that at least a thousand men were necessary for such a stroke, while with half that number he could successfully hold his own. To do this, it was thought, required a force of two hundred at the mouth of the Ohio, and a hundred and fifty each at Vincennes and Cahokia.

Clark's position at the falls, where his men had been promised one hundred and fifty thousand acres in bounty land, alarmed De Peyster during the winter, lest Clark should fortify so good a strategic point. It was Clark's purpose to spend the time till spring in an incursion among the Shawnees on the Miami and Scioto; but the river fell and rendered transportation difficult, and the plan was abandoned. On November 19, he wrote a letter to George Mason, which, with his letters of February 24 from Vincennes, and April 29 from Kaskaskia, constitutes the main sources for the study of his campaigns. Clark's memoirs, said to have been written at the request of Jefferson and Madison, though more in detail, were written (1791) too long afterwards to be of comparable value.

So the year (1779) was closing almost everywhere beyond the mountains with suspense on both sides, but with the opposing generals intent on preparations for a new campaign in the spring.

In August, 1779, Haldimand had sent some aid to Detroit, and had taken measure to reassure the Six Nations, whose spirits had been rudely shattered by Sullivan and Brodhead. It seemed doubtful if Clinton could keep his promise of large reinforcements for Canada, for by September the negotiations for exchanging the Convention troops which surrendered at Sara-

toga had fallen through, and South Carolina, where the British were strengthening their foothold, had made large demands on the resources at headquarters in New York. So Detroit, though a new fort had been built there, was far from secure when, late in the year, De Peyster came from Mackinac to take charge.

That commander had left the garrison at the straits hardly more confident. The effect of Hamilton's discomfiture, when news of it had reached them in May, had been discouraging. It rendered the French uneasy, and, as De Peyster said, "cowed the Indians in general." Haldimand, when he heard of these results, asked De Peyster to send some Puants, Sacs, and Foxes down to Quebec to give them new courage at the sight of a British fleet, and later he sent a speech, for De Peyster to render to the tribes, in which he advised them "to keep the Bostonians [Americans] out of the country in order to enjoy peace and plenty."

De Peyster had by this time asked to be relieved, and Sinclair was sent to take the post, which in his superior's judgment was "in a critical situation." Not long before, a French trader, Godefroy Linctot, had deserted to the rebel cause, and in July, 1779, it had been believed at Mackinac that the renegade was preparing to attack St. Joseph with four hundred men. After this the Indians were slowly rehabilitated in the English interest, and before De Peyster left he had himself begun to be hopeful that "the Indians would clear the Illinois at one stroke," and welcome the Cherokees coming up from the south. Haldimand hardly shared De Peyster's confidence, and when Sinclair arrived in October, 1779, he found it not so easy to arouse the Indians for a spring campaign to the Illinois. Sinclair had been sent there with a distinct plan of campaign on the part of the home government. He was expected to descend the Mississippi, while Campbell from Pensacola took New Orleans and came up to meet him. Germain in the previous June had notified Haldimand of this plan, and at a later date he had instructed Stuart to keep the southern Indians in open communication with Detroit. Germain's purpose had already been, temporarily at least, dashed by Galvez's prompt movement in September, 1779, on Natchez, later to be explained, and by all efforts at the north failing.

Before the year (1779) closed, a new movement in the western regions had been consummated, which gave the pioneers a firm hold on the Cumberland valley. During a season which was the severest the frontiersmen had experienced, and which was marked by suffering and famine throughout the west, James Robertson, now closing a ten years' residence on the Holston, had spent the previous year among the Cherokees, laboring to keep them quiet. About November 1, 1779, with a train of immigrants from the Watauga hamlets, he started west. By the close of the year they had built a fort and a few cabins, which were the beginnings of the later Nashville. It was a region then known as the French Lick, and had been, since 1714, occasionally occupied by the French hunters. Vast herds of buffalo had long found the lick an attraction. Within the next three months Robertson's party built a stockade, and scattered their huts about the ground.

This occupation of a new region was the most decided gain for the American cause which a year of anxiety had developed. Clark still held the Illinois country, to be sure, but he was surrounded with little of that domesticity which comforted Robertson at the French Lick. With little homogeneousness in the Illinois population, there was scant confidence in its future. Now and for some time yet, Clark's ability to maintain himself depended on the pecuniary aid which Vigo and Pollock rendered. In November (1779), the Virginia Assembly had decided to strengthen Clark's position, but their action was wholly dependent on the credit which the governor of that State could obtain at New Orleans. For three and a half years from March, 1778, Clark dispensed fifty thousand dollars in specie, or nearly two and a quarter millions in currency. Up to the close of 1779, he drew in nearly equal parts fifty thousand dollars or more in specie from Pollock and from the Virginia treasury. Pollock's account with Virginia, mainly for the support of Clark, shows that he advanced in specie down to August, 1781, over ninety thousand dollars.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SINISTER PURPOSES OF FRANCE.

1774-1779.

LOUIS XV. of France had died in 1774, and in the mid-summer of that year, Maurepas, affable and courtly, but whatever you please in principle and a known enemy of England, had been put at the head of the cabinet of the new king, Louis XVI. The minister of foreign affairs was Vergennes, now a man of fifty-three, a patient and polite diplomat of the intriguing school. He was perfectly unscrupulous when occasion required, and an adept in the arts of deceit. "A little good-natured wisdom," said Jay at a later day, "often does more in politics than much slippery craft. By the former, the French acquired the esteem and gratitude of America, and by the latter their minister is impairing it." It was his policy to be prepared for war, and to watch for an opportunity to catch England at a disadvantage.

He must have looked on with some satisfaction when he saw his Anglican rival strive, by the Quebec Bill, to hem in her revolting colonies by the same geographical confines which France in claiming to the Alleghanies had so long struggled to maintain. A few years later, as we shall see, Vergennes himself would gladly have pressed the same restraint upon the nascent American Republic, if Franklin, Adams, and Jay had given him the opportunity. Already the alliance which was to follow the downfall of Burgoyne was a purpose of Vergennes, but he could not at this juncture escape anxiety lest the conciliatory counsels of Chatham would prevail, and lest England, by plunging into a French war, would, as her cabinet dared to hope, succeed in winning back the loyalty of her colonies. He was, indeed, astounded at the imbecility of the English ministry in neglecting opportunities of appeasing the rebels. He was told that the obstinacy of the king was at fault. The monarch

might indeed be stubborn, but the real fault was the blindness of the Tory party to the change which was taking place in what that age called the prerogative of the king, and in the principles of the British Constitution. There was an unwillingness to recognize the fact that revolutions are no respecters of vested political interests. The Tories failed to understand that civic progress is often made on the wreck of the present.

Vergennes was possessed by a similar obtuseness. Still, an occasional light was thrown into his mind by his consuming desire to humble England. Egregiously perfidious himself, he was continually prating of English perfidy.

Congratulating himself, somewhat prematurely, that Spain was won to his views, Vergennes, on August 7, 1775, in a communication addressed to the Spanish minister, distinctly foreshadowed his purpose of active intervention in the American war. In October, M. Bonvouloir sailed in the "Charming Betsy" for Philadelphia, under secret instructions from Vergennes, to observe what was going on in the American Congress. He was also to seek occasions to let the Americans know of the sympathy of France.

Doniol's bulky acknowledgment of French heartlessness, as his great work has proved to be, as well as Stevens's *Facsimiles*, show us how detestably insincere Vergennes could be. Near the end of 1775, he put on record his opinions for the edification of his king. He told his royal master that French aid alone could make sure the success of the colonies. He assured him that it was the true policy of France to cripple her natural enemy. When the struggle in America had weakened England, the time, he said, would come publicly to assist the revolt. Meanwhile, he explained, France must keep the American courage up, by promises, till such a propitious turn of the contest comes.

The American Congress was at the same time playing into Vergennes's hands. Late in November, they had instituted a Committee of Secret Correspondence, with Franklin at its head, and on December 12 this committee instructed Arthur Lee, then in London, to make approaches to the Continental powers.

When the new year (1776) opened, Vergennes found himself, through the intrigues of his enemies, in a degree of embarrass-

ment which was increased by the indecision of the king. Before January was gone, a letter from Beaumarchais, saying that England was nearly hopeless, was so skillfully used in Vergennes's hands that the king withdrew his opposition, and the way seemed clear.

Still, the influence of Maurepas and Turgot was against precipitating a war, which, in the latter's judgment, might, by emancipating the British colonies, give the signal for the revolt of all colonies of whatever power. Turgot was indeed in a fair way to prove too much of an obstacle, and in May he was dismissed.

Early in March, encouraging reports came from Bonvouloir, and Gerard de Rayneval formulated the results for Vergennes's eye. It was represented that if the humiliation of England was carried to an extent of assuring the independence of the colonies, France could have no fear of them in their exhaustion. War with England was represented as inevitable, whatever the result of their assisting the colonies.

Vergennes had no disposition to retreat, and on May 2, 1776, he definitely requested the king to approve a grant of money to the colonies, and the royal assent was given. Up to this time the minister had abstained from positive action in aid of the colonies; but he had winked at the help which was being given in the French ports. It was a turning-point, and a policy was begun of decided significance.

The troops which England had already dispatched to America alarmed Vergennes, lest a way be found in the sequel to hurl them against the French West Indies. At the same time, he aroused Spain by picturing a like danger, if these troops should be moved against New Orleans. The ministers at Madrid were not slow to see how Louisiana could aggrandize Spain, if England, in the first instance, and, after that, if her severed dependencies, could be kept back from the Mississippi. Nothing could conduce so much to this end as the exhaustion of both parties in the war, and the greater the exhaustion, the better prospects for France and Spain. It was thus, with Spanish connivance, the hope of Vergennes to lure the Americans to a collapse by giving them hope that they could obtain a subsidy of money. On May 3, 1776, Vergennes proposed to Spain that she should advance a million dollars to the Americans.

Grimaldi, in advising his royal master to accede to the proposition and sharing Vergennes's sinister aims, congratulated him on a movement which might not only force England to destruction, but would at the same time exhaust the Americans. The colonists would in this way become in the end an easy prey to the Bourbons.

Meanwhile, the American Congress, ignorant of the concealed purposes of France, had sent Silas Deane to Paris as its agent. The Committee of Secret Correspondence had given him, on March 3, his instructions. Deane soon found himself the sport of two parties in the gay capital. On the one side he was shadowed by a complacent American named Bancroft, who reported everything to the English ministry. On the other, Vergennes, with whom Deane had his first meeting in July, (1776), played the sympathizing friend to conceal his inimical wiles. With diplomatic blandness the French minister promised all that America could need.

Not long afterwards came tidings of the Declaration of Independence. Vergennes was now aroused, and active interference seemed imminent, while Beaumarchais had attained a position where he could assure the American Committee of Secret Correspondence that his fictitious house of Hortales et Cie was ready to be an intermediary in bringing Congress and the French government into closer relations. Still later, (August, 1776), Vergennes, while urging his royal master that the time for action had come, also suggested to Spain that she could now throw off the mask. Spain hesitated, as Portuguese affairs perplexed her, but on October 8, she assented. Almost at the same time, news reached Paris of Washington's defeat on Long Island, and that untoward event called a halt in the autumn of 1776.

Meanwhile, events were moving rapidly in America, and Spanish officials were winking at aid given the colonies at New Orleans.

Intelligence of the action on July 4, 1776, at Philadelphia, had hardly reached Fort Pitt when, under orders of Congress, and by direction of the State of Virginia, Captain George Gibson and Lieutenant Linn started, on July 19, down the river in the disguise of traders. When, in August, they arrived

at New Orleans, they found the Spanish governor, Unzaga, in no complacent mood. He had been uneasy under the suspicion that in diplomatic ways all was not going well. He was apprehensive that England would succeed in pacifying her colonies, and could then, with their aid, turn upon Louisiana. To get information, he had already sent a spy to Philadelphia.

Gibson and his companion found, however, prompt sympathy in Oliver Pollock. This American had begun active exertions in behalf of his countrymen in April, 1776, when he had unsuccessfully tried to persuade Unzaga to protect American vessels against British warships. With Pollock's aid Gibson's acts were partly concealed from the British spies, and he bought twelve hundred pounds of powder. A part of it, under Pollock's direction, was shipped north by sea, while the greater bulk of it, nine thousand pounds, in one hundred and fifty kegs, was placed on barges to ascend the river. This was done while English spies were watching for some overt act, and, to make it appear that he was committing some offense against Spanish law, Gibson allowed himself to be thrown into prison.

Linn, in charge of the barges, started homeward on September 22, 1776. It was a long pull against the current for nearly eight months, and it was May 2, 1777, before the lieutenant delivered his dangerous burden to Colonel William Crawford, at Wheeling, "for the use of the Continent." The expedition, in its slow progress, had run great risks of being intercepted.

After Linn had started north, Pollock wrote from New Orleans to Congress, tendering renewed services and recounting the beneficial effect which the Declaration of Independence had made in that town. He said that the governor was ready to open trade with the Americans, and would protect their cruisers and prizes, should they come into the river. He also added that this Spanish official was ready to unite with Congress in maintaining a regular express by the Mississippi and Fort Pitt, between Philadelphia and New Orleans. Pollock's sympathies had not escaped the notice of the English spies. His surrender was demanded by the British commander at Pensacola, but was refused. An English sloop-of-war was lying down the river, and Pollock was fearful that some untoward accident might throw him into its commander's hands. Accordingly he desired Congress to give him a commission in some capacity,

so that he could have its protection in an emergency. In the same letter Pollock adds that the Spanish governor had sent orders to the mouth of the river to put American vessels entering the passes under the Spanish flag.

On the 1st of February preceding (1777), Don Bernardo de Galvez, the commander of a regiment in the garrison at New Orleans, succeeded to the governor's chair. He very soon opened communication through Major Cruz, at St. Louis, with Colonel Morgan on the Ohio, and took Pollock into his confidence as one whom Unzaga assured him he could trust.

Galvez was a young man of twenty-one, of powerful family connection, and likely to bring Spanish and French interests into close relations. Jay, who later knew his relatives in Spain, informed the president of Congress that "the one on the Mississippi has written favorably of the Americans to his brothers here, and it would be well to cultivate this disposition." The opportunity to do so was not lost.

The new governor soon strengthened himself by bringing emigrants from the French West Indies. In retaliation for British captures on the lakes back of New Orleans, he boldly seized some English vessels trading between the Balize and Manchac. He began to build some boats to carry long-range guns, which would be more than a match for the light guns which any vessel could take over the bar at the mouth of the Mississippi.

Pollock soon devised some audacious plans. In April, 1777, he sent a vessel north under Lemire to inform Congress that Galvez stood ready to furnish cash and supplies to any American force intending to capture Pensacola, and a little later (May 5) he urged Congress to make a decision, and, if favorable, to send blank commissions to be used in raising troops in New Orleans. Colonel George Gordon, commanding at Fort Pitt, had forestalled any action of Congress, and before Linn's return he had sent word to Galvez that if the Spaniards would supply transports, he was hoping to send one thousand men down the river prepared to attack Mobile and Pensacola. A little later, the Spanish governor was assured that he need have no apprehension, but that the Creeks, Choctaws, and Chickasaws could be depended upon to stand neutral. Nothing came of the project, but the Committee of Secret Correspondence took on their part

an important step when they appointed, in June, 1777, Pollock their commercial agent, and directed him to ship at once forty or fifty thousand dollars' worth of cloths and strouds to Philadelphia by three or four swift vessels, promising to send flour in return to balance the account.

It was not long before the British blockade of the Atlantic coast had become so close that Congress found it impossible to send the flour out of port. In October, Pollock was told to run the necessary risks of forwarding supplies along the coast, as transportation by the river was too slow and, because of Indian forays, too hazardous for their present exigencies.

On September 26, 1776, a few days after Linn's barges had cast off their moorings at New Orleans, Congress had appointed some commissioners to Europe. At their head was Franklin, and he was not without hope that in the final settlement he could induce the British ministers to sell Florida and Quebec to the new Republic. His companions in the mission were to be Arthur Lee, now in London (for Jefferson had declined to be one), and Deane, already in Paris. The latter, active in mind, had conceived a new plan for relieving the stagnation of events, and on December 1, before Franklin arrived, he had written home, outlining a scheme to attract immigration, and to find money for the depleted treasury of the colonies. He thought that the country which the Quebec Act had aimed to alienate from the colonies would be "a resource amply adequate, under proper regulations, for defraying the whole expense of the war, and for providing the sums necessary to purchase the native right to the soil." To give this land its value he proposed that it should be made a distinct State, of twenty-five million acres, to be confederated with those other colonies which had made a declaration of independence. The settling of it was to be left to one hundred or more grantees, while Congress reserved for their own advantage one fifth of the land, mines, etc. To induce immigration, he relied upon the sympathy with the American struggle which, despite the calculating selfishness of the Vergennes ministry, was marked among the French people. Before the month (December) closed, the American commissioners, Franklin being now on the spot, had their initial meeting both with Vergennes and the Count

d'Aranda. They got some encouragement in the promise that American privateers should have equal protection in the French and Spanish ports. Vergennes, however, had lost some of his boldness, or was veiling it, when, a few weeks later (February, 1777) Grimaldi was succeeded at Madrid by the Count Florida Blanca.

This man, who thus became the Spanish king's prime minister, was forty-six years old; he had risen from an inconspicuous station, and by force of character had well crowded with action his mature life. He disliked England, was jealous of France, and hated revolutions. He certainly was not quite ready to make good all the promises which Grimaldi had made. He had his eye on Portugal, and he wished rather to have French aid in securing that little kingdom, than to join in the struggle in British America. He thought, also, that France and Spain could work together better in Brazil, a Portuguese dependency, than in North America. Vergennes felt otherwise, and this lack of accord, as well as the bad news from Washington's army, seemed at present to be fatal to an agreement.

To offset the ill effects of the military miscarriages near New York, Congress was quite prepared (December, 1776) to promise its assistance in capturing Pensacola from the British and share its advantages as a port, as well as the navigation of the Mississippi, with Spain; but this willingness was not known till April, when Franklin opened the question with Aranda. A few weeks before (March 4, 1777), Arthur Lee had met Grimaldi at Burgos, but he could get no promise of active assistance. He further learned that Florida Blanca was apologizing to England and playing shy with Vergennes. Nevertheless, it was intimated that the Americans would find powder and other supplies at New Orleans, which they could take, if they liked, on credit.

In France there was an active public opinion, asking for action, largely induced by the influence of Franklin. But Vergennes repelled the request of the American commissioners for guns and ships, and made a show of preventing Lafayette and De Kalb embarking for America. By April 20, however, Lafayette, who had fled to Spanish territory, put to sea, though ostensibly for the West Indies.

This exodus, or some other incident, had aroused Stormont,

the British ambassador in Paris, to a belief that an expedition to aid the rebels was arranged by a French general officer, and he suspected that he could get more particular information if he could pay fifteen hundred guineas for it. His government was not quite as credulous, and directed him not to pay the money. Before long the French cabinet was assuring the London statesmen of their determined neutrality. This led the British ministry in July to propose a treaty, in which both England and France should guarantee their respective possessions in America. Vergennes was not to be caught, and before many days had passed, he and the king were pretty well agreed that the expected crisis for determinate action had come. There was some difficulty in making the king see wisdom in abetting a rebellion against a royal brother; but Vergennes had little sympathy with any such sentiments, when the purpose to punish England was in the balance. It had come to be simply a question of the opportune moment for a public declaration. Franklin, in September, was assuring Congress that the commissioners were much too far from accomplishing their object. The final fruition of all his hopes was nearer than Franklin could have judged. The autumn had brought mingled elation and regret in the colonies. Washington had failed at Brandywine and Germantown; but Burgoyne had capitulated at Saratoga. An army worsted was no offset to an army captured, and Jonathan Austin Loring, when he sailed, on October 30, as the messenger of good tidings to the American commissioners in Paris, carried also conviction to the hesitating cabinet of France.

Early in December, 1777, and not many hours apart, the startling news reached Lord North in London, just as he had returned at midnight from a debate in Parliament, and it was broken to Franklin at Passy by the Boston messenger. It was soon heard by Vergennes. "There must be no time lost," he said. He let the king, who was wondering what Spain would do, understand that an advantage was likely to accrue to whomever first welcomed the Americans to the company of nations.

Beaumarchais, when he was trying to induce the French king to advance the Americans a million, told him that "to sacrifice one million to make England spend a hundred is but advancing a million to obtain nine and ninety." The present news was a stronger plea than any argument of his could be,

and having received it from London, he had hopes of being the first to break it in Paris. He was hurrying to that capital as fast as his horses could gallop, when his carriage overturned, and he was put to bed in agony in a neighboring house. It was December 6, and he sent a message ahead, dictated from a couch of pain. It was too late. The king was already engaged in inviting propositions from Franklin. Two days later (December 8), the American commissioners, in language that had probably been arranged with Vergennes, made their response in a document which was at once dispatched to Spain. It had no immediate effect. Spain's Mexican and Brazilian fleets, with their treasure, were still awaited, and it was not prudent to incite England to their capture. Beside, Spain's rupture with Portugal was still unhealed. At least, such were the professions.

Vergennes, meanwhile, was having conference with the American commissioners, and on December 17 they were informed that France was ready for an alliance and would make an acknowledgment of their independence. Ten days later (December 27), Vergennes was sending word to Madrid that Spain was losing the opportunity of centuries to cripple the power of England, and recover Gibraltar, Minorca, and Florida. France had already pledged her power to the extent, in one way and another, of about three million livres, as Vergennes and Franklin both knew!

The new year (1778) opened in France with the American commissioners greatly satisfied with the outlook. "Ever since Burgoyne's fate was known," wrote William Lee, "we are smiled at and caressed everywhere." Louis XVI., following up the arguments of his minister, was sending word to his Bourbon brother of Spain that he had come to an understanding with the American commissioners, "to prevent the reunion of America with England." Every obstacle removed, on February 6, 1778, the treaty was signed. Stormont, the English ambassador in Paris, divined what was in progress, and a certain "Mr. Edwards" was probing the secrets for him, — perhaps, under a new guise, the same Dr. Edward Bancroft who had been dogging the steps of Deane. Stormont was paying well for what information he secured, and was naturally immersed in the misery of not knowing just how much to believe

of all that was betrayed to him, while, as the negotiations proceeded, Maurepas, in his intercourse with him, was blandness itself in his denials. Within two days, it was confidently believed in London that the French king had at last succumbed, and had banished his qualms of conscience in recognizing rebels. It was supposed that the allied parties had agreed to give Canada and the West Indies to France, if the fortunes of war threw those regions into their hands.

On March 10, 1778, Vergennes instructed Noailles in London to break the news to Lord Weymouth, and on the 13th it was done. The respective ambassadors of the two countries were withdrawn, and when Stormont reached London on the 27th, he found bank stocks at 69, a drop to less than a moiety of the value of two and a half years before.

This condition to a mercantile people was very alarming. Grenville Sharp and others were already outspoken for an accommodation with America on the basis of her independence. It would prevent, they claimed, a rupture with France and Spain. North had inclined to the same view; but it was not a grateful one to the king and the rest of the cabinet. They so far felt the pressure, however, as to introduce into Parliament (February 17) acts of conciliation with America on the ground of continued allegiance. They were passed, and reached America by the middle of April.

France, fearful of their effect, was soon reassured by a prompt rejection of them by Congress. The movement of the English ministry encouraged Florida Blanca to offer mediation for the purpose of curbing the ambition both of the colonies and of England, and of assuring some territorial aggrandizement to Spain. It was Spain's proposition to confine the revolted colonies to the Alleghany slope, while she guaranteed to England the valley of the St. Lawrence and the region north of the Ohio, taking to herself all south of the Ohio between the mountains and the Mississippi. England was not so much in straits that she could come to such an agreement, and the arbitration was refused.

Spain got nothing for her pains, and France was content, both with the failure of Lord North, and with the disappointment of Florida Blanca. It all looked well in the mind of Vergennes for securing deeper revenge upon England. Vergennes

cared nothing for America, if only her exhaustion was increased so that France could the better become the arbiter of her future. His simple purpose was to degrade England first, and America next.

The defeat of Florida Blanca's plot with England was felt by Vergennes to open the way to secure the alliance of Spain, and it was well known what Spain wanted. "The Court of Spain," wrote Lee to Congress, March 19, 1778, "will make some difficulties about settling the dividing line between their possessions and those of the United States. They wish to have the cession of Pensacola." Ten days later (March 29), Vergennes wrote to Gérard at Philadelphia that Spain would probably require a promise of Florida before she would accede to the alliance, and Gérard was instructed to prepare Congress for yielding that point. To insure the continuance of the alliance with France, Gérard was reminded that the United States should be made to understand that Canada must remain to England, France renouncing any purpose of regaining that province.

When Congress, on May 4, 1778, had ratified the treaty, attention had already been directed to the Spanish problem on the Gulf. Patrick Henry, as governor of Virginia, had as early as October, 1777, been urging upon the Spanish authorities at New Orleans the opening of trade with the States by the Mississippi, and now again in January, 1778, he was making a distinct proposition to Galvez to accept produce sent down from Kentucky in return for munitions and cash. In the following June, Colonel David Rogers started from Fort Pitt, in two boats built by General Hand's orders, to make a beginning of the trade. Reaching New Orleans in October, he found that Galvez was so ignorant of the geography of the valley that he had sent the goods intended for Virginia to St. Louis. Thither Rogers was obliged to return for them. The passage of the Mississippi to and fro was made with little danger, as ever since April, the river above New Orleans had been freed of the English flag; but later, while ascending the Ohio, and near the mouth of the Licking, the little flotilla was waylaid, as we have seen, by Hamilton's Indians, and its commander killed.

Meanwhile, a more active career awaited Captain James

Willing of Philadelphia. This officer had departed from Pittsburg, bearing a commission from Congress. He had less than fifty men ; but as his business was mainly to plunder, he picked up recruits as he went. One of his aims was to placate or intimidate the Tory settlement about Natchez, where a body of loyalists had bought of the Choctaws, in 1777, a stretch along the river from 31° to the mouth of the Yazoo, a distance of something over one hundred miles. During January, Willing had carried a rather ruthless hand among the upper settlements of the river. In February, he was at Natchez, devastating the estates of such as had fled across the river. He seized one of the Tory leaders, Colonel Anthony Hutchins, and took him to New Orleans, where he was put on parole. The plunder which Willing also took away was estimated by those who suffered at a million and a half dollars in value. The agents of France in New Orleans were not altogether pleased at this kind of domination for the American flag, inasmuch as too much success might give the Republic such territorial claims on the river as it was not French policy to encourage. Rocheblave, who commanded the British post in the Illinois, when he heard of the fall of Philadelphia, and that it was reported that some of the chief rebels were "flying by way of Fort Pitt," imagined that Willing's exploits were simply preparing the lower Mississippi as a refuge for disheartened patriots.

In April, 1778, Pollock complained to Congress that a British sloop-of-war was still capturing vessels at the river's mouth, but he had at least ground for rejoicing in the new commission from Congress, which Willing had delivered to him, and in that officer's destruction of the Tory nest at Natchez, which had been supplying provisions to Pensacola and Jamaica.

Pollock now dispatched one Reuben Harrison to Natchez to preserve the neutrality which Willing had instituted ; but Hutchins, breaking his parole, reached that post ahead, and, gathering his old associates, Harrison's boat was lured to the banks and captured. This for a while ended the neutrality. To keep the river open for the passage of supplies to the Ohio looked now hopeless, for the "Hound," a vessel sent from Pensacola, was likely before long to reach a station at Manchac, near Baton Rouge, where her boats could patrol the river. Pollock's plan was for American boats coming down from above to avoid capture by being put under the Spanish flag.

Willing was now raising men in New Orleans, and was intending to risk passing up the river with a flotilla in time to reach the falls of the Ohio in October, which, with his lading of supplies for Fort Pitt, he could best pass at that season.

In April, 1778, Galvez issued a proclamation permitting trade with the United States. Pollock, at the same time, was fitting out a captured letter of marque as an American cruiser. He was somewhat embarrassed for money, as he had not yet received from Philadelphia the \$36,000 due him for the supplies which he had sent up the river.

Notwithstanding there had been no adhesion given as yet in Madrid to the American cause, it was apparent that the representatives of Spain and America were acting now in much harmony at New Orleans. The price of this informal connection might put Spain, possessed ultimately of Florida, in a position to contest with the Republic the eastern bank of the Mississippi, as it turned out she did.

As the summer (1778) came on, the British plans had worked out to their satisfaction. They controlled Natchez with a force of two hundred men. Another sloop-of-war, the "Sylph," with a crew of one hundred and fifty men, kept a body of sixty British rangers under cover at Manchac. Others were expected, for Clinton, in New York, had been aroused to the exigency.

Pollock was accordingly obliged to bestir himself and send warnings up to the Arkansas to meet any boats descending the river. In July, two Scotch merchants in New Orleans, Ross and Campbell, were found to be sending tidings to Natchez of intended attempts to send supplies up the river. They were seized and sent to Pensacola. The reëstablished Tories at Natchez had indeed rendered the blockade of the river so effectual that Willing hesitated to start with his supplies. In August, however, under the escort of an armed force, led by Lieutenant George, he hoped to ascend the river for other exploits, — the expense of the undertaking being met in part by a loan of \$6,000 from Galvez; but nothing came of the plan.

Pollock had been long anxious for some decisive stroke. In May, he had urged Congress to start an expedition from Fort Pitt to sweep the British from the river, and then to advance on Pensacola. He was confident there was not in that post, beside Indians, more than eight hundred to a thousand men. He

thought a thousand Americans could clear the Mississippi, and that three thousand could capture Pensacola. He had himself, he adds, secured a prize ship, the "Rebecca," and put a suitable armament on board with one hundred and fifty men, and in two months he hoped to coöperate in attacking the English ship at Manchac. But his plans miscarried. In the autumn, the British control of the river was so well maintained that he was obliged to send Willing and his men north by sea. In December, he dispatched a vessel to Havana with merchandise to be exchanged for supplies, which were to be sent thence to the United States. He had gone on spending his own money and receiving no remittances from Congress, which was now over \$40,000 in his debt. He was selling his own slaves to enable him to meet his outstanding obligations.

As the summer and autumn (1778) wore on, the purpose of France was developed. Franklin, as sole commissioner, was treating with Vergennes in Paris, and Gérard and Gouverneur Morris were conferring in Philadelphia. The object of Vergennes was unmistakable. He would, in confining the new Republic to the Atlantic slope, propitiate Spain, and in giving the region north of the Ohio, with Canada, to England, he would establish a constant menace between the colonies and the mother country, and cripple the future of the nascent Republic. So he talked with Franklin with as much bland concealment of his intention as he could, while he instructed Gérard to prepare Congress for submission to Spain's demand. France at this time had eighty ships of the line and sixty-seven thousand sailors, and for ten years she had been drilling ten thousand gunners for her navy. Nevertheless, she urged that England with her one hundred and fifty ships of the line (and two hundred and twenty-eight in all) was an overmatch, unless the sixty great ships of Spain could be added. D'Estaing, with his fleet, had not certainly, during the summer, justified in American waters the hopes which had been entertained. Therefore it was necessary for America, as Vergennes represented, to abate her territorial pretensions and secure the alliance of Spain for a common good. By October (1778), it seemed as if Vergennes had brought Florida Blanca to consent to join the alliance on certain conditions. These were that the war should

be continued till Gibraltar was gained for her, either by capture, or by agreement at the peace; and that America should agree to her having Florida and the trans-Alleghany region. Morris, in Philadelphia, was unfortunately showing how the Republic might yet give in to such demands. He was confessing to Gérard that yielding the Mississippi to Spain and Canada to England might the better restrain the western communities in any arrogant hope they felt of future independence. There was no such hesitation about Canada in Lafayette. He and D'Estaing had planned for an invasion north of the St. Lawrence, and had sent from Boston a proclamation to arouse the native French of Canada. This done, D'Estaing had in November sailed for the West Indies, while Lafayette, two months later (January, 1779), went to France to work out this aggressive movement for the coming season. Washington saw the dangers of it for the Republic, as a Frenchman like Lafayette could not. The fear of the American leader that France, reëstablished in Canada, would help the schemes of Spain on the Mississippi, led very soon to the abandonment of the project.

Nor did a scheme of Vergennes and Charles III. of Spain, planned at the same time, result in any action. Gérard was instructed to sound Congress cautiously in the matter, but we know little more of it than as a proposition to the United States to accept a long truce with England instead of a peace, during which France and Spain would have time for arranging ulterior projects. England, however, was in no mood to come to terms of France's proposing after her own approaches to Congress had been repelled, and while France kept a fleet in the American waters. It was apparent that both England and Spain preferred to gain time, rather than commit themselves to any definite arrangement.

Early in 1779, Congress had decided (January 14) to make no peace without the concurrence of France, and it was apparent at what price Spain would render her aid in the war, and that the United States were mainly to pay the cost. Gérard, instructed by Vergennes, was assiduously impressing upon Congress that the demands of Spain were proper and should be met; that it was meet for America to renounce territorial ambition and be content with thirteen States along the Atlantic

slope, and that there was great danger of an Anglo-Spanish league, unless Pensacola and the free navigation of the Mississippi were assured to Spain.

Spain, meanwhile, was toying with Grantham at Madrid, professing a desire for alliance with England, and suggesting the benefits of the proposed long truce with her colonies as best to calm the internecine passions. At the same time she was shuffling with France, and waiting the results of Gérard's intrigues at Philadelphia, buoyed up the while by the hope of regaining something of that imperial dominion in the New World which the bull of demarcation had assigned to her at the end of the fifteenth century. While Vergennes (February 12) was submitting to Spain a proposition to fight England unceasingly till America's independence was secured, leaving Spain's aspirations to be satisfied by wresting something from America in the future, Florida Blanca set no less a price on the adhesion of Spain than the old demand of Gibraltar. When their demands were known, Congress, on March 19, with considerable spirit, announced that while Spain might possess Florida, the American States had no intention of releasing claim to all that England gained below the Great Lakes by the treaty of 1763, and to the full navigation of the Mississippi. To make their intentions definite, Congress defined the bounds by a line from the northwest angle of Nova Scotia, along the height of land between the Atlantic and the St. Lawrence to the northwest head of the Connecticut, and thence direct to the south end of Lake Nipissing, and on to the sources of the Mississippi, — of course in ignorance of just where those sources were. It was provided as an alternative that, if it became necessary, the line beyond Lake Nipissing might be run farther south, but not below 45°. On the south they claimed the left bank of the Mississippi above 31°, — the old southern bounds of the Carolina charter of 1663, which had indeed never been acknowledged by Spain. There was also a distinct demand on Spain for a port of entry on the river within Spanish Louisiana.

While this action was pending, and the British commander in New York was strengthening Pensacola with General Campbell's force of fifteen hundred men, Spain, fearing England less now that she had lately augmented her fleets, entered into a secret treaty with France on April 12, 1779, and thus joined

hands in the new triple-combination against Great Britain. The professed object of this clandestine alliance was to secure Gibraltar, and to distract England by an invasion of the British islands, and by attacks on Minorca, Pensacola, and Mobile. It is only of late years that the full text of this convention has become known, and Bancroft, in his earlier editions, had allowed larger pretensions for Spain than were given to her.

Six days after the treaty had been concluded, Spain made other perfidious propositions for alliance with England, and these being rejected, on May 3, 1779, she openly declared war. There was now no further doubt on England's part of what she was to encounter. In the early part of the summer the European parties to the conflict were manœuvring for an advantage, while Congress was at the same time facing a serious complication in the evident purpose of France and Spain to insist on recognizing England's territorial pretensions in the Quebec act. France saw that this gave Spain a better chance of wresting the country north of the Ohio from England, — as indeed was attempted by Spanish troops in 1781, — than from the grasp which Virginia was preparing to make upon it, and did make in 1779.

On June 17, 1779, Germain notified Haldimand of the Spanish war, and instructed him to reduce the Spanish posts on the Mississippi and assault New Orleans. At the very beginning of the year (1779) Hamilton, at Vincennes, had reported that the southern Indians, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Alibamons, had been banded in the British interests, and that were he sure that Spain had declared war, he could, with the aid of the savages, push the Spaniards from the Mississippi, since, as he affirms, the Spanish authorities had but slender influence with the tribes. The British commander at Pensacola had also had his emissaries among the Cherokees, and within a month from the time when Haldimand was prompted by Germain to attack the Spanish, these savage marauders were harrying the confines of Carolina. Arthur Lee had anticipated this, and while Germain was writing to Haldimand, Lee was warning Spain that a British foothold in Carolina meant the use of it as a base to dispatch the Indians against the Spaniards on the Gulf. Already, by a pact with the tribes, the Chickasaws and Choctaws were scattered along the Ohio and Mississippi to

intercept supplies from New Orleans, in case they had run the gauntlet at Natchez, where some English rangers under Captain Bloomer were now stationed.

This was the condition in the Great Valley, and such were the English intentions, when Galvez, the young Spanish governor at New Orleans, threw himself into the war with admirable spirit. As early as March, 1779, Patrick Henry had urged upon Washington to dispatch an expedition against Natchez to preserve communications with New Orleans from the up-country, since Pollock's shipments of munitions and supplies by the river had become uncertain. Little heed, however, had been given to the advice, and at this time there was a small chance that Campbell at Pensacola and Hamilton at Vincennes might be able to work in conjunction and maintain the blockade of the river, if not drive the Spaniards out.

On July 8, the Madrid authorities had sent instructions to Galvez for an active campaign. The proclamation of hostilities with England had been made at Havana on July 22, and Galvez was soon aware of the British purpose, which he learned from an intercepted dispatch.

By August 18, he had fitted out a flotilla, when a hurricane, sweeping the river, sank his vessels. His energy soon replaced them. Accompanied by Pollock—to whom Galvez had unsuccessfully offered a Spanish commission—and a few other Americans, who preferred to carry their own flag as a separate detachment, and with a following of six hundred and seventy men, Galvez began the ascent of the river. On September 7, with a force increased at this time to over fourteen hundred men, he approached the southernmost point held by the British, Bayou Manchac, where he carried Fort Bute by assault. He was now one hundred and fifteen miles above New Orleans, and from this point to Natchez the British were in possession. A week afterwards (September 13), he began regular approaches before the fort at Baton Rouge, and eight days later it surrendered, and carried with it Fort Panmure at Natchez, the successor on the same site of the old Fort Rosalie of the Natchez wars. Colonel Hutchins, the paramount British authority in the region, and a traitorous sneak by nature, left it to Colonel Dickson to make the surrender.

Several hundred prisoners, large supplies, and various trans-

ports thus fell into Spanish hands, and Galvez returned to New Orleans to extend Louisiana over Florida, as far as the Pearl River, and to welcome in October some reinforcements from Havana.

These successes encouraged Pollock, who was just now much in need of good cheer. With Continental money in circulation to about \$200,000,000, and reduced to an insignificant value, Congress had failed to keep with him its promises of remittances, and, to make matters worse, not a single vessel of those he had sent north by sea with supplies had escaped the British blockaders. About the only produce which Congress could depend upon to keep Pollock in funds was flour, and it was practically under an embargo in the Atlantic ports, so much of it had been needed to feed the army and D'Estaing's fleet. Nor could relief be immediate. There had never before been so fine a crop of wheat in the States, but it would take time to grind and bolt it, and to send it to New Orleans amid the risks of capture.

While affairs were thus prosperous at New Orleans for Spain, and American interests were with increasing difficulty sustained by Pollock, Congress had been struggling with the question of the ultimate bounds of the new Republic, and now in the instruction given (August 14) to John Adams, who was about going abroad prepared to treat with Great Britain, it had substantially agreed upon the limits set by that body some months before.

Adams was just at this time in a rampant state of mind, — a condition not unusual with him, — and in a letter from Brainerd (August 4), while Congress was coming to its purpose, he had not only objected to the surrender to Great Britain of Nova Scotia and Canada, but he had pictured, in ignorance of her secret intentions, the great complacency of Spain, which he judged would make her an agreeable neighbor in the future. But Congress, before its president could have received Adams's letter, declared, on August 5, that if Great Britain persisted "in the prosecution of the present unjust war," advances should be made to enter into a defensive and offensive alliance with France and Spain jointly, to the end of gaining Canada, Florida, and the free navigation of the Mississippi. It only

shows how little the true character of Spanish and French purposes was understood in Congress, that it could have hoped to bring at that time those powers to assure the States any one of those three conditions.

The same propositions were again brought under discussion on September 9, when the terms of a treaty with Spain were considered, and two days later it was determined to agree to join Spain in an invasion of Florida and the conquest of Pensacola, but only on condition of her granting the free navigation of the Mississippi, with a port of entry below 31°. Matters between them would run smoother, it was interjected, if Spain would advance the States the sum of five million dollars. In this frame of mind Congress committed the Spanish mission to Jay on September 27, and two days later passed his instructions in accordance.

Neither France nor Spain was prepared to accept such terms, and the French minister at Philadelphia renewed his protests and pictured the future misery of a republic too large to hold together, — a future of disintegration that was much to the mind of Vergennes. Virginia, the most interested of the colonies in this territorial integrity, was urgently instructing her delegates never to think of yielding to the Spanish claim.

Meanwhile, on August 2, a successor to Gérard in Luzerne had landed at Boston. Thence he made his way to West Point, to confer with Washington. The new envoy inquired of the commander-in-chief how far his army could be depended upon in an attack on Florida. Washington was wary, and we have the notes of the talk, made by Hamilton, who acted as interpreter. By these it appears that Washington thought it might be possible to assist in that enterprise, if Congress thought well of it, and the British were driven from Georgia and South Carolina. There was here a confirmation of Arthur Lee's opinion of the difficulty of holding Florida, with the enemy in those States.

This attempt to engage Washington independent of Congress was quite in accordance with the purpose of Vergennes to make the several States agree on their own parts to the treaties. Vergennes's object was thereby to perpetuate better the influence of France among them, — a condition which that minister never lost sight of in view of an ultimate agreement with Great Brit-

ain. In September, he plainly intimated to his confidants that while it was to be hoped that the United States would hold compact till their independence was secured, the interest of France required after such an event that the union should be broken, in order that it should not become a power dangerous to France and her aspirations. That there was among the French people and in the French military and naval contingent a wide sympathy for the cause of American independence is true ; but it was emasculated by the perfidy of their ministry. America's obligation to what stood at that time politically for France was much like the dependence of an unfortunate spendthrift upon a calculating pawnbroker. It is a misuse of words to call this obligation by the name of gratitude.

What Hamilton divined in that day has been abundantly proved by the publication of evidence in our day: "The dismemberment of this country from Great Britain was both a determinary motive and an adequate compensation to France for the assistance afforded." Again he says: "If a service is rendered for . . . the immediate interests of the party who performs it, and is productive of reciprocal advantages, there seems scarcely an adequate basis for a sentiment like that of gratitude. . . . To suppose that France was actuated by friendship . . . is to be ignorant of the springs of action which invariably regulate the cabinets of princes."

In following the course of France in our Revolutionary War, there is every reason to emancipate ourselves from predilections, prejudice, and tradition, the three great ensnarers of seekers for historical truth.

CHAPTER X.

A YEAR OF SUSPENSE.

1780.

VIRGINIA had persistently nurtured her territorial claims to the northwest ever since the treaty of 1763 had brought this over-mountain region under British control, and the royal proclamation had formulated an issue. She had resented the pretensions of that proclamation in constituting this territory "crown lands" for Indian occupancy. She had rehearsed her claims till the other colonies were tired of them. She had never once questioned, as others had, that the English king, in 1609, had any right to assume jurisdiction beyond the springs of her rivers. She made no account of the annulment of her charter in 1624, and claimed that the recognition of her "ancient bound" by the English Commonwealth in 1651 disposed of that objection. She recalled how, in 1749, the royal instructions to Governor Gooch had recognized both banks of the Ohio as being "within our colony of Virginia." When England got her real title to the trans-Alleghany regions in 1763, she called it merely a confirmation of her immutable charter. She pronounced solemnly, by legislative enactment, that the Indiana deed of 1768 was void. She saw no reason why Trent and the traders should be recompensed for losses in the Pontiac war any more than others who suffered damage from the same cause, and if the traders were to be favored, she held that Pennsylvania and not Virginia should recoup them, since they belonged to that colony. George Mason, in her behalf, charged Sir William Johnson "with mysterious and clandestine conduct" in furthering that grant, for Virginia had already preëmpted the very land from the Indians at the treaty of Lancaster. She saw nothing in the Walpole grant of 1772 as sustaining the rights of the crown against her claims. She saw no way for the Republic to maintain its rights at the future

peace against the limits of the Quebec Bill, but in standing squarely upon Virginia's chartered rights.

We have seen how soon the frontiersmen began to make inroads on this royal reservation of 1763, and how the rights of the Iroquois and Cherokees, as affiliated with the northern and southern colonies respectively, were played off against each other. If the New York claim, as derived from the Iroquois, was illusory, Franklin could, on the other hand, charge Virginia with inventing the claims of the Cherokees to the Kentucky region in order to bolster up her charter right. In a draft of an act of confederation for the colonies, when war had become inevitable, Franklin had, in 1775, aimed to bring the claims of Virginia to a tribunal. In this draft he made all disputes as to bounds between colonies referable to Congress. In it he also gave to that body the same right which he had recognized earlier to be in Parliament, to plant new colonies in this western wilderness. The next year, June 29, 1776, Virginia, in adopting her new State Constitution, which the war had forced upon her, stood squarely by her old pretensions of jurisdiction in this region, with the right of establishing one or more States within her charter limits.

A few weeks later, in Congress, John Dickinson presented (July 12, 1776) the articles for confederation in a new shape, destined in the main to be those under which the States finally achieved their independence. The draft provided that no lands could be purchased of the natives, either by any colony or by an individual, before the limits of the colonies westward were adjudicated upon, and that, when these limits were determined, the confederacy was to guarantee such bounds to the colonies, and no purchases were to be made beyond them except by the United States for the general benefit of all the States. It distinctly provided that Congress should have the power to settle intercolonial boundary disputes; to "limit those bounds which by charter, or proclamation, or under any pretense, are said to extend to the South Sea;" and to "assign territories for new colonies and ascertain their boundaries," which may be admitted to the confederacy by the assent of nine States. Canada, at the same time, could join the confederacy at her own pleasure. These articles, if adopted and assented to, practically made Congress the arena in which Virginia must contend for her pretensions.

While this matter was still in abeyance, Congress made a distinct assertion of its control over these western regions by resolving on September 16, 1776, to grant lands over the mountains as bounties to the Continental troops. This meant recompensing Virginia for yielding for this purpose such lands as should be selected. Maryland at once (October 9) announced her objection to making such payments a charge upon all the States and a benefit to one, and on November 13, 1776, Maryland's protest to this effect was laid before Congress. The position of this dissentient State is best expressed in instructions to her delegates at a later stage of the controversy: "Policy and justice require that a country unsettled at the commencement of this war, claimed by the British crown, and ceded to it by the Treaty of Paris, if wrested from the common enemy by the blood and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as a common property, subject to be parceled out with free governments."

It was now clear that the smaller States, and those which had no such western claims, were prepared to insist upon making these trans-Alleghany lands a common source of financial supply in the struggle with the mother country. Congress moved slowly in a matter which produced such variances of opinion, and it was not till October 14, 1777, that it dared even approach the question. It then directed that the colonies should have a common treasury, and that there should be a system of proportionate taxation among the States to supply this treasury. The next day, October 15, 1777, Maryland tried to force the issue by proposing that Congress should have the power to set a western limit to the States claiming to the Mississippi, so as to create a public domain beyond. Maryland stood alone in the vote. Within a fortnight, the larger States combined (October 27) to make it a provision of the impending act of confederation that no State without its consent should be stripped of its territory for the benefit of the United States. Within three weeks, the Dickinson draft, with all the land amendments which Virginia had insisted upon, was adopted (November 15, 1777), subject to the ratification of the States.

It was soon apparent that the confederation would not have the support of Maryland without some acknowledgment of the rights of all the States in these western lands. By early summer

in the following year (June, 1778), Maryland, with Delaware, New Jersey, and Rhode Island acting mainly in accord with her, tried to induce Congress to remove difficulties by voting that commissioners should determine the limits of the States claiming to the Mississippi, and that the fee of the old "crown lands," under the proclamation of 1763, should belong to the United States, while the original claimant States should retain jurisdiction. Congress declined to accede to the proposition, and on July 10, 1778, appealed to the hesitating States to accept the articles, and leave the settlement of their demands to the future.

It soon became known that Virginia had substantiated her claim north of the Ohio by the success of Clark, and in October she set up, as we have seen, a civil government at Kaskaskia.

Two months later, Maryland set forth the grounds of her position in refusing to accept the Act of Confederation, and the new year opened with Congress further temporizing by postponing on January 6, 1779, the consideration of Maryland's declaration.

In May, 1779, Virginia aggressively determined to open a land office in the territory, offering the land at forty pounds the hundred acres, and declaring valid all her existing military grants. This again aroused Maryland, and she instructed her delegates to lay before Congress her protest against this project. This forced Virginia to a new rehearsal of her claims. There was with some an attempt to throw disrepute upon Maryland's willingness to exempt from her general contention such tracts as had been "granted to, surveyed for, or purchased by individuals before the commencement of the present war," by tracing it to a purpose to save a grant between the Wabash and the Illinois, which, in 1773, had been made to Governor Johnston of Maryland in conjunction with Dunmore and Tryon.

Some of these earlier grantees did unite in September, 1779, in presenting a memorial to Congress, in which the representatives of the Indiana and Vandalia companies were included. In this paper they asked to have Virginia's purpose of disposing of these lands in October prevented. This led to a vote asking the States to make no grants of such lands while the war lasted. Virginia defended her right to open a land office, but the motion prevailed (October 30) despite the opposition of herself and North Carolina.

The manifestly increasing antagonism to Virginia's extreme claim did not prevent her still making grants (October) of these same lands to her soldiers, and taking steps to open new routes over the Cumberland Mountains. As confidence increased in the ultimate solution of the question against the Virginia pretensions, Delaware had already accepted the Act of Confederation in February, 1779, and in November New Jersey did the same, but both States had done it under protest. Near the end of the year (December 14, 1779), Virginia's remonstrances grew milder. She was willing to listen to "just and reasonable propositions for removing ostensible causes of delay to the complete ratification of the Confederation," and to grant lands within her charter bounds to the continental line of any or all the States. In obtaining this concession, Maryland had scored a triumph.

Such was the condition of the controversy in Congress, when, in the opening of 1780, it had become generally recognized that the future trans-Alleghany extension, both of the claimant States and of the new Republic, depended on the success of the military and pioneer movements on each side of the Ohio. Haldimand had begun a system of canals round the rapids of the St. Lawrence, which did much to facilitate pushing of supplies to his western posts, but British attempts to enforce the pretension of the Quebec Bill on the north of the Ohio, in efforts directed from Detroit and Mackinac, had so far failed, notwithstanding the sympathy of the Indian tribes. South of the Ohio the adventurous pioneers had strengthened their hold upon the regions of Kentucky and Tennessee in spite of British and savage raids from north of the Ohio, and threats of the British agents, Stuart and Cameron, from the side of Florida. The frontiersmen's success had also so far put an obstacle in the way of the Spanish pretensions, which France was anxious to advance.

The Americans had little more than a hope of holding their western positions north of the Ohio. The expectation of advancing on Detroit was for the present, at least, kept in abeyance. On the British side the plans of the ministry, committed in the north to Haldimand, were thus in the hands of one who had no hesitation in espousing all that the Quebec Bill intended.


The plan of Germain to maintain a line of communication between Canada and Florida had indeed been checked by the precipitate action of Galvez at New Orleans, but it did not, in their ignorance of the Spanish successes, seem altogether impracticable to Sinclair, or to his superior officer at Quebec. The commandant at Mackinac was not informed of the fall of Natchez till midsummer (July 30), when the tidings came from Haldimand, who had learned of the misfortune but six weeks before.

Thus in the dark, and supposing that Brigadier Campbell, leaving Pensacola, would enter the Mississippi some time in May, Sinclair, when in February the days were palpably lengthening, sent messages to the Sioux and other tribes to unite in the early spring of 1780 at the Wisconsin portage, and to bring with them supplies of corn for a campaign. At the same time he urged Wabasha, his Sioux ally, "a man of uncommon abilities," to move with his "people undebauched and addicted to war" down the Mississippi towards Natchez, there to act as circumstances might require.

To divert the rebel attention from this main part of the campaign, Haldimand had instructed (February 12) De Peyster, at Detroit, to arouse the Wabash Indians, and "amuse" Clark, or drive him from the Ohio rapids, "otherwise the Indian country will be open to the continual incursions of the rebels, and safe communication will be formed between Fort Pitt and the Mississippi." The British authorities were soon to learn, if they had not already been informed, by an intercepted letter, of Clark's purpose to build a new fort on the Mississippi.

It was March (1780) when the Spaniards at St. Louis learned of Sinclair's plans, and a few weeks later, in April, some boats, with supplies which Gratiot had carried up to Prairie du Chien, were captured by the approaching band.

St. Louis was now a town of a hundred and twenty houses, principally of stone, with a population of perhaps eight hundred, mainly French, and a hundred and fifty negroes. On May 26, 1780, a force, thought to have comprised about nine hundred Indians, fell upon some farmers, who incautiously — for the enemy's approach was known — had gone beyond the protection of the stockade. Sinclair had hardly feared that the savages would fail in an assault; but he was not so confi-




FORTIFICATIONS

The cut, showing their relations to the town as it was in 1822, is from L. E. Beck's *Gazetteer of* g. round tower. h. blockhouse. c. Catholic Chapel. k. Baptist Church. l. jail. m. Presby-

dent in holding the place, if once taken. But no assault followed, partly because of the usual savage unwillingness to attack a post which had been forewarned, and partly because of the lukewarmness, if not insincerity, of Calvé and the other French leaders of the Indians. The break came when the Sacs and Foxes, alleged to be under Calvé's influence, swerved from the task.

It is thought that the whole force, which Sinclair had organized, consisted of perhaps fifteen hundred warriors with European leaders, while a body of other savages with a number of



OF ST. LOUIS, 1780.

Illinois and Missouri, Albany, 1823. KEY: a. line of works. b. tower. c. demi-lunar. f. gates. terian meeting-house. n. market. o. Missouri bank. p. ferry. q. old windmill. r. ox-mill.

French traders, inspired by Sinclair's promise to reserve to them the traffic of the Missouri valley, had been led by Langlade by way of the Chicago portage. This contingent was expected to fall upon Kaskaskia in case of success at St. Louis, and to place the Illinois villages under contribution, and to send supplies from them to Green Bay and Mackinac, — the support of which post was at this time creating much complaint in the communications of Germain. Langlade had for a guide a certain Monsieur Durrand, who had been found with a quantity of continental money in his possession, and to secure his fidelity Sinclair had taken possession of all his property.

When the commander at St. Louis had learned of his danger, he had sent word to Clark. Early in the year, Jefferson, the better to secure the Virginia title to the Kentucky region, had directed Colonel Thomas Walker and Colonel Smythe to extend the line which separated Virginia from Carolina to the Mississippi, and at a point where it reached that river ($36^{\circ} 30'$) Clark had been instructed to build a fort. The site of this proposed stockade, known as Iron Banks, was about five miles below the mouth of the Ohio, in the country of the Chickasaws and Choctaws, who soon manifested their enmity. The spot had attracted Governor Henry's attention as early as January, 1778, and Clark in September, 1779, had issued orders to induce settlers to occupy it. Todd had at the same time made sundry grants, not far distant. Leaving that post to protect the Kentucky settlements from other raids, when the news reached him from St. Louis Clark immediately responded, and twenty-four hours before Wabasha and his horde approached St. Louis, he was on the opposite side of the river at Cahokia, watching for his opportunity. He had no occasion either to cross the Mississippi or to defend Kaskaskia, and found nothing to do but to dispatch Lieutenant Montgomery to pursue the retreating enemy.

By June 4 (1780), the first of the fugitive savages reached Mackinac, those under Calvé coming by Green Bay, while others returned by Chicago. They reported that they had killed about seventy persons, had taken thirty-four prisoners, and they showed forty-three scalps. Sinclair at once sent two vessels to the Chicago River to bring off the main body of Langlade's men. This was done in time for them to escape the attack of a mounted American force, which a few days later appeared at that point.

So ended ignominiously the attempt to control the Mississippi from the north. Sinclair brooded on his disappointment for seven or eight weeks before he got some relief by learning, as we have seen, that he had not been alone disappointed, for there had been a similar disaster inflicted nine months before by Galvez in the lower parts of the Mississippi.

The British force, with which Haldimand had intended to "amuse" Clark while Sinclair's expedition followed the Missis-

sippi, left Detroit near the middle of April, 1780, under the command of Captain Henry Bird. It consisted of about six hundred men, led by Elliot and the Girtys. It had been fitted out at a charge of about \$300,000. Logan, with a band of savages, accompanied it, while a force of Huron warriors had at the same time started in the direction of Fort Pitt, to rivet the rebels' attention in that direction and intercept any foray of Virginians on the upper Ohio. It was supposed by the tribes that retaliation for the continual attacks on emigrant boats might incite such inroads, and for the fear of such reprisals the Mingoes and Delawares had been much alarmed.

Bird had passed by the Maumee portage to the Great Miami, and on the way Alexander McKee had joined him with some five hundred Shawnees. The varying reports of his entire force would seem to indicate that the fickle savages came and went on the march as they liked. The information which Bird got at Lorimer's Station showed that Clark was at the falls with two hundred men, poorly supplied. Bird's purpose, as Haldimand had directed, was to attack that post, and he had with him two small cannon, the first guns that had been taken into Indian warfare.

His Indians, however, proved unruly. Haldimand had warned him that savages cared more to have raids projected for which they could get advanced gifts, than to participate in unrequited forays, and Bird's experience did not belie the warning. His red brutes killed his cattle, grew insubordinate, and finally refused to advance towards the falls. Not wholly to fail of results, Bird turned towards the mouth of the Licking and, ascending that stream, captured several Kentucky stations, and took a large number of prisoners. Having accomplished no strategic purpose, he suddenly turned back, his captives bearing the plunder, and reached Detroit on August 4. He might have inflicted serious mischief on the river by stopping to waylay the emigrant boats, for something like three hundred of them, averaging perhaps fifty feet in length, and carrying ten persons each, it is supposed, reached the falls during the season. His precipitate retreat, however, saved him from Clark, who was now afield with a force he had raised in Kentucky. Clark carried a rather high hand in gathering his men, for he shut the land offices to throw the speculators out of em-

ployment, and stationed guards on the outward trails to take the arms from fugitives. In this way he gathered at the site of Cincinnati — opposite the Licking — about a thousand riflemen, mounted or afoot, and built there a blockhouse on the site of the future city. It was August 2 — the reports of the date are somewhat uncertain — when he went forward, carrying a single cannon in his train. Having moved some fifty or sixty miles, in dismal weather, he found, on August 6, the Indian village at Chillicothe in flames. He hurried on to Piqua on the Little Miami, in the region of the modern Springfield. After a conflict, in which he got no assistance from Benjamin Logan, who had gone astray with one division of his force, he scattered the Indians, who under two of the Girtys somewhat stubbornly confronted him, though Clark brought his three-pounder into action. He then burned the town and destroyed the neighboring cornfields. He had succeeded in inflicting such a retaliatory stroke as to save Kentucky from savage raids for the rest of the season. Clark returned to the falls, his force scattering, on the way, to their homes.

All this, however, was too late to alarm Detroit seriously. If Jefferson could have compassed it, he would have kept Clark to the larger project of seizing the straits. Early in the year (February 10), while uninformed of Sinclair's intentions, Jefferson had written to Washington to inquire if there was truth in the rumor that Colonel Brodhead was to be sent against Detroit from Fort Pitt. He added that "these officers [Clark and Brodhead] cannot act together," and if Brodhead was to lead an attack on the straits, he would see that Clark was sent in some other direction. Ten days later (February 21), Brodhead had learned from prisoners that there were four hundred and fifty men at Detroit and eighteen hundred at Niagara, beside large hordes of Indians. The numbers troubled him, and he begged Washington to make a diversion on the Susquehanna to check any hostile incursion by the Alleghany.

On March 18, Brodhead informed Washington that he had heard from Clark, who was willing to coöperate with him, "either for the reduction of one of the enemy's posts or against the Indian towns," and that Clark expected to be reinforced in the spring. At the same time (March) Jefferson, who had

perhaps misjudged Clark, wrote to this officer that he must abandon all hope of advancing on Detroit. This letter was intercepted, and probably banished the anxiety which De Peyster had before that felt.

By April, reinforcements and supplies not reaching him, Brodhead informed Washington (24th) that unless Clark could join him, Detroit could not be threatened. He complained that the boundary dispute between Virginia and Pennsylvania, and the necessity of protecting the local frontiers, had prevented his summoning any militia. Clark, as we have seen, was too much needed at this time at St. Louis to think even of making a diversion up the Ohio. Brodhead did not willingly abandon all hope, and tried to get other and perhaps better tidings of the British force. A scouting party which he sent towards Sandusky had returned (June 30) without success. Ten days later (July 10), Brodhead outlined to his lieutenants a march so far as Sandusky at least, but his purpose was discovered, and the plan was abandoned. Just as this proved futile, an onset from the side of Cahokia was attempted and likewise failed. Colonel La Balme, a man bred to the cavalry service, with a few score (perhaps a hundred) French and Indians, had started to surprise Detroit, thinking to arouse the French of the straits to welcome him. His force, however, was entrapped one night on the Miami, their leader killed, and his papers taken. This must have relieved Haldimand of some anxiety.

So the season (1780) ended with much the same equal distribution of loss and gain which had characterized the last two years, north of the Ohio. The English had pretty well kept their hold on the tribes. The death of White Eyes, the friend of Zeisberger and the chief of the peace party of the Delawares, had left that faction without a head, and it had gone over to the royal side. At the west, however, the Sacs and Foxes had pronounced for the Americans. Practically, neither side could claim to have made good their territorial pretensions; and there was continued apprehension on both sides well on to snow-flying. Guy Johnson, commanding at Niagara, and Governor Todd in Kentucky, were growing more and more anxious; Clark, at the falls, was in greater trepidation than De Peyster, at the straits. Brodhead, at Pittsburg, was complaining of the want

of money, credit, and provisions, and was alarmed at rumors of a British advance from Detroit.

But on the whole the year (1780) had given better promise south of the Ohio. Clark had established Fort Jefferson, but it had only been maintained by fighting the Indians about it. The situation was insalubrious; it was difficult to keep it supplied; settlers did not like the neighborhood, and finally, its garrison being needed elsewhere, it was the next year abandoned.

The fight at King's Mountain (October 7) had drawn off a large part of the fighting militia of Virginia and North Carolina, and the Cherokees had seized the opportunity to rise upon the exposed settlements. Retribution came to them suddenly. The heroes who had gained the brilliant victory — which is later to be described — rendezvoused, under Sevier, Martin, and Campbell, on the French Broad, and rushed upon the Cherokee towns. These attacks laid twenty-nine of the savages low; seventeen were taken prisoners, and fifty thousand bushels of corn were destroyed. But one American was killed. The campaign over, Colonel Campbell (January 16, 1781) reported to Congress the desirability of erecting a fort at the junction of the Tennessee and Holston rivers, the better to hold the country.

But nothing, meanwhile, seemed to daunt the eager settlers. For some years to come, they came into this wilderness at the rate of four or five thousand annually. They came both by flotilla on the Ohio, and by the Wilderness road. Two years later, there were twelve thousand souls in Kentucky, and in 1784, it is computed there were as many as thirty thousand. The discovery of numerous salt-springs had conduced to this surprising influx, for the price of that condiment had for some time been almost prohibitory. Virginia had divided the country into three counties, each with its lieutenant, and all three subordinate to Clark as general commanding. The old system of gaining a fixed extent of soil by squatter right had given place to treasury warrants, carrying acreages, which were variable, but defined. The new system was hardly in consonance with the habits of the squatter population earlier on the soil. In some

respects, the ways of life in Kentucky were becoming irksome. The laws of Virginia were in some aspects burdensome under their remote conditions. To carry appeals from local justices to Williamsburg was costly. There was a constant tendency in the older communities to underrate their forbearance with the Indians.

As the result of such discontent, some six hundred and forty residents on both sides of the Ohio, in Kentucky and Illinois, united in May, 1780, in a petition to Congress to be set up as a separate State, and left to manage their own internal affairs. The movement proved premature, and was doubtless immature, and there was no evidence that it was countenanced by many of the stabler and more experienced pioneers. The east had its complaints at the same time, and it was not unusual to hear in Congress more or less apprehension that the "freedom from taxes, militia duties, and other burdens," as well as the allurements of the land offices, in Kentucky, were enticing deserters from the Continental armies.

Robertson of Watauga, accompanied by some Holston adventurers, seeking new trails and fairer lands, had, as we have seen, during the previous autumn (1779), seized upon the bend of the Cumberland, known as the French Lick, and was now compacting the new settlement. Late in the winter of 1779-80, Colonel Donelson, a sharer with Robertson in the movement, with thirty boats, carrying some two or three hundred souls, including the less hardy of the men, but largely composed of the women and children, — and among them the future wife of Andrew Jackson, — had started on a perilous voyage down the Tennessee, and up the Ohio and Cumberland, to the appointed spot. It was not the first nor the last of such river expeditions; but it has become better known than the others, owing to the preservation of the leader's diary. This record shows the hazards of the wintry stream, and how the flotilla, beset by small-pox, was whirled in the rifts, and ran the fusillades of the cunning Chickamaugas. After all their trials, the new-comers poled their bateaux up to the Cumberland bluffs on April 24, 1780, and were welcomed by Robertson. They found that a stockaded village had been laid out. It was named Nashborough, after the governor of North Carolina,

when it had been found to be within the charter limits of that State. The population now scattered along the banks of the Cumberland was thought to number not far from five hundred. Some among them had been renegades from the Atlantic slope, to escape the marauding forces of Cornwallis. Robertson, before the decision of the settlement's allegiance was settled, had been in conference with Clark about a title to the lands; but the same survey, as conducted by Henderson for North Carolina and Walker for Virginia, which had fixed for Clark the site of Fort Jefferson, had also determined the new settlement to be beyond the jurisdiction of Virginia.

Three hundred miles of forest separated it from all neighboring succor. Its people were adventurers, but they had known the value of orderly government on the Holston, and accordingly, at a meeting convened at Nashborough on May 1, 1780, Robertson presented some articles of association, and they were readily adopted. They are supposed to reflect the form of the constitution of Watauga, which has not been saved for us, but of this imitation we fortunately have nearly the whole, with the amendments shortly after adopted. The two hundred and fifty-six males who signed it declared their purpose to "restrain the licentious and supply the blessings flowing from a just and equitable government." It is a token of the bloody conditions of their life, that of these two hundred and fifty-six subscribers, mainly in vigorous early manhood, scarce a score were alive a dozen years later, and it is said that only one man among the departed had been known to die a natural death. Nothing better than this shows what living was in these isolated settlements. If food and powder gave out, it meant a stealthy march, amid lurking savages, to the nearest and better supplied settlements. Nothing but the dauntlessness of a military leader like Robertson could hold such communities to the task of subduing the wilderness. He was now, under their new articles, the chairman of their board of "judges, triers, and general arbitrators," and with universal suffrage to support him, he was to administer the executive business of the little community till North Carolina set up a county government in the region in 1783.

The whole region of Tennessee and Kentucky had been threatened by the success of the British at Charleston in May

(1780), and by the imbecility of Gates at Camden in August. But the over-mountain men from Holston, under Shelby and Sevier, aided by a regiment of Virginians under Colonel William Campbell, had rallied to a self-imposed task and retrieved those defeats. Mounted almost to a man, with evergreen sprigs in their coon-skin caps, they had followed their leaders through the passes, a thousand in number, and perhaps many more, for the reports are at variance. At King's Mountain, in October, 1780, they encompassed Fergusson and the loyalist militia from the Carolina coast. The backwoodsmen wonderfully proved their wily courage, man to man alike in numbers, but it is to be regretted that their victory was darkened by some dastardly acts.

Their success had caused a lull, which prepared the way fortunately for Greene to assume the command of the southern department before the year closed.

Further south, the success of Galvez in the autumn of 1779, on the Mississippi, had been followed by the Spanish attack on Mobile in the following March. Reinforcements joining him from Havana, Galvez left New Orleans with about two thousand men, and on the 15th took Fort Charlotte on the Mobile River in season to defy Campbell, who came to succor it. The Spanish rule was thereby extended from the Pearl to the Perdido River.

Meanwhile, Oliver Pollock, in New Orleans, was doing his best to send powder and supplies to Todd and Clark. He found difficulty, however, in negotiating the paper sent him by Clark because of the scarcity of specie. He obtained temporary relief from the private fortune of a Spanish official, and from the generous acceptance of Virginian bills by one Daniel Clark, an American whose claim on that State long remained unsettled. All the while trying to keep up the credit of continental bills, Pollock was daily diminishing his available cash to the extent of nearly nine thousand dollars in the aggregate. The depreciation of these bills was, on the whole, much less in the Great Valley than on the Atlantic coast.

There had been throughout the year two problems deeply affecting this trans-Alleghany region, which had closely engaged the attention of Congress.

With a population in the States rising three million, and likely to increase abnormally, there was no disposition among the representatives of the people either to accept the dictates of France and Spain south of the Ohio, or those of England towards the lakes. The question practically turned on the free navigation of the Mississippi as bounding the empire acquired by the treaty of 1763, and on the control of this western country as a public domain supposed to be capable of meeting the cost of the war.

Jay, who had been chosen minister to Spain (October 4), to enforce its claim to the Mississippi just at the time that Galvez was grasping the lower parts of that river, had found in Madrid great difficulties in his suits. Congress drew money-bills on him, hoping for his success with the Spanish ministry, but that government broadly intimated to him that their assistance would depend on obtaining exclusive control of the Mississippi. Ever since the Continental Congress had sought the recognition and aid of Spain, the Mississippi question, in one form or another, had been a perplexing problem. It was made all the more difficult through the combined Bourbon interests of Spain and France, and by the embarrassing disposition of a strong faction in Congress to sacrifice the future of the West by surrendering to Spain this control of the Mississippi. The purpose of this faction was, as Richard Henry Lee said, nothing but a studied "depreciation of our back country."

The Madrid cabinet insisted that the proclamation of 1763 had divested the colonies of all territorial rights beyond the Alleghanies. To meet such pretensions, Jay, on his arrival in Spain, had instructed his secretary, who preceded him on the way to Madrid, "to remember to do justice" to the rights of Virginia to the western country.

Jay soon discovered, upon confronting the minister himself, that it was the object of Spain to entrap the Americans into an alliance which would have compelled them to continue the war "for objects which did not include ours." This sinister purpose dawning upon Jay's mind, he had resolved, so far as he had the power, to yield nothing. "France is determined," he wrote home, "to manage between Spain and America so as to make us debtors to French influence with Spain, and to make Spain obligated to their influence with us."

As the negotiations with Gardoqui went on, it was suggested to Jay that matters between Spain and the United States would go more smoothly if Jay would only offer the surrender of the Mississippi. Jay replied "that the Americans, almost to a man, believed that God Almighty had made that river a highway for the people of the upper country to go to the sea by; that this country was extensive and feeble; that the general, many officers, and others of distinction and influence in America were deeply interested in it; that it would rapidly settle; and that the inhabitants would not be readily convinced of the justice of being obliged either to live without foreign commodities or lose the surplus of their productions; or be obliged to transport both over rugged mountains and through an immense wilderness to and from the sea, when they daily saw a fine river flowing before their doors and offering to save them all that trouble and expense, and that without injury to Spain."

Gardoqui replied that the present generation would not need the river, and that it might be left to future ones to manage their own affairs. When these complexities were reported to Franklin in Paris, he replied to Jay (October 2, 1780): "Poor as we are, yet as I know we shall be rich, I would rather agree with them to buy at a great price the whole of their rights in the Mississippi than sell a drop of the waters. A neighbor might as well ask me to sell my street door." Congress gave Jay all the support he needed. "If," they wrote to him, "an express acknowledgment of our rights cannot be obtained from Spain, it is not by any stipulation on the part of America to be relinquished."

The French minister at Philadelphia was meanwhile eagerly abetting the Bourbon interest in the same spirit. He represented to Congress that the United States had no rights to territory westward from the settlements as they existed at the date of the proclamation of 1763, and that the east bank of the Mississippi was British territory, open to Spanish inroads. The understanding between France and Spain was apparently complete, and, as the season wore on, Carmichael, Jay's secretary, became convinced that Spain was manœuvring for delays, trusting rather to prompt interposition at the general peace to attain her ends.

Meanwhile, John Adams, who, in February, 1780, had

reached Paris, clothed with authority to treat for peace, was flattering Vergennes in May that "an alliance with France was an honor and a security which had been near his heart." It was not many weeks, however, before this importunate Yankee was offending Vergennes by his self-aggression and want of tact. Fortunately, he saw behind the diplomacy of the wily Frenchman what Jay, released from his Spanish toils, later discerned, and what Franklin, in his belief that gratitude to France was both a duty and good policy, was loath to see.

At Madrid, Jay's impulses and his instructions allowed him to go no farther than to promise the aid of America in establishing Spanish hold on Florida, and before this, Mirales, the Spanish minister in Philadelphia, had been instructed to engage with Congress for a body of American troops to enter the Spanish service for that purpose.

On October 4, 1780, Congress had further upheld Jay by new instructions, and Madison drew up the case of the United States. It was reported to Congress on October 17, and was at once sent to Franklin and Jay. It represented that the Illinois and Wabash regions were under American jurisdiction, and that the mouth of the Ohio and the course of the Mississippi down to 31° were controlled at Fort Jefferson. It was put to the credit of the United States, and not to that of Virginia, that this condition prevailed; and Virginia, at the same time, proposed that the Mississippi below 31° should be guaranteed to Spain, if Spain would guarantee "to the United States" all above that parallel.

The Americans were making rather than confirming principles in international law. Claims to the free navigation of a river whose mouth was held by an alien were not then to be settled by any well-established conclusions in which all nations agreed. The freedom of the Rhine had been determined by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648; but that of the Scheldt was yet to be left unsettled by the Peace of Fontainebleau in 1785.

This action of Congress in October was hardly done when the ill success of Gates in the south and the sense of insecurity which Arnold's treason had caused produced one of those revulsions to which strenuous times are liable, and in November, 1780, there were signs that Congress, on the urgency of South Carolina and Georgia, was weakening its position. It

was known that, on the one hand, England was endeavoring to disjoin Spain from the French alliance, and, on the other, it was an every-day occurrence that Luzerne, in Philadelphia, was bringing to bear all the pressure he could to effect the purpose of France and the interests of Spain. With this turn of affairs, Congress approached the end of 1780 with not a little unrest from sectional discord. Virginia was admonishing New England that if she weakened on the Mississippi question, she might rue it when the question of the fisheries was to be settled.

In respect to the other problem, the year (1780) had opened with an encouraging outlook. New York had stepped forward with a proposition to cede to the States the claim which she professed to have acquired (1701, 1726) from the Iroquois to the western lands. She argued that the grant to the Duke of York had barred the claims of the New England colonies, while that of Virginia was estopped by the rescinding of her charter and the grant to Penn, which preventions gave precedence to the Indian claim which she advanced. It was in fact the least valid of any of the claims, but was good enough to give away as a precedent. On February 19, the New York Assembly authorized her delegates to make either an unreserved or a limited cession. The act was read in Congress on March 7. Six weeks later, that State authorized Congress to restrict her western limits.

These actions had their effect in Virginia. Late in June, Joseph Jones wrote to Jefferson: "Could Virginia but think herself, as she certainly is, full large enough for vigorous government, she, too, would moderate her desires, and cede to the United States, on certain conditions, her territory beyond the Ohio." George Mason, in July, formulated the Virginia propositions. These were to give up the country between the west bounds of Pennsylvania and the Ohio, north of Mason and Dixon's line (being the region since known as the Panhandle), if Congress guaranteed to Virginia her remaining territory, which he claimed to be bounded by the north bank of the Ohio on one side, and by the North Carolina line (36° 30') on the other. This cession of the territory north of the Ohio was contingent upon seven conditions: First, that the territory should eventually be made into not less than two States. Second, that Vir-

ginia should be reimbursed for Clark's expedition and all other attending expenses. Third, that the French settlers should be protected in their titles, and defended against incursions from Detroit. Fourth, that one hundred and fifty thousand acres should be reserved as bounty lands for Clark's soldiers. Fifth, that the cession at the falls made to Clark by the Wabash Indians should be confirmed to him. Sixth, in case Virginia did not have land enough south of the Ohio to make good her military bounties, that she should have it on the north. Seventh, that all the territory not thus reserved should be held in common by all the States, and that all individual purchases of land should be void.

An impulse to hasten the completion of the confederation was palpably growing, and, on September 6, Congress urged the States claiming a western extension to "remove the only obstacle to a final ratification of the articles of confederation," and make a united cession of these disputed territories. Congress had been brought to this, not only by the New York act of February 19, but by consideration of counter representations made by Virginia and Maryland. A few days later (September 12), Madison felt sure that the crisis had passed. In October, there were new hopes for a while. Connecticut offered to cede her charter claims beyond the mountains, provided she could retain jurisdiction. Congress, with the otherwise encouraging prospect, was not disposed to hamper the transfer, and declined to meet the conditions. On the same day, Congress ordered that all ceded lands should be held for the common benefit of all the States, — the initial legislation for a public domain, — but at the same time recognized the rights of the States to be reimbursed for the cost of maintaining their claims. It was further agreed that these lands should be divided into republican States and become candidates for admission to the confederation.

The year closed with Tom Paine in his *Public Good* attacking (December 30) the Virginia pretensions to their charter rights. He dwelt on the vague definition of the charter of 1609, as admitting no such precision of bounds as Virginia claimed, and in the belief which at that time prevailed of the narrowness of the continent, no such imperial range of bounds could have been contemplated. Contemporary newspapers

allege that Paine's sense of justice was based on promise from the Indiana Company of twelve thousand acres of this same land, though Conway, his latest biographer, disputes the statement.

Paine outlined a plan of setting up a new State of nearly the same limits as the present Kentucky; and by the sales of its territory he expected to replenish the national treasury. Hamilton was one of the few who did not expect much aid to the treasury in this way. "Back lands," he says, "are a very good resource in reserve; but I suspect they will not have so much present financial efficacy as to be useful to procure credit."

So, upon the whole, the year 1780 closed in the west with good omens, if with checkered results in actual accomplishment.

CHAPTER XI.

EAST AND WEST.

1781.

THE year 1781 was practically the last year of the war on the Atlantic slope. Greene had shown the highest ability in the south in snatching the fruits of victory from defeat, and Cornwallis had been entrapped at Yorktown. The year had opened sadly in the revolt of the Pennsylvania line, and the depreciation of the continental paper had gone on, so that by midsummer the bills were in effect valueless. Scarce a sixth of the taxes could be collected; and the confederation, after it was perfected, seemed but a mockery of "the firm and perpetual league of friendship" which it professed to be. No one felt its futility more than Washington, and he had complained to his personal friends, "I see one head gradually changing into thirteen. I see one army branching into thirteen." Yet with all this, there came the flash at Yorktown, and the year closed along the seaboard with hope.

Beyond the mountains there had been, during the year, the old iteration of cross movements, with no real gain to either combatant; but in Congress a first step, as will be later shown, had been taken in giving a continental control to the "crown lands" reserved in the proclamation of 1763. While these cession movements bade fair to solve the problem of the confederation's asserted extension to the Mississippi, and to establish a ground for a boundary at the peace, the Spanish claim to that river was still a source of anxiety. On the same day on which Virginia had proposed an inadmissible cession (January 2), Congress, as we shall see, had instructed Jay to yield the Mississippi to Spain, rather than lose her alliance. Likewise on the same day (January 2), an expedition left St. Louis to plant the Spanish flag within the disputed territory. Under the lead of Captain Pourré (or Pierro), a force of sixty militia and

sixty Indians marched two hundred leagues across the Illinois region, and fell upon an English post at St. Joseph (near the modern Niles in Michigan), captured it, secured prisoners, and then quickly retreated, and were back in St. Louis in March. Both Franklin and Jay, when they heard of it, were prepared to believe that Spain had attempted the incursion merely to establish a claim to be advanced at the peace when, under possible diplomatic complications, a mere dash across the country might count against the steady hold which Clark had fixed upon the Illinois.

Before Pourré had returned to St. Louis, Galvez, on February 28, started with a fleet, conveying fourteen hundred men, to invade Florida. He appeared before Pensacola and, despite some defection in his naval auxiliaries, he pushed his transports, under fire, past the English fort into the inner bay. The admiral was chagrined, and followed in Galvez's wake. The fort beat off the fleet, and Galvez brought up his land forces and opened trenches. A breach was made in the walls by the explosion of a magazine, and while storming parties were organizing, the British, on May 9, hoisted the white flag. Thus all of west Florida fell into Spanish hands, and Spain had secured a coveted foothold on the flank of the Southern States. Eight hundred troops, with which Campbell, under Germain's orders, had expected to secure the lower Mississippi, were sent prisoners to New York under parole, but to the discontent later of the Spanish government. During the absence of Galvez, and on the rumor of his defeat and of a British fleet being in the Gulf, the British settlers and the loyalists, including the Connecticut colony, living about Natchez, rose (April 22) upon the Spaniards and by a ruse overawed them. Colonel Hutchins once more (April 29) spread the British flag upon Fort Panmure, while the Spanish garrison marched to Baton Rouge. Upon Galvez's triumphant return, the insurgents were in danger of his resentment, and fled across the country to Savannah, making a painful march of one hundred and thirty-one days. Some of them fell into the hands of the hovering bands of patriots, and the rest reached that town in October. It is a story of prolonged misery which Pickett has told in his *Alabama*.

While Spain was thus successful at the south and had, by a dash at St. Joseph, attempted to give effect to her diplomatic pretensions in the northwest, the real struggle as to the future ownership of the great stretch of country between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi was to drag on for another year along the Ohio and on its affluents.

It was still in the autumn of 1780, and at the close of the active campaigning of that year, the dream of Jefferson to make at last an effective demonstration against Detroit, by which Virginia would be relieved of maintaining five hundred or a thousand men in the western wilds to protect her frontiers and outlying settlements. Jefferson had appealed to Washington to give the movement continental sanction, and to furnish the munitions and supplies, while Virginia called on her militia.

To give and to take counsel in the initiatory steps, Clark had come over the mountains, and was representing in Richmond that the government must be prepared to confront the coming season something like two thousand British and Indians in the western country. The problem was how to anticipate the assaults of such a body and carry the war into the enemy's country. When Jefferson, in September, 1780, had been sending prisoners from Richmond to New York for exchange, he had not given up Hamilton, for fear of the active energies that officer might impart at Detroit if he should rejoin his old command. Clark's futile attempts to reach Detroit had already cost Virginia something like half a million pounds of the current money, and it was computed that another three hundred thousand must be added to that, if the present expedition should succeed. Jefferson hoped, as we have said, that this pecuniary aid would come from the Continent, while Virginia supplied the men. He sent out orders for the frontier militia to gather at Pittsburg, on March 1, 1781, but he imparted to the county officers no definite plan for the campaign. There was, however, no misunderstanding as to the purpose between Clark and the governor, and Clark was in his daily councils.

Steuben was during the winter trying to impede the raids of Benedict Arnold along the James River, and Clark, still at the east, entered into these defensive movements with alacrity, leaving Jefferson, meanwhile, to direct the preparations which were going on at Fort Pitt. Late in December, 1780, Jeffer-

son drew up Clark's instructions, charging him not only with the capture of Detroit, but with securing control of Lake Erie. He promised him two thousand men, and assured him that ammunition and packhorses would be at the falls of the Ohio by March 15. If preparations were then completed, Clark would be able to take advantage of the early break of the ice in the Wabash, and reach Lake Erie before the enemy could move their forces across it. Washington, in reply to Jefferson's appeals, was at the same time dispatching orders (December 28, 1780) to Brodhead, commanding at Fort Pitt, to furnish all the troops he could, including an artillery company, and to avoid raising questions of rank with Clark. Jefferson had asked Washington to give Clark a continental commission, to prevent any question of rank, but Washington had declined because Clark was on strictly state service. In January, 1781, Clark, lingering still at Richmond, was made a brigadier-general of the Virginia forces, "to be embodied in an expedition westward of the Ohio." They were destined for a campaign which was to be rendered unusually active by a widespread uprising of the Indians in the British interests. At least, so felt Slaughter, who held the falls in Clark's absence, and who was disturbed by the rumors which reached him. Stories of this kind induced Jefferson, on January 13, to ask Steuben to release Clark from his engagements on the seaboard, in order that he might proceed immediately to the western country. Thus withdrawn from further participation in the movements on the James, Clark, who proceeded to Pittsburg, found little to encourage him.

Weeks went on, and there seemed to be little chance of Clark's securing the two thousand men which Jefferson had promised, though, on February 13, the governor had informed him that Steuben had consented to Gibson's acting as his lieutenant and taking his regiment with him to the west. Continual alarms in Kentucky and the invasion of tide-water Virginia were keeping the fighting men at home, and Jefferson, finding the militia loath to march from their settlements, had called (February 16) upon some of the county lieutenants to urge volunteers to rally around Clark.

Washington had sent Clark little aid, and it may be doubted if the commander-in-chief felt much confidence in a hazardous

movement of militia, liable to scatter at any sudden rumor of an Indian raid upon their homes. We find Clark in March, 1781, complaining to Washington that Brodhead, who had declined to detach Gibson's regiment, kept men from his ranks, but the commanding general could well make allowance for the environments of danger at Fort Pitt, where Brodhead hardly knew whom to trust. He had, however, more than once (February 25; March 27) assured Washington that Clark should have his best support, while he accounted to the commanding general for the apathy of the militia by saying that "they are availing themselves of the unsettled jurisdiction." Brodhead's condition was indeed desperate. He could get no supplies, and there was every indication of his being very shortly enveloped by hostile savages.

Late in the winter (February, 1781) it was known that the Delawares outside the Moravian influence were moving westward along Lake Erie, professedly in search of game; but it soon became certain that they were putting themselves within the range of British influence. When the spring fairly opened and the Cherokees were making hostile demonstration in the southwest, it was only too apparent that the Americans had hardly a friend among the warring tribes of the Ohio valley. With this condition of things, Brodhead, on April 7, led, with something of desperation, one hundred and fifty regulars from Fort Pitt against the recusant Delawares. At Wheeling his little force was strengthened by about as many militia under Colonel David Shepherd. Brodhead crossed the Ohio, fell upon the Indian town at Coshocton, laid it waste, destroyed the cattle and stores, and returned with his plunder. He had by this movement pushed the Delawares back from the Muskingum and Tuscarawas, and forced them to the Scioto and Sandusky, and they never returned. Some Christian Delawares, whom he had encountered at the Moravian stations, followed him back to Fort Pitt. Brodhead's success was in part owing to the misapprehension which Simon Girty, now by De Peyster's orders among the Wyandots, had of Brodhead's strength. While the American expedition was pursuing its devastating march, Girty supposed that it comprised at least a thousand men, and that Clark had already started down the Ohio with as many more. It was this false information that held the Wyandots back.

That Clark's enlistments suffered from these movements by Brodhead was clear; and the failure of Washington to send him recruits, as well as the uncertain jurisdiction of Pennsylvania and Virginia, rendered it very doubtful if he could move down the river by the middle of June, as he hoped to do. More than once in May (21st and 26th), Clark appealed to Washington. "It has been the influence of our post on the Illinois and Wabash," he says, "that has saved the frontiers, and in a great measure baffled the designs of the enemy at Detroit. If they get possession of them, they will be able to command three times the number of valuable warriors they do at present."

The difficulty between Brodhead and Gibson was ripening. The latter officer, prevented by Brodhead from aiding Clark, was restless under the deprivation, and Clark intimated to Washington that positive orders from him would give Gibson the release he longed for.

The exact scope of Jefferson's instructions to Clark had not yet been divulged, and what Clark let fall favored the belief that his purpose was in reality to succor the exposed Kentucky settlements.

This pretense of Clark was evidently accepted by Haldimand, when he heard of it, as his true intent, for as early as May that general was sending word to Sinclair and De Peyster that the Americans would not enter Canada, and they must be attacked along their frontiers. He advised De Peyster to cease pampering the Sandusky Indians, and to keep them busy in breaking up American settlements north of the Ohio.

It was thus while the British were thinking themselves safe from assault north of the lakes, and intent on making their Indians wage a vicarious warfare, that Clark, near the close of July, 1781, embarking a force of only four hundred, out of the two thousand promised to him, and carrying three fieldpieces, began to move down the river from Pittsburg. On reaching Wheeling, he wrote to the governor — no longer Jefferson, who had resigned on June 1 — that he had "relinquished all expectations. I have been at so much pains," he says, "that the disappointment is doubly mortifying." His only hope was that he should learn that Detroit had not been reinforced, which might yet encourage him to attempt its capture. As he went on, his force alternately diminished and grew by desertions and

additions, and it bore a rather heterogeneous aspect when, on September 1, he reached Fort Nelson at the falls. De Peyster, at Detroit, better informed at last than Girty, had rather tardily sent down to the Ohio a force of a hundred rangers under Captain Andrew Thompson, and three hundred Indians under McKee, to watch for a favorable moment to waylay Clark. Joseph Brant and George Girty — the latter formerly one of Willing's marauders — were, fortunately for De Peyster, already astir. On August 24, at a point eleven miles below the Great Miami, they fell upon a flotilla of mounted Pennsylvania volunteers, one hundred and seven in number, under Colonel Archibald Lochry (Loughrey), following in the wake of Clark, and seeking to overtake him. A letter to Clark, sent forward by this lieutenant, had been intercepted and revealed the situation. Clark had not reached the falls when every man of this force was either killed or captured. They had landed to cook their breakfast and feed their horses, when they were suddenly attacked from both sides of the river. A third of them were killed, and the rest surrendered; but the colonel and others, unable to march, were later murdered.

Three days afterward, the victors, moving up the Great Miami, met McKee coming laggardly down from Detroit. The combined bodies were not deemed to be sufficient to assail Clark, now in his stockade at the falls, as they had learned on September 9, when within thirty miles of that point.

The enemy soon broke up, and a part, some two hundred in number, bent on mischief, were led by McKee and Brant towards the Kentucky settlements. Meanwhile Clark, fearing attack, lay inactive at the falls. About the same time, a Cherokee chief, aided by some of these raiders, threatened the Cumberland settlements; but Robertson effectually repulsed the assailants, and gained prestige enough to hold, for a time at least, his neighbors, the Choctaws and Chickasaws, in the interests of his people.

As the summer advanced, the northern Indians gathered for an attack on Wheeling. Zeisberger, the Moravian, who had learned of the savage purpose, sent (August 18) warning messages, so that the attack when it came was expected, and the garrison of Fort Henry was prepared. The enemy were baffled, and with-

drew, but not till they had taken some prisoners, and from one of them they had learned that the Moravians had forewarned the garrison. The result was hardly to be avoided. The Moravians had proved spies and tale-bearers, while claiming immunity as neutrals, and, if the evidence is to be believed, they had been tortuous in their replies when accused of it. Gnadenhütten, their settlement on the Tuscarawas, was therefore broken up by a party of Indians, Tories, and French partisans, under Matthew Elliot, who drove the missionaries and their Delaware neophytes to Sandusky first, and later to Detroit (October 25), where they could do less mischief.

Brodhead, who had been complaining (August 29) to Washington of the dissensions in his camp, owing to a divided headship between himself and Gibson, could have had little regret when, on September 17, he withdrew from Fort Pitt, leaving Gibson in command. Neither this new commander, nor Clark at the falls, had any longer a hope of reaching Detroit. Brodhead had been withdrawn by order of Washington, who at the moment of the change was closing about Cornwallis and Yorktown. The brilliant outcome in October of this movement in the Virginia peninsula gave Washington for a time little opportunity to think of the situation on the Ohio, and of the barren issues there of the year's campaign.

But neither Clark's abortive aims at Detroit, nor Greene's defeats in Carolina, were without results that told in the end. Greene could say of Eutaw (September 8) that it was "the most obstinate fight he ever saw," and that "victory was his." Notwithstanding the distresses of the campaign, Greene had rendered Yorktown possible. Clark had still a stronger hold, feeble as it was, on the northwest than De Peyster had. He had some seven hundred and fifty men at the falls, fed on rotten buffalo meat, and the savages surrounded him, and far and near the settlers were fortified, but, as Haldimand acknowledged, Clark had still kept the British on the defensive between the Ohio and the lakes, a condition which occasional raids of the savages did not relieve. Haldimand charges it upon the capricious conduct of the Indian allies of the British that Clark's fate had not been decided, and the terror of Clark's name had done much to create that capriciousness. That Clark had


escaped the expected fate determined, as it turned out, the future territorial allegiance of the great northwest.

Cold weather settled down in November with Haldimand still ignorant of the fate of Cornwallis, and looking forward to another season of hostilities on the Ohio. Now that Yorktown had determined so much on the seaboard, Congress, which received an official notice of that victory on October 24, was within a month, as Livingston informed Franklin (November 26), preparing for an active campaign for the next season. When Franklin heard the great news from the Virginia peninsula, he wrote from Paris to John Adams: "The infant Hercules in his cradle has now strangled his second serpent," referring to the news from Saratoga which sealed the French alliance four years before.

Washington, scanning the future, saw the necessity of forcing decisive results beyond the mountains in the next campaign, and for this object General William Irvine was sent to take command at Fort Pitt. One of the earliest reports which Irvine made to Washington was that Lochry's neighbors of Westmoreland County, in Virginia, were disheartened at the havoc which that officer's defeat had made among the flower of their young men. They were accordingly seriously thinking of abandoning their county in the spring. On the other hand, the fact that the indecisive campaign of the last season in that region had not deprived the Americans of any territory had already, as Irvine reported (December 3), instigated "people of different places to concoct plans to emigrate into the Indian country, there to establish a government for themselves." This impulse was in large measure owing to the continued uncertainty of the limits of the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania and Virginia. An agreement had been reached in the preceding April by which the five degrees from the Delaware should be determined on the southern boundary line of Pennsylvania. There had, however, been delays in running the bounds, so that the weary settlers were threatening to migrate beyond the disputed territory, and Irvine was reporting to Washington, in December, that until the lines were drawn the militia were useless. There was also, doubtless, an adventurous spirit and some ambitious projects interwoven with these restless motives. It was

owing, perhaps, to the stringent acts which Pennsylvania passed against such an exodus that the Virginians in greater numbers than the Pennsylvanians were joining in the removals. The line which was expected to set at rest these disturbances was not in fact actually run in a provisional way till November of the next year (1782), and it was not confirmed till three years later (1785).

Irvine felt that while the present time demanded, first of all, military success, it was not wise to inaugurate such remote



PENNSYLVANIA AND VIRGINIA BOUNDARY DISPUTE.

NOTE. — This cut is from N. B. Craig's *Olden Time*, Pittsburg, 1846, vol. i. p. 449.

KEY : ——— is the finally established Pennsylvania line. (curved and straight) is the line claimed by Pennsylvania. — — — is the line proposed by Dunmore. — o — o — o is the line proposed by Virginia to be continued north by the curved line.

autonomies. He was doubtful if even the established Kentucky settlements, or such posts as Fort McIntosh, could be sustained till more peaceful times came. His purpose was to prepare the immediate frontiers against savage raids, and then to devote all available resources to following up the Indians to their destruction, and to waste no time in merely burning their towns. He planned in the end to make, if he could, a sudden attack upon

Detroit. He had no purpose to hold the straits, if he got possession of them, for the distance to Detroit was too great to transport supplies, and the British would still command the lakes. He expected only to make a dash and do as much damage as he could, and then retire, hoping in this way to impress the Indians and acquire a temporary respite till the final influence of Yorktown towards a peace was made clear. Washington, in his correspondence with Irvine, recognized the necessity and expediency of the movement, but nothing could well come of the project during the winter.

The tenacity with which, under all his disappointments, Clark had maintained his grasp on the northwest during 1781, made that year such a turning-point in the struggle with the mother country beyond the mountains as Yorktown had proved to be on the Atlantic slope. Not less important was the firm step forward which the States had made in the same interval in determining their political relations to this western country. Just one year from the time when New York had indicated a scheme of compromise, Virginia had retreated from her first pretensions so far as to offer (January 2, 1781) a cession of jurisdiction over the country north of the Ohio, if Congress would agree to certain conditions. To one of these, that the region should ultimately be partitioned into States, there could be no objection. Nor was it unreasonable to require Congress to reimburse her for defending this same region from the assaults from Detroit, for there was then unsettled on her hands the just claim of Oliver Pollock for a very large sum which he had advanced to Clark in his necessities. Congress knew well enough its own indebtedness to the same ardent patriot, who had beggared himself in the cause, and had parted with all his property in New Orleans at a sacrifice, in his efforts to repay the money which he had borrowed from the chest of the Spanish king. Congress, as well as Virginia, had caused Pollock's embarrassment, and it might well meet the obligations of both. It was furthermore no unexpected stipulation that the French Canadians inhabiting this region, and who had so readily changed their allegiance, should be protected in their landed rights; that all bounty lands which had been promised to the soldiers should be respected. It was no hardship for

Congress to agree that all royal grants in that country should be held to be void. But when, by implication, Virginia asked that the claims of New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut, and that all claimants under native grants, both those of individuals and of the Indiana Company, should be disregarded, and that the Kentucky country should be guaranteed to her, she arrogantly asked more than Congress could possibly concede. To take these and all other propositions, from whatever source, into consideration, Congress on January 31, 1781, instituted a committee, who proceeded to call upon all the claimant States and grantees to make a showing of their rights.

New York moved promptly, and directed her delegates to execute a deed to Congress of the territory west of a self-imposed boundary following the meridian of the western end of Lake Ontario, but requiring a guarantee of her territory east of that line if Virginia secured such a pledge. This deed was executed on March 1, and Maryland, having authorized her delegates in anticipation, on the same day signed the articles of confederation, in the belief that the crisis was passed. The next day Congress began to head its bills, "The United States in Congress assembled."

Matters rested till October, when, just as the toils were tightened about Cornwallis, and a committee of Congress stood ready to hear Virginia and her rivals formulate their respective claims, that State stood aloof (October 16) and contended that any presentation of her position was not consistent with her dignity, and ten days later she vainly tried to embarrass the committee and limit its powers.

On November 3, the committee made its report. They represented that they had not obtained from Virginia the same assistance which had been furnished them by the rival claimants. The committee, as was expected, made the most of the opportunity to aggrandize the Iroquois claim of New York, both north and south of the Ohio, and to belittle that of Virginia. They attempted to show this depreciation by setting the rights of the Iroquois, the grants which the traders of the Indiana Company had received, and the limits fixed by the proclamation of 1763, against the charter rights of 1609. It was farther claimed that the crown lands as George the Third had defined them had fallen naturally to the revolting colonies as

a whole. The grant to the Vandalia Company, though legally instituted, was held to be too large for public policy, while it might be expedient to make some compensation to the proprietors in the final settlement; but that the assumed holding of the Illinois and Wabash Company had no warrant in law whatever. The committee closed with urging Virginia to make an unrestricted cession. Madison, who was fearful that Virginia would take deep umbrage at the report, still hoped that the seven States necessary to act on the committee's report would save Virginia from such humiliation, and indeed the report as a whole was never acted upon, since it was seen that the cession movement could get on better without such friction. And here the matter rested at the close of 1781.

We have seen that, beneath the lowering skies of the opening of the year (1781), Congress had taken the initiative and Virginia, notwithstanding her recent reproach to New England, had abandoned her demand for the free navigation of the Mississippi in order better to gain the adherence of Spain. Jefferson sent instructions to that effect to the Virginia delegates on January 18. Some weeks later, Virginia moved in Congress that the river below 31° be yielded to Spain, if she would guarantee the free navigation to the United States above that point. On February 15, Congress, supine and in despair, instructed Jay to yield, if it was found necessary to the securing of a Spanish alliance. As the weeks went on, there was a practical abandonment of all beyond the mountains, except so far as France might dictate the retention. Congress was even ready, pending an acknowledgment of independence, to agree to a truce with England, if France and Spain would deny that government the occupation of all it had claimed. The degradation was complete when, on June 11, to Luzerne's delight, nine States, which were mainly those occupied by the enemy, forced through Congress a vote, leaving absolutely to France the definitions of the American bounds. Luzerne felt so sure of his victory that he informed his government that Congress would be content with the Ohio, if not with the Alleghanies, as a frontier. The surrender to France once made, all sorts of notions prevailed as to what could be saved of the western country. It was hoped, by yielding the Fort Stanwix grant of 1769 beyond the Kana-

wha, — requiring at the same time the destruction of all neighboring fortified posts, — to satisfy France ; but if more was demanded, they hoped to appease the Franco-Spanish avidity by yielding, “ for the use of the Indians,” Niagara and western New York, and all the western slope of the Alleghanies, except so far as the charter of Pennsylvania covered the territory about the forks of the Ohio. These alternative schemes are outlined in a paper by Gouverneur Morris, preserved in the Sparks manuscripts. Virginia at one time (June 8) tried in vain to get a vote in which the western bounds were defined as leaving the St. Lawrence where the 45th parallel struck that river, and then proceeding by the lake to the Miami (Maumee), and so to the sources of the Illinois, and down that river to the Mississippi, but not another State had the courage to insist upon it and save the conquest of Clark.

While everything was fluttering to the death in Philadelphia, the soul of Jay in Madrid was rasped almost beyond endurance. He knew the ministry to be “ insincere and mysterious,” and it is pretty well proved, as he then feared, that his letters were opened in the Spanish post-office. He was conscious that those to whom he was granting diplomatic courtesies knew more of what Congress had done than was permitted him to know. He got intimations from Gouverneur Morris that led him to conjecture the truth.

Finally, however, he obtained his luckless instructions, and on July 13 delivered them formally to Florida Blanca. He could now, at least, talk with him for the future upon terms more equal.

By August, Congress had received Jay’s response. Joseph Jones gives us his version of Jay’s chagrin : “ The Dons are playing a game wholly for themselves.”

When Congress awoke to this, with a spurt of valor, it voted August 10, unanimously, to yield nothing to Spain. Before this determination could have reached Jay, he sought to force a decision out of the laggard and tortuous Spanish ministers. On September 22, he made a formal proposition to relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi below 31°, intimating the greatness of the concession, inasmuch as it must retard the settlement of the country. He told the minister that the concession must be accepted immediately, for it could not be held to if

deferred to the general peace. He assumed this bold front with the same spirit with which he had tried to impress on Congress that their wavering was a mistake, and that any spirit was better than one "of humility and compliance." The bluster failed, and Jay was obliged to confess to Congress, when he next wrote (October 3), that Spain insisted on the entire control of the Gulf of Mexico, and the exclusive navigation of the Mississippi. "The cession of the navigation of the Mississippi will, in my opinion," he added, "render a future war with Spain unavoidable."

Before the president of Congress had received this, Oliver Pollock at New Orleans, with ample knowledge, was writing to the same official that the United States must insist on a port of deposit near the Houmas village, twenty-two leagues above New Orleans, where there was high land, and that they must claim a pilot stand at the Balize.

Four days after Pollock wrote this, Cornwallis surrendered, and there was clearing weather.

CHAPTER XII.

PEACE, 1782.

THE surrender of Cornwallis; the disposition of Parliament to peace; Conway's successful motion (February 22) to discontinue the war, which led North to exclaim, "We are beat completely;" Burke's triumphant hopes, — all were recognizable signs of the coming end of the dragging conflict. The British held a few ports on the seaboard, but by July they had evacuated Savannah. Such Atlantic footholds were not likely to interfere with America's securing an unbroken coast from Maine to Florida, though there was to be an attempt to make the country east of the Penobscot the price of the final surrender of such ports.

While there was little opportunity for French machinations along the eastern slope of the Appalachians, it was otherwise beyond the mountains, and the progress of events in the great western valleys might in the coming months (1782) be of cardinal importance in settling the ultimate bounds of the Republic.

Possessions in the northwest, as they stood, favored the permanence of the American occupation, if there should be no great disaster during the coming season (1782). Haldimand, as commanding along the northern frontier, showed no disposition to be active. Guy Johnson was eager to make a dash on Fort Pitt, and Rocheblave, now restored to the Canadian service, thought that a show of force on the Ohio might swerve the Kentuckians from their allegiance to the confederated States; but Haldimand gave little encouragement to any movements beyond a projected one of De Peyster to dislodge the American settlers about Chicago.

Clark still held his post at the falls, and was anxious to make it the rallying-place of patrol boats on the Ohio, but with a treasury of four shillings and "no means of getting more,"

he could do little. The place, however, was already beginning to bustle with a transit trade. One Jacob Yoder, an adventurous trafficker, had brought in the spring some merchandise from the seaboard to the Monongahela, and from Old Redstone on that stream he had floated it down the river to the falls, in search of an ultimate market in New Orleans.

There was a belief that by faithless acts, some Moravian Indians, who had returned to the Muskingum, had threatened the quiet of the river. So, with little hesitation, a party of Pennsylvanians, under David Williamson, had ruthlessly fallen upon them. It was a natural retribution when, in June, Colonel Crawford, under Irvine's orders, led a party against the Delawares on the Sandusky, and this unfortunate leader was captured and burnt at the stake. In August, a still harder blow was dealt by Captain Caldwell, with a party of British rangers and Indians, dispatched by De Peyster, when an attack was made on Bryant's Station, resulting, a day or two later, in a counter struggle of some mounted Kentuckians at the Blue Licks. This conflict proved to be one of the severest defeats which the frontiersmen ever sustained. A few weeks later, a force of British and Indians made an assault on Fort Henry (Wheeling). Colonel Zane and a feeble garrison happily sustained themselves till succor arrived. Before the season closed, Major Craig, sent from Fort Pitt, made a useless reconnoissance (November) towards Sandusky, while at the same time Clark, animated by revenge for the season's disasters, starting from the falls, led a thousand men against the Miamis, and devastated their towns. It was the last brilliant dash of a man who, amid the whirls of disappointment, was soon to surrender himself to evil habits, and drop out of memorable history. He had now made the final rude onset against British power in the northwest, as he had made the first four years before.

Though Haldimand, on the British side, had, in the main, throughout the season counseled defensive measures, it had not been easy for him to prevent retaliatory strokes. Brant had hoped, while the year was closing, to give a finishing blow. Before the progress of the negotiations in Paris were known to presage peace, this savage chieftain had planned an attack on Fort Pitt, but learning of the excellent condition in which Irvine had put that post, he desisted.

Thus it happened that negotiations for peace were going on in Paris while the fortunes of a desultory conflict were swaying hither and thither beyond the mountains. There was in the west, as in the east, no marked change in the position of the combatants as the season closed.

It was, consequently, as we shall see, mainly the attitude of France and Spain touching this very western country, rather than the demands of England, which caused perplexity in the settlement of the boundaries of the new nation. Indeed, the good results of the final treaty we mainly owe to England, for by playing into the hands of our more bitter enemies, France and Spain, she could have seriously hampered the young Republic at its birth.

While the surgings of the war had not affected the relative possessions of the belligerents in the west, the relations of the States to that territory had, pending the negotiations for peace, been carried to an effective stage. Congress was brought in January (1782) squarely to affirm that the confederated States had succeeded to all the charter rights of the sea-to-sea colonies, as abridged by the Treaty of 1763. Thus the ground was conveniently cleared when, on May 1, 1782, Congress set itself to consider the committee's report of the preceding November 3.

The main thing to be dealt with was the acceptance or refusal of the deed which had been offered by New York. There were reasons why Virginia kept a jealous and watchful eye upon her Northern rival. The Southern State saw danger in the pressing Vermont question, for if that district was admitted to the Union, it meant, as New York claimed, that Congress could decide between a State and a portion of the same State seeking autonomy. Such a result might prove a precedent, as Virginia saw, for Congress to partition that State's domain in accepting Kentucky. The success of Vermont would bode further ill to Virginia, in that the admission of that Northern State to the confederation would swell the vote of the non-claimant States, in considering the proposition of the committee to despoil Virginia of her rights, by accepting the conflicting claims of her rival, New York. It was clear to Virginia that if Congress decided for New York, it threw the whole force of the confederation against her.

The country was in something like a death struggle, and was impressed with a belief (however futile it proved to be) that a public domain at the west was going to furnish means to pay the expenses of the war. Under these circumstances, there was little chance that the rival claims of Virginia and New York would be dispassionately weighed, since measures in legislative bodies are not always, under the stress of war, pushed to just conclusions.

The question of the relative value of these rival claims has not indeed proved easy of solution in later times. Bancroft holds all claims but Virginia's to be invalid. The Supreme Court of the United States, in *Johnson v. McIntosh*, while pronouncing against Indian titles as opposed to European preemption, may seem so far to have sustained the position of Virginia. But the historical question is complicated by the royal annulment of her charter in 1624, though the Virginia publicists have contended that further action in 1625 showed that the consequent possession by the crown of the original territorial limits did not deprive the colony of its rights of jurisdiction; nor was this again affected, as they further claimed, by the proclamation of 1763. In Congress, at least, at this time and later, the native grant was sustained, and pointedly, for the Indiana title, being a native one, was upheld, and the Vandalia title, being a royal preëmption, was voided.

We have seen that Thomas Paine had raised a new issue in giving a construction to the terms of the charter of 1609 which was opposed to that maintained by Virginia. The charter, it will be remembered, makes one of the lines running back from the coast proceed due west, while the other turns northwest, and both by a vague implication were supposed to strike the western ocean. Virginia's due west line was the North Carolina boundary, and the northwest one that which cut off the western parts of Maryland and Pennsylvania and extended indefinitely towards Alaska, abridging thereby also the western extension of Massachusetts and Connecticut. Paine's due west line struck back from the coast at the Maryland line, while his northwest line struck inland at the south till it joined the west line or entered the western sea. This water was held at that time (1609), as Paine contends, to be so near the Alleghanies and beyond their western slope that the two lines,

as he understood them, would probably touch the sea before they collided, and so warrant the expression of the charter, that they extended to that sea. Paine contended that this construction gave a more reasonable limit to the colony than the extent claimed by Virginia, which was large enough to embrace fifty colonies. It will be seen that this view disposed at once of the controversy so long and bitterly waged by Virginia with Maryland and Pennsylvania, and affected the jurisdiction of the upper Shenandoah.

Congress, however, was clearly determined not to decide between disputed interpretations, if a settlement could be reached by the voluntary quitclaims of the rival States. The manifestations of the hour were easily colored by predilections. Madison fancied the Middle States, which had been opposed to Virginia by reason of the numbers of their citizens who were interested in land companies, were now drawing to the Virginia side. The Northern people said that Virginia was, on the contrary, losing ground, and even Madison, rather than continue the contest, at last felt disposed to yield everything that would not benefit the arrogant land companies. The purpose of these he thought might be thwarted by setting Kentucky up as a new government. Indeed, if Irvine's observations were correct, there had grown during the summer, beyond the mountains, a strong disposition for more than one such separate government.

The question of the acceptance of the New York deed came up in Congress a month before the peace commissioners in Paris had closed their labors, and Virginia stood alone in casting her vote against it. After a struggle of six years, the policy to which the constancy of Maryland had contributed, but which Congress had more wisely shaped, was now established. The New York deed, based on the various treaties with the Iroquois in 1684, 1701, 1726, 1744, and 1754, as the committee's report of August 16, 1782, enumerated them, conceded to Congress the fee in the territory between the lakes and the Cumberland Mountains, with a stretch westward, and all under a title which Madison styled "flimsy." He charged New York with urging her jurisdiction, not so much to maintain it, as to secure some credit for her cession of it. The true Virginian plea was that the Iroquois, while they could confer the right of occupancy,

could give no title against the prior discovery of other Christian people. If the New York title had validity, it really left to Virginia but a remnant of her supposed jurisdiction to be surrendered as indisputably hers. Congress had decided that to accept this New York claim was sufficient for the occasion, as setting an example to be followed by the other claimant States, and its action practically banded the confederation in that object. Unless Virginia was bound to stand for her rights, — and the event proved she was not, — and unless Connecticut and Massachusetts and the States south of Virginia were to assume a position equally perverse, — and the event proved they were not, — the question of a great public domain was thus opportunely settled, a month before the provisional treaty of peace was signed at Paris, when Congress, on October 29, voted to accept in due form the deed offered by New York.

While thus in two important ways the relation of the West to the new Republic had been settled on its own soil, we need now to turn to a consideration of the diplomatic foil and fence at Paris, which were ended on November 30, 1782, in a provisional treaty of peace.

This diplomatic struggle had resulted in a distinct American triumph, owing in large measure to the prevision and dauntless convictions of Jay, and to a natural revulsion in the minds of the other American commissioners against both open and sinister efforts of Vergennes, — a revulsion reluctantly reached, however, by Franklin. John Adams was confident that the western population could not be appeased if their expectations were abridged, and he had proved himself a courageous ally of Jay, and had insisted that with firmness and delicacy — the latter not precisely his own trait — the commissioners could get all for which they contended. Franklin was never anything if not politic. Shelburne's opinion of him was that "he wanted to do everything by cunning, which was the bottom of his character," and most Englishmen have taken that view of him ever since. He was certainly never more astute — which may be a more pleasing word — than in now yielding to Adams and Jay: and he was never more successfully judicious than in disarming the resentment of Vergennes, when that minister discovered how he had been foiled. So peace and independence

were triumphantly won, and what the West most needed for its future development was gained.

The new boundaries had been settled on lines that ultimately startled even those who had conceded them, and constituted one of the grounds for the later assaults by Fox and his adherents. Of the eight hundred thousand square miles of territory with which the young Republic entered upon her career, one half of it, of which France and Spain would have deprived her, lay west of the Alleghanies. This broad extension was but the beginning of an ultimate domain, which is measured to-day by three and a half millions of square miles. The courts in the United States have always held that the territory secured through this treaty was not a concession of conquered lands. It was rather the result of a rightful partition of the British empire upon lines which had bounded the American colonies. Livingston, in letters to Franklin in January, 1782, had enforced this view: "The States," he says, "have considered their authority to grant lands to the westward coextensive with the right of Great Britain." This extension to the Mississippi, he again says, "is founded on justice; and our claims are at least such as the events of the war [referring to Clark's successes] give us a right to insist upon," while the settlements in the West "render a relinquishment of the claim highly unpolitic and unjust."


To secure these bounds, the American commissioners had acted almost defiantly towards France. Lee understood their spirit when he asked in Congress: "Shall America submit the destiny of the west to France, while Spain, her ally, stands ready to grasp it?" Hamilton read Congress a lesson, when he said that it was not France who could have extorted from us "humiliating or injurious concessions as the price of her assistance," but Congress, who placed France in a condition to do it, by imposing on the commissioners the obligation of deferring to Vergennes. This degradation had been felt in Congress, and to a demand to recede from it, the friends of those instructions had apologized for the injunctions by declaring them only formal; but no one then knew that France had intrigued to secure their enactment as a means to save the western country to Spain. It was fortunate that under Jay's lead the commissioners disregarded those instructions, and Adams certainly did not construe them as imposing the necessity of following the advice of Vergennes.

When Livingston, after the treaty was signed, called the conduct of the commissioners in question for making the treaty without the privity of Vergennes, Jay fittingly replied that France could have no complaint, since the treaty had nothing in contravention of the treaty of 1778; that it could not be binding till France had concluded a general treaty; and that the instructions presupposed France would act in the interest of America, while it was proved she was planning for Spain's and her own advantage. This explanation of Jay gave the tone to the advocates of the commissioners in Congress. Richard Henry Lee said that France deprived herself of the right of privity when she began to plot against her American ally. Rutledge and Arthur Lee contended that the public good required the action of the commissioners.

"The English," said Vergennes, when it was all over, "had bought rather than made a peace." While all Europe was wondering at the British concessions, it is not difficult to understand the British motive. The party of peace, which Grenville Sharp represented, had got the upper hand. The stubbornness of King George and his advisers had given way to those indubitable principles which often wreck the present to settle the future. It had become necessary to decide whether Canada should be environed with a kindred people, or with the race of Bourbon aliens.

As early as January, 1782, Livingston, in the uncertainty of the future, had intimated to Franklin that a neutral Indian territory beyond the mountains would be preferable to a direct British contact in that direction. In this the American foreign secretary was not probably fully aware of the purposes of France and Spain. In June, D'Aranda gave to Jay a copy of Mitchell's map, on which he had marked what he proposed to make, if he could, the western limits of the American States. It showed a line running north on the back of Georgia to the mouth of the Kanawha, and so to Lake Erie. It afforded a recognition of the grants which had been later made in the ter-

NORM. — The opposite section of a *Carte générale des Treize Etats Unis et Indépendants de l'Amérique Septentrionale* d'après M. Bonne, Ingénieur Hydrographe de la Marine de France, 1782, shows the French view of the limits of the United States, to be allowed by the treaty, — the line running south from "Sandoaké fort" on Lake Erie. The dotted line at the top of the map extends to Sandusky on Lake Erie.



ritory restricted by the proclamation of 1763. All this was as far as the Bourbon cabinets were inclined to go. To this was opposed the American argument that the very prohibitions under that proclamation were an acknowledgment of the States' inherent charter rights, which that instrument had only temporarily assailed, as Livingston had rehearsed to Franklin.

This line drawn on Mitchell's map was the first clear indication of what Spain was striving for. D'Aranda coupled his graphic argument with claiming that the Spanish capture of the Illinois fort had pushed their rights eastward till they reached the territory belonging to the Indians. Jay hardly needed the promptings of recent instructions from Livingston to deny the Spanish conquest and to maintain the American rights.

Rayneval now put into Jay's hands a paper in which he tried to show that after 1763 England had never considered the western country a part of her "established" colonies, and that Spain never acquired the territory above the Natchez. The country between the Spanish possessions and the Alleghanies was, as he claimed, the inheritance of the natives, and to secure them in their rights he proposed a tortuous line, running north from the Gulf to the mouth of the Cumberland, on the east of which the Indians should be under the protection of the Americans, and on the west the Spanish should have a similar supervision, with an exclusive right to the navigation of the Mississippi. In September, Jay acquainted Vergennes that it was his determination to abate nothing of the Mississippi claim. It was a sign to the French minister that he had both alertness and firmness to deal with in the American commissioners.

De Grasse, after being captured by the British fleet in the West Indies, had been taken to England, and, passing on parole from London to Paris, he is thought to have carried an intimation from the English cabinet which induced Vergennes to send Rayneval to the English capital. Oswald believed that Rayneval's object was to bring Shelburne to allow that both banks of the Mississippi should go to Spain. If he could have accomplished this, Vergennes, as Rayneval intimated in a paper which he gave to Jay, was prepared to support England at the final settlement in a demand for the limits of the Quebec Act. Rayneval had never agreed with Jay's views, and had thought

any concession made by the American commissioner too small. In pressing upon Shelburne the necessity of hemming the Americans in on the west, he revealed for the first time to the English cabinet what was really the purpose of France and Spain, and opened the English mind to what North had warmly contended for, — the integrity of the bounds of 1774 in the Ohio valley, both as a justice to their Indian allies, and as preserving the forts which they had erected north of the Ohio. It brought back the old proposition of Vergennes, made two or three years before, of closing the war by dividing the western country between England and France.

Vergennes's present purpose was patent. He wished to weaken the United States, and he desired to have England acknowledge that the bounds of Canada ran to the Ohio, so that if ever a turn in fortune rendered it possible, France could recover by treaty her possessions in the St. Lawrence valley. Just what Rayneval's purpose was in this English mission has been a subject of controversy. Diplomatic denials in the mouth of such a man count for little. If we take his ostensible instructions as evidence, they contravene the character of both Vergennes and his creature. It is necessary always to remember that Vergennes never had any purpose but to aggrandize France.

Shelburne was clearly suspicious. He saw that to release the Americans from the French toils, and from any evil to Britain resulting therefrom, was to give the new nation an extent of territory which would conduce to its dignity and buttress its independence against Bourbon intrigue.

Oswald, the English agent, in talking with Franklin, significantly hinted at the recent Russian discoveries "on the back of North America" as affording a possible base for a friendly power to move against Spain, if that country drove both England and the United States to extremities. "This appeared a little visionary at present," said Franklin, "but I did not dispute it."

So the Spanish and French Bourbons were thwarted in reality by the adhesion of England to her old colonial charters, and by her purpose to make them an inheritance for her emancipated colonies. The conquest of the northwest by Clark told in the final result rather more against the pretensions of Spain than



constitutes five eighths of the United States, two of which five eighths are occupied by the Ohio and its waters ; the residuary streams which run into the Gulf of Mexico, the Atlantic, and the St. Lawrence make the remaining three eighths."

Under her treaties with France and Spain, England claimed a right to use the Mississippi from its source to the sea, and the new treaty following an offer which Jay had made through Vaughan, when he sent him to England to counteract the plots of Rayneval, confirmed to the United States an equal share with England in that navigation, and Shelburne, at the time in ignorance of the attendant geography, imagined that British manufactures were by this privilege likely to find a new market. The denial of this British right to the river by Spain led, as we shall see, to complications which gave some romantic interest in the near future to the history of the western settlements. England's claim to that right rested now, curiously enough, on the supposition that the upper reaches of the Great River were available for shipment or travel from Canadian territory, and when the source of the Mississippi was found to lie wholly within the American domain, and when the purchase of Louisiana in 1803 had secured both banks of the Mississippi to the United States, England abandoned the right, and made no reference to it in the treaty of 1814.

The concession of territory which the treaty made to the United States in the extreme northwest was everywhere a surprise. Luzerne wrote to Vergennes : "The Americans, in pushing their possessions as far as the Lake of the Woods, are preparing for their remote posterity a communication with the Pacific." The prophecy has been fulfilled.

A discontent, much like that of France, was at once manifested in Canada at the line which the treaty had given the United States on the north. There was a widespread feeling among the Americans that England would never consent to dividing the Quebec of 1774. General Irvine, when in command at Fort Pitt, had felt confident of this. Haldimand had long struggled to make the Quebec Bill effective. Now when he saw that his efforts had not only failed on the Ohio, but that farther east the Americans had gained Niagara and Oswego, he felt a sense of shame in the necessity which it involved of

removing the Iroquois, the British allies, to the other side of Lake Ontario. This necessity made Sir John Johnson call the treaty an "infamous" one.

The surging of the war had not made the fate of the Ohio country certain, notwithstanding the brilliant exploits of Clark. The negotiations at Paris had accordingly lingered, with many counter-plots, as we have seen, over the destiny of that region. Franklin at one time had feared that England was trying to detach France from the American alliance by offering to restore Canada to her, and but for Rodney's defeat of De Grasse (April, 1782), there might have been some chance of it. The English, on the other hand, had had their fits of distrust for fear that France might prevent the United States coming to an independent negotiation, when the Ohio country would have been the consideration in other diplomatic bargains. That England had a lingering hope in some way to secure that country as a refuge for the loyalists is evident. "We did not want such neighbors," said Franklin, who had been too much exasperated against the Tories soberly to estimate what a loss the country was to suffer by their expulsion. Franklin indeed had suggested to Oswald that these political outlaws should even be denied a home in Canada, and that the American jurisdiction ought to extend to the Arctic circle and so accomplish their exclusion. He added, with a mock graciousness, that perhaps some of the Canadian waste lands could be sold to indemnify the royalists for the confiscation of their estates. This was an intimation that he very soon regretted he had given. He confessed, however, that there might be some Americans who felt that Canada in British hands would be the best guarantee of the American Union.

It has been claimed by Dr. Wharton, in his *International Law Digest* (iii. 913), that if Franklin had not been hampered by his fellow negotiators, he would probably have secured Canada to the United States, but there is little ground for such a belief. He could have had as little hope of it, when the test came, as Vergennes had of restoring the ancient reign of France within its borders. Grenville, in a letter to Fox, stated the question squarely when he said that England would naturally see little reason to give away a fourteenth province, after she had lost thirteen.

The acquisition of the country between the Ohio and the lakes, the joint control of most of the midland seas and the entire jurisdiction over others, was of itself a prosperous stroke. It carried a sufficient success, even though England did not concede the navigation of the lower St. Lawrence, which she in fact denied down to the conclusion of the reciprocity treaty in 1854.

There had been, during the closing months of the negotiations, more than one proposition as to these northern bounds submitted to the English ministry.

Rayneval, as we have shown, had been content to leave the question to English diplomacy, never once questioning that she would stubbornly stand by the Quebec Bill, and Vergennes, when the final negotiations were approaching, had written to Luzerne that the Americans had no claim whatever to carve away any part of the Quebec of 1774. Oswald, however, had felt the pressure of Franklin, and he had pointedly reported to Townshend that to reduce Quebec to the limits which it had under the proclamation of 1763 was "necessary and indispensable" to a peace. Accordingly, Townshend, on September 1, instructed the British agent to consent "to a confinement of the boundaries of Canada, at least, to what they were before the act of Parliament of 1774, if not to a still more contracted state on an ancient footing." This was practically an acceptance of the Nipissing line of 1763. Jay met the occasion within a short time, and on October 5 put into Oswald's hands some articles which Franklin had approved, and which embraced this Nipissing line, which turned from the St. Lawrence at 45° north latitude, and ran straight to Lake Nipissing, and thence to the source of the Mississippi. Three days later, Oswald forwarded the draft to London for his Majesty's consideration.

The line did not, as Franklin had anticipated, prove satisfactory, and Strachey, one of the under-secretaries, was sent to Paris to strengthen Oswald's hands, bearing a letter to him dated October 23. There had intervened some military successes for the British arms, and the ministry felt more encouraged in their ability to press a recognition by the United States of the loyalists' claims to the Ohio country. Accordingly, Strachey was expected either to secure this, or, as an alternative, to push the northeastern boundary from the St. Croix

westward to the Penobscot. But it was too late, and the American commissioners were as firm as ever.

In November, Strachey sent to the foreign secretary a new draft of a treaty, accompanied by a map which showed Oswald's line, and two others, now submitted by the Americans, who were prepared to accept either one of them. One of these lines followed the 45th parallel due west to the Mississippi, thereby accepting the peninsula between Lake Ontario and Lake Huron in lieu of what now constitutes the upper parts of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. The other proposition was a line starting from where the 45th parallel touched the St. Lawrence, and following the mid-channel of river and lakes westward and beyond Lake Superior. This line took the reverse in the exchange of peninsular territories. Strachey, in his letter accompanying the draft, recommended that certain "loose" expressions in it should be "tightened" in the engrossment of it in London, and premised that the American commissioners were "the greatest quibblers" he had ever known. They had been quibbling to some effect.

The foreign secretary, on November 19, at the instance of the Duke of Richmond, adopted the mid-lake line, and urged the signing of the treaty before the assembling of Parliament. Eleven days later it was signed, and in sending it the same day to London, Strachey wrote: "God forbid, if I should ever have a hand in another peace!" John Adams said: "The peace depended absolutely upon the critical moment when it was signed, and haste was inevitable."

On December 10, Strachey, who had in the mean while gone to London, wrote back to Oswald that he had found "Mr. Townshend and Lord Shelburne perfectly satisfied." The satisfaction did not prove, however, sufficient to insure quiet.

The American commissioners might well congratulate Livingston that the bounds which they had secured showed little to complain of and not much to desire. But in England upon second thought, and in Canada at once, there was little of such complacency, because of the weighty loss which befell the mercantile interests. The trade of Canada was not very great, but it was its all. Shelburne congratulated himself that while Canada afforded only £50,000 annual revenue, he had put an

end to the war which had cost £800,000 a year. The treaty's partition of the valley of the Great Lakes had, moreover, dealt a blow to Canada in throwing more than half of the western trade in skins — reckoned at £180,000 — into the control of the Americans. It was estimated that not far from four thousand Indians of the watershed of the upper lakes were accustomed to gather for trade at Mackinac, which was also by the treaty brought within the American bounds. Haldimand, by dispatching Calvé to them, lost no time in trying by seductive speeches to keep these tribesmen faithful to British interests. The North West Company of Montreal stood ready to profit by such opportunities as long as the surrender to the Americans of the western posts could be delayed. Through this postponement the company was enabled for some years to control the trade of the more distant west through stations at La Baye and Prairie du Chien.

The traffic which the Canadians had long conducted throughout the region northwest of Lake Superior was now likewise threatened by the Grand Portage becoming, under the treaty, the American boundary. This passage was the water-way — called by a misconception in the treaty Long Lake — which with some interruptions connected Lake Superior with the Lake of the Woods. The trade passing along this communication had amounted to about £50,000 annually, and there were nearly three hundred men yearly following it at the end of a course of eighteen hundred miles from Montreal. Haldimand, prompted by the solicitude of the Canadian traders, had advised them not at present to throw any doubt on the divisionary line which was to be tracked along these linked and unlinked waters. To question it would, he feared, lead to a joint survey, and that to a disclosure to the Americans of the channels of trade in that direction. Meanwhile the Canadians had begun to search for another portage wholly on British ground, and one Frobisher had speedily found it by the way of Lake Nepigon.

This passage of the Grand Portage was supposed by the commissioners in Paris to be the true source of the St. Lawrence waters by a water-way of a steady incline, but broken by carrying-places. It was really known by those more familiar with the country to be cut by a divide which turned the streams on one hand to Lake Superior and on the other to the Lake of the

Woods. Modern exploration, indeed, as the line is run, has shown several minor divides in addition. It is said that the suggestion of making this broken current the line of the treaty came from one Peter Pond, a native of Boston, who had been connected with the North West Company, and whose representations were accepted by the English commissioners. This was easier for them, because Pond's statements seemed to be in accordance with Mitchell's map of 1755, the principal one used by the negotiators. In this map, as in all the contemporary maps, Lake Superior is shown to be well filled with islands; and the mid-water line, athwart the lake, was defined as passing the northern end of Phillippeaux Island on its way to the Grand Portage. This was in accordance with a belief that the north end lay nearly opposite the entrance of the water-way. The fact is, that it is much more nearly on a line with the south end, and by this misconception the international line on modern maps makes an unexpected turn in order to throw that island on the American side.

It was at that time also supposed that a line passing from Lake Superior up this water-way and crossing the Lake of the Woods would at the northwest angle of that lake strike the 49° of latitude, and if then continued due west on that parallel, that it would strike the Mississippi somewhere in its upper parts. Mitchell had not exactly figured this condition in his map, but it could be inferred from what he did show.

In 1785, this same vagrant Bostonian Pond made, as we shall see, a plot of this region, in which he was the first to emphasize the fact that the Mississippi really rose far south of the 49° of latitude, and so cut off Englishmen from the chance of navigating that river. This development actually left a space of about one hundred miles between the springs of the Great River and the Lake of the Woods. In this interval there was, of course, by the treaty no definition of bounds, — a difficulty solved after Louisiana was acquired by dropping the line due south from the lake till it reached the 49th parallel, along which the boundary was then carried west to the mountains.

The proclamation of 1763 was the cause of other difficulties on the southern border. Florida at the general peace was

restored to Spain, England having held it since 1763. It was the sole success of the miserable intrigue in which Spain had been engaged, and if the later admission of Lord Lansdowne (Shelburne) is to be believed, England yielded it now in the hopes that it would embroil the United States and Spain in the future. Whether yielded for that purpose or not, it certainly became a bone of contention, and D'Aranda is said to have warned his sovereign that it would.

Its retention by England would, under the secret clause of the new treaty which had been agreed upon, have stopped the bounds of the Republic at the latitude of the mouth of the Yazoo, 32° 28', instead of carrying them farther south to 31°, — another result of the proclamation of 1763, and equally the source of later troubles with Spain. Notwithstanding such a diminution of the Republic's area, Jay had hoped the negotiation would have left west Florida in the hands of England, and in the usual ignorance of the geography of the source of the Mississippi, he urged it upon the English commissioners as affording near the mouth of that river a complement of the commercial rights which they acquired at the source.

The fact that England in the proclamation of 1763 had annexed this debatable territory — now containing perhaps ten thousand inhabitants — to west Florida, as well as Galvez's successes in capturing the English posts within it, was the ground of the claim which Spain urged for possessing to the Yazoo. If Congress, in 1779, had yielded to the importunities of Patrick Henry, and had succeeded in doing what Galvez later did, the secret clause of 1782 might have proved effective. As it was, the success of Galvez had been at the time grateful to Congress, and when, at the close of the war, Oliver Pollock presented to that body a portrait of his friend, the Spanish governor, it was accepted "in consideration of his early and jealous friendship, frequently manifested in behalf of these States."

If the United States, in the conclusions which had been reached, had any occasion for gratitude, it was because in the perilous issue England for a brief interval showed something of that "sweet reconciliation" which Hartley and Franklin had talked so much about, for that temporary blandness came, as John Adams said, at the right moment to serve America's terri-

torial ambition. Certainly, the United States had no ground for gratitude to France or Spain, neither of which had any other intention than to aggrandize the other, humiliate England, and cripple America. Fortunately, to secure these results the independence of the United States was necessary, and this was the only proposition to which Vergennes was constant. There was indeed no reason to expect anything else of the Bourbon political twins. "The Americans know too much of politics," said Talleyrand, "to believe in the virtue called gratitude between nations. They know that disinterested services are alone entitled to that pure sentiment, and that there are no such services between States." This was the key to the diplomacy of that age, and times have not much changed.

Sparks in his time, and Wharton of late years, trusting too implicitly in the public and even confidential professions of Vergennes and Rayneval, — two so expert masters of duplicity that they needed constantly to struggle to prevent duplicity becoming masters of them, — have believed that the suspicions of Jay and Adams as to the purposes of France were without foundation, and that Franklin had the clearest conception of the situation; but the publications of Circourt, Fitzmaurice, Doniol, and Stevens have indicated that the insight and prevision of Jay was true, when, a fortnight before the treaty was signed, he wrote to Livingston as follows: "This court is interested in separating us from Great Britain, and on that point we may, I believe, depend upon them; but it is not their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so. It is their interest to keep some point or other in contest between us and Britain to the end of the war, to prevent the possibility of our sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the war and dependent on them for supplies. Hence they have favored and will continue to favor the British demands as to matters of boundary and the Tories."

The provisional treaty was made definitive on September 3, 1783, after England, France, and Spain had agreed among themselves to other terms of peace in the preceding January. The interval since the signing of the preliminary treaty had allowed England time, through new political leaders in the coali-

tion with North, which Fox managed, to recover from her tractable mood, and the final treaty was signed by those who did not formulate it. It was useless to hope in the revision for the rectification of what John Adams called "inaccuracies," and its language was unchanged.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE INSECURITY OF THE NORTHWEST.

1783-1787.

THE war for independence was over. Jefferson reckoned that the struggle had cost the people of the United States something like \$140,000,000, while it had caused England the ineffectual expenditure of at least five times as much. It was acknowledged in the House of Commons that every soldier sent across the sea had cost £100 sterling. Brissot, with only approximate correctness, put it rather strikingly: "The Americans pay less than a million sterling a year for having maintained their liberty, while the English pay more than four million sterling additional annual expense for having attempted to rob them of it."

But this monetary disparity was no test of the far greater loss which Great Britain had suffered. Her dominion had been curtailed by a million square miles, as it was then computed, and this territory constituted an area best assured of a future among all her possessions. Her prestige was injured, and her hereditary enemy across the Channel gloated on the spectacle. Her colonial children had been divided: a part of them were left suspicious of her, the rest were looking to her for substantial recognition of their loyalty. Her savage allies had been turned over to the tender mercies of those whose possessions they had ravaged. There was a population of about three and a quarter million, mostly her kin in blood, whom she had alienated when she most needed their support. All this had happened because her ministry were blind to the advance of human ideas, and were stubborn in support of an obstinate king, who could not see that the world moved on, and that there was an inevitable waning of old assumptions in the royal prerogative and Parliamentary rights.

The American commissioners had made a triumph under the

guiding influence of Jay and Adams, as Hamilton at the time recognized, which cut by a double edge. Not only had England felt one edge, but France had felt the other. "The Count de Vergennes and I," said one of these commissioners, "were pursuing different objects. He was endeavoring to make my countrymen meek and humble, and I was laboring to make them proud." It proved, indeed, the pride that goeth before a fall, and that fall was very near being a fatal one when, some years later, John Adams's predictions were verified. "England and France," he said to the president of Congress, September 5, 1783, "will be most perfectly united in all artifices and endeavors to keep down our reputation at home and abroad, to mortify our self-conceit, and to lessen us in the opinion of the world."

A few days after the signing of the preliminaries, John Adams, addressing Oswald, one of the British commissioners, deprecated any resentment which the mother country might be disposed to harbor. "Favor and promote the interests, reputation, and dignity of the United States," he said, "in everything that is consistent with your own. If you pursue the plan of cramping, crippling, and weakening America, on the supposition that she will be a rival to you, you will make her really so; you will make her the natural and perpetual ally of your natural and perpetual enemies," — and she came near doing so. Some days after Adams had written thus, Jay, in addressing the secretary of foreign affairs (December 14, 1782), said in explanation of the complacency shown by Britain in the preliminaries, and in the king's speech: "In the continuance of this disposition and system, too much confidence ought not to be placed, for disappointed violence and mortified ambition are certainly dangerous foundations to build implicit confidence upon."

A few months later, Jay again wrote (April 22, 1783): "They mean to court us, and in my opinion we should avoid being either too forward or too coy. . . . There are circumstances which induce me to believe that Spain is turning her eyes to England for a more intimate connection. They are the only two European powers which have continental possessions on our side of the water, and Spain, I think, wishes for a league between them for mutual security against us."

Similar apprehensions were shared by sagacious observers on both sides. Madison wrote to his father (January, 1783): "The insidiousness and instability of the British cabinet forbid us to be sanguine." Hamilton warned (March 17, 1783) Washington of the "insincerity and duplicity of Lord Shelburne." Benjamin Vaughan wrote in February from London that the treaty "had put many good people into ill humor, and it has given a thousand pretexts to the bad people among us." Franklin found it easy to believe that any change of affairs in Europe, or mishaps among the Americans, would find the ministry ready to renew the war, for, as he wrote, the British court "is not in truth reconciled either to us or the loss of us." He maintained this opinion steadily, and wrote (September 13) to the president of Congress that the English court "would never cease endeavoring to disunite us." These views were reflected in the expressions of Richard Henry Lee, William Bingham, and many others.

In entering upon its new career, the young Republic was indeed surrounded by hazards greater than she had surmounted. When, on January 20, 1783, hostilities were declared at an end, they gave place to internal dissensions and external intrigues. These things startled the steadfast patriots. "There has not been a more critical, delicate, and interesting period during the war," wrote Elias Boudinot to Washington. Washington at one time was forced to say of the sad conditions: "I think there is more wickedness than ignorance mixed with our councils."

Jay, in September, 1783, was urging upon Gouverneur Morris: "Everything conducing to union and constitutional energy of government should be cultivated, cherished, and protected, and all counsels and measures of a contrary complexion should at least be suspected of impolitic views and objects."

A better spirit of union might have parried some of the dangers, but there were others naturally inseparable from having for neighbors on the northern frontiers those who, when the treaty was soberly reviewed, saw how much they had lost. Still greater peril came from the inherent weakness of the confederacy.

Edmund Randolph wrote to Washington: "The nerves of

government are unstrung, both in energy and money, and the fashion of the day is to calumniate the best services if unsuccessful." Franklin felt that these rumors of incapacity and wrong were doing the State much injury, and persistently held that matters were better than they seemed. "Our domestic misunderstandings," he wrote to Hartley, "are of small extent, though monstrously magnified by your microscopic newspapers."

Hartley had warned Franklin while the negotiations of peace were pending that the victorious States might, after all, reject the authority of Congress, as they had that of Britain, so that the peace would be but the ill-fated moment for relaxing all control. Hamilton wrote to Washington on March 17, 1783: "There is a fatal opposition to continental views. Necessity alone can work a reform. But how produce this necessity? how apply it? how keep it within salutary bounds? I fear we have been contending for a shadow." There was no better proof of it than the fact that not a quarter of the requisitions which Congress had made, and was to make, on the States for the necessary expenses of government were and could be met. The need of a central controlling power was more and more engaging the attention of circumspect observers. Hamilton now undertook to devise a plan of a military establishment for the peace. He urged that a system independent of and controlling the separate States was essential, if the western country was to be protected and the navigation of the Mississippi to be secured.

It was soon evident, such was the laxity of the bonds between the States, that the stipulations of the recent treaty could not be enforced. The only power to hold the States to their obligations in this respect was that same Congress whose demands were of no avail in asking pecuniary support for the government.

That there existed a disposition on both sides not honestly to observe the conditions of the treaty was only too apparent, — on the part of the British because they did not wish to observe them, and on the part of the American Congress because they could not. Jefferson spoke of Congress as "inactive spectators of the infractions because they had no effectual power to control them." Adams contended that the British ministry

were in the first instance responsible for a breach of the compact. Jay maintained that the blame lay with the Americans, and he said to John Adams "that there had not been a single day, since the treaty took effect, in which it had not been violated by one or other of the States."

It is safe, however, to assume with Richard Henry Lee, "that both countries were to blame, and transgressions were on each side coequal." Hamilton said, "The question is one so mixed and doubtful as to render a waiver expedient on our part." At the end of a long controversy over this point of first responsibility, it was "Curtius's" opinion that "the parties were as remote from agreement as when they began." The real apprehension was whether either side, actuated by passion, should take advantage of the infractions of the other, and deliberately put common concessions out of reach. Hamilton remonstrated with Governor Clinton on such "intemperate proceedings" in New York as really put the treaty in jeopardy.

That breach of the treaty which seriously affected our western history was in the detention of the military posts on the Great Lakes, which were, by the terms of the treaty, included in the concessions to the Republic. There was, perhaps, some ground for the fear, on the part of the British, that the concession had seemed like abandoning their Indian allies, and that some time was needed to reconcile them to the change. Such had been the fear of Hartley, and he had proposed for the definitive articles a delay of three years in which to pacify the tribes. The suppression on the part of the English, however, for a long time of any reason for the detention was in a high degree irritating. When it was announced, it proved an allegation that threw the blame upon the Americans, since it was held that there had been obstruction in the several States to the collection of British debts, which were to be paid under the terms of the peace, and that the posts were retained as security for the unpaid indebtedness. There can be no doubt that the rightful processes of law for collecting debts had been impeded, as Jay in his report acknowledged. Hamilton, in his *Observations on Jay's Treaty*, points out that various acts respecting the British debts, in New York, Virginia, and South Carolina, antedated the conclusion of the treaty, as fixed in the final ratifications.

Rhode Island, New Jersey, North Carolina, and Georgia had made the debts payable in depreciated paper money, when the obligation was in sterling. Congress virtually acknowledged this when it called upon the States (April 13, 1787) to repeal these same laws. Hamilton further urged it was "an usurpation upon the part of any State to take upon itself the business of retaliation." Indeed, Pennsylvania, in showing that one of her acts complained of had in reality been passed before the treaty was made, pointedly affirmed that "when treaties are broken on the one part, representatives from the other contracting party to repair the breach should always precede retaliation."

Meanwhile, the debtors themselves were flying over the mountains, where they could not be followed, impoverishing in some degree the producing power of the east, and adding to that population which Franklin, in his *Sending Felons to America*, charged the British government with pouring into the States. Boudinot, then president of Congress, had early foreseen the difficulty. On April 12, 1783, he wrote to Lafayette: "The terms of peace give universal satisfaction, except that no time is mentioned for the American merchants paying their English debts. Having the greatest part of their estates in the public funds, and having suffered greatly by the depreciation of the money, inevitable ruin must be their portion if they have not three or four years to accomplish the business." Congress did, indeed, in the following June, send instructions to have a limit of three years for paying the debts inserted in the definitive treaty, but no change was made. Franklin, in a more exasperated spirit, rebuked the British importunity, when he said it was British depredations that had made Americans unable to meet the demands of their British creditors. As the years went on, and the liquidation of the debts was still arrested, Tom Paine reminded the British creditors that it was their commercial restrictions that interfered with the course of justice, in depriving the American merchant of his legitimate gains. It was estimated that these debts amounted to about \$28,000,000, and to this \$14,000,000 in interest was to be added, making \$42,000,000 in all. It was Jay's advocacy of paying this interest that came near at a later day (1794) defeating his confirmation as special envoy to England. Rufus King thought that no jury would award interest. John Adams claimed that the war had annulled England's rights to interest.

The chief infringements of the treaty on the American side were due to Virginia. It was owing to her tobacco crop that her planters now owed nearly as much as all the other States combined. Brissot put it in this way: "The independent Americans have but little money. This scarcity rises from two causes. First, from the kind of commerce they heretofore have carried on with England, and afterwards from the ravages of a seven years' war. This commerce was purely one of exchange, and in certain States, as Virginia, the importations always surpassed the exportations, and the result was that they could not but be debtors to England."

This question of the creditors' obligations was mixed up in the public mind with a rightful demand for compensation due the Americans for the loss of fugitive slaves, carried off by the British at the evacuation of New York. The president of Congress wrote to Franklin, June 18, 1783: "It has been an ill-judged scheme in the British to retain New York so long, and send off the negroes, as it has roused the spirit of the citizens of the several States greatly." The value of such slaves was placed by their former possessors at more than \$400,000, and they were said to number, adults and children, nearly three thousand, as commissioners, sent to watch the evacuation of New York, reported.

That this deportation of the blacks took place was acknowledged by Pitt, but it was contended that when the slaves fled within the British lines, in some instances in response to Carleton's proclamations, they became British property, and could be rightfully carried off like other acquired chattels, and that the terms of the treaty had reference only to seizing slaves for the purpose of carrying them off, which had not been done, though there was a doubt in some cases if the slaves had not come within the British lines after the signing of the treaty. Joseph Jones wrote to Madison that this rape of the blacks would inevitably be used to justify delay in paying the British debts. Hamilton contended that if it was infamous in Great Britain to seduce the negroes, it would have been still more infamous to surrender them back to slavery. He held that the British interpretation had much in its favor, and the act was not "such a clear breach of treaty as to justify retaliation." On

much the same grounds the British might demand, it was contended, the deserters from their service who had yielded to American seductions. At all events, this carrying off of slaves instigated the Virginia Assembly in May, 1784, to put statutory obstacles in the way of English creditors. Patrick Henry was a warm advocate of these retaliatory acts. Richard Henry Lee and others of less passionate mood opposed them, but in vain. Among the soberer remonstrants was George Mason, who wrote to Mr. Henry: "On the whole, we have better terms of peace than America had cause to expect, and I cannot but think it would be highly dangerous and imprudent to risk a breach of the peace." In the sequel, Virginia grew more moderate, and there was talk of a plan to liquidate the debts in seven annual installments. Jefferson could flatter himself that before the last installment of the debts was paid, the value of the deported slaves could be reserved. Virginia, meanwhile, had made her compliance contingent upon that of the other States, and upon the surrender of the deported negroes. In these demands, as in her imperative demands for the evacuation of the posts, she was led by Patrick Henry. Congress in the end, and on a report from Jay, did, as we have seen, what it could to induce the recalcitrant States to purge their statute-books of all laws hindering the collection of such debts; the relief, however, was not absolute till the adoption of the Federal Constitution gave such matters into other hands.

Thus the most serious risk of the peace came from that State which, in her territorial extension, claimed to have gained most by the persistent efforts of the peace commissioners to carry the Republic's bounds to the Mississippi.

There was another British plea for the retention of the western posts which had far less justification. The American commissioners had resolutely refused to guarantee any compensation to loyalists for their losses, and the British agents had as persistently refused to make reparation for private property of the patriot party destroyed during the war. It was Jay's opinion that "Dr. Franklin's firmness and exertion" on the American side did much to maintain their ground. All which the American commissioners would concede was in the fifth article of the treaty, that Congress should recommend to the

several state assemblies to repeal their confiscation acts, and make such restitution of property already confiscated as they could consistently. The sixth article, however, required that there should be no future confiscations or persecutions, — a provision which, it must be confessed, was subjected by some, as Hamilton said, to a “subtle and evasive interpretation.”

The American people naturally rated the Tories by the worst of them, and how little sympathy there was for them can be conceived from Franklin’s statement of their case: “The war against us was begun by a general act of Parliament declaring all our States confiscated, and probably one great motive to the loyalty of the royalists was the hope of sharing in these confiscations. They have played a deep game, staking their estates against ours, and they have been unsuccessful.” “As to the Tories,” said Jay, “who have received damage from us, why so much noise about them and so little said or thought of Whigs, who have suffered ten times as much from these same Tories?” Carleton, with undue haste, had pressed Congress to do what had been promised for it; but Livingston replied that no action could be taken till the articles of peace were ratified, when, as he alleged, the recommendation of Congress would be received with more respect, after the “asperities of the war shall be worn down.” When Lady Juliana Penn appealed to Jay for the restoration of her rights in Pennsylvania, he replied (December 4, 1782): “There is reason to expect that whatever undue degree of severity may have been infused into our laws by a merciless war and a strong sense of injuries will yield to the influences of those gentler emotions which the mild and cheerful season of peace and tranquillity must naturally excite.” The recommendation called for by the treaty was in due time made by Congress, but the States, having the matter in their own discretion, showed no inclination to favor the loyalists.

The commissioners, who were aware that the terms of the treaty in this respect were considered in Europe “very humiliating to Britain,” insisted, in a communication to Congress (September 10, 1783), that the provisions of the treaty should be carried out “in good faith and in a manner least offensive to the feelings of the king and court of Great Britain, who upon that point are extremely tender. The unseasonable and unnecessary resolves of various towns on this subject,” they added,

"the actual expulsion of Tories from some places, and the avowed implacability of almost all who have published their sentiments about the matter, are circumstances which are construed, not only to the prejudice of our national magnanimity and good faith, but also to the prejudice of our government." Nevertheless, the States were content to feel, as apparently Franklin in his heart felt, that the recommendatory clause of the treaty was simply embodied to dismiss the matter, and, if any relief was to be afforded the loyalists, there was naturally a general acquiescence in the belief that their relief should wait the withdrawal of the British forces. The fate that should then befall them was perhaps expressed as considerably as was likely to be the case in what Jay wrote: "I think the faithless and cruel should be banished forever and their estates confiscated; it is just and reasonable. As to the residue, who have either upon principle openly and fairly opposed us, or who from timidity have fled from the storm and remained inoffensive, let us not punish the first for behaving like men, nor be extremely severe to the latter because nature had made them like women."

So the debts and the loyalists were made by the British ministry to justify as best they could the retention of these lake posts for the next twelve years, with all the repression which it implied upon the development of the northwest, which amounted, in Hamilton's opinion, to the value of £100,000 a year.

Two or three months after the preliminaries of peace had been received, Congress, with the same precipitancy which characterized Carleton in urging action about the loyalists, instructed Washington to arrange with Haldimand for the same speedy transfer of these posts at the west and on the lakes as had been made of the port of New York. The stations in question were those at Mackinac, Detroit, Wabash, Miami, Fort Erie, Niagara, Oswego, and a few minor points, including two on Lake Champlain. The post at Detroit carried with it some two or three thousand neighboring inhabitants, and there were, in addition, some other settlers near Dutchman's Point. Accordingly, on July 12, 1783, Washington wrote to Haldimand and dispatched Steuben with the letter. On August 3, the American general, having reached Chambly, sent his credentials

forward, and Haldimand hastened to the Sorel to meet him. It was then that Haldimand, with great civility, orally declined to discuss the matter without definite orders from his superiors, and a few days later took the same position in letters which he addressed to Steuben and to Washington. The English general also declined to allow Steuben to proceed to an inspection of the posts. Steuben later told the president of Congress that in his opinion the British were "planning their schemes in Canada for holding the frontier posts for a year or two longer."

Hartley, indeed, had anticipated in the course of the negotiations at Paris, as has been shown, that the Indians would find themselves by the treaty "betrayed into the hands of that people against whom they had been incited to war," and that it was as necessary to treat them warily as it was that provision should first be made for the traders. Already, in August, 1783, the British traffickers at the upper posts had complained of American interference with their profits in a trade which was known to be worth £50,000, in the region beyond Lake Superior. A little later the Montreal merchants represented that the trade of Mackinac comprised three quarters of the entire trade in the Mississippi valley between 39° and 60° of latitude. The finest fur country was represented to be that south of Lake Superior, but here hardly a quarter of its possible yield was secured, owing to the irascibility of the Sioux. Well might Frobisher, one of the leading traders, contend that it would be a "fatal moment" when the posts were given up. Hartley's reasons for delay in surrendering this trade were precisely those now advanced by Haldimand in reporting his action to Lord North, and he was doubtless right in alleging that undue haste might incite the savages about the posts to war, while the traders dependent on them needed time to close their accounts. After waiting nearly a year for such mollifying and conclusive effects, Haldimand on his part in April, 1784, asked instructions from Lord North; and Knox, on the other hand, on May 12, 1784, was ordered to make a new demand, and sent Colonel Hall, who in July was dismissed by Haldimand with the same courtesy, because no orders to surrender the posts had been received. Previous to this, on April 9, Great Britain had ratified the definitive treaty, as Congress had done on January 14 preceding, and in August Haldimand

was in possession of the verified document. It was now apparent that the issue had become a serious one. The question was not only upon the language of the treaty, "with all convenient speed," but also upon the propriety of considering the provisional or the definitive treaty as the true date for release. The Atlantic ports had indeed been given up after the provisional treaty, but that was an act of mutual convenience. It was Hamilton's opinion that the practice of nations in similar cases was not decisive; while the United States had seemed to agree to the longer period by deferring its legislative recommendations till after the final treaty had been ratified.

It has sometimes been alleged that the retention of the posts was simply an expedient to force the Americans to make such terms with the Indians as the British commissioners had failed to make by the treaty, and possibly to gain some vantage-ground in case there might be a further rectification of the frontier.

The relation of the frontiers with the tribes was certainly a critical one, and largely because of the neglect of the Indian interests by the British. Patrick Henry was urging at this time an amalgamation of races, and he desired to have bounties offered for half-breed children as a means of pacification; but there was generally greater faith in muskets. General Jedediah Huntington was now recommending to Washington the sending of some five or six hundred regulars to the frontiers, for the military situation in the west was looking serious. At the peace, according to Pickering's estimate, it had been thought that more than eight hundred troops would be necessary to garrison the entire frontier, north, west, and south. That officer had then assigned one hundred and twenty men to Niagara, "the most important pass in America," sixty to Detroit, and one hundred to the farther lake posts. In June, 1784, Monroe urged Congress to be prepared to maintain a western force; but all he could accomplish was to secure some seven hundred twelve-months' militia from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania, to protect the frontier.

Indian outrages were renewed on the frontiers in the spring of 1783, and in April, Dickinson of Pennsylvania was moving Congress to take some effective steps. On May 1, Congress ordered that the northwestern tribes should be officially in-

formed of the terms of the peace, and one Ephraim Douglas was sent to Detroit. De Peyster, the British commander at that post, was found by Douglas to have given the Indians the impression that the posts were still to be retained by the British. On July 6, in the presence of the American agent, De Peyster urged the Indians to be quiet, and told them that he could no longer keep them, and gave Douglas an opportunity to explain the treaty. A few days later, Douglas went to Niagara, where General McLean was now feeding three thousand Indians, and there had an interview with Brant. This chieftain disclosed that the Indian lands must be secured to the tribes before any treaties could be made. Douglas reported to General Lincoln, now secretary of war, that he was neither permitted to accompany Brant to the Mohawk villages, nor to address the Indians. Simon Girty, who was De Peyster's interpreter, served in the same capacity later for Sir John Johnson, when another conference was held with the Indians at Sandusky, and Johnson warned them not to permit the Americans to occupy their lands. It was advice which led to many difficulties, though Congress itself was not without responsibilities for the long and harassing conflict which followed upon their occupation of the territory north of the Ohio, though it may be claimed that the results were worth the cost. "As to originating the Indian war," said Boudinot, ten years later, while president of that body, "so far from its being originated by Great Britain, I know that it originated in the false policy of Congress in 1783; I foretold it then, with all its consequences."

It is necessary now to broaden our survey somewhat in order to understand better the real reasons which had induced Haldimand to devise a plan for retaining the posts, — a scheme into which the ministry easily entered. "Who are these mighty and clamorous Quebec merchants?" exclaimed William Lee, when the news reached Brussels in February, 1783, that they were complaining of the peace. It was, in fact, these Canadian fur traders who saw in the concessions of the bounds which had been made in the treaty that their traffic could no longer be protected from the rivalry of the Americans. As Brissot reckoned, the annual sales in furs at London, coming from Canada, amounted for a few years succeeding the peace to

about five million "livres tournois." "It is from this consideration," he adds, "that the restitution of these forts is withheld." It was supposed at the time that one of the objects in prolonging British intrigues with the disaffected Vermonters, so as to detach them from the Union, was, as Hamilton expressed it, to "conduce to the security of Canada and to the preservation of the western posts."

The British furthermore felt that these American rivals would find no longer any obstacles to their wish to open an inter-oceanic channel of trade. Carver tells us of a purpose which had been entertained by the Atlantic colonists, before the outbreak of the Revolution, to send an expedition under Colonel Rogers towards the Pacific, with the expectation of discovering the long-hidden Straits of Anian. The clash of arms had prevented the fulfillment. While the war was progressing, however, the English government had sent Captain Cook on his famous voyage, with instructions (1776) to make the Pacific coast at 45° north latitude, and to follow it north to 65°, in the hopes of finding that long-sought strait, for the discovery of which the British government had recently offered a reward of £20,000. Little was then known of what Spain had already done on that same coast, for the Spanish flag had really been shown above 42° and up to 50°, while Haceta had actually surmised the existence of the Columbia in 1775.

When Cook, at Nootka Sound, saw the natives tremble at the noise of his guns, he was convinced that the Spaniards had not already accustomed them to ordnance. He himself missed the Straits of Juan de la Fuca, but by recording the presence of the sea otter in those waters, he intimated a future industry of the region. His journals were not published till 1784-85; but a brief official report had already been made public, which John Ledyard, a Connecticut adventurer, used in preparing an account of the voyage, published at Hartford (1783) just at the close of the war. Ledyard had been a corporal of marines on Cook's ship. It was an indication of the interest, since the pressure of war had been removed, which was taken in adventurous traffic that Ledyard, eager to be the first to open trade on the northwest coast, now engaged the attention of Robert Morris in his plans. Ledyard was through life the sport of freakish fortune, and no effort of his could mould the passing

encouragement even of Morris into practical shape, and he went to Europe to enter new fields. Jefferson, then the American minister at Paris, feeling him to be "a person of ingenuity and information, but unfortunately of too much imagination," gently encouraged him, and Ledyard started to pass through Russia and approach his goal by way of Kamschatka. Sir Joseph Banks, who had encountered him, had reached a high opinion of him, and thought him the only person fitted for such an exploration. His attempt failed, and it was left for some Boston merchants, a few years later, to accomplish by a voyage around Cape Horn the preëmption of the valley of the Columbia, to become the goal of fur-trading competitors.

An organized effort on the part of the British merchants had been made in 1783, just at the time when the retention of the posts was under consideration, by the formation of the North West or Canada Company. This trading organization almost immediately started up rival companies. Some bloody contests in the wilderness followed between their respective pioneers, which were ended only by their combining in 1787. Separately, and later jointly, the trading instincts of these associates pushed adventurers on the one hand up the Ottawa and so to the Peace River, and by the Mackenzie to the Arctic seas; and on the other hand ultimately to and beyond the Rockies. By 1785, they had begun to plant the British flag north of the Mississippi and upon the Missouri, as well as on the lesser of the upper affluents of the main river. The headquarters of these operations were maintained on that portage, between Lake Superior and the Lake of the Woods, which the treaty had just made the line of boundary of the new Republic, in ignorance of the real ultimate source of the Great Lakes in the springs of the river which enters Lake Superior at Duluth. A correct knowledge of geography would in reality have lost the United States a large part of the modern Minnesota. The traffic along this treaty route was conducted with a policy too like that which had enfeebled New France on the same soil, to insure an equal contest with the American settler in the later struggle for the possession of the Columbia valley. There was, however, on the part of some, a conception that American enterprise must seek its channel to the Pacific and the nations beyond not so much in the north, in conflict with the British, as in the south, in the rivalry of the Spanish.

By the time that Carleton had withdrawn (November, 1783) the British troops from the Atlantic coast, it had become apparent to the British government, on the prompting of the merchants of Canada, that the conditions of the peace were far from favorable to that class of subjects. These trading combinations had of late been extending their operations from Detroit and Mackinac as centres, and their movements had conduced to the founding of Milwaukee and other new posts on and beyond the lakes. A later attempt to carry a larger vessel than had before been used on Lake Superior through the rapids at the Sault failed; but with such craft as still sailed on those waters, the volume of the trade was large, and more than half of it was conducted by the merchants, through the posts which rightfully fell to the Americans by the treaty and were still in British hands. Hamilton put it more strongly, and said that by surrendering half the lakes, England quit-claimed a much larger part of the fur trade. Of the two thousand troops now holding Canada, less than eight hundred occupied the posts from Oswego westward, while less than four hundred held Lake Champlain and its approaches. Preserving the posts by such a force as this, it was hoped to prevent the transfer of allegiance to the new Republic of the allied merchants, who might otherwise prefer to cling to their profits under the new Republic rather than to their birthright without them. It was, perhaps, safe to trust to the future for some vindication of a refusal to give up these stations, and the delay had convinced the traders that there was no immediate need of discovering other portages to the far West, as at first they had begun to do. Thus not only were mercantile interests to be served, but pride also, for there was a growing sense of mortification at the loss by the treaty of the principal carrying places, and the hope was entertained that some rectification of the boundary might yet be possible, through the failure of the American government to maintain itself, as was indeed later attempted by those who negotiated a treaty with Jay in 1794. In arguing the question of priority of infractions, the British agents claimed that, until the ratifications of the treaty were exchanged in May, 1784, it was not incumbent on the British government to issue orders to evacuate the posts, and that such orders, if issued then, could not have reached Quebec before

July, 1784, and that prior to this the American States had enacted laws impeding the collection of the British debts.

The fact is, however, that the British policy had been determined even before the two governments had respectively ratified the definitive articles, for the day before Parliament confirmed the treaty, Sydney had sent instructions to Haldimand, which reached him before June 14, 1784, to hold fast to the posts. It is thus certain that a month before the time came for relieving the British government of an imputation of unfairness, this action was taken. If it was not an infraction of the treaty, then no enactment of the American States, anterior to the same date, could be held to be such. The facts are, that both sides were faithless, and practically by acts of even date; nor was there any disposition on either side to undo promptly what had been done, when both sides were fully informed of the ratification. The motives in both cases were those of mercantile gain.

The retention of the posts meant a profit to the English in excess of what would be gained by the possession of New York, and larger than any possible loss by repudiation of the debts.

When Governor Clinton of New York, after Congress had ratified the treaty, demanded the evacuation of Oswego and Niagara by sending, in March, 1784, an agent who made the demand at Quebec in May, Haldimand, who did not, as it turned out, get word of the British ratification till the following August, would not recognize the right of a single State to make such a demand; and as if to screen the real object of the posts' retention, intimated that the posts might not be surrendered at all, if the claims of the loyalists were not better respected. In August, that general was pointedly warned by his superiors to refrain from such explanations, and in November, he left his successor, St. Leger, instructions to observe the same warning.

Jay, on September 6, 1785, when the loyalists were moving into Ontario almost by thousands, notified John Adams that "some of the loyalists advise and warmly press the detention of the posts;" but when, in the latter part of 1785, Adams, then the American minister in London, first learned officially of the grounds for still holding the post, it was not ascribed to the neglect of the loyalists, but accounted a means of securing payment of the debts.

When Haldimand, in making answer to the demand for the posts within the jurisdiction of New York, had referred to the loyalists, their fate had long been uppermost in his mind. By August, 1783, the pioneers of this expatriated body were beginning to reach Canada from New York in large numbers, to seek for new homes. Dunmore, while the negotiations for peace were going on, had proposed to settle these faithful subjects on the Mississippi, with a view of using them from that base in continuing the war, just as Washington at one time had looked beyond the mountains to find an asylum if irretrievable disaster overtook him on the sea coast. But the peace had changed all. Franklin and his associates would not listen to any scheme of making the confederation responsible for the security of the loyalists, while there was no provision for which the English commissioners had contended so steadfastly, and if Jay was correct in his assurance to Livingston, December 12, 1782, the British commissioners did not expect that restorations would be made to all that class. But their constancy had been of no avail, and the fortunes of the luckless Tories had been left to the uncertain consideration of the several States. There was nothing then left for the British commissioners to do but, in the choice of northern bounds which the Americans gave them, to select those which left the southern peninsula of Canada between Lakes Ontario and Huron in British hands. It was here, in a region which had been previously almost unoccupied, that it was now proposed to settle these unhappy refugees, though Haldimand, in November, 1783, recommended that a settlement be made near Cataraqui. Beside those who had come overland from New York in the summer of 1783, others left the same port by ship in the following autumn, to join such as had gone before. In the exodus it is supposed that about fifty thousand fled to Canada, and if the figures of the Tory, Judge Jones, can be trusted, there were one hundred thousand of these exiles who departed from New York to seek some asylum between March and November of that year (1783). Within a twelvemonth, there were certainly ten thousand of them who found their way to these upper Canadian lands, and some twenty thousand are known to have gone to the maritime provinces.

These outcasts carried into Canada just the blood, hardihood,

and courage which were so needed in a new country. From their devotion to an undivided empire, they later assumed the name of United Empire Loyalists, to distinguish them from other settlers. They were a band that the States could ill afford to drive from their society. Not a few of the Americans then felt that these defeated countrymen could have been much better dealt with within the Republic than as refugees in a neighboring land, where they would be stirred by animosities. John Adams said of them: "At home, they would be impotent; abroad, they are mischievous." No one felt it at the time more warmly than Patrick Henry, who urged that they should be encouraged to settle beyond the Appalachians. "They are," he said in a speech to the Assembly of Virginia, "an enterprising, moneyed people, serviceable in taking off the surplus products of our lands." He added that he had no fear that those who had "laid the proud British lion at their feet should now be afraid of his whelps."

While what is now the Province of Ontario was coming into being north of the lakes, there was a parallel movement going on south of Lake Erie, which was in the end to reach a far greater development. Before the tidings of peace had reached this more southern wilderness, and late in the winter of 1782-83, the frontiersmen and the Shawnees, with other confederated tribes, were still keeping up the hostile counter-movements which had long tracked that country with blood. Hamilton was reaching the conclusion that "the most just and humane way of removing them is by extending our settlements to their neighborhood." The Indians north of the Ohio had not received from Haldimand the aid for which they had hoped, for the policy of the British made at this time for peace. Nevertheless, the old feuds, quite as madly followed by white as by savage, were not to be quelled, and they continued for some years. Judge Innes shows by figures that from 1783 to 1790, at least fifteen hundred frontiersmen were killed in these implacable raids, and that twenty thousand horses were stolen from one side or the other. General Irvine, who was watching these lawless actions from Fort Pitt, did his best to prevent settlers passing north of the Ohio, and he believed that nothing but the extirpation of the Indians or driving them beyond the lakes and the Mississippi could ever render this region habitable.

This was the condition of that country when American officers, now looking forward to a respite from war, were hoping to provide within it new homes for some part at least of a disbanded army. This peaceful movement had begun in the spring of 1783, at Newburgh on the Hudson, while Washington was awaiting the official promulgation of peace from Carleton in New York. The movement was at the start in the hands of Generals Huntington and Rufus Putnam. On June 16, two hundred and eighty-eight officers of Washington's weary army, mainly New Englanders, petitioned Congress that the lands granted for military service in 1776 should be surveyed in what is now eastern Ohio, so that they could be occupied, and in time constitute a separate State of the Union. The lands to which they referred were east of a meridian which left the Ohio twenty-four miles west of the Scioto, and struck northward to the Maumee, whence the line followed that stream to Lake Erie. Putnam bespoke Washington's influence in behalf of the petition, and suggested for the protection of the intended settlements that a chain of forts, twenty miles apart, should be placed on the western bounds of this tract. Washington transmitted to Congress the letter of the officers, with Putnam's letter and his own approval; but nothing came of the appeal.

Meanwhile, various projects had been broached looking to a more comprehensive appropriation of the region to civilized uses. Jefferson, with the instincts of a politician, was contemplating the planting of a State on Lake Erie as a northern appendage, which should be offset by a southern one on the Ohio. This was a revival of a project of Franklin some years before. Colonel Pickering, with a northern fervor, was thinking of a State to be set up at once, with a military spirit, and from which slavery should be excluded. On June 5, 1783, Colonel Bland of Virginia introduced in Congress an ordinance for erecting a territory north of the Ohio and dividing it into districts, with the ultimate purpose of making States of them, when their populations reached two thousand each. This territory was to be defended by frontier posts, and seminaries of learning were to be encouraged.

While all these measures were thus still inchoate, unauthorized appropriations of the Indian country by reckless parties seemed likely to revive lingering hostilities. To avert this danger, Con-

gress, in September, 1783, issued a proclamation against such unlawful occupation of the Indian lands. This action did little to accomplish its object. We soon find McKee, in September, telling Sir John Johnson that the Sandusky Indians suspect the Americans of a design to encroach upon their tribal lands. The steady flow of settlers across the Ohio did seem to point to such a purpose. Haldimand was confident that these provocations would end in a war, which would be ruinous to the savage. This meant that the retained posts would be deprived of a natural barrier; and he accordingly urged Sir John Johnson to inculcate moderation upon the Indians.

With these dangers impending, Washington, on September 7, 1783, recommended in a letter the laying out of two new States in this western region. In language nearly following that of Washington, Congress, on October 15, in preparing the way for the ordinance of the next year, resolved to erect a distinct government north of the Ohio, but at the same time a committee reported to Congress that the Indians were not prepared "to relinquish their territorial claims without further struggles," and recommended that emigrants be invited to enter the region east of a line drawn from the mouth of the Great Miami, up that stream, and down the Maumee to Lake Erie. The next month, November, 1783, Washington, in taking leave of the army, pointed to the west as promising a happy asylum for the veteran soldiers, "who, fond of domestic enjoyments, are seeking for personal independence."

We need now to consider the existing state of the controversy over the title to these same lands. The steps for a western government, both north and south of the Ohio, were doubtless in part owing to a wish to bring Virginia to an unrestricted cession of her alleged or established rights to the country. There had been a memorial addressed to her Assembly in December, 1783, asking to have Kentucky set up as a State, and urging that more States would add to the dignity of the Union. Referring to this desire for self-government, it added, "A fool can put on his clothes better than a wise man can do it for him."

When we consider the almost inexplicable language of the Virginia charter of 1609, it shows how state pride can obscure the mind to find George Mason pronouncing its definition of

bounds "intelligible and admitting of natural and easy construction." However this may be, Virginia was now content to hold that, defining her limits in her constitution of 1776, and the confederation accepting her adherence, with full knowledge of that constitution, the other States were bound to recognize the confederation's declared principle, "that no State shall be deprived of territory for the benefit of the United States." This precluded the Union, it was held, making any demand for cessions. With these convictions, the Virginia Assembly had proved little inclined to brook any opposition, such as Tom Paine had made in his *Public Good*, when he represented the United States at the peace becoming "heir to an extensive quantity of vacant land" in the west. The Assembly was so incensed at Paine for such opinions that it stopped, at the second reading, a bill which had been introduced to compensate him for his services in the Revolution.

Congress had already determined to accept cessions, as it had that of New York, without inquiring into title. A committee had been appointed to look into the terms of the cession proposed by Virginia, and on September 18, 1783, this committee had recommended that Congress should accept the Virginia cession, if that State would withdraw the guarantee that Kentucky should be secured to her. This action was supplemented by an order establishing the undivided sovereignty of the United States over the west. There was little now for recalcitrant Virginia to do but to hasten her action. Edmund Randolph had seen the unfortunate predicament into which the State was thrusting herself, and some months before had written (March 22, 1783) to Madison: "I imagine that the power of Congress to accept territory by treaty will not be denied. This will throw a plausibility against us [Virginia] which never before existed in the contest with Congress," — for the treaty of peace had, in fact, buttressed the exclusive claim of the United States. Jefferson, too, was becoming fearful lest Kentucky, applying to be received as a State, would be favored by Congress with bounds stretching east to the Alleghany. This, he felt, would deprive the parent State of that barrier of "uninhabitable lands" which she ought to have to separate her from a neighbor on the west, if Virginia maintained her bounds on the Kanawha.

On October 19, 1783, Monroe had written to George Rogers Clark, urging that a new State should be set up with the tradition of Virginia, so that the old commonwealth, now becoming aware of her isolation among her sisters, might have an efficient ally in the federal councils. The pressure had become so great, both within and without, that the next day, October 20, the Assembly authorized her delegates in Congress to make a deed of cession, without the objectionable reservations. This they did March 1, 1784. The instrument provided that "the necessary and reasonable expenses," later estimated at £220,000, connected with Clark's conquest and rule in the northwest, should be paid back to Virginia by the United States, if the claims were allowed before September 24, 1788. This had been consented to, not without apprehension that the charges would be inordinate, since few or no vouchers could be produced. This time-limit proved sufficient to protect all claims but Vigo's, for he was at the time beyond notice.


The deed had also made reservation of bounty lands for soldiers. In December, 1778, and again in May, 1779, Virginia had set aside for this purpose a tract in Kentucky, part of which was later found to lie within North Carolina; and to make this loss good, in November, 1781, she had substituted a new tract bounded by the Mississippi, the Ohio, and the Tennessee rivers and by the Carolina line. This embraced nearly 10,000,000 acres, and one third was for the Continental line and two thirds for the state troops. If this did not prove sufficient, it was now provided by the deed of cession, in order to satisfy some objectors to a cession, that a tract north of the Ohio and between the Scioto and the Little Miami should be added. There proved to be no objection to these provisions, and Virginia congratulated herself that she had made in the cession "the most magnificent sacrifice upon the altar of public good which was, perhaps, ever recorded in the history of States," since by it she "chiefly paid the bounty claims of all the Continental officers and soldiers of all the old States." This over-elated commonwealth had no apprehension, apparently, that she had been making free with territory to which other States had as good a title as her own or even a better one, though all their titles were poor enough, it must be confessed, compared with that which the treaty of peace had given to the confederation.

A renewed effort upon the part of the Vandalia Company to obtain the recognition of Congress, now that it had acquired this western region, failed of success.

There was one way beyond her ostentatious sacrifice in which Virginia hoped to gain, and that was in the use of her rivers as channels of communication between the seaboard and this western country. Patrick Henry, in one of his speeches in the Virginia Assembly, said: "Cast your eye, sir, over this extensive country, and see its soil intersected in every quarter with bold, navigable streams, flowing to the east and to the west, as if the finger of heaven were marking out the course of your settlements, inviting you to enterprise and pointing the way to wealth." There would be the greatest advantage to Virginia, said Washington, "if she would open the avenues to the trade of that country, and embrace the present moment to establish it."

Jefferson, in 1782, in speaking of the Mississippi as likely to be the route outward — but not inward — for the western country, for heavy commodities, looked to the Potomac and the Hudson as lines of communication for the lighter burdens. He had, indeed, in his graphic description of the combined energies of the Potomac and Shenandoah in bursting through the barrier of the Blue Ridge, invested that tidal avenue of Virginia with popular interest. In comparing the rival routes to the coast from Cayahoga, on Lake Erie, Jefferson pointed out that to reach New York by the Mohawk and Hudson required eighty-five portages in eight hundred and twenty-five miles, while it was but four hundred and twenty-five miles to tide-water at Alexandria on the Potomac, with only two portages, and this route, he said at one time, "promises us almost a monopoly of the western and Indian trade." One of these portages was between the Cayahoga and the Beaver, where, as General Hand had informed Jefferson, a canal could be cut, connecting lagoons, in a flat country. The other interruption was between the Ohio valley and the Potomac, where a distance of fifteen to forty miles was to be overcome, "according to the trouble

NOTE. — The opposite map is a section of the "Map of the western part of the territories belonging to the United States," in George Imlay's *Topog. Description*, London, 1793. It shows the different routes from Richmond and Alexandria over the mountains.



which shall be taken to approach the two navigations." Washington, two years later, figured it more carefully, when he made the distance from Fort Pitt to Alexandria three hundred and four miles, including thirty-one miles of land carriage. This was by the Youghiogheny; but if the course by the Monongahela and Cheat River was followed, the distance would be found to be three hundred and sixty-five miles, with a portage of twenty miles.

Beside the rival plan of using the Hudson and the Mohawk, there was still the route from Philadelphia, which was a distance of about three hundred and twenty miles, wholly by land. If water carriage be sought, this communication would be lengthened to four hundred and seventy miles, and would follow the course of the Schuylkill, Susquehanna, and Toby's Creek, the last an affluent of the Ohio. Charles Thomson, the secretary of Congress, was directing attention to two other Pennsylvania channels. One was to leave Lake Erie at Presqu'Isle, and proceed by the Alleghany and one of its branches to a portage connecting with the Juniata. The other joined Ontario with the east branch of the Delaware, through the Iroquois country. Virginians were aware of the spirit of the Pennsylvanians, and Madison wrote to Jefferson that "the efforts of Pennsylvania for the western commerce did credit to her public councils. The commercial genius of Virginia is too much in its infancy to rival her example."

No one took more interest than Washington in this question of western transit. He expressed himself not without apprehension lest the new settlements on the Ohio, left alone, would find it for their commercial interests to bind themselves with their British neighbors on the north, and seek an exit for their produce through the St. Lawrence, or with the Spaniards on the west and south, and find an outlet in the Gulf of Mexico. This might happen, he felt, all the more easily because aliens in considerable numbers, bound by no tradition or affinities of blood, were casting in their lots with the people of the remoter frontiers. It was with these fears, and seeking to avert them, that Washington turned to find some practicable communication through the Appalachians. He could but be struck, he said, "with the immense diffusion and importance of the vast

inland navigation of the United States. Would to God," he exclaimed, "that we may have wisdom enough to improve them." Madison looked to this "beneficence of nature" as the sure protection for the evils of an over-extension of territory.

Just after the close of the war, Washington had visited the battlefields along the upper Hudson and the Mohawk, and had been impressed with the capabilities of canalization in that direction, so as to form a western route. He described his course to the Chevalier de Chastellux as "up the Mohawk to Fort Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix)," whence he "crossed over to Wood Creek, which empties into Oneida Lake and affords the water communication with Ontario. I then [he adds] traversed the country to the head of the eastern branch of the Susquehanna, and viewed Lake Otsego and the portage between that lake and the Mohawk River at Canajoharie."

Later, when once again in Virginia, in March, 1784, Washington was urged by Jefferson to weigh against these New York routes the advantages of the course by the Potomac. In the following September (1784) Washington, going west to see some of his own lands, — on the Kanawha and the Ohio, which he was yet to hold for ten years and more, — followed the upper Potomac, and made observations of the most accessible ways to reach the waters of the Ohio. On his return, he addressed from Mount Vernon (October 10, 1784) a letter to Benjamin Harrison, then governor of Virginia, in which he said: "It has long been my decided opinion that the shortest, easiest, and least expensive communication with the invaluable and extensive country back of us would be by one or both of the rivers of this State, which have their sources in the Appalachian Mountains. Nor am I singular in this opinion. Evans, in his *Map and Analysis of the Middle Colonies*, which, considering the early period in which they were given to the public, are done with amazing exactness, and Hutchins, since, in his *Topographical Description of the Western Country*, a good part of which is from actual surveys, are decidedly of the same sentiments, as indeed are all others who have had opportunities and have been at the pains to investigate and consider the subject." Washington then goes on to point out that Detroit is farther from tide-water on the St. Lawrence by one hundred and sixty-eight miles, and on the Hudson by one hundred and seventy-

six miles, than it is from a port for sea-going vessels on the Potomac. He proceeds to recommend the appointment of a commission to inspect the portages between the Potomac and the waters flowing into the Ohio, as well as to report upon a route by the James and the Great Kanawha, where the overland connection was thought to be about thirty miles. Jefferson had said of the Kanawha, as a suitable avenue for transit, that, rising in North Carolina, it "traversed our whole latitude," and offered to every part of the State "a channel for navigation and commerce to the western country."

Samuel Wharton, in 1770, had said of the Kanawha valley that barges could be easily moved to the falls. "Late discoveries have proved," he adds, "that a wagon road may be made through the mountain which occasions the falls, and that by a portage of a few miles only a communication can be had between the waters of the Great Kanawha and the James."

Washington closed his letter to Harrison with a reference to a new proposition of propelling vessels by mechanism: "I consider Rumsey's discovery for working boats against the stream, by mechanical power principally, as not only a very fortunate invention for these States in general, but as one of those circumstances which have combined to render the present time favorable above all others for fixing, if we are disposed to avail ourselves of them, a large portion of the trade of the western country in the bosom of this State irrevocably."

James Rumsey, to whom Washington referred, was a machinist living on the upper Potomac, now a man of little more than forty years, who had exhibited to Washington a month before (September 6) a model of a double boat, which, by the application of mechanical power to setting poles, was intended "to make way against a rapid stream by the force of the same stream." This exhibition drew a certificate of approval from Washington (September 7), but Rumsey soon abandoned this device for another, as we shall later see.


NOTE.—The opposite map is Washington's sketch (1784) of the divide between the Potomac and the Youghiogheny, as engraved in U. S. Docs., XIX. Cong., 1st Session, House of Rep., Report, No. 228. The committee making this report point out that the road (dotted line) from Cumberland to the Youghiogheny is almost precisely the route of the later Cumberland road, and the dotted line A.....B, across the Dividing Ridge, is almost identical with the recommendation of the government engineers (1826) for the course of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. These correspondences the committee consider to be proofs of the insight of this "great and extraordinary man."

[illegible]

NOTE The point of emission proposed as presented by the U.S. Fishes Commission in their late report is perhaps a mile lower down than the point "A. B." as marked on the original map of 1784.

This letter to Harrison was communicated to the Virginia Assembly, and led to the formation of the James River and Potomac Canal Company. By December, 1784, the project of such an organization was well in hand, and Washington went to Annapolis to consult with the Assembly. Shortly afterwards (January 5, 1785) he wrote, from Mount Vernon, to General Knox that the bills which had been prepared both for the Virginia and for the Maryland legislatures, in which each State had pledged £1,000 to the project, were drafted to his liking. The plan embraced two measures. One was to clear a road, say forty miles in length, from the north branch of the Potomac to Cheat River, an affluent of the Monongahela, — a route which Jefferson considered "the true door to the western commerce." The other scheme was to carry a road from Will's Creek, and connect with the Youghiogeny, another branch of the Monongahela. This, however, required the concurrence of Pennsylvania, and in December, 1784, the Virginia Assembly had asked of Pennsylvania the privilege of free transit for goods through that government. The Assembly of that State had discovered by a survey that a canal wholly through her own territory, and connecting Philadelphia with the Susquehanna, would require £200,000 for its construction. This large cost inspired Jefferson with the hope that the Youghiogeny route would prevail, and Washington was convinced that this last channel was "the most direct route by which the fur and peltry of the lakes could be transported, while it is," as he added, "exceedingly convenient to the people who inhabit the Ohio (or Alleghany) above Fort Pitt." In anticipation of this route being selected, Brownsville was, in the spring of 1785, regularly laid out on the Monongahela, near Red Stone Old Fort, which had for some years become the usual starting-point for boats carrying emigrants down the Ohio to Kentucky, and around which landing-place there had grown up a settlement of boat-builders and of traders in supplies.

A route for which surveys by the new bill were also ordered, and which was more satisfactory to the mass of tide-water Virginians, was by the James River, whence a short portage, say twenty-five or thirty miles, conducted to New River, and then to the Kanawha below its falls, and finally to the Ohio. It was on this route that Washington earlier secured some lands, and



[The above map is from a MS. map by Heckewelder (1796), reproduced in the *Western Reserve Hist. Soc. Tract. No. 64* (1884). It shows the valleys of Muskingum and Cayahoga, and the Indian paths.]

Albert Gallatin was at this time surveying some adjacent property on the Kanawha for himself.

When these plans were well devised, Washington, on November 30, 1785, wrote to Madison: "It appears to me that no country in the universe is better calculated to derive benefit from inland navigation than this is; and certain I am that the conveniences to the citizens generally, which will be opened thereby, will be found to exceed the most sanguine expectation." Very likely this letter expresses exactly the opinions which Washington in the previous spring had disclosed to the commissioners of Maryland and Virginia, when, after their conferences at Alexandria in the interests of intercolonial trade, they had accepted an invitation to Mount Vernon, and spent several days with its owner, — a meeting that proved one of the preliminary steps to the federal convention at a later day.

Whatever the favorite route from tide-water, it was necessary, when once the Ohio basin was reached, to discover the best avenue to the lakes. On this point Washington had been actively seeking information. He had applied to Richard Butler, then Superintendent of Indian Affairs, particularly in reference to a connection which Jefferson had recommended between the Muskingum and the Cayahoga, so as to reach Lake Erie at the modern Cleveland. Later, in 1786, Congress made all the portages between the lakes and the Ohio basin common highways, — a provision that was the next year embodied in the ordinance of 1787. At a still later day (January, 1788), the New York portage by Lake Chautauqua was, at the instance of General Irvine, made the subject of other action.

While these physical difficulties were under consideration, it was clear to Washington's mind that, to develop any such business as these rival routes contemplated, it was necessary not only that a large immigration should be sent beyond the mountains, but that it should be directed in the right way. It was apparent that for the present the contemplated channels of trade might suffice and serve to keep the nascent commonwealths of the west in touch with the older communities; but Washington did not disguise his continued apprehension that "whenever the new States became so populous and so extended to the westward as really to need the Mississippi, there could be no power to deprive them of its use." There

was, particularly among the Virginians, a growing conviction that this Mississippi question was a burning one, and its solution could not be far ahead. It was a necessary outgrowth of that caballing of Vergennes and Spain which Jay and his associates, in 1782, had so boldly and dexterously overcome. France was still as treacherous and Spain was as weakly obstinate as they had been then. In the summer of 1784, Madison had met Lafayette at Baltimore, and endeavored to make him comprehend that France needed, in order to preserve the friendship of the United States, to persuade Spain to give up her exclusive pretensions to the Mississippi. "Spain is such a fool that allowances must be made," said Lafayette. It was only a question how long she could afford to be a fool, while her unfriendliness was not altogether distasteful to Washington, since it helped his ulterior projects about the western connections of Virginia.


After the James River and Potomac Canal Company had been formed, Washington was induced to become its first president. He remained long enough in control of it to take a broad view of its future development. Just after he had resigned his presidency, and was about to assume the executive chair under the Federal Constitution, he congratulated Jefferson that the recent surveys had shown the sources of the Ohio and Potomac nearer than was supposed, and two or three boats had lately passed from Fort Cumberland to Great Falls, nine miles above tide-water, showing what progress had been made in opening the Potomac.

In appreciation of the value to the company of his services, the Virginia Assembly made Washington a considerable sharer in its stock. He hesitated long about embarrassing his action by accepting such a gratuity, and was persuaded to do so only by the urgent representations of Patrick Henry. He reserved, however, the right to make its advantages ultimately accrue to the public, as later under his will was provided.

As to the political needs of the country thus to be reached and developed, there had been movements in Congress looking to the formation of States out of it, while the war was still in progress. It had been proposed, in 1780, to constitute States of dimensions not more than one hundred or one hundred and

fifty miles square. Washington had been urging James Duane to action in this matter, and on October 15 Congress resolved on some step towards setting up such Western States, and Jefferson was made the chairman of a committee to consider the question. On March 1, 1784, he reported an ordinance which gave to the proposed States some such area as had been suggested in 1780. His original plan, however, was more comprehensive than an organization of the northwestern region merely, for he desired, with the consent of Virginia and the other Southern States, to include also their over-hill country, and to exclude slavery therefrom after the year 1800. By this plan there could be laid out fourteen States south of the 45th parallel and north of the 31st. He proposed to give two degrees of latitude to each State in horizontal tiers. The most westerly north and south column would have six States below the 43d parallel and one above, lying west of Lake Michigan, and a second still farther north, stretching to the bounds of Canada. Those below the 43d would be bounded on the east by a meridian cutting the falls of the Ohio. Near this point Louisville was already a town of a hundred motley houses, including the only variety store in the Ohio valley, kept in stock by the traders who passed down the river from Pittsburg. North of the 43d parallel, and lying between Lakes Michigan and Huron, was another State, with four other States lying directly south, and extending to the 35th parallel. South of that the country east of the meridian already named was to be joined to South Carolina and Georgia. The eastern boundary of this second column of States was to be a meridian cutting the mouth of the Kanawha. This left an irregular piece of territory lying east of this last meridian, and inclosed by it, by the Alleghany River, by the western bounds of Pennsylvania, and by Lake Erie, which was to make an additional State. By this division the Ohio bisected the two States lying between the 37th and 39th parallels. It was provided that these States could become members of the confederation as they successively attained a population equal to the smallest of the original States. A series of curious and pedantic names, rather ludicrously mixed with more familiar

NOTE. — The opposite map is a section of a "*Carte Générale des Etats-Unis*" in Crèvecoeur's *Lettres d'un Cultivateur*, Paris, 1787. It shows the proposed divisions of the western territory under Jefferson's ordinance of 1784. Frankland is misplaced.



appellations, was given to the group. The most northern of all was named Sylvania. Michigania and Chersonesus lay respectively west and east of Lake Michigan. Just south of these lay Assenisipia and Metropotamia; then came in the next tier Illinoia and Saratoga; while Polypotamia embraced the country holding the various rivers that joined the Ohio in its lower course, and Pelisipia lay to the east of the last named, and mainly south of the Ohio. The State of irregular outline was to be called Washington.

The ordinance was recommitted, somewhat modified, again reported March 22, and was later by amendment subjected to other changes. Jefferson's uncouth names were abandoned. The Ohio, instead of the 39th parallel, was made the boundary between the States which had earlier been called Saratoga and Pelisipia. The territory north of 45° up to 49° was added to what Jefferson had called Michigania. The clause abolishing slavery after 1800 was removed. The ordinance thus reformed was adopted on April 23, 1784. The essential feature of the new law was that the States could adopt constitutions like that of any of the original States, and when they reached a population of 20,000, they could be admitted to Congress by delegates, and they could have the right to vote when a census showed their State to have a population equal to the smallest of the old States. All provisions were in the nature of a compact between the new communities and the old.

Though an act of Congress had thus indicated the future of the northwest, there was little disposition among the people to give it force, and it remained practically a dead letter for the next three years. During this interval tentative efforts were made from time to time to improve the scheme. Washington objected to the ordinance as being too ambitious. He thought a plan of "progressive seating," by which States should be called one after another into being, as population demanded, would have been wiser. There was a feeling among the frontiersmen in favor of natural boundaries rather than for astronomical ones. This objection was met by Pickering: "This will make some of the States too large, and in many of them throw the extremes at such unequal distances from the centres of government as must prove extremely inconvenient." This terminal question took a definite issue when, in January, 1785, the settlers west of the

Alleghanies sent a memorial to Congress, asking that a separate government should be set up with bounds upon the Kanawha and Tennessee rivers; but the movement was premature.

Pickering now developed an active agency in two directions. It is probable that he incited Rufus King to move, on March 16, 1785, that the ordinance of April 23, 1784, should be amended so as to abolish slavery after 1800. The proposition was referred to a committee, who reported on April 6, but the matter dropped without definite action.

At the same time (March 16, 1785), Jefferson's plan for a survey of the western territory was referred to a grand committee. Pickering had, at the beginning of that month, sent a plan to Gerry, in which he deprecated the Virginia habit of scrambling for allotments and of setting up "tomahawk claims," which had prevailed in the Kentucky region, and which had proved an incentive to Indian outbreaks. He outlined instead a scheme of township surveys, with indications of the quality of the lands, in order that there might be a more systematic assignment of rights by constituted authority. On April 12, 1785, the grand committee, of which Grayson was chairman, reported an ordinance of such a character, which provided also that a section of a square mile should be reserved in each township for the support of religion, and another for schools. The educational clause alone was retained. The township was made six miles square; and five ranges of townships were to be surveyed between the Ohio and Lake Erie, beginning west of the Pennsylvania line. The district between the Scioto and the Little Miami was reserved to meet the bounties due the troops who took part in Clark's campaign. On April 26, an observer wrote to Gerry that Congress had spent a month on the problem, while Virginia made many difficulties. "The Eastern States," he added, "are for actual surveys and sale by townships; the Southern States are for indiscriminate locations." On May 20, 1785, the reported plan was adopted as in effect an adjunct of the ordinance of 1784, and Grayson wrote to Washington that it was the best that under existing circumstances could be procured.

It was evidently the purpose of Congress, in this ordinance of May 20, to follow Washington's advice and push westward by stages, and make settlements by "compact and progressive

settlements." The expansive tendency had, moreover, earned Jay's reprobation. "The rage for separation and new States," he wrote to John Adams, October 14, 1785, "is mischievous; it will, unless checked, scatter our resources and in every view enfeeble the Union." What territorial limits to give the new States became an inherent element of any scheme. Monroe, who was interested, journeyed west on a tour of observation. He found the discomforts of the way fatiguing, and doubtless looked upon the country in a spirit which was influenced by his irksome experiences. He saw and heard enough about the country to believe that the stories of the inordinate fertility of the soil were the work of land speculators. Nevertheless, there was, as Jay expressed it, "a rage for emigrating to the western country," and the Continental Land Office was thronged with those seeking "to plant the seeds of a great people beyond the mountains." In Monroe's judgment, no more than five States could be profitably laid out where Jefferson had counted on perhaps double that number. When Monroe returned, a movement was vigorously made in Congress to discredit the astronomical bounds and substitute natural ones, and to reduce the number of States to be laid out to three or five. It was necessary, in the first instance, that the conditions of the cessions of Virginia and Massachusetts — later explained — should be made to conform to the new disposition of States, and this was in due time accomplished. Grayson now proposed a division like this: An east and west line should be drawn from the western bounds of Pennsylvania so as to touch the southern head of Lake Michigan. This gave one State in the lower Michigan peninsula and another west of that lake, extending north to 49°, and bounded west by the Mississippi. Between the Ohio and the east and west line there were to be three States, to complete the five, and the lines to separate them were to be meridians cutting the mouths of the Great Miami and the Wabash. This last line was later changed, so that the division followed the Wabash north till it reached Vincennes, and then went due north by the river and by a meridian.

Jefferson saw danger in this smaller number of States. He would have them of about thirty thousand square miles each, and not one hundred and sixty thousand. It was like the difference between Virginia, east of the mountains, and a common-

wealth three times as large, as he contended. He feared that the people in such large States could not be kept together, and that they would very likely break up their territory. In this way they might, in part at least, withdraw to join either the British or the Spanish. He wrote to Madison (December, 1786) that he thought this policy of making large States "reversed the natural order of things." He then reverted again to the chance of distractions arising from the disposition of Spain to monopolize the Mississippi, and said that the prospect gave him "serious apprehension of the severance of the eastern and western parts of our confederacy. A forced connection [with the west] is neither our interest nor within our power."

Jefferson was not alone certainly in perceiving trouble ahead in this direction, but there were measures more pressing which must be put in train, before any congressional action regulating the civic government of the northwest could be satisfactorily applied. The first of these was to complete the release of territorial claims, urged by some of the seaboard States; and the other was to quiet the Indian title sufficiently, at least, to open areas to settlement. It is necessary now to consider these two measures.

The cessions of New York and Virginia had thrown the further responsibility upon Massachusetts and Connecticut. Connecticut was still governed under her original charter, which gave her a sea-to-sea extension. Massachusetts had had a similar charter taken from her by the king in council; but she did not recognize the power of the monarch, and now with a new and revolutionary constitution, she stood for her original territorial rights.

The first charter of Massachusetts placed her northern bounds on a parallel three miles north of the Merrimac River on any part of it. In early days she had contended that this meant three miles north of that river's source in Lake Winnipiseogee, while New Hampshire was willing to accept a line which started west three miles north of its mouth. The dispute culminated at a time when Massachusetts was little inclined to favor the royal prerogative. The Privy Council, being called upon to arbitrate, punished the older colony by curving the line from a point on the coast three miles north of

the mouth of the Merrimac, so that it ran parallel to that river till it reached its southernmost bend, from which point it was carried due west, — as defined in the maps of to-day. Massachusetts, in recognizing, at that time, this paramount authority of the sovereign as settling her bounds east of the Hudson, argued that west of that river, beyond the rights acquired by New York, — which were allowed to extend to the upper waters of the Delaware, — her independence secured her original rights so far as they had been untouched. Therefore she claimed that her rights were unimpaired in the northwest, between the latitude of Lake Winnipiseogee and a continuation of her bounds on Connecticut. This gave a belt westward, eighty miles wide, north of $42^{\circ} 2'$. These limits gave Massachusetts pretensions to the larger part of western New York, — wherein she was a rival claimant with New York, — and the southern parts of Michigan and Wisconsin, where Virginia, holding rival claims, had already released them. The Mohawk basin was unsettled beyond Cherry Valley, at the headwaters of the Susquehanna, and German Flats. New York, while claiming jurisdiction in the country farther west than the Mohawk, particularly in the valley of the Genesee, after having, for a year or two before, presumed to sell the lands which were in dispute, entered into an agreement with Massachusetts made at Hartford, December 12, 1786, by which she recognized the fee of that region west of Seneca Lake to be in Massachusetts, but subject to the native title. This arrangement covered six million acres, which Simeon de Witt was to survey and plot in a map, subsequently published in 1802. Massachusetts sold these lands in 1788 to Phelps and Gorham, who had sought in vain to enlist the aid of Rufus King in the purchase, but that portion of it, about four million acres, west of the Genesee, later reverted to Massachusetts, and was again sold by her to Robert Morris. He retained what was known as the Morris Reserve, and sold the rest to the Holland Land Company. It is not necessary to go into details about this particular part of the western claims of Massachusetts. When her western bounds — of the State proper — had been fixed in 1773 by a line, roughly parallel to the Hudson and say twenty miles east of it, Thomas Hutchinson, one of her commissioners, had fortunately insisted that the acceptance of that line was without

prejudice to the claims of Massachusetts farther west, so that this State was not now debarred from claiming in the far West. This was but one of the obligations under which Massachusetts lay to her later exiled governor, one of the loyalists who was best provided for, in England. What Hutchinson saved for Massachusetts east of Niagara was not indeed to be yielded to the public domain ; but this was not the case with the fifty-four thousand square miles in Michigan and beyond, whose fee and jurisdiction she ceded to Congress by an act of April 19, 1785. This was prior, as we have seen, to the movement for reducing the number of States proposed to be set up in the northwest.

To remove the last bar to a clear title to this public domain, there was now nothing left but for Connecticut to do what Massachusetts had done, in regard to a strip west of Pennsylvania and south of Lake Erie and of the Massachusetts cession, or between 41° and $42^{\circ} 2'$, and stretching to the Mississippi. This claim covered about forty thousand square miles. In assertion of her charter rights, Governor Trumbull of Connecticut, on November 15, 1783, had, by proclamation, warned all intruders off. Connecticut had had a long and, at times, somewhat ferocious quarrel with Pennsylvania over a similar strip which cut off a northern segment of the territory of William Penn's charter, and only a year before (1782) it had been settled by the intervention of Congress, which gave no reasons, but upheld the claim of Pennsylvania. So what was left for Connecticut to contribute was this same strip further westward, where it covered what is now a part of the States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. Within it were the sites where Cleveland was to be founded a few years afterwards in 1791, and Toledo and Chicago at a later day. This was the cession which Connecticut made, September 14, 1786. She imposed a condition, however, which, but for her promise to settle the country on Lake Erie, might have failed of acceptance in Congress. This was reserving a section along Lake Erie in the present State of Ohio, which is still known as the Western Reserve ; and whose settlement, soon to follow, realized the hope of Franklin, twenty years before, of a barrier State in that position. After a struggle in Congress, in which there was much opposition to any recognition of the Connecticut's charter rights in this res-

ervation, the act of cession was accepted on May 26. It was supposed that the reservation as defined included about six million acres, but it proved to contain only about three million two hundred and fifty thousand acres, when it was finally surrendered to the United States in 1800. This Connecticut cession, barring what was temporarily withheld with some doubt as to the retention of jurisdiction with the fee, compacted the great public domain of the northwest. There was still a small unclaimed area on Lake Erie. The long controversy over the western boundary of Pennsylvania had been closed in 1784 by running her southern line due west from the Delaware for five degrees, when it turned at right angles and was extended north to 42°. This point proved to be contiguous to Lake Erie, but there were five or six miles of lake shore east of it that did not belong to New York, since the western bounds of that State had recently been run by Andrew Ellicott on a meridian twenty miles west of the most westerly point on the banks of the Niagara River. Thus a bit of territory nearly triangular in shape and known as the "Erie triangle," measuring something over two hundred thousand acres, was considered to be a part of the public domain, not embraced in the ordinances of 1784, or in the later one of 1787. In 1788, the United States extinguished the Indian title in it for £1,200 and then sold it to Pennsylvania, by which that State secured on the lake the old port of Presqu'Isle, now the city of Erie.

Meanwhile, before the cession of Connecticut had been made, Congress had in connection with the ordinance of May 20, 1785, created the office of Geographer of the United States, electing to that position Thomas Hutchins, who had been Bouquet's engineer in a campaign in this western country twenty years before. After the Connecticut Reserve had been made, Hutchins was directed to survey seven, instead of five, longitudinal ranges of townships, north of the Ohio, west of Pennsylvania, and south of the Reserve.

This plan of a rectangular survey was first suggested in the report of a committee, of which Jefferson was chairman, on May 7, 1784, and it was in accordance with his distrust of rivers and ridges as suitable lines of demarcation. It has been suggested that the hint of such a survey came from Dutch

practice in a country too flat for natural divides. What Hutchins now undertook to do constituted the first systematic survey west of the mountains, and was known as the Seven Ranges. To start it, a "geographer's line," so called, was run due west for forty-two miles from a point where the bounds of Pennsylvania crossed the Ohio to a meridian that struck the Ohio a few miles above Marietta, and formed the western bounds of nineteen towns in the most western of the ranges. A post was set at each mile, and every six miles a spot was indicated as a township corner, through which a meridian line was run to the Ohio and to the line of the Reserve (41°), cut by other east and west lines at regular distances of six miles. In this way the lines were marked, at first, without any very nice regard to the magnetic variation, though Rufus King had tried in Congress to insure a record of it. Another difficulty was soon pointed out by Pickering and others, which was that there was no recognition of the converging of the meridian going north. "A difference of six hundred yards in ten miles must surely produce material errors," said Pickering. This was remedied at a later period (May 10, 1800, Act of Congress) by running other base lines occasionally, with new six-mile subdivisions.

While the work was going on, it was necessary sometimes to protect the surveyors from inroads of the savages. Tupper had been engaged with Hutchins, and it was his report on the country to Putnam that helped start the later Ohio Company. Hutchins did not live to complete the work, and when he died in 1788, at Pittsburg, the charge of the survey was assumed by the treasury. Hutchins's work has given him fame, as by it he introduced that universal square plotting of the public lands which makes the map of our Western States and Territories so unattractive to an eye accustomed to the diversity of geographical boundaries.

The quieting of the Indian title has been mentioned as the other necessary preliminary to the successful settlement of these western lands. The red man had first recognized in 1784, in the treaty of Fort Stanwix, the authority of the new Republic; and this meant, in an enforced dealing with the Indians, a more extensive governmental relation than had been maintained with them in the past. The confederation had of late

years spent annually less than \$2,500 in the Indian problem, the greater cost devolving upon individual States. In 1784, the cost, to the extent of \$4,500, fell upon the United States.


It was held in later years by Chief Justice Marshall that a European nation making discovery of a territory had the sole right of extinguishing the Indian title within that territory, and that individual bargains with Indians for land were of no binding effect. This principle had been established by Congress in 1781.

The earlier treaty of Fort Stanwix, in 1768, had, according to the claim of the Indians, considered the Ohio as the boundary between them and the whites; and recognizing this, it now devolved upon Congress to take steps to enlarge the territory open to settlement. In March, 1784, that body deemed it desirable that the Indian title should be quieted on the hither side of the meridian of the falls of the Ohio. To do this, it was necessary to bring the tribes to treaty stipulations, and somewhat unadvisedly it was determined to enter into pacts, tribe by tribe, rather than to deal with them in a mass. There were two obstacles in sight. One was the difficulty of finding the money necessary for the presents required in a successful agreement with the savages. The other was the obstinacy with which the Indians, in some part at least, and under British instigation, were opposed to abandoning the Ohio limits.

It was politic to begin at the immediate frontiers. Richard Butler, with whom Washington had been consulting about the Ohio portages, was in October, 1784, joined in a commission with Oliver Wolcott and Arthur Lee, to whom representatives of Pennsylvania should be added, to meet the New York Indians at Fort Stanwix, in order to extinguish their title to lands lying north and west of the Ohio, and within the limits of Pennsylvania and New York. A treaty was made, and by it the Iroquois, who had been pressing west along the southern shores of Lake Erie, were in fact shut out from any further advance in that direction. The pretensions of the Six Nations to make sale of this territory angered the western tribes, who claimed it as within their own patrimony. This rendered it necessary to placate those discontents.

Fort McIntosh had fallen into disrepair since 1783, and was now refitted; and here, on January 21, 1785, the American

commissioners, Isaac Lane, George Rogers Clark, and Samuel H. Parsons, met representatives of the Wyandots, Delawares, Chippewas, and Ottawas. It was now agreed for a satisfactory consideration that a region in the northwest of the present State of Ohio should remain inviolably in the Indian possession, except that the whites should be allowed tracts, six miles square, about any military post which was within the territory. The region thus reserved stretched on Lake Erie from Caya-



FORT MCINTOSH.

[After a plate in *The Columbian Magazine*, January, 1790. See the same sketch revamped in *Pennsylvania Archives*, second series, vol. xiv.]

hoga to the Maumee. Its easterly line ran by the Cayahoga and the Tuscarawas to near Fort Lawrence. The southern line extended thence to the portage connecting the Miami and the Maumee, and by the latter stream the line extended to the lake. Gerry, on February 25, 1785, writing from New York, informed Jefferson that Arthur Lee had just returned from the Indian country, and had reported that the new treaty had secured thirty million acres for coming settlements. There were all the while opposing views as to the desirability of acquiring the Indian title beyond the Miami, and so to the Mississippi.

Pickering was among those who opposed any such movement as opening the lands to "lawless emigrants," who were rather incited than restrained by any prohibitory enactments. On the other hand, there were those who contended that such purchases were necessary to give the color of right to "lawless emigration," and so prevent an Indian war.

There was another pressing difficulty, and that was the invasion of these lands, north of the Ohio, by irresponsible land-grabbers. In January, 1785, Governor Henry had warned all intruders of the dangers they incurred. Congress was determined to prevent the occupation of the acquired lands till they had been surveyed. On January 24, 1785, General Harmar, now in command on the Ohio, had been instructed to drive out all squatters, and he did not hesitate to brand them as "banditti, whose actions were a disgrace to human nature." In March, he sent Ensign Armstrong along the north bank of the Ohio as far as a point opposite Wheeling, to dispossess the intruders, and this officer reported that he had heard of many hundred more, as far west as the Miami. The work was followed up by a proclamation from Harmar on April 2, 1785; and by vigilant action that general succeeded in preventing a combination of the adventurers, for the purpose of resisting under some organized form of government. By May 1, Harmar reported that the cabins of such squatters had been burned.

The immigration by the Ohio, which had now been going on for some years, was estimated at the close of 1785 to have carried something like fifty thousand souls west of Pittsburg, and there was enough community of interest among them, English, Scotch, Irish, and German, to warrant in the summer of 1786 the setting up of the first newspaper west of the Alleghanies, the *Pittsburg Gazette*. The stream of emigrants, aggregating year by year from five to twenty thousand, and sometimes in a twelvemonth making a procession of a thousand boats, had been stranded mainly on the Kentucky side of the river, but the lateral valleys on the north bank had received no inconsiderable numbers, as Armstrong was now reporting.

While these measures were in progress, it had occurred to the philanthropic Countess of Huntingdon (February, 1785) to send a company of English colonists to settle on lands adjacent

to the Indians, in order to influence the savage character through Christian neighbors, and so bring them to civilized ways. There was no doubt that a spirit in the white man, different from that prevailing among the wild adventurers of the west, was needed on the frontiers; but there was a fear that colonists direct from English homes would feel more sympathy with the English of the retained posts than with the neighboring bush-rangers, and that accordingly the philanthropic experiment was too dangerous for trial. So nothing came of it.

All these movements did not escape the notice of Simon Girty and other emissaries of the British at Detroit. Very likely it was by the instigation of such men that a disaffected remnant of the Shawnees, Mingoes, and Delawares, and a few Cherokees, got together in council on May 18, 1785, and gave warning through one John Crawford, a Virginian whom they held, that resistance would be made to encroachments north of the Ohio, if such were persisted in. Ten days later (May 29), we find McKee informing Sir John Johnson of the growing discontent of the tribes, and the pressure which those along the Wabash were exerting on the easterly Indians to combine in order to enforce their rights.

In August, an Indian council at Niagara, and the movements of the autumn months, showed that it was difficult to insure quiet, especially as there were rumors of an American attack on Detroit. Such had been the uncertain condition when, on June 15, 1785, Congress, to give higher authority to Harmar's action, proclaimed that the surveys of the new lands must be completed before settlement could be allowed. It was felt by Hamilton and others that the proclamation was likely to be futile, and that the territory must inevitably become the theatre of a savage war, and in April, militia had been called out for three years' service on the frontiers. There were foreboding symptoms in the active agencies which Simon Girty and Joseph Brant were exerting along the frontier. As an Iroquois chieftain, Brant had felt deeply the manner in which his tribesmen had been driven from their old homes and forced to find hunting-grounds on Canadian soil, and had turned a deaf ear to Monroe's entreaty to join the American rather than the British interests. Nothing had more perplexed Haldimand than making suitable provision for these old allies of the British.

Despite their antipathy to the Americans, Brant and his countrymen were not a little incensed, moreover, in seeing what measures the British Parliament had taken to provide for the losses of the loyalists, while the losses of his own people had been left without corresponding relief. He was threatening during the summer (1785) to proceed to England and lodge his complaint with the ministry, while Haldimand tried to assuage his resentment.

In the autumn (1785), the commissioners, of whom General Robert Howe was now one, began to prepare for a further treaty to carry out the wishes of Congress expressed the preceding June. Monroe accompanied them "for private considerations," as it was said. Captain Doughty, stationed at Fort McIntosh, was persuaded that a more generous treatment of the Indians would be better, and recommended to the secretary of war a greater outlay in gifts. Jay, as a looker-on at the centre of government, was far from content with what the Indian department was doing, and by no means sure that there were not sinister agencies at work. "Our Indian affairs do not prosper," he wrote, January 9, 1786; "I fear Britain *bids higher* than we do. Our surveys have been checked, and peace with the savages seems somewhat precarious."

Doughty detailed a company of infantry to escort the commissioners as they proceeded west. Arrived at the mouth of the Miami, a field was cleared, stockades and blockhouses were built, and the post was named Fort Finney. The Indians had been notified that this was the spot for a conference. On November 13, 1785, General Samuel H. Parsons joined his fellow members, and the commission was ready for its task.

The Shawnees on the Scioto, who had kept aloof from the meeting in January, 1785, now came in, and a treaty was concluded on much the same terms as at Fort McIntosh. They agreed to confine themselves in the territory between the Great Miami and the Wabash. This was on January 31, 1786, and the Indians left five hostages to insure the release of white prisoners, which were held among the tribes. Another effect of the treaty was that it afforded for a while protection to the government surveyors on the western lands.

These several treaties had at last secured from the Indians

participating a recognition of the title of this great northwestern country which the United States had received from Great Britain. This recognition, however, had not been obtained without exciting the jealousy of some portion of the conceding tribes, particularly of such as had sought an asylum under British authority in Canada, and were in December sitting in council at Detroit. Brant, despite Haldimand's endeavors to prevent him, had proceeded to England, and we find him there on January 4, 1786, presenting his claims, and, in behalf of the whole Indian race, appealing to Sydney for countenance and aid in the savages' efforts to keep the Americans south of the Ohio. John Adams says that he saw the chieftain at the queen's drawing-room. "The ministerial runners," adds this observer, "give out that Brant is come to demand compensation for the Indian hunting-grounds ceded by the English, and to get something for himself as half-pay as colonel." Brant was deeply chagrined to find that there had really been a cession of the Indian territory to the Americans, and made the best he could of Sydney's promise to pay £15,000 for the certified losses of the Indians. Brant's disappointment was apparent to the ministry, but they counted on his pacifying his tribe, and advised his abstaining from revengeful hostilities against the Americans.

While the government in London was struggling with the importunities of this chieftain, the American commissioners had been only partially successful, as we have seen, at the mouth of the Miami, inasmuch as the Cherokees and Mingoes were raiding along the Ohio, rather than to join the conference at Fort Finney, while the tribes near Sandusky were holding aloof. Major Doughty, in March, 1786, sent one Philip Liebert to the lake shore to gain, if he could, these suspected bodies. It is doubtful if the savages who had seemed complacent at Fort Finney were acting in the best faith, for by April they knew in Detroit that their signing of the treaty was only to gain time and prevent the harrying of their villages by the whites.

By midsummer (1786), Sir John Johnson and Brant, who had now returned from England, had called upon the Niagara a council of the Six Nations and the western tribes. From Brant's bearing, Campbell of the twenty-ninth regiment, which

was at Niagara, reported that the Mohawk chieftain was in ill humor, and cared only for his own interests. Girty, McKee, and their Indians soon joined the council, and on July 25, 1786, the Indians had gathered there in good numbers. Brant now did his best to unite them in a campaign against the Americans. His speeches had not their usual effect, and he next tried personal solicitation among their villages, but he was no more successful here; and in September he was telling the British leaders in Detroit that he could do nothing more. Indeed, there was already a movement among the Indians to start westward, and find homes beyond the Mississippi, but it did not go far.

As the summer of 1786 wore on, it was by no means sure that the danger was over. There was a disposition in Virginia to bring matters to an issue. Rufus King records how the governor and Assembly of that State were "clamoring for a war against the Indians," but Congress without a quorum stood still. King further comments on "the lawless and probably unjust conduct of the inhabitants of Kentucky towards the Indians bordering on the western side of the Ohio." The secretary of war was powerless. When, in June, 1786, he needed a thousand dollars to transport powder to the western troops, the treasury board were not able to supply the funds, and the troops deserted because they were not paid.

The Indian bureau of the confederation had set up two departments, one north, the other south of the Ohio. The instructions of their respective agents on the spot were to regulate the relations of the settlers to the Indians, and to protect the savages in their territorial rights. To aid in this, Congress, which in March had declined to aid Knox in reorganizing the militia, voted (October 19, 1786) to raise a body of thirteen hundred and forty troops, so as to increase the western force to a legionary corps of two thousand men, but the condition that they should be raised in New England soon aroused suspicion that, under the color of protecting the western settlers, it was the real purpose of Congress to overawe the participants in Shays's rebellion in Massachusetts. On November 29, Gerry wrote to King of the Massachusetts legislature that "the country members laugh and say the Indian war is only a political one to obtain a standing army." On the Canadian side there was something of the same indirection. The British government

were not ready to espouse the cause which Brant had not been able to set afoot in the west, but they were not averse, as Dorchester's instructions to Sir John Johnson show (November, 1786), to furnishing supplies to the Indians, and in October there were two hundred savage warriors waiting at Niagara for powder.

So things were uncertain at every point just beyond the mountains; but farther west, on the Wabash, there were other complications arising from the discontent of the old French settlers at Vincennes. There were in this place, and near the Illinois, perhaps a thousand French, and they numbered four to one American. In the confusion following the war, with their allegiance deprived of an object, they had petitioned the American Congress to set up a government among them, to be in some sort stable, and there was at the same time some talk of bringing additional French thither to increase that population in the Ohio valley. This being denied, the situation had become grave. Vincennes was a town of some three hundred houses, but the sixty American families who made a portion of the population lived apart from their French neighbors. The outlying American squatters had withdrawn from the dangers attending their exposure to the savage marauders, and had sought shelter among their compatriots in the town. The Indians, on their part, were harbored among the resident French. So the partisans on both sides lived in much insecurity, facing and fearing each other.

It was an opportunity for the Kentuckians, who, seeking the leadership of George Rogers Clark, now but the wreck of his former self, organized at Harrodsburg on August 2, 1786, and advanced to relieve the Americans by scattering the Indians. In this they sought to do what the general government seemed indisposed to attempt. Gathering towards the middle of September, at the falls of the Ohio, on the 17th, some twelve hundred in number, horse and foot, they started out. Harmar, when he heard of it, had no confidence in their success, so bad was their organization, and such difficulty had Clark experienced in holding the men to his standard. The apprehension was well founded, for he accomplished little, and fell back upon Vincennes. Here, in an attempt to support a garrison, he seized stores from the Spanish merchants, and it was for a

while supposed that he intended to attack the Spanish across the Mississippi.

The weeks through the autumn of 1786 were disturbed ones. Kentuckians still pursued the Shawnees and ravaged their towns. The Indians were everywhere uneasy, and all through Georgia and Virginia the inhabitants were in arms. It was the old story of encroachments and counter raids. A hundred thousand dollars in specie, said Rufus King, had been paid in ten years to satisfy the savages, in the hope of pacifying them, but the sacrifice was futile.

Late in October, Lord Dorchester reached Quebec to assume the supreme command. He had come with special instructions to prevent, if possible, the Indians bringing on a war with the Americans. On November 27, we find him informing Sir John Johnson that this was the king's desire, and in December he writes to the commandant at Detroit to "confine the war in as narrow bounds as possible," if it should inevitably come. Brant was at this time at the straits, and had summoned there a general assembly of the tribes from the Hudson to the Mississippi. It was his purpose to formulate the last Indian appeal to be sent to the American Congress. A paper was drawn up with such skill as Brant possessed, embodying a protest against the congressional policy of treating with separate tribes, instead of covenanting with the entire body of the Indians. It insisted upon the invalidity of the Indian cessions of land as individual tribes had made them. It stood stubbornly for the Ohio as the Indian boundary, and deprecated the sending of surveyors across that river. There was too much reason to believe, as most Americans then thought, not only that British sympathy supported the hostility of the Indians, but also their demand for an Ohio frontier.

Brant certainly felt that in making this stand, it was necessary to have the countenance of the English; but it was a question how far they would sustain him in actual war. It turned out that Sydney, in April, 1787, instructed Dorchester to avoid assisting the Indians openly, but to see that they had what ammunition they needed. This disguised aid was apparently become the British policy, while the troops with which they manned their posts were insufficient for an active defense. The forts themselves were in a "ruinous" condition, and

Dorchester had only two thousand men to hold them along a line eleven hundred miles in length. The governor depended, however, upon the assistance of the loyalists and Canadians, if the forts were attacked. Sydney had instructed him to retake the posts, if they were lost. Nevertheless, it was the manifest policy of the British cabinet not to come to extremities, if it could be avoided.

The English ministry were quite prepared for the information which Dorchester now began to transmit, and the public press was only too ready to augment the stories of a gradual disintegration in the new Republic. The governing class was eager to believe such tales. Lord Lansdowne so felt, and Jay tried to disabuse his mind. "We are happy," said the American, "in the enjoyment of much more interior tranquillity than the English newspapers allow, or their writers seem to wish us." Unfortunately, the question of debts and loyalists had shown them the insubordination of the States, and they were in doubt if it was possible for any representative of the confederation which could be sent to their court to be sure of his position. Sheffield predicted that, sooner or later, the western country would revolt and seek the rest of the world through the Mississippi. All these things incited in England the hope that intestine disorders and a half-hearted interest in the proposed new constitution would urge public feeling to seek social and political stability in a return to monarchy, and it was fancied that Hamilton was latently the leader of a growing monarchical party, against which the newly organized government was only a temporary barrier. Hamilton had indeed privately vouched for his confidence in the British Constitution; but his public action was opposed. Speaking of the Federal Constitution, he said, "Not more than three or four manifested theoretical opinions favorable in the abstract to a constitution like that of Great Britain; but every one agreed that such a constitution would be out of the question." So there lingered, not without cause, a feeling among the English that public sentiment would some time find a reason propitious for an offer of one of the king's sons as a sovereign of an allied kingdom, and there were broad intimations made that a prince of the house of Hanover would serve them better than a French Bourbon. The chance was not untalked of in the States. "I am told," said Washington to Jay, August

1, 1786, "that even respectable characters speak of a monarchical government without horror." "I cannot believe," said Benjamin Lincoln, "that these States ever will or ever can be governed by laws which have a general operation. Were one under an absolute monarch, he might find a remedy, but some other mode of relief must be provided." Lincoln was further of the opinion that the extent of the country along the seaboard, embracing such a variety of climate and production, rendered a uniform government less easy of exercise than if its area stretched westward in an isothermal belt. "Shall we have a king?" asked Jay. "Not, in my opinion, while other expedients remain untried." "No race of kings," said Jefferson in commenting, "has ever presented above one man of common sense in twenty generations." But John Adams, in his essay on constitutions, had distinctly shown himself, it was thought, friendly to the British Constitution, — a point that at a later day Fauchet made the most of in his dispatches to the French government.

There were certainly great provocations to these dangerous sentiments. Shays's rebellion in Massachusetts had unsettled the national hopes, because, as Hamilton said, that State had thrown her citizens into rebellion by heavier taxes, "for the common good," than were paid in any other American community. To make matters worse, Jefferson in his wild unbalance had welcomed the revolt, or proposed to cherish it, as a benignant sign, and based his consolation on what Hamilton called a "miserable sophism."

The reckless financial course of Rhode Island had made dark the future of all. "The turbulent scenes in Massachusetts and the infamous ones in Rhode Island" were the words in men's mouths. "The bulk of the people," said one observer, "will probably prefer the lesser evil of a partition of the Union into three more practicable and energetic governments," and the advocates of such a partition were a force to be combated by the writers of *The Federalist*, one of whose salient points was that a dismemberment of the Union would reopen the question of the right to the western lands, lodged in the seaboard States, and expose the territorial disputes among the States to the arbitrament of war.

Whatever the result, whether the call for a king, or disinte-

gration, it had become clear to the British leaders that time would work to their advantage. So any dilatory policy which would put off a hostile demonstration on the part of the Indians, into which the posts might be drawn, was a manifest prudence. Meanwhile, it was true that a good deal of the recurrent bitterness in reference to the retention of the posts, which the Americans had shown, had gone. Whatever truth there may have been in it, Dorchester was beginning to think that, if they could not recover these military stations, the Americans were content to accept the situation, and seek to rival them in trading-posts by establishing new ones on the lakes. When he learned that a considerable number of Americans were encamped on the Great Miami, and making their way towards Vincennes, the alternative presented itself to his mind that if they were not aiming to attack the posts, they were intending to afford support in founding these rival stations.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE NORTHWEST OCCUPIED.

1786-1790.

DURING 1785, General Benjamin Tupper of Massachusetts, who was one of Hutchins's surveyors, had opportunities of traversing the Ohio country. On his return east, he wrote to Washington that he had been charmed with the aspect of the west. Later, he spent a night in Rutland, Massachusetts, in a house still standing, where with its master, General Rufus Putnam, a project was considered of leading a colony of old soldiers to this attractive region. The midnight talk of these old companions in arms revived the longings shown at Newburgh two years before. It was accordingly agreed between them to issue a call to the disbanded officers and men of the army living in New England, to meet in Boston on March 1, 1786, to consider a new project of westward emigration.

The call met with a good response. Eleven delegates appeared from different New England communities, and within two days the Ohio Company was organized. Not only officers of the army were welcome, but those who had served on the sea as well, and among the naval veterans was Commodore Whipple of Rhode Island. There was a good deal of preliminary work to be done, for it was necessary to seek those who held land certificates for service in the war, as these credits were to be accepted in payment for the soil. There being already a tide of settlers turning towards Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine, it was also necessary to set forth by advertisement the greater attractions of this western country. In due time, such business methods were well arranged under Generals Putnam and Parsons as directors, to whom a third, Manasseh Cutler, skillful with the pen and fertile in counsel, was added.

Rufus Putnam had made a creditable record in the war, though, as is often the case with engineer officers, he had not

gained a conspicuous position in the public eye. He was of a Massachusetts stock that had always been well known. Samuel Holden Parsons was a Connecticut man, of good standing, though of late years some disclosures, principally in the secret service books of Sir Henry Clinton, have raised an unfortunate suspicion that he failed at times in loyalty to the revolutionary cause. Friendly efforts have thrown these charges into the category of things not proven, but it still remains a fact that his good faith in relation to the Ohio Company was, in some respects, questioned by his associates in that undertaking.

But the chief spirit in this colonizing movement was a minister of the gospel in Ipswich, Massachusetts, who gained distinction enough in his pulpit to become a Doctor of Divinity, and he knew scarce less of law and medicine. Manasseh Cutler was a self-reliant man, and had that confidence in his star which characterizes a certain type of New Englander. Moreover, he believed, as that sort of a man often does, in making his neighbors and those he knew best his associates in any hazardous undertaking. He was as shrewd and as politic as any among the people he favored, not above telling half the truth and bargaining for the rest. He was equal to cajoling when he could not persuade, and by that token not a poor politician. With whatever skill he had in subduing opposition, he was a master in observation, both of man and nature, and naturalists look back to his botanical records to-day as among the earliest in New England of much scientific value. He knew, above all, how to stand up against opposition, whether in man or the devil. Such qualities gave him the leading place among those who were devising plans for a new life, and seeking, under his inspiration, a new career in the distant West.

While these measures were being shaped in Boston, Nathan Dane, an Essex County man, representing Massachusetts in Congress, had opened the way for a committee, of which Monroe was made the chairman, to report an ordinance for the government of the northwest, and in considering the matter, Monroe had invited Jay to confer with the committee. It was the purpose of the new movement to supplant Jefferson's ordinance of 1784. Its progress was delayed, quorums failed, and a new Congress intervened before, on April 26, 1787, the revised ordinance was reported. There were some features in

it not in the earlier law, but there was nothing in the nature of a compact to prevent repeal without common consent. The question of preventing slavery had been so squarely met and thrown out in Jefferson's experience that the subject was now ignored.

A fortnight later, on May 9, the bill came up for a second reading. At this time, General Parsons, now in attendance, put in a memorial for a grant of land within the jurisdiction of the proposed ordinance. There was, however, something in the manner of his application that disturbed both Cutler and Putnam when they heard of it, and even excited suspicions of Parsons's honesty. A third reading was in order on the next day, but there was no quorum, and all business was laid over.

A month and more now passed, during which interest was centred in the federal convention, which assembled at Philadelphia on May 14. In this interval the work of Congress was blocked by the absence of delegates. During these idle days Cutler had appeared in New York, prepared to supersede Parsons in directing the application for land in behalf of the Ohio Company, now representing two hundred and fifty shares at a thousand dollars each. Cutler reached that city on July 5, and found Congress with a quorum, the first it had had since May 11; but its president, Arthur St. Clair, was absent. Hutchins had advised that the company ask for its territory near the Muskingum. Cutler now, in presenting the subject anew, showed that he was determined, if land was purchased, that a due recognition should be made in the pending ordinance of those social and political principles which had been formulated of late in the constitution of Massachusetts, and in the laws of the States which the new era had fashioned. Cutler's proposition came before the committee on July 6, and included a payment for the land which he asked for of sixty-six and two thirds cents the acre, in soldiers' certificates, which, reduced to specie value, was equivalent to eight or ten cents.

Congress at this time hardly knew where to turn to meet its financial obligations, and such a proposition was a welcome relief in its distresses. Three days later, on July 9, the ordinance was recommitted to see if it could not be modified to suit the demands for which Cutler stood. These conditions and expectations brought a new atmosphere about the deliberations

of Congress. The new proposals, it was found, opened the way to pay off about one tenth of the national debt, and in addition, the prospect seemed good of combining into a code of fundamental principles the numerous social and political ideas which were flying about in the air, and many of which had, in one way or another, from time to time, been brought directly to the observation of Congress. Some of them involved, however, a smothering of cherished antipathies on the part of some of the members, particularly a demand for the extirpation of slavery north of the Ohio. Cutler was in his element in standing as the champion of freedom, and he was politician enough to know how the Virginia opposition could be quieted by showing to the representatives of the Southern States the better chance they had of compacting their interests south of the Ohio, if they conceded something on the other side of that river to the principles of the North, since such concessions might strengthen the obligations of the North to protect the products of slave labor in the South, and to stand by that section of the country in an inevitable contest with Spain over the free navigation of the Mississippi. This was to be the chief victory of Cutler in paving the way for the later motion of Dane. The other points upon which Cutler insisted were more easily carried. Such were reservations of land for the support of religion and education. The latter object received a double recognition. Five sections in each township were set aside for the benefit of schools, and two whole townships were devoted to the advancement of liberal learning.

While in the hands of the new committee, it would seem that the draft of the ordinance was submitted to Cutler for his scrutiny, and under his influence, doubtless, some other of the final social provisions of the instrument found their place in it. With these amendments, it was reported back to Congress on July 11, and went promptly through successive readings. It became a law on the 13th "with great unanimity," the eight States present all voting for it. Rufus King was not present in the final stages of the question, and Dane, after the passage of the ordinance, wrote to him: "We wanted to abolish the old system and get a better one, and we finally found it necessary to adopt the best we could get." All that was desired was not obtained; but it was nevertheless a triumph for Cutler and those

who sympathized with him. The Virginians had yielded much. There were, in fact, potent reasons other than those already mentioned for them to accede, since it gave them the hope of using the proposed trans-montane community to further their scheme of opening communication with the west through the Virginia rivers. So the tricks of give and take, as politicians understand them, did their part in the work.

It is of little consequence, if not futile, to try to place upon any one the entire credit, such as it was, of this famous ordinance of 1787. Cutler's interposition was doubtless opportune. What the Massachusetts country parson was from the outside, very likely the Massachusetts lawyer, Nathan Dane, was from the inside; and with both combining, with Congress ready to bargain and be complacent, and with the example of Jefferson's earlier ordinance, and the personal influence of King and others according, the instrument took its final shape, as the natural and easy outgrowth of surrounding conditions. It was also, as Rufus King called it, "a compromise of opinions," and he added, in writing to Gerry, "When I tell you the history of this ordinance, you shall acknowledge that I have some merit in the business."

Congress, as we have seen, had caused a large tract of territory to be surveyed west of the mountains, thinking, by disposing of it, to place the finances of the young Republic on a healthy basis; but there had been few or no sales of the land. Cutler, as a buyer, had now appeared, ready and anxious to make a purchase and give a vital flow to the revenue.

The federal convention, just at this time sitting in Philadelphia, was seeking to find a way out of a dismal political environment. It needed, in one aspect, the encouragement of just the outcome which a copy of the perfected ordinance, as printed in a Philadelphia newspaper on July 25, afforded it. The bold assumption of Congress to regulate the public domain was a stroke which helped the convention better to understand the relations of the States to the unorganized territory in the west. The enlarged conception which the new ordinance gave of the future problem of western power, and its effect on the original States, clarified the perplexities which had excited in the convention the apprehensions of Gerry and others. The influence which the new outlook had upon the different mem-

bers was naturally in accordance with their individual habits of mind. Morris expressed a fear at granting any new western state privileges like those enjoyed by the seaboard commonwealths. The chief advocate of equal rights was George Mason of Virginia. "If it were possible," he said, "by just means to prevent emigration to the western country, it might be good policy. But go the people will, as they find it for their interest; and the best policy is to treat them with that equality which will make them friends, not enemies." He had, too, a just anticipation of the time "when they might become more numerous and more wealthy than their Atlantic brethren." King, whom Brissot was reporting as "the most eloquent man in the United States," evinced wherein his hope lay: "The eastern State of the three proposed will probably be the first, and more important than the rest; and will, no doubt, be settled chiefly by eastern people, and there is, I think, full an equal chance of its adopting eastern politics." So with some a hope to bolster the power of the North as against the South was not the least consideration in the movement.

The ordinance shows, in its conglomerate character and somewhat awkward combinations, the rapid changes which took place in it during the brief interval while it was upon the anvil of Cutler and the reformers. The company which was to act under it was waiting, and there was no time to spend to weld into symmetry its independent parts. The instrument was peculiarly the outcome of prevalent ideas. Congress by previous legislation had experimented with many of them. The statutes of several of the States, the constitution of Massachusetts, and the Bills of Rights largely patterned upon that of Virginia, and which the new fervor of independence and liberated humanity had elicited, were but other expressions of current hopes drawn upon, while devoted hands were moulding the provisions of the ordinance. Thus it was an embodiment of current aspirations, and had not a single new turning-point in human progress; but it was full of points that had already been turned. Let us pass in review its leading features so as to show this.

The ordinance was intended to provide security and political content in a territory of two hundred and seventy thousand

five hundred and fifty square miles, or thereabouts, which was larger than any known in Europe, except Russia, and twice as large as Great Britain and Ireland combined. This country lay above the Ohio, east of the Mississippi, and was bounded on the north by Lakes Erie, Huron, and Superior. It was to be divided eventually into five States, and the Eastern States had welcomed this provision as a substitute for the smaller commonwealths which Jefferson had proposed.

As this provision was made a part of a compact, it was supposed that this territorial distribution was binding. Everybody counted blindly. They did not sufficiently comprehend that any planning for the future of an extensive and little-known territory must necessarily, compact or no compact, depend for its perpetuity on a sustaining public interest. The question of bounds of these five States, as provided in the fifth compact of the ordinance, was peculiarly liable to such vicissitudes. In defining the latitudinal line which was to make the northern boundary of the three lower States, the framers of the ordinance had overlooked the more accurate configurations of Hutchins's map of 1778, and had gone back to Mitchell's map of 1755. In this way they accepted a false position for the southern bend of Lake Michigan, which that divisionary line was to touch. The question of sharing in some equitable way the frontage on the lakes, and the plea that an infringement of the compact of the ordinance was necessary to afford such a frontage so as to prevent Illinois casting in her lot with the South, in due time, threw to the winds, as a matter of course, that obligation of the instrument, and a majority vote dissolved the compact, as it did in another question of inherent national interest when the acquisition of Louisiana was confirmed. A similar disregard of the agreement, also, in time abridged the rightful claim of Wisconsin to the region east of the upper Mississippi and south of the Lake of the Woods. In this respect any modern map shows how futile the compact was.

The provision of the fourth section of the compact seeking to promote trade in transit, by declaring streams and connecting portages common highways, had already been anticipated, in connection with Virginia's project for opening channels to western trade, by a resolution of Congress on May 12, 1786. Pickering had urged it before in a letter to Rufus King: "It seems

very necessary to secure the freedom of navigating water communications to all the inhabitants of all the States. I hope we shall have no Scheldts in that country."

The assurance for a representative government, which the ordinance gave, was accompanied by a provision which allowed, as was permitted in the ordinance of 1784, the adoption of the laws of any of the older States. The provision sometimes proved an onerous one amid environments which rendered modifications of such laws necessary to a healthful condition of public life. It was provided that when a State reached a population of sixty thousand free persons, it could form a constitution and be admitted to Congress by delegates allowed to vote, while with a less population such delegates could not vote. A property qualification was rendered necessary in order to be either voter or magistrate, and, if manhood suffrage is an advance, the ordinance made a backward step, for Jefferson's ordinance had given every man the right to vote. The new act nearly mated the provision of the Virginia constitution of 1776, where a vague requirement of "sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with, and attachment to, the community" had been considered to mean the possession of a freehold.

The section for the exclusion of slavery, which was introduced by Dane on the second reading of the bill, was a matter that had been for a long time bandied about between North and South, and between factions for and against, both in the North and in the South. The phrase, "all men are born free and equal," in some of its forms, used in the Virginia Constitution in 1776, repeated in the Declaration of Independence, and copied in the Bills of Rights of Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, was simply a hackneyed expression of political assertion, as John Adams said at the time. It meant what it pleased anybody to say it meant. There was no thought in Virginia that it touched the question of slavery, while in Massachusetts, under the pressure of public opinion, it was seized upon by the Supreme Court of the State, in 1783, to signify the legal abolishment of slavery in that community. With the same language to deal with in the New Hampshire constitution (1783), it was early construed as freeing those only who were born after the enactment. Similar phraseology in the Vermont constitution, in 1777, had not been held to abolish slavery.

With such "rights and liberties" as Virginians acquired under her constitution, with her interpretation of that phrase, she covenanted with the Union in her deed of cession of March 1, 1784, that they should still pertain to her citizens then in the northwest territory. Notwithstanding this, her representatives had voted for Cutler's bill, which he thought in conflict with that covenant. While, then, this professed prohibition of slavery in the northwest was in July, 1787, enacted in New York, George Mason was saying in August, in the federal convention in Philadelphia, that "the western people are already calling out for slaves for their new lands, and will fill that country with slaves, if they can be got through South Carolina and Georgia." Mason's reference was of course mainly to the people south of the Ohio; but it is by no means certain that Cutler knew just what this prohibition of the ordinance meant for the north side of the Ohio. There were four or five thousand French and half-breeds in the Illinois country, whose rights of property had been guaranteed in the treaties of 1763 and 1782, and human servitude prevailed among them. Did this ordinance provide for its extinction and without compensation to the owners of slaves? Some evidently feared it, for there was some emigration of such over the Mississippi from Kaskaskia. Fortunately, in the awkward dilemma, the faith and justice of Congress, careless of promoting them, were established for that body by St. Clair when he became governor of the territory. He reported to the President that he had construed the ordinance with something of the same freedom that had been used with the glittering words of the Bills of Rights, as intending only to prevent the introduction of slaves, and not aimed at emancipating such as were there and had been introduced "under the laws by which they had formerly been governed." He hoped, he said, that in doing this he had not misunderstood "the intentions of Congress," as by his interpretation he had quieted the apprehension of the people and prevented their flying beyond the Mississippi.

Therefore the ordinance failed to abolish slavery, and it was not, moreover, any novelty in its professions of abolishment. When there had been, under Pickering's influence, a movement in the army, in 1783, to provide homes for the war-stained veterans, it had been a condition too emphatic for misinterpreta-

tion that the total exclusion of slavery should be "an essential and irrevocable part of the constitution of the proposed State." Mason and other Virginians had been, as we have seen, advocates for the abolition of slavery. Jefferson's preliminary ordinance of 1784 had rooted it out of every part of the trans-Alleghany region, though this section had received only the votes of six States, when seven were required. Cutler had indeed, with Dane's aid, turned the southern adherence to negro bondage so adroitly to his own purpose that he had secured, futile though it was, the expression in the last article of the compact which was intended to extirpate slavery. For this intention due credit must be given; but King and Pickering had been public advocates of abolition before ever Cutler was heard of. The American Anti-Slavery Society had been founded in Philadelphia in 1775. Tom Paine had written the preamble of the Abolition Act of Pennsylvania in 1780. A society for the liberating of slaves had been organized in New York in 1785. Notwithstanding these signs, it is apparent that the provision of the new ordinance for this end was never proclaimed, for fear of the influence it might have to prevent emigration to the territory. There is indeed no evidence that the supposed fact of prohibition was ever used in any advertisement of the Ohio Company to advance settlement. The ordinance can hardly be said to have been instrumental in keeping human bondage out of the northwest in later years. It afforded a rallying cry ever after 1795, when the movement of the slavery faction began in that region to overcome and eradicate the aversion of the people to such bondage, but it was the constancy of a later generation, and the leading of such as Governor Coles, and not an ordinance which was never in its entire provisions effective, which had been annulled by the adoption of the constitution, and substantially reenacted by the first Congress, that did the work which was really consummated in the constitution of Illinois at a much later day.

Congress had for some time played fast and loose with the question of religion and education. George Mason had long been the redoubtable champion of both. In the revision of the Virginia laws in 1777, Jefferson had contended for "religious freedom with the broadest bottom." Though the provision for

the support of religion had been once lost in Congress, the sustenance of education had been a part of Bland's motion in June, 1783, and again in the bill for surveys in 1785, when lot sixteen was set aside in each township. The allowing of all kinds of orderly worship and the furtherance of religious interests, the support of education and the protection of Indian rights, were now secured — as they had been often allowed before in other parts of the country — in the first and third articles of the compact. .

The provisions of the second compact for the regulating of social life were all ordinary observations pertaining to common law processes, the writ of *habeas corpus*, and trial by jury. The conditions developed in Massachusetts by Shays's rebellion had induced Richard Henry Lee and Nathan Dane to become sponsors of the clause which prohibited laws impairing the obligations of private contracts. The absolute ownership of lands, the equal sharing of property, and the prevention of primogeniture and entail were all in the creeds of Jefferson, Monroe, Johnson, and others, and had before been embodied in the laws of Virginia and other States. Hamilton had pointed to the common observance of an equal inheritance as insuring the country from the evils of a moneyed aristocracy.

So the ordinance of 1787 introduces us to nothing new in human progress. There was doubtless that in it which proved a guiding star for future legislation, as in the struggle over the slavery question in Illinois; but it may well be questioned if later enactments, without such a beacon, and keeping in sight the interests of the community as they arose, would not have made of the northwest all that it has become. The provisions of this fundamental law were operative just so far as the public interests demanded, and no farther, and the public interests would have had their legitimate triumph unaided by it. The ordinance simply shared this condition with all laws in communities which are self-respecting and free.

The ordinance disposed of, Congress, on July 23, authorized the Board of the Treasury to sell to the Ohio Company a tract of land lying between the Seven Ranges and the Scioto, and beginning on the east five miles away from the left bank of the Muskingum. The tract was supposed to contain one million



THE OHIO COMPANY'S PURCHASE.

[From a General Map of the Course of the Ohio from its Source to its Junction with the Mississippi, in Collet's Atlas.]

five hundred thousand acres, for which there was to be paid, if the measurement proved correct, a million dollars in soldiers' certificates, one half down and the other half when the land was surveyed. In order to increase the inducement for the government to sell, — for there had arisen a doubt if Cutler's terms


of payment were to be accepted, — and at the same time to play furtively into the hands of Colonel Duer, an ardent speculator and “representative of some of the principal characters in the city,” this New England parson and trusted agent of the Ohio Company, on the same day, and keeping Duer’s participation in the shade, suddenly increased his proposal for territory. He asked now for five million acres, and offered a payment of \$3,500,000. Cutler by this time had discovered that St. Clair, who since the 17th had been in his chair as presiding officer of Congress, was not averse to receiving the governorship of the new territory, and though St. Clair was not Cutler’s choice, the latter found it politic to favor the president’s somewhat disguised aspirations so as to advance his own enlarged project. Under this reinforcement, Cutler’s lagging project had been resuscitated, and the bargain was concluded, and the desired area was secured. It was to include country north from the Ohio, ten townships of an eighth range, and to extend west, south of the upper boundary of the tenth township, till seventeen ranges of six miles each had been covered. Hutchins thought that the meridian making the western bounds of the last range would come nearly opposite the mouth of the Kanawha, thus by a considerable stretch falling short of the Scioto. This was indeed a misjudgment, which, with other mishaps, led to some serious complications, as we shall see.

The bargain clinched, Cutler and Winthrop Sargent, the later secretary of the colony, to whom the grant had been made, sold on the same day a half interest to Colonel William Duer, as had been understood, who, on his part, agreed to advance money to help meet the payment on the whole. The other moiety of the purchase remained with Cutler and those associated with him in the subterfuge.

Three months later, after the surveys had been made, the bargain was finally consummated on October 27, 1787. It was then found that the Ohio Company’s part of the purchase was but nine hundred and sixty-four thousand two hundred and eighty-five acres, for which only \$642,856.66 was to be paid. The transaction had absorbed something less than one half of the two million acres pledged by warrant to the soldiers of the recent war. Congress had, August 8, 1786, made the American silver dollar very like the Spanish, and this specie basis

was to govern the value of the warrants, however variable the current paper value of the scrip.

It was fortunate for the new settlement that it was to have, at the mouth of the Muskingum, an assured safety in the neighborhood of Fort Harmar, which had been built there in 1785 for the protection of the surveyors and as a refuge for the traffickers on the river. This post and Fort McIntosh at the mouth of the Big Beaver were the only stations now held by




FORT HARMAR.

[After a cut in the *American Pioneer*, vol. 1., Cincinnati, 1844. The small house in the left foreground is where St. Clair made the treaty of 1789. Just above this house is the mouth of the Muskingum, and over that the point on which Marietta was built.]

the government north of the Ohio. They commanded the routes to two different portages, both leading to the Cayahoga and Lake Erie. Wharton, in 1770, in addressing Lord Hillsborough, had spoken of the Cayahoga as having a wide and deep mouth large enough to receive great sloops from the lake. "It will hereafter be a place of great importance," he added. It was considered in Virginia that one of the most effective

NOTE.—The map on the two following pages is from Crèvecoeur's *Lettres d'un Cultivateur*, vol. iii., Paris, 1787, and shows the valleys of the Hockhocking, Muskingum, and Big Beaver, and purports to be based on observations of Bouquet, and on information from the Shawnee chief, White Eyes.

ESQUISSÉ
(MUSKINGHAM




measures to be fostered was the opening of canals where now these portages necessitated a land carriage. The country, irrespective of its value for transit, was of itself an attractive one, and at this time, as General Harmar tells us, buffalo swarmed along its alluvial bottoms, not to disappear till ten or twelve years later, leaving memories with the settlers of many a savory haunch. Putnam, when he came to know the country, called its climate as "healthy as any on the globe;" and of the land itself he said that it was the "best tract, all circumstances considered, which the United States had or ever will have to dispose of, to such an extent." In respect to its numerous intervalles, he held it to be a more advantageous settlement than either the Scioto or Miami regions, which, as we shall see, were at the same time seeking other occupants.

The new movement was as encouraging to the government as it was promising to those embarked in it. Before the sale was consummated, Richard Henry Lee had written (October 11, 1787) to Washington that the lands at the west were becoming "productive very fast," and he was hopeful enough to believe that "the lands yet to be disposed of, if well managed, would sink the whole thirty millions [of debt] that are due."

During the summer of 1787, Harmar with a military force had advanced to Vincennes to take its French population under protection, while Major Hamtramck was left in command at Fort Harmar to watch the coming immigrations. With the following spring, the tide of settlers flowed actively. The Conestoga wagons, which of late years had superseded the pack-mule in passing the mountains, poured into Red Stone on the Monongahela, bringing some discontents, if current reports are believed, who were escaping from subjection to the new Federal Constitution. Pittsburg, with a population, as Colonel May expressed it, "two dogs to a man," was in itself federal in sympathy; but the surrounding country afforded all the sympathy that was wanted by the flying democrats. This western community was now for the first time kept in some correspondence with the seaboard, through a postal service on horses which had just been established, connecting Philadelphia at a

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page is from *The Navigator* (Pittsburg, 8th ed., 1814), and shows how the navigable channel passes the Muskingum. The islands are: 34, Duvall's; 35, Muskingum; 36, Second; 37, James's; 38, Blennerhassett's. It is the earliest published river chart.

THE NAVIGATOR.



fortnight's interval with the Ohio. The flatboats in which the new-comers descended the Monongahela to the main river were fitted with wagon tops over their after-parts, affording some shelter to the women and children. The men picked off the buffalo and wild turkeys on the banks to keep the company supplied with fresh meat. It was not easy to make an accurate record of the number of boats which were constantly passing into the Ohio at Pittsburg, for many floated by in the night; but in 1788, up to May 11, at least two hundred boats, averaging twenty persons to each, passed that point in the daytime. When land in Pennsylvania in large tracts was selling at half a guinea an acre, there was naturally a large exodus over the mountains.


Not a boat of this moving flotilla was freighted with so much of promise as one long, bullet-proof barge which, in the hazy air, passed unguardedly by the mouth of the Muskingum, till its company was first made aware of their nearing their destination by the walls of Fort Harmar looming through a thick mist. With some aid from the garrison, for which they had signaled, the overjoyed company pushed their boat back against the current, and brought it up against the eastern bank of the Muskingum. The name of this fateful craft was the "Mayflower," a reminiscence of that other vessel, which nearly a hundred and sixty-eight years before, and freighted with a still greater promise, cast her anchor under the shelter of Cape Cod. The bleak shores of New England, without a sign of welcome on that November day, 1620, were a strong contrast on this 7th of April, 1788, to the limpid stream reflecting the verdure of spring, and the welcoming flag of the new Republic floating above the fort.

Let us go back a few months. At a meeting of the promoters of the Ohio enterprise in Boston on the 21st of the preceding November, it had been determined to found their future city at the mouth of the Muskingum, and two days later Rufus Putnam was chosen the leader of the pioneers. Boat-builders were sent forward, and by the last of January, 1788, they had begun their work on the Youghiogheny. Putnam, with the surveyors and engineers, joined them by the middle of February. Everything was ready, and by the 2d of April the

"Mayflower" floated out upon the stream, and five days later she reached the Muskingum. "No colony in America," said Washington, "was ever settled under such favorable circumstances." The position which had been chosen was a striking one. Samuel Wharton, in 1770, had extolled the country. Evans and Hutchins had publicly joined in glowing descriptions of it. The confluence of the Ohio and the Muskingum formed two attractive peninsulas, with high banks, and a breadth of two hundred and fifty yards of limpid water flowing between them. On the lower point Fort Harmar had been built. On the upper were the scattered mounds of a long-vanished people. Here, amid a growth of trees, some of which, surmounting the earthworks, attested their great age, the labors of the new colony were to begin. Through the late spring and summer the initial work of the pioneers, and of those that soon joined them, was carried on. Ground was cleared for many an allotted home lot, and for their stockade, called the *Campus Martius*. Some built huts of the planks that had made their boats. Others felled trees and constructed ruder shelters. The few yokes of oxen which they had brought dragged the timber among the stumps, where lately the forest stood. They sank saw-pits, and turned tree-trunks into planks. Some were attracted by the comely grain of the black walnut, and saved it against need to make household tables and chests.

They gained acquaintance during these summer months with every subtly changeable quality which the climate could show. There was at one time intense heat and myriads of gnats. The river water, which was their dependence, was sickening in its tepidness. Then there came cloud-bursts, followed by rainbows. Away in the mountains, beyond their observation, there were deluges, and the rivers that skirted their acres became wonderfully agitated, and they looked on in wonder. They had never before seen rivers rise so rapidly. Again, the torrid air would flee suddenly before an atmosphere which in June seemed like September. All such changes induced a rapid vegetation, which surprised M. Saugrain, the naturalist, who was on the spot during the year. Their gardens leaped from sprout to

NOTE. — The map on the two following pages shows Fort Harmar and the site of Marietta, together with ancient earthworks of the "Mound-builders." It is from Crèvecoeur's *Voyage dans la haute Pensylvanie*, Paris, 1801.





bud, and from blossoms to edibles. Fifteen thousand fruit trees were in bearing within a few years. Brissot found the soil "from three to seven feet deep, and of astonishing fertility. It is proper," he adds, "for every kind of culture, and it multiplies cattle almost without the care of man." These and the game — buffalo, deer, bear, with turkeys, pheasants, geese, and ducks — and the marvelous fish of the streams — carp, sturgeon, and perch — furnished their tables with a rich abundance. Those who were invited to the mess of the officers in the fort were gladdened with a still greater variety. But their New England bringing-up did not let many of them forget their Sunday "dinner of beans," as one of their diaries shows.

The neighboring Indians, who ventured among the settlers to shake hands and barter, soon perceived that a policy differing from what the savages had known in the whites was governing their new neighbors. The New Englanders were making their settlement much compacter than had been the habit of the squatters upon tomahawk claims on the other side of the Ohio. Parsons was soon reporting to his friends at the east how the natives were struck by this. That individual irresponsibility which had been found in the long knives of Kentucky was on the very next day after the arrival of the first barge banished from the new colony by the promulgation of a code of laws. These were temporarily devised, pending the arrival of their governor, and made public by being nailed to a tree. They selected a man of repute among them, Return Jonathan Meigs, to be responsible for their enforcement.

Within a few seasons, something like twenty thousand souls floated down the Ohio to such expectant, law-abiding communities, and it remained to be seen whether these novel conditions of civilized life in the western wilderness would have a beneficent effect upon the five thousand savage warriors who made their homes between the Ohio and the lakes.

The colony's working parties in the field were from the first prudently protected by armed patrols. There were, indeed, occasional alarms, compelling the withdrawal of everybody to the shelter of the stockade, but there was no serious disturbance of their quiet beyond an attack upon an outpost which they soon established up the Muskingum. A few Mingoës and other savage desperadoes wandered on the Scioto, and from a



MARIETTA.

[This cut is from Harris's Journal of a Tour in 1803.]

high rock on the Virginia bank, nearly opposite its mouth, the Indian lookouts watched for the descending boats, and sometimes lured them to destruction; but above the Muskingum there was little danger, and the bed and blanket linings of the low cabins on the emigrants' boats rarely received in these upper reaches of the Ohio the bullets of the skulking foe. So it was that they who passed beyond, bound for Kentucky, ran the larger hazard; but the risks did not produce great hesitancy among them. By the end of the summer of 1788, there were less than one hundred and fifty adult males in the Muskingum colony; while for the previous twelve months, something like five hundred boats, carrying ten thousand emigrants, were known to have passed Fort Harmar, to take the chances of the savage gauntlet and land their passengers for the Kentucky settlements, with which there was now talk of uniting those on the Cumberland.

The New England element on the Ohio became eventually mixed with a large infusion of that Presbyterian Scotch-Irish blood which had been long strengthening the fibre of the Kentucky spirit. Those of this blood that passed into the Ohio region came over the mountains from New York and Pennsylvania, and have left their descendants in the east and central regions of the present State of Ohio. Those that fled from the uncongenial surroundings of Carolina and its slave code were scattered along the river shelves and back of them, between the Muskingum and the Miamis.

The spring of 1788 was a busy one for Putnam and his companions. There had been the labor of gathering and transshipping their supplies at Pittsburg, now a muddy and coal-blackened little village of a few score houses and a thousand people. When Parsons and Sargent reached there on May 12, the former was soon approached by British emissaries, anxious to make commercial connections for the new settlement. Their choice of negotiator has a sinister look, when we remember how Cutler had distrusted Parsons. Nothing came of it. Putnam, a safer man, was much more interested in what Congress was likely to do with Brant. This Mohawk leader was still restless. "The Indians are having a critical time," he said. "The Yankees are taking advantage of them, and the English are getting tired of them." If Congress showed no

disposition to redress the wrongs of his people, would Brant yield to the Indian passion for war? A desolating conflict seemed likely from the lawlessness of the remoter squatters, and was apparently to be forced on the Wabash by the inroads of the Kentuckians, who were unhappily most of the time beyond the control of the government. "Not a single Indian war," said Jay later in one of his *Federalist* papers, "has yet been occasioned by the aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is; but there are several instances of Indian



MARIETTA.

[From Collet's *Atlas*.]

hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States, who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants."


Before the arrival of St. Clair as governor, the colony had compacted itself and given to their town, in commemoration of Marie Antoinette, the French queen, the name of Marietta, by running together parts of her double name. As they had recognized in this the aid of France in their revolutionary struggle, they celebrated the fruition of the war in a festival on Independence Day, when venison, bear, and buffalo meat regaled the appetite, and General Varnum, who with others had left Rhode Island to escape the tyranny of her paper-money faction, delivered an acceptable address. Five days later, they received their new executive with a salute of fourteen guns.

This man, Arthur St. Clair, was of Scotch and noble birth, and had been educated at Edinburgh. He had come to America thirty years before, and had served under Amherst at Louisburg and under Wolfe at Quebec. He had been sent later on staff business to Boston, and had there married, in 1760, the

daughter of a family of social standing, and secured with her a competence. This he later lost in Pennsylvania, where he had settled in 1764. Joining the patriot side in the war for independence, he had, though much in service, attracted little favorable notice. He perhaps met undue censure for his failure to thwart Burgoyne, at Ticonderoga, in an "unexpected and unaccountable" evacuation of that post, as Hamilton said. He later engaged in the civil service, and was president of Congress when Cutler, playing upon his vanity, helped on his own projects by favoring St. Clair's aspirations to be governor of the new territory. It is fair to remember, however, that St. Clair professed this was an honor thrust upon him. He was now a man of fifty-four, and not in his political opinions without somewhat advanced views, as appeared in part when he made his inaugural address. Eleven days later, in July, he created, by proclamation, the county of Washington, which embraced the eastern half of the present State of Ohio, and the machinery of government was set in motion. He and the three judges — Samuel H. Parsons, J. M. Varnum, and J. C. Symmes — now fashioned a permanent code of laws which, in its provisions, was very strict and even cruel. Debt and petty offenses were harshly treated, and "in punishment of crime" the statutes instituted a barbaric kind of servitude, compared with which the bondage of the slaves at Vincennes was mild. On September 22, the governor marched in the procession of magistrates which opened on that day the first session of their organized court.

St. Clair found, however, his most difficult task not in governing his immediate dependents, but in carrying out the wishes of Congress to extinguish the Indian title everywhere south of 41°, and west to the Mississippi. Mated with this was the perhaps greater difficulty of controlling the recklessness of the irresponsible squatter and the wild bushranger's provocation of the Indian.

Soon after Brant had presented his memorial to Congress, insisting upon the Ohio as the Indian boundary, the government of the confederation had addressed itself to accomplish by treaty what it hardly dared attempt by war, while the northern posts were in the hands of the British. The chief impediments in this action had been found in the rampant propensities of the Kentuckians. "It is a mortifying circumstance,"



CAMPUS MARTIUS AT MARIETTA.
From the *American Pioneer*, March, 1842.

wrote Harmar on December 9, 1787, to the secretary of war, "that while under the sanction of the federal authority negotiations for treaties are holding with the Indians, there should be such presumption in the people of Kentucky as to be forming expeditions against them." The natural result of such irregular warfare was the forming among the tribes of "confederations and combinations," whose mischief-making it was expected that St. Clair would thwart.

It was a question then, and has been since, in all surveys of this period, how far the British government, or its individual

agents, were responsible for the Indian hostilities. St. Clair, in January, 1788, wrote to the secretary of war: "Notwithstanding the advice the Indians received from Lord Dorchester to remain at peace with the United States, there can be but little doubt that the jealousies they entertain are fomented by the agents of the British crown." Hamilton wrote in *The Federalist*: "The savage tribes on our western frontiers ought to be regarded as our natural enemies and their [Great Britain] natural allies, because they have most to fear from us and most to hope from them," and for this reason he was urging a standing national army instead of local protection of the frontiers. A lack of unity of purpose in the States, and a setting of local interests before those of the confederation, was a constant source of perplexity in many ways. In dealing with the Indians, this lack of a common policy was most harassing. In July, 1788, St. Clair complains of the government of New York distracting the Six Nations by calling them to council at Fort Stanwix and making a treaty, at the same time that the federal authorities were inviting them to a conference at Fort Harmar.

Since 1786, when the tribes had been summoned to a council by George Rogers Clark, the Indians as a body, on one pretense or another, had avoided making a treaty with the whites. In the summer of 1788, St. Clair had urged such a meeting upon them, not, however, without a suspicion that they would decide upon war as an alternative. In this belief he was determined to be forearmed, and by the first of September, 1788, he had called upon the governments of Virginia and Pennsylvania to hold in readiness some three or four thousand militia, while he equipped his regulars for forest service, and hoped to add to them some three or four hundred recruits from the French on the Wabash.

It was with some apprehension lest they were more determined on war than on peace that St. Clair saw the warrior chiefs begin to assemble at Fort Harmar on the 9th of September, 1788. Representatives of the various tribes came in slowly. Meanwhile, a dubious character, one John Connolly, known to be a British emissary, was disquieting the governor, lest to the Indian difficulty another was to be added. The governor heard in November that Connolly had gone to Kentucky

in behalf of Lord Dorchester, and it was not quite clear whether Connolly's purpose was to detach the Kentuckians from the American cause by offering them better security under British protection, or his mission had some connection with the Spaniards and the Mississippi. We now know that Dorchester had a month before (October, 1788) informed his home government that the people of Kentucky were both planning to force the Mississippi and to bargain with the English for an outlet through the St. Lawrence, and this throws some light on the way in which Parsons had been approached at Pittsburg. Before this, in August, 1788, Madison had written to Jefferson: "Spain is taking advantage of disgust in Kentucky, and is actually endeavoring to seduce them from the Union, — a fact as certain as it is important."

While St. Clair was in the uncertain frame of mind that suspicions of this kind engendered, by December 12, those of the Six Nations and other tribes who had been proof against the persuasions of Brant and McKee had assembled at Fort Harmar in such numbers that the governor was ready to open the conference. There was by this time, because of St. Clair's constant professions, no hope on the Indians' part that Brant's contention for the Ohio as a boundary would be recognized. Brant and his Mohawks had withdrawn to Detroit. This development distressed St. Clair, as it well might, and it gave him further anxiety to learn that Dorchester was strengthening the fortifications of Detroit. He also received further proofs that the Spaniards were seeking to undermine the loyalty of the settlers on the Cumberland and Tennessee, and that Colonel George Morgan, who had received a grant from the Spanish for a settlement on the west bank of the Mississippi, was holding out inducements for settlers disposed to expatriate themselves. This settlement of New Madrid, which Brissot called "a pitiful project of granting to those who shall establish themselves there the exclusive right of trading to New Orleans," proved a movement which Brissot thought in reality "the first foundation of the conquest of Louisiana."

Amid such anxieties as these, St. Clair went on with his negotiation till in the course of January, 1789, he concluded two treaties. The first was with the Six Nations, except the Mohawks, whom Brant had withdrawn. It confirmed the provi-

sions made at Fort Stanwix in 1784. The other was with the Wyandots and other western tribes, and confirmed the grants towards Lake Erie made at Forts McIntosh and Finney in 1785. In some respects the new agreements were more advantageous to the whites than the earlier ones. At all events, they confirmed all the grants made by the Indians north of the Ohio which Brant had labored to prevent.

St. Clair made proclamation of the result on January 24, 1789, and, as Parsons said, the treaty ended "to the satisfaction of all concerned." St. Clair himself was confident that the Indian confederations had been broken and "Brant had lost his influence," though, as the governor wrote to Knox, it was not possible for him to extend the bounds beyond the lines earlier agreed upon. St. Clair soon discovered that the tribes who were not "concerned" in it were far from being satisfied, and this meant the distrust of a large part of the twenty to forty thousand Indians — for the estimates are not very precise — scattered over the northwest. The Shawnees particularly were insolent and began their restless maraudings, which had a tendency for a while to check western immigration, — a condition not unacceptable to the British fur traders at Detroit.


Knox wrote to Washington a few months after the treaty was signed that the Indians possessed a right to the soil in these western lands, and it was only to be taken from them by their consent or a just war, — a principle easy enough to comprehend, and ever since maintained by the American courts; but the fact that there are always likely to be tribes or bands not uniting in agreements opened then, and has raised since, a question of title which has usually to be settled by force.


Meanwhile the fair fame of the Ohio Company was suffering from the remote results of the conduct of its chief promoters. When it was known what was meant by the sudden increase of the purchase which Cutler made, by which he obtained more than three times as much land as the company itself had intended to acquire, there was by no means among his associates a general approval of his purposes.

Cutler's furtive manœuvre in the purchase, in order to screen so many "principal characters of the country," gave place to questionable devices in subsequent efforts to make the most of

what had been acquired as the reward of collusion. It is not clear just how far Cutler was responsible for the extravagant representations which were used in Paris to promote a bewildering speculation and to dupe innocent enthusiasts. Brissot, in defending the promoters, claimed that these seductive descriptions were original, not with Cutler and his allied contrivers, but with Hutchins; still it is certain the company adopted them. The compact of the two companies, as represented by Duer and Cutler, professed that they were "jointly and equally concerned in Europe and America in the disposal of their lands," which connects Cutler on its face with any nefarious practices of Duer and his agents. Putnam, at least, as one of the trustees of the company, could hardly have been ignorant of much that was done, and was indeed actively engaged in some part of it. The object which these scheming confederates had in view was to draw into the Scioto speculation for their own gain, the public securities of the United States which were held in Europe, and to entice to the Ohio country those who were dismayed at the sudden murkiness which portended and accompanied the French Revolution. There was, moreover, a purpose to whet the eagerness to engage in such American ventures, now that Jefferson's consular convention with France was calculated to keep the United States subservient to that country, and that such participation was likely to prove advantageous to French commerce. The agent who was employed to accomplish this, after other agencies had failed, was Joel Barlow, a man now four-and-thirty years old, of Connecticut stock, who had just become known as one of the "Hartford wits," and the author of *The Vision of Columbus*. Sailing from New York, he reached Havre on June 24, 1788, and was soon at his task in Paris. In what this agent did, he may have exceeded the authority committed to him, and in such acts his principals are relieved from complete responsibility for what followed. The next year, 1789, Barlow formed a company in Paris, and sold to it three million acres on the Ohio, west of the seventeenth range. The payments for it were to run in part till

NOTE. — The map on the following pages is from a map, *Plan des Achats des Compagnies de l'Ohio et du Scioto, gravé par P. F. Tardieu*, and used by Barlow in Paris to advance his deceptive measures. It represents the "Seven Ranges" and the lands of the Ohio Company as "cleared and inhabited," and places the "Première Ville" as without the bounds of the Ohio Company, when it was within them. Marietta is called "Mariana."





1794. To advance the speculation, Barlow caused to be turned into French an overdrawn description of the country, which Cutler had printed at Salem in 1787, couched in language showing the inevitable vices and devices of land speculators. This translation was published at Paris in 1789, and it was accompanied by a map, prepared by the associates in America, as Todd, Barlow's biographer admits, though he acknowledges that he keeps the worst side of the transaction out of sight. This map aimed to further the deceit, begun in Cutler's advertising description, and if that was drawn from Hutchins, the false statements of the map, representing both in the Seven Ranges and in the Ohio and Scioto Company's land a settled country, were certainly the associates' and Barlow's fabrications. Barlow, it may be allowed, was not alone in hopeful cheer for the future, if he was deceptive in the present, when he claimed that there would be in twenty years a larger population beyond the mountains than was then on the Atlantic slope, and that, "sooner or later," the capital of the whole country must be in the centre of it, for Hamilton not long before, in the federal convention, had prophesied a doubling of the representation in Congress in five-and-twenty years.

If the business of the Scioto associates was a nefarious one, not a little of the mischance must be ascribed to the feverish condition of France. The infatuated Parisians were easily led to their ruin, and there is little evidence that they put Barlow's persuasions to any test, though existing caricatures, issued at the time, show that something like correct knowledge of the Ohio country existed, for one of them indicates a belief that the company were selling imaginary acres, and offering maps — as was the case — on which rocky deserts were represented as fertile plains and the territory was supplied with all the appurtenances of civilized life, while in but one corner of it a few pioneers were completely isolated in their incipient struggles with the wilderness.

If this Scioto venture, as we shall later see, proved a grievous misery, an experiment more creditable to those concerned had taken place in the Miami country. In August, 1787, John Cleve Symmes, who was one of the three judges associated with St. Clair in the government of the northwest, applied to the

land office for a million acres lying between the Great and Little Miami, offering terms the same as the Ohio Company had paid. The increasing demand for land had carried up the value of the military scrip, so that the completion of the transfer was not reached till May 15, 1788. Israel Ludlow, a New Jersey man, who had made the survey, found that the million acres supposed to lie between the two Miamis were diminished to something over a quarter of that extent. In the following July, Symmes started to reach his grant. He had fourteen four-horse wagons and about sixty persons in his train. With this equipment he landed from his barges at the Little Miami on September 22, 1788, accompanied by Ludlow, Denman, and Filson, names associated with the beginnings of this venture. Here, on a site opposite to the spot where, coming from the Kentucky mountains, the Licking poured into the Ohio, they planned for a town, but before much could be done, the Indians prowled about in a hostile manner, and it was thought prudent to return to Limestone (Maysville), sixty miles up the river, on the Kentucky shore, where a settlement had been begun four years before. In November (1788), a party returned to the same spot and built a blockhouse. About Christmas, Denman, Ludlow, and another party left Limestone, and pushing their boats through the floating ice-cakes, they landed on December 28, on the same ground. Some eight hundred acres of the immediate region had been bought by Mathias Denman and two others, whom he admitted to the enterprise, for something less than two hundred and fifty dollars. In the party was John Filson, who was to employ his skill for surveying in laying out the streets of a town. It fell to Ludlow to take measurements, so as to find out where the purchased area began, at a spot twenty miles from the mouth of the Great Miami. Denman and Ludlow began to consider what name to give the projected settlement, and thought of Cincinnati, in commemoration of the society of which Washington was then the head; but Filson, who had been a schoolmaster, exercised his unpolished wits in fashioning a strange name. He was not quite sure which of the two endings to his conglomerated designation he preferred, *burg* or *ville*; but he had no doubt about the rest of the composition, and his pedantry prevailed. So Losantiville was adopted, signifying the town (*ville*) opposite

(*anti*) the mouth (*os*) of the Licking (*L*). When St. Clair later came upon the spot, he preferred Cincinnati, and the future city was saved a ridiculous designation. Filson, being soon killed by the Indians while venturing inland, was not destined to make a similarly bizarre combination of the city lines, and its streets were really laid out by Ludlow.

This and other settlements in the neighborhood assured, General Harmar sent a detachment to protect the colony, and on September 26, 1789, the troops began to erect a stockade on a reservation of fifteen acres. The post was named Fort Washington, and in December Harmar, accompanied by about three hundred men out of the six hundred in his department, arrived and established there his headquarters. Cincinnati, under such military protection, outstripped the other neighboring settlements on the Great and Little Miami, and soon became the county seat.

The use that was to be made of the Mississippi and its eastern affluents had now become a burning political problem. The strenuous contention which Franklin had made in 1783 to secure the main current of that river as a boundary of the young Republic had brought its sequel. The Ohio, which had already become the main avenue to the Kentucky and Cumberland regions, was now the principal approach to the new settlements on the northern banks. So long as the British retained the lake posts, the Ohio was to have no rival as a western route. Washington, soon after he became President, had addressed himself to this perplexing question. In October, 1789, he had asked St. Clair to investigate the portages between the Ohio basin and Lakes Erie and Michigan, as forming a connection with the posts, which he hoped now to demand with the weight of a better organized government behind him. So he instructed Gouverneur Morris to sound the British authorities about entering upon a commercial treaty. He also directed him to reopen the question of the posts, while Hamilton intimated to the British agent in New York that his government need no longer fear that the United States did not offer a stable administration to deal with.

While this matter was pending, the use of the Mississippi was

a more vital consideration for the west. The Ohio, from Pittsburg to the rapids at Louisville, had a course of ten hundred and seventy-four miles, as it was then reckoned. Hutchins had described it as carrying "a great uniformity of breadth, from four hundred to six hundred yards, except at its confluence with the Mississippi and for a hundred miles above it, where it is a thousand yards wide. For the greater part of the way it has many meanders amid rising ground upon both sides. . . . The height of the banks admit everywhere of being settled, as they are not liable to crumble away. . . . There is scarce a place between Fort Pitt and the rapids where a good road may not be made and horses employed in drawing up large barges against a stream remarkably gentle, except in high freshes."

A down voyage on the Ohio was easy and pleasant, barring the risk of the *savage* bullets, and the barges of the emigrants went on at three or four miles an hour in ordinary stages of the water; but their progress was accelerated to double that speed in the spring freshets. The return voyage was altogether trying. Any plan of an ocean commerce for the West by an outlet in the Gulf of Mexico presented so serious an obstacle in the stemming of this current that the canal companies of Virginia derived their chief impulse from this obstruction in a rival route.

From New Orleans to Louisville, now a town of some sixty dwellings, boats of forty tons, manned by eighteen and twenty hands, could hardly accomplish the trip in less than eight or ten weeks, — a voyage which the first steamboat which accomplished it made, in 1815, in five-and-twenty days. It was a serious question if any method could be devised to overcome this obstinate current so as to reduce this time. There were those who contended that some scheme of artificial propulsion, such as Rumsey and Fitch were now experimenting with, would yet reduce the cost of transportation on this up-voyage to a tenth of the expense of carriage by land and water from Philadelphia to the same point. When Cutler had tried to impress the susceptible public by that vein of prophecy which blinded the poor settlers of Gallipolis, he added: "The current down the Ohio and Mississippi for heavy articles that suit the Florida and West India markets . . . will be more loaded than any stream on earth. . . . It is found by late experiments that sails

are used to great advantage against the current of the Ohio, and it is worthy of observation that, in all probability, steam-boats will be found to be of infinite service in all our river navigation." Cutler himself had had hopes of substituting the screw for oars in the ordinary manual labor of the boats. In August, 1788, he had tried an experiment on the Ohio, with the help of Tupper, in which he claimed to have "succeeded to admiration" in propelling a boat by a screw worked by hand.

If this question of artificial propulsion was one factor in the Mississippi question, there was another in the opposition of Spain to the claim of the West to seek the ocean by the Gulf of Mexico, and Jay was soon aware that Spain "did not mean to be restricted to the limits established between Britain and the United States." In May, 1785, Gardoqui had come to negotiate a treaty of commerce in behalf of Spain. In conferences which he later had with Jay, it was proposed that the United States should abandon for twenty-five years all claims to descend the Mississippi to the Gulf in recompense for the commercial privileges which Spain, on those terms, was disposed to grant. Rufus King recounted the arguments of those ready to accede to this demand. He believed that if the free navigation of the Mississippi was secured, the east and west must separate, for the commerce of the west would inevitably follow the Mississippi. To populate the west would indeed make a market for the western lands, but the disposing of them at this risk would pay too dearly for replenishing the treasury of the country. He acknowledged that the cry for the Mississippi was a popular one, but to insist on the point was a sure way to a war with Spain, and such a conflict, with a probable loss of territory and the fisheries, was too great a risk. Edward Rutledge of South Carolina told Jay that "the majority of those with whom I have conversed believed that we should be benefited by a cession of it [the Mississippi] to Spain for a limited time."

Jay himself was ready to accede to the demand of Spain, but on bringing it to the attention of Congress, in August, 1786, it was apparent that the country had become clearly divided on the issue, and there was great heat in the controversy. The members from the South and West, with few such exceptions as Rutledge, insisted on opening that river in opposition to the

commercial classes of the North, which valued the professed opportunities of trade even at the cost which Spain demanded. Otto wrote to Vergennes in September, 1786, that he feared the heated opposition of the two sections would lead to open advocacy of disunion. Jay's purposes had aroused Virginia. On March 1, 1787, Randolph wrote to Madison: "The occlusion of the Mississippi will throw the western settlers into an immediate state of hostility with Spain. If the subject be canvassed, it will not be sufficient to negative it merely, but a negative with some emphasis can alone secure Mr. Henry to the objects of the convention at Philadelphia." Mason said in the federal convention in July: "Spain might for a time deprive the west of their natural outlet for their productions, yet she will, because she must, finally yield to their demands." Henry Lee, in August, when it seemed that Jay might carry his point, wrote to Washington: "The moment our western country becomes populous and capable, they will seize by force what may have been yielded by treaty." In October, Lafayette said to Jay: "In a little time we must have the navigation, one way or the other, which I hope Spain may at last understand." In December, Madison, observing as Randolph had done, represented to Washington that Patrick Henry, heretofore a warm advocate of the federal cause, was now become cold because of Jay's project, and was likely, if Congress acceded, to go over to the other side. Monroe and Grayson, to avoid a rupture, were inclined to compromise, so as to agree with Gardoqui that exports from the west should have free passage by the Mississippi, while imports should enter the Atlantic ports.

As the months went on, the feeling in sympathy with the west increased. Jefferson wrote of Jay's project in January, 1787, as "a relinquishment of five parts out of eight of the territory of the United States; an abandonment of the fairest subject for the payment of our public debts, and the chaining of those debts on our own necks." If, by virtue of this desertion of the west, he added, "they declare themselves a separate people, we are incapable of a single effort to retain them." In April, Harmar, at the rapids of the Ohio, found the question "the greatest subject of discourse," and the opinion prevailed there that, if the Spanish demands were met, it would be "the greatest of grievances." The Spaniards were warned that their

obstinacy might throw the western people into the arms of England, who could offer them the St. Lawrence as an outlet. Brissot said that if Spain would only open the Mississippi, "New Orleans would become the centre of a lucrative commerce." Brissot believed Spain would do this, except that she feared "the communication of those principles of independence which the Americans preach wherever they go."


By February, 1787, Jay's party in Congress showed signs of weakening, and later, when New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island deserted him, Jay abandoned all hope. But Spain was firm for an exclusive use of the river, and the time was only put off when the question would come to an issue. Virginia might resolve, as her Assembly did on November 12, 1787, that the free use of streams leading to the sea was guaranteed "by the laws of God and man," but something more than legislative votes was necessary to secure the boon. There was a lingering suspicion that England, at the peace, had so readily yielded the western country because she was sure it would eventually involve the new Republic in controversy with Spain, and rumors of a coming conflict were, as it now turned out, constantly in the air. Harmar wrote in January, 1788, to the secretary of war: "I very much question whether the Kentucky and Cumberland people and those below will have the audacity to attempt to seize Natchez and New Orleans. I know of no cannon and the necessary apparatus which they have in their possession to carry on such an expedition." It was at the time evident that though Kentucky had something like a hundred thousand population, the wiser course for attaining success was to bide the time when Spain and western Europe were embroiled in a war.

The question, particularly in Virginia, entered into the discussions over the adoption of the federal constitution, which, now that Massachusetts had adopted it, trusting to the future for amendments, was in a fair way to become the law of the land. Madison contended, in the debates in Richmond, that the constitution, by creating a strong government, would render the opening of the Mississippi certain. Patrick Henry doubted it much. "To preserve the balance of American power," he said, "it is essentially necessary that the right to the Mississippi should be secured." The distrust which Jay's purpose had

created was hard to eradicate. "This affair of the Mississippi," said Jefferson to Madison in June, 1789, "by showing that Congress is capable of hesitating on a question which proposes a clear sacrifice of the western to the maritime States, will with difficulty be obliterated." In a well-known letter which Rufus Putnam wrote to Fisher Ames in 1790, that leader of the Marietta settlement strove to show how nothing but necessity could wean the West from the East, while the seaboard towns must be the natural market for the western products; but to preserve this mutual dependence, the Ohio region must be sustained by Congress in its demand for the free navigation of the Mississippi, and he urges Ames to press Congress to that conclusion.

A second factor in the Mississippi problem was some method, as already indicated, of stemming its current by artificial means. We have seen in the preceding chapter that, in 1784, Rumsey had gained the approbation of Washington for a mechanical method of using setting-poles in pushing boats upstream. Very soon after this, he had grasped a notion of using steam for power, as indeed William Henry of Lancaster had suggested to Andrew Ellicott as early as 1776. Rumsey's new notion was to use this power in forcing water out of the stern which had been taken in at the bow, and in this way to propel the boat. In the autumn of 1784, the legislatures of Virginia and Maryland had granted him the exclusive use of the invention in their waters. At the same time (November) he communicated his plans to Washington, but they did not gain his full confidence. On March 10 of the next year (1785), he wrote to Washington: "I have quite convinced myself that boats may be made to go against the current of the Mississippi or Ohio rivers . . . from sixty to a hundred miles a day."

It is difficult to reconcile all the conflicting statements circulated and vouched for by Rumsey and his rival, John Fitch, each claiming priority in the use of steam. It is certain that in March, 1785, Fitch, who had traveled much in the western country, and was countenanced by Hutchins, professed with some little reserve to Patrick Henry that his knowledge of the northwest was not equaled by that of any other man, and that he intended to put his knowledge to use in the construction of a map of that region, which he soon actually executed, cutting



NOTE. — The above cut is a sketch from Fitch's map. The dot-and-dash line is the boundary on Canada. The dash line defines the western part of Pennsylvania. The dot lines show the bounds of the proposed States under the ordinance of 1784. There are various legends on the map in the places indicated by the capital letters, thus: —

A. A map of the northwest parts of the United States of America.

B. The several divisions on the N. W. of the Ohio is the form which that country is to be laid off into States according to an ordinance of Congress of May the 20th, 1785.

C. The author presents this to the public as the production of his leisure hours, and flatters himself that altho' it is not perfect, few capital errors will be found in it. He has not attempted to take the exact meanders of the WATERS, but only their general course. In forming this map he acknowledges himself to have been indebted to the ingenious labours of *Thomas Hutchins* and *Will^m M^cMurray, Esq^r*. But from his own surveys and observations he was led to hope he could make considerable improvements on those and all that have gone before him. How far he has succeeded is now submitted to the impartial public by their very hble serv^t, JOHN FITCH.

the copper himself, and working off the copies in a hand-press of his own construction. He had hopes that, by traversing the country and selling his maps, he could obtain what money he needed to carry out a project which seems very soon afterwards to have entered his mind. He later claimed that when the conception of using steam to propel a boat against the current of the western waters dawned upon him, he had not heard that any one had ever broached the idea. The scheme, when he advanced it, did not altogether commend itself to those who had had experience with the Ohio and Mississippi currents, and Jacob Yoder, who, it appears, was the first to take a boat with merchandise to New Orleans, had expressed his distrust. Fitch, with his earnest vigor, set to work on a model, and before long had it afloat on a little stream in Pennsylvania. It was a boat propelled by paddle-wheels. On August 29, he wrote to the president of Congress that he had invented a machine to facili-

D. To THOMAS HUTCHINS, *Esqr., Geographer to the United States*. Sir: It is with the greatest diffidence I beg leave to lay at your feet a very humble attempt to promote a science of which you are so bright an ornament. I wish it were more worthy your patronage. Unaccustomed to the business of engraving, I could not render it as pleasing to the eye as I would have wished. But, as I flatter myself, will be easily forgiven by a gentleman, who knows how to distinguish between form and substance in all things. I have the honor to be, sir, your very hble servt, JOHN FITCH.

E. The falls of Niagara are at present in the middle of a plane about five miles back from the summit of the mountain, over which the waters once tumbled, we may suppose. The action of the water in a long course of time, has worn away the solid rock and formed an immense ditch which none may approach without horror. After falling perpendicular 150 feet (as some have computed) it continues to descend in a rapid seven miles further to the Landing place.

F. Copper ore in great abundance found here.

G. The falls of St. Anthony exhibit one of the grandest spectacles in nature; the waters dashing over tremendous rocks from a height of about forty feet perpendicular.

H. From Fort Lawrance and thence to the mouth of Sioto, a westerly course to the Illinois is generally a rich level country abounding with living springs and navigable waters; the air pure and the climate moderate.

I. This country has once been settled by a people more expert in the art of war than the present inhabitants. Regular fortifications, and some of these incredibly large are frequently to be found. Also many graves or towers, like pyramids of earth.

J. Ploria's wintering ground.

K. On the Miamis are a large number of Indian towns, inhabited by Shawanoes, Delawares, Mingos, &c.

L. The lands on this lake are generally flat and swampy; but will make rich pasture and meadow land.

M. From Fort Lawrance to the mouth of Yellow Creek and northward to the waters of Lake Erie is generally a thin soil and broken land.

N. From the mouth of Sioto to Fort Lawrance, between that line and the Ohio, the soil is tolerable good; but generally much broken with sharp hills.

P. From the Pennsylvania line to Great Sandy, and thence a southwesterly course to the Carolina line, is generally very poor land and very mountainous, rocky and broken.

Q. The Kentucky country is not so level as it is generally represented to be, there being a range of hilly land, running thro' it N. E. & S. W.; also very deep valleys on the larg streams.

R. Ironbanks, settled in the year 80 and evacuated the same year.

The original map, from which this sketch is made, is in Harvard College library, and I have heard of but one other copy. A photograph of it, nearly full size, was taken for the late Judge C. C. Baldwin of Cleveland.

tate internal navigation, and laid his plans before that body. In September, he outlined his scheme to the American Philosophical Society, and eight or ten weeks later, on December 2, he offered a model for their consideration.

Meanwhile, Fitch had petitioned the Virginia Assembly for aid in pushing his invention, and Governor Henry entered into a bond with him, by which Fitch agreed that if he could sell a thousand copies of his map at six shillings each, he would exhibit his steamboat in Virginia, giving "full proof of the practicability of moving by the force of a steam engine . . . a vessel of not less than one ton burthen." This agreement was dated on November 16, 1785, and Fitch was to forfeit £350 if the conditions were not fulfilled. The maps were not sold, and he lost the aid of Virginia. He successively asked, but without avail, similar assistance from Pennsylvania, Maryland, and New Jersey. He had had before this, in September, an interview with Garδοqui. To induce the Spanish minister to patronize the scheme, he had set forth the future of the west under the influence of such an invention, and had given him a copy of his map. He had intimated, also, an alternative project of working his paddles by horses. Garδοqui sought first to secure an exclusive right to Spain in the results, and to this Fitch would not agree. He now resorted to forming a company in Philadelphia, where he had received the aid of a Dutch mechanic, Voight by name, and in the summer of 1786, he made some experimental trips with a new craft on the Delaware, attempting, on July 20, to use a screw, and doing better a week later with paddles. This furthered his plan of subscription, but when Franklin offered him a gratuity, instead of a subscription, he confesses he was stung to the quick. In December, 1786, he printed in the *Columbian Magazine* a description of his boat, with a cut of the little craft, and this still more animated the public interest. A new vessel, forty-five feet long, with upright paddles, was completed in the following May, 1787, and on August 22 he made an exhibition of it on the Delaware for the delectation of the members of the federal convention. This gave him some additional notoriety, and he announced a scheme of building a boat for lake use with two keels. He proposed, also, to edge its wheels with spikes, so that in winter it could be run on the ice at thirty miles an hour.

Though there is some discrepancy in evidence as to the date, it would seem that his final success was achieved in the spring of 1788, when he moved a vessel called the "Perseverance," of sixty tons burthen, for eight miles on the Schuylkill. Brissot, who saw the experiment, says that the power was exerted by "three large oars of considerable force, which were to give sixty strokes a minute." In July, he used stern paddles in a trial on the Delaware, and went twenty miles. Notwithstanding this, Fitch did not escape ridicule from the incredulous, and Brissot expresses some indignation "to see Americans discouraging him by their sarcasms."

The now active rivalry of Rumsey added personal bitterness to the controversy between them, as shown in a pamphlet which was printed. Rumsey, being as impecunious as his antagonist, had sought in the same way to get the assistance of the legislatures of some of the States. He claimed in his memorials that his boat could make twenty-five to forty miles a day against a strong current, using for the power a current of water taken in at the bow and ejected at the stern.

When Rumsey memorialized the Virginia Assembly in 1785, the project was thought chimerical, and gained no attention till Washington, to whom he had disclosed his method, gave him a certificate. It was not till the early winter of 1787 that he made a public trial of a boat, eighty feet long, on the Potomac, making three miles an hour on December 3, and four miles on December 11.

While Fitch was, by his experiments, creating some enthusiasm in Philadelphia in 1788, Rumsey was making promises in England, and foretelling the possibility of crossing the ocean in fifteen days. He died of apoplexy four years later (December 23, 1792), a disappointed man. Some abortive attempts had been made in Scotland by Miller in 1788, and by Symington in 1800, to solve the problem, but the first real success did not come till 1807, when Fulton ran the "Clermont" on the Hudson, and when, two years later (November, 1809), the "Accommodation" steamed from Montreal to Quebec in thirty-six hours of actual progress, having anchored on three nights.

CHAPTER XV.

THE SOUTHWEST INSECURE.

1783-1786.

THE peace of 1783 had brought no better security south of the Ohio than had been attained on the north of it.

In May, 1782, just as the English cabinet was making up its mind to grant the independence of the colonies, a Kentucky German, Jacob Yoder, had pushed off from Redstone on the Monongahela, in a big boat laden with flour, to risk the passage to New Orleans, and reap, if he could, some profit from his venture. He was fortunate. The Spanish authorities on the Mississippi were waiting then for the outcome of the war, and had no reason to stop this adventurous trader, who had successfully run the gauntlet of the Indians. He reached New Orleans in safety and sold his flour for furs. These skins he took to Havana, where he bartered them for sugar, which in turn he shipped to Philadelphia. With much money in his pocket, the result of his speculation, he recrossed the mountains to his Kentucky home.

Meanwhile, the negotiations at Paris were hurrying to a close, and when it became known that by a secret provision of that treaty, England and the States, in order to reconcile their discordant views, had agreed in any event to ignore the Spanish claim to territory above 31°, there was no chance of Yoder's venture being repeated, and such peaceful commerce soon gave place to stagnation on the river, only relieved by an occasional freebooting sally of the wild Cumberland frontiersmen, who wanted to get what sport and plunder they could out of harrying the Spanish settlements along the river. Cruzat, commanding at St. Louis, complained to Robertson of these lawless acts; but it was difficult to fasten responsibility anywhere, though the authorities at Nashborough labored to prevent such incursions.

For twelve years or more to come, Spain was to be the covert

enemy of the new Republic. All this while she was seeking to lure any who would act in concert with her, both among the wild tribes of the southwest and among the almost as wild frontiersmen of the outlying settlements of the confederacy and the later Union. Events seemed at times distinctly fashioned for her advantage. The whites in Georgia and along the Tennessee were recklessly invading the Indian lands, and inciting them to retaliate. Before the Revolutionary War had closed, it had seemed plain to Governor Harrison of Virginia that bounds must be agreed upon to restrain the white squatters, and he and Governor Martin of North Carolina had consulted in November, 1782, about appointing commissioners to settle a line. When Pickering, in April, 1783, was planning a peace establishment, he had provided for the southwest only a modest quarter of the eight hundred troops which he destined to garrison the exposed posts, as a protection against the dangers to be apprehended from "the Indians and the Spanish." As early as May 31, 1783, a treaty had been made at Augusta with the Cherokees, and later (November) with the Creeks, by which the Americans secured the title to a tract of land west of the Tugaloo River, but the result failed to secure the approval of the great body of those tribes; nor was the warlike faction of the Creeks won by other agreements, which had been made with the same tribe and the Chickasaws, in July and November. The Creeks and their Spanish backers were thus become a serious problem in the southwest.

The general peace of 1782 had been a vexatious one to the court at Madrid. Spain had not secured Gibraltar, as she had hoped to do, and matters on the Mississippi, with the understanding that existed between England and her now independent colonies, were no less a disappointment. Lafayette, who in the spring of 1783 had been in Madrid, wrote thence to Livingston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that he "could see that American independence gave umbrage to the Spanish ministry."

Before the war closed, Virginia had already pressed her claim to an extension to the Mississippi, where Clark had built Fort Jefferson, but North Carolina had never officially pushed her jurisdiction beyond the mountains till in May, 1783, her legislature by an act stretched her southern boundary by the parallel of $36^{\circ} 30'$ likewise to the Mississippi. This enactment

was not only a warning to Spain that her claim to the eastern bank of the Mississippi would be contested, but it also showed the people of the Holston and Cumberland valleys that they had not escaped the jurisdiction of the parent State in going westward to subdue the wilderness. Both of these settlements had steadily grown. There was perhaps a population of three thousand five hundred souls in the Cumberland district. The older communities along the Clinch and the Holston had begun to form some of those religious consolidations which the Methodist communion carries in its spreading circles, while the Scotch-Irish in southwestern Virginia and in the neighboring parts of Kentucky and Tennessee had set up the presbytery of Abingdon, an offshoot of the larger one of Hanover, which had been formed in 1749.

In this extension of her western jurisdiction North Carolina had not failed to reserve a certain tract of this territory for the use of the Indians; but she had done it of her own option, and without consulting the tribes. This was an arrogant act, which the Creeks quickly resented.

The Kentucky settlements between the Cumberland and the Ohio had, in March, 1783, been divided by the Virginia authorities into three counties. The principal seat of local business was at first placed at Harrodsburg, but later at Danville. These settlements showed signs of civil regularity which did not prevail to the south of them, and invited renewed immigration. This in some part pursued the Virginia path by the Cumberland Gap, following what was known as the Wilderness Road, which, however, was but a mere bridle trace for pack-horses. The larger part of the migration floated down the Ohio from Pittsburg, which had just been formally laid out as a town by the agents of the Penns, with a population of about a thousand. As a rule, however, the Virginia emigrant struck the Ohio ninety miles below, at Wheeling, and thereby avoided some of the difficulties of the shoaler water between that point and Pittsburg. In either case they disembarked, as had been the custom from the beginning, at Limestone, and thence made their way over a well-beaten road to the valleys of the Licking and Kentucky, not failing to remark how the buffalo had deserted their old traces, and taken to the less-frequented portions of the country. It is not easy to determine with accuracy the

extent of this inflow during the years immediately following the peace; but it has been reckoned as high as twelve or fifteen thousand a twelvemonth, with proportionate trains of pack-horses and cattle. These numbers included, doubtless, a due share of about four thousand European immigrants, who sought the States yearly.

Whenever these wanderers encountered the red man, it was not difficult for the new-comers to discover that, to the savage mind, the enforced transfer of allegiance from the English crown to the new Republic was a change that wronged and incensed the victims of it. To the military man, who was not an uncommon member of the new emigration and who had seen service under Bradstreet and Sullivan, this attitude of the Indian mind boded no little mischief.

The restless conditions of the tribes in the southwest offered to Miró, now the Spanish commander at New Orleans, an opportunity for conference and intrigue. The way was opened by the ceaseless endeavors of Alexander McGillivray to form a league of the southern tribes against the Americans, in order, with Spanish countenance and with a simultaneous revolt on the part of the northern tribes, to force the exposed settlers back upon the seaboard. The scheme was a daring one, and no such combination among the redskins had been attempted since the conspiracy of Pontiac. But McGillivray, with all his craft, had little of the powers of mind which the Ottawa chief had possessed, and his efforts fell short of even the temporary success which Pontiac had achieved. McGillivray was a half-breed Creek, whose mother was of a chief family of that nation. His father was a Scotchman. He had something of the Scotch hard-headedness, and had received an education by no means despicable. Adhering to the royal side in the late war, his property had been confiscated, and he was now adrift, harboring hatred towards the Americans, while he was not amiable towards the British, who had betrayed, as he claimed, himself and his race. As early as January 1, 1784, he had communicated with the Spanish commander at Pensacola, with a proposition for a Spanish alliance. He also intimated the possibility of detaching the over-mountain settlements from the confederacy, maintaining that the west contained two classes of discontents, who might well be induced to play into the hands of

Spain. One of these included the tribes, indignant at the desertion of them by Great Britain. The other was the body of Tories now tracking over the mountains to begin a new career, mingled with runaways escaping the federal tax-gatherers.

On such representations Miró was ready in May, 1784, to hold conferences with these southwestern tribes. On the 22d, he met representatives of the Chickasaws, Alabamas, and Choctaws at Mobile, and sanctioned a treaty of friendship and mutual support, while he enjoined upon them the necessity of refraining from taking scalps or otherwise maltreating their prisoners. On the 30th, he met McGillivray and a large body of Creeks, Seminoles, and Chickamaugas at Pensacola, and entered into a like agreement. By the 6th of June, this half-breed chieftain was on his way back to the tribal centres, bearing promises of full supplies and munitions from the Spanish posts. The desultory conflict which followed through a course of years, known as the Oconee war, was on the whole a great disappointment to McGillivray, for he never succeeded for any length of time in making the Creeks and their abettors maintain a solid front for the task which he had set.

While this savage warfare kept the frontiers anxious, the sinister purposes of Spain were only partly veiled in her attempts to aid the Indians. The federal government knew perfectly, as Pickering had intimated, that the enmity of Spain was a constant factor in this southwestern problem. Lafayette, in February, 1783, had written to Livingston from Cadiz that "among the Spanish, the Americans have but few well-wishers, and their government will insist upon a pretended right all along the left shore of the Mississippi."

During the summer of 1783, there were constant attempts of the Spaniards to stop American boats trading on the Mississippi, and it was believed that the renewed activity of the Indian depredations along the Ohio was by their instigation. To prevent these evils, the Kentucky people looked to the parent State in vain. They soon discovered that with military movements directed from Williamsburg, as the militia laws required, delays interposed that were dangerous, while self-protection could not allow hesitancy of action. This led them to consider the advantages of autonomy, while its necessity and justice were not unrecognized in the tide-water region of Virginia. Wash-

ington was outspoken, and favored confining the western limits of the old State to a meridian cutting the mouth of the Great Kanawha. He revealed to Hamilton his anxiety when he told him that, unless such concessions were made, it would take but the touch of a feather to turn the western people to other masters. Jefferson wrote to Madison that Virginia ought to let Kentucky go, and that promptly, lest all the over-mountain people should unite, when Congress would sustain their claim, to make the mountains instead of the Kanawha the boundary. He thought it no small advantage for Virginia to have the hundred miles and more of mountains beyond that river as a barrier between the two States.


Filson, a Pennsylvania schoolmaster who had turned surveyor, had lately run through these Kentucky settlements and estimated their population at about thirty thousand. His map, made at this time, shows fifty-two settlements and eighteen scattered houses. He had also just published an account of Kentucky, in which he had had the aid of Daniel Boone, David Todd, and James Harrod. Boone had also connected the early days of the pioneers with the present in a sketch of his life, which Filson had taken down at the dictation of his friend.

The movement which McGillivray was inciting at the south grew to look ominous. In this crisis Colonel Benjamin Logan assembled his militia captains at Danville to take measures for protection. This body of counselors was law-abiding enough to shrink from any movement not purely defensive, but their military organization, in the absence of civil control, opportunely offered the best initiative towards a representative convention to be held at Danville on December 27. Still holding to the military divisions of the people, it was directed that a single delegate from each company should be elected to attend. When the convention met, the question of withdrawing from the government of Virginia divided the conference. In this uncertainty it was readily seen that independence was rather a civil than military question. Accordingly, a new notice was issued, recommending the people, by delegates, to be assembled at Danville in May, 1785, to take the problem into full consideration.


NOTE. — The map on the two following pages is the principal part of Filson's map of Kentucky.




This Map
KENTUCKE,
Drawn from actual Observations,
is presented with the most perfect respect
to the Honorable the Congress of the
United States of America, and
to his Excellency George Washington
our Commander in Chief of their
Army. By their
Order, Lieutenant
John Filson.



The Stream of the Ohio is in every part Moderate, except the Rapids



H. Sinks
 S. Salt
 T. Town
 D. Dwell
 W. Water
 R. Road



While this Kentucky movement was making progress under the forms of law, more headlong action was taken beyond the mountains of North Carolina, which for a while threatened serious complications. That State, in her Bill of Rights in 1776, had anticipated the formation of one or more other States in due time out of her western territory. There had been laid, as we have seen, in this over-mountain region, the foundations of two separate communities. They were destined to be united in one commonwealth, but they held at this time little communication with each other, though the more distant was sprung, as it were, from the loins of the nearer. The one in which James Robertson was the leading spirit was scattered in the valley of the Cumberland, tributary to Nashborough, or Nashville, as it was now becoming the fashion to call the collection of huts which bore that name. Miró had already his eye upon Robertson as a likely ally in his future schemes, while yet he was sending him friendly messages, explaining how he was doing what he could to restrain the savages who were raiding the Cumberland frontiers. The time was not yet ripe for the Spanish intriguer to show his hand in this region.

Farther east, the country originally settled from Virginia, and lying just below the southwestern corner of that State, was the valley in which the Watauga Association had moulded a self-centred community. With its growth the North Carolina legislature had divided the region into four counties, — Washington, Green, Sullivan, and Davidson, and all but the last were infected with the same unrest as was pervading Kentucky. These settlements were separated from the support of North Carolina by the mountains on the east, while in the west it was a long distance beyond the Cumberland Gap before the more western communities were reached. Their closest ties were with their neighbors across the Virginia line on the north, and near it their principal town, Jonesboro', was built. This Watauga region — as a whole it might be called — lay between the Alleghany and Cumberland mountains, and was drained by the Clinch, Holston, and other tributaries of the Tennessee. It was exposed towards the southwest by the course of that river, along which it was open to inroads of the Cherokees, and particularly of the Chickamaugas, the most relentless branch of that tribe. It was also in this direction that the settlements looked to

increase their territory, and they had already begun to extend beyond the agreed allotments by the tribes, and were building stockades in close proximity to the Indian villages. The peace of the valley was still farther jeopardized by the occupation in February, 1784, of a tract of territory near the great bend of the Tennessee in the present State of Alabama, under a movement led by Sevier and Blount. The position was too advanced for support, and had soon to be abandoned under the savage threats. With this aggressive temper, the authorities of North Carolina had little sympathy, and the frontiersmen complained that the legislature made no appropriations for gifts with which to appease the plundered savages.

At this juncture the state Assembly at Hillsborough, in June, 1784, voted to cede to the confederacy their charter lands lying west of the mountains and extending to the Mississippi. This cession covered twenty-nine million acres, and the act gave Congress two years in which to accept it. The report of this action, spreading over the mountains, was all that was necessary to arouse the rebellious spirit of a people who felt that without their concurrence they were cast off by the parent State and left to shift for themselves. It was to them, at least, apparent that if they were to find any protection against their hostile neighbors, in the interval before the acceptance by Congress of the cession, it was to be in their own vigilance.

In this state of affairs a convention met at Jonesboro' on August 23, 1784, and organized under the presidency of Sevier. It was agreed by delegates of the three counties already named, and by a two-thirds vote, that they be erected at once into an independent State. When this decision was known to the rabble of hunters and woodsmen who surrounded the courthouse, there were shouts of turbulent joy. The convention framed an address, setting forth the plan and advantages of independence, and determined on holding another convention in November, to adopt a constitution. It was decided to appeal to Congress for countenance and advice as to the proposed constitution. There was a disposition to induce the contiguous part of Virginia to join in the movement. This was a note which alarmed the authorities at Williamsburg, and Patrick Henry saw in it the finger of the Spanish devil.

While these things were taking place at Jonesboro', the legis-

lature at New Berne, taking alarm, repealed the act of cession. This reversal for a while tempered the impetuosity of the Separatists in the valley, and when a new body of delegates convened in November, it was found that the party for independence had lost strength, and the convention broke up amid a confusion of aims. Governor Martin took advantage of the seeming dispersion of the rebellious party, and invested Sevier with a commission and authority to lead the disaffected back to their loyalty. In December, accordingly, we find the man who had been counted upon to perfect the revolutionary scheme, and who was yet to head the revived movement, doing his best to hold the people to obedience to the laws.

So the year 1784 ended with great uncertainty as to the political future of the three leading communities west of the mountains. In Kentucky, the soberer sense of the people plainly deprecated any hasty action. In the Holston region it seemed as if a division of public opinion would delay action, at least. At Nashville, in its remote situation, more connected with Kentucky than with the Holston region, there was nothing as yet to incite alarm.

How far these initial measures for independence were made with Spanish concurrence is not clear; but it is not probable that Miró had as yet ventured upon any direct assurance of support. The Spanish authorities, however, were certainly cognizant of McGillivray's aims and hopes.

The Americans, when the United States made Oliver Pollock its agent at Havana, had already lost a vigilant friend at New Orleans, who might now have divined what time has since disclosed. He left the Mississippi for his new mission indebted to the royal treasury in the sum of \$151,696, which he had borrowed to assist the American cause in the days when Spain was playing with the sympathies of the struggling colonies. At this time, while Virginia was perplexed with her western problem, Pollock was imprisoned in Havana during eighteen months for debts which he had incurred in her behalf, a rigor doubtless instigated by the changed feelings which Spain was harboring towards the new Republic.

There was little doubt in the minds of Congress that a strug-

gle with Spain was imminent for the control of the Mississippi. Lafayette, who had written from Madrid such unassuring opinions of the Spanish temper, had now returned to the States, and in Baltimore he disclosed to Madison his belief in the determination of the Madrid cabinet to stand by what they deemed their interest in the matter. Madison was so impressed both with Lafayette's assurances and with the absolute necessity of thwarting Spain in her purpose, that he saw no way of avoiding a war except for France and Britain to intervene jointly, and profit by the trade that the free navigation of the Mississippi would bring them. America's demand, as Madison formulated it, was not only for the free use of the river, but for an entrepôt below 32°, for he felt assured the west would never consent to shift the lading of their descending boats to sea-going vessels higher up the river. Free trade down the stream would make, he contended, New Orleans one of the most flourishing emporiums of the world, and Spain ought to see it. The French in New Orleans, he again affirmed, cannot be denied this trade by their Spanish masters.

While all these views were common, Congress on June 3, 1784, instructed its diplomatic agents that the navigation of the Mississippi must in any event be rendered free.

During 1785, events took a more decided color from Spanish diplomacy. The opening of the Mississippi became with the possession of the northern posts the two objects nearest the heart of the west. In January, Madison said discouragingly, "We must bear with Spain for a while," and trust to the future to develop a sale for our western lands through the opening of the Mississippi. "All Europe," he added, "who wishes to trade with us, knows that to make these western settlements flourish is their gain." To such terms Lafayette replied: "Spain is such a fool that allowances must be made." Just what these allowances might be were soon to be disclosed, when Don Diego de Gardoqui, with the ultimatum of Spain, arrived in Philadelphia in May, 1785. He did not present his credentials till July 2, and at that time Jay was authorized by Congress to treat with him.

Meantime, the rumors from the west made people fearful of they knew not what sudden developments. It was heard with

alarm that Georgia had sent messengers to New Orleans, demanding the surrender of Natchez, only to be rebuffed by Miró with a profession that he had no authority to comply. It was not this so much as the assurance of a single State in exercising diplomatic functions in violation of the federal compact that seemed serious. It was well known that Washington did not share the impatience of his southern brethren about the Mississippi. He looked upon delay in the settlement with Spain as likely to promote what he deemed of more importance, — the development of trade channels across the mountains. In June, 1785, he wrote to Marbois: "The emigration to the waters of the Mississippi is astonishingly great, and chiefly of a description of people who are not very subordinate to the laws and constitution of the State they go from. Whether the prohibition, therefore, of the Spaniards is just or unjust, politic or impolitic, it will be with difficulty that people of this class can be restrained in the enjoyment of natural advantages." Again, on September 7, Washington wrote to Rochambeau: "I do not think the navigation of the Mississippi is an object of great importance to us at present," and he added that it might be left till the full-grown west would have it "in spite of all opposition."

Apprehensions of difficulty prevailed, when, on July 26, Jay began his negotiations with Gardoqui. The American secretary very soon saw that the Spanish agent would interpose few direct hindrances to a treaty of commerce whereby the Atlantic ports would profit. Jay knew that there was nothing which the country needed more than a season of business prosperity. Taxes were burdensome, and those who could were flying across the mountains to escape the gatherers of them. To pay such demands and to appease England by meeting her claims for debts, commercial opportunities were needed. But it soon became evident to Jay that Spain had no intention of enriching the Americans except by acquiring corresponding advantages to herself, and these were the best security for her claims on the Mississippi in the absolute control of its navigation. To meet such demands Jay could do nothing while Congress adhered to the vote, which we have seen was passed a year before, that in any event the Great River must be left open. Nothing which Jay could suggest weakened the firmness of Gardoqui

on this point. So there grew in the American's mind the belief that all would go well if Congress would consent to yield the Mississippi for a term of years — say twenty-five — without prejudice to later claims. This, he thought, would certainly satisfy the Northern States, which were to gain most by commercial privileges, while the South and West might agree that any imperative demand for the free navigation of the river would not arise for a generation. This was known to be Washington's view of the exigency. Virginia had just appointed commissioners to open a wagon road from the head of James River to the Kanawha falls, and beyond to Lexington, in Kentucky. Washington claimed that it was likely to be cheaper to carry western produce through the mountains to tide-water than down the Mississippi, if it started from any point east of the Kanawha, or even from the falls of the Ohio. Congress, hesitating in such a belief, on August 25 instructed Jay to close no agreement with Gardoqui without their approval.

While the thrifty German and slovenly Celt were raising more flour in Kentucky than could possibly be consumed, there was small chance that any scheme of closing the great channel of western commerce for a lifetime would find favor. Nor, indeed, could any plan of repressing the marvelous expansion of the west be acceded to. Before Jay began his negotiations, he had written to Lafayette that this western increase was going on "with a degree of rapidity heretofore unknown," and that it would continue, "notwithstanding any attempts of anybody to prevent it."

The prevalence of views in the East and in Congress antagonistic to western progress, as they were deemed, could but arouse the latent spirit of independence which we have seen existed in more than one over-mountain region. They particularly aroused a recent comer to Kentucky, who was gifted with all that makes for subtle leadership and unscrupulous political daring, — a smooth affability, a cunning mind, a ready speech, and a fascinating address. The possessor of these insinuating qualities was James Wilkinson, an officer of the Revolution, who, in 1784, had resigned the adjutant-generalship of Pennsylvania and had appeared in Lexington. His reputation, even then, was not without tarnish, but he had left suspicions behind, and had thrown himself at once into mercantile life. The men

he dealt with had little cause to inquire sharply into a character which Roosevelt not undeservedly calls "the most despicable in our history." Wilkinson was soon vigilant as a speculator in skins and salt, — sharp enough, doubtless, but where everybody about him was a rasping bargainer, he was not conspicuous for moral delinquencies. He wrote to a friend, whom he had left in Philadelphia: "If I can hold up cleverly for a couple of years, I shall lay the foundation of opulence for posterity." He claimed to the same correspondent that "his local credit and consequence, vanity apart, were not inconsiderable." He always had had a belief in his star.

At the time when delegates met in May, 1785, to consider the question of independency, Wilkinson was too ill to attend, and we very likely owe it to his absence that the convention persisted in holding to constitutional grounds, and agreed to solicit the permission of Virginia to become a separate State. It also took an advanced stand in political policy when the members declared for equal representation and manhood suffrage, as against the Virginia practice of equal county representation irrespective of population. In order to make the circulation of an address effective, it was also determined in the convention to set up a printing-press.

It was Wilkinson's boast that determinate action was delayed till another meeting in August, in order that the members might have the advantage of his presence. When, on August 14, the new convention met, he made a passionate demand for an immediate unconditional separation from Virginia. He claimed that he had been at the start one of those adverse to independence; but that the renegade spirit in Congress on the Mississippi question had convinced him of the necessity of such action. Before the members assembled, he had again advised his distant friend that "free trade out of the Mississippi would push Kentucky most rapidly. Our products are so prodigious," he added, "that our exports would exceed our imports fivefold. We are unanimously ready to wade to it through blood." He closed his fierce prophecy with a suggestion that the Mississippi would be no sooner cleared than the Spanish mines beyond it "might be possessed with the greatest facility." With these views he entered the convention, but its members resisted his violent urgency, and deferred to another convention the final settlement of the question.

When this healthy and moderate action was known at the east, Madison recognized in gratification that "the first instance of the dismemberment of a State had been conducted in a way to form a salutary precedent." Washington stood less for their order of going, and was prepared to meet the people of Kentucky "upon their own ground, and draw the best line and make the best terms, and part good friends."

To turn to the people of the Holston. They proved to have shared only a temporary calm after their convention had dissolved. Sevier had been unable to uproot the latent passion for independence. Early in the year (1785), the Separatist leaders had petitioned Congress for the right of setting up their new State between the Alleghany River and the meridian of Louisville. Its northern bounds were to run from the junction of the Great Kanawha and Greenbrier and along the 37° parallel. Its southern were to be by the 34°. This would have given them a large part of Kentucky, and have carried their territory well down to the bend of the Tennessee. With these rather magnificent visions, their Assembly met at Greenville, now selected as a capital, and in March began their work, in a rude log cabin, which had an earth floor and a clapboard roof. This hasty body stood for a population which it was supposed numbered about five-and-twenty thousand. But it was a community with no other currency than that supplied by fox and mink skins, varied with such agricultural products as could be passed from hand to hand. With this money they proposed to pay their civil servants, and, upon an apportioned salary of such products, Sevier, now in the headlong stream like everybody else, was chosen governor. Their new chief magistrate very soon sent a letter to Congress asking for recognition, but it was unheeded, as Governor Martin had warned them it would be. Patrick Henry, alarmed at their territorial ambition, feared that it would arouse the tribes and cause impediments in the Spanish negotiations. Meanwhile, as governor, he cautioned the State's Indian agent not to commit Virginia to any participation in coming events.

In May, Congress urged North Carolina to renew her cession and thus place the territory of the Separatists under federal control; but a state pride declined to part with any portion of

her territory with a rebellion unquelled. On the last of May, Sevier's people made a covenant with such of the Cherokees as could be enticed, and got a questionable title to lands south of the French Broad, and east of the ridge which parted the waters of the Tennessee River. They invaded without any such pretended right other lands of the Cherokees and Creeks. Such acts added an Indian war to their other difficulties.

Against all these usurped functions Governor Martin issued a manifesto; and in June Sevier replied, taking the ground that the Separatist movement had followed upon their being cast off from the parent State by the act of cession, and no revocation of that cession could undo their action.

In September, 1785, Benjamin Franklin, sharing now with Washington the highest veneration of their countrymen, had landed in Philadelphia on his return from his long and distinguished service in Europe. He soon received a letter which Sevier had written to him in July, in which the Separatist governor communicated the purpose of the Holston communities to perpetuate Franklin's signal name as that of their new commonwealth, and asked his counsel and support. Sevier at much the same time had written a propitiatory letter to the Virginia authorities; but in neither case did the new magistrate elicit what he wanted. Indeed, the struggling and unkempt little republic was to find few friends outside its own limits. In October, 1785, Massachusetts had moved in Congress and Virginia had favored a motion that Congress would support any State against a secession of a part of it; but the members were not quite prepared to act. Patrick Henry was at the same time warning the Virginia delegates of the dangerous proximity of this rebellious State. If Congress hesitated, the Virginia Assembly promptly made it high treason for any attempt to dismember her territory in such a revolutionary way, and authorized the governor to employ the military power of the State in suppressing any such movement.

While the future of the south frontiers was uncertain through all these movements, Congress made an effort to act in a national capacity and soothe the irritated tribes. In the preceding March, that body had authorized the appointment of commissioners to treat with the Indians. As the summer wore on,

rumors of war were frequent, and in September, Colonel Martin, now living on the Holston, as the Indian agent of Virginia, had informed Patrick Henry that the southern Indians were preparing, in conjunction with the Wabash tribes at the north, to raid the frontiers. There was need of prompt action, and in October the commissioners sought to open negotiations with the Creeks at Galphinton, but those wary savages kept aloof. In the latter part of November, 1785, they succeeded better with the Cherokees, and met nearly a thousand of them at Hopewell on the Keowee (November 18-28). It was a principle with these national agents to act as if no private or state agreements had already been made with the tribes. It was not unexpected, therefore, that both North Carolina and Georgia complained that lands which they had reserved as bounties for their soldiers, in the late war, were recklessly acknowledged to belong to the Cherokees. The Indians showed by a map that the territory which they had not parted with covered more or less of Kentucky, Tennessee, the Carolinas, and Georgia. It included both the Henderson purchase and the lands of the Cumberland communities, but they were not disposed to displace their occupants. The line, as agreed upon, was to run from the mouth of Duck River (where it joins the Tennessee) to the ridge separating the Cumberland and Tennessee valleys, and on leaving this water-parting it was to strike the Cumberland, forty miles above Nashville. The whites within the Indian territory were to have six months to remove; but those who were living — some three thousand in number — between the French Broad and the Holston were to remain till their case could be adjudicated by Congress. The treaty included a formal acknowledgment of the supremacy of the United States, and made it obligatory upon the Indians to give prompt notice of any intended hostilities of the Spaniards.

These were the conditions when, late in 1785, a new convention met at Greenville to adopt a permanent constitution for the new State. One Samuel Houston drafted the document which was first considered. It gave the name of Frankland to the State, and was in various ways too ideal for a practical people. It has only very recently been brought entire to the attention of scholars. It called for a single legislative chamber, made land-owning necessary to office-holding, but even this

qualification must be unaccompanied by membership in the professions of law, medicine, and theology, while an adhesion to Presbyterian forms of church government was required. A small majority settled the question both of rejecting this constitution and substituting substantially the existing one of North Carolina. The final vote displaced the name of Frankland and adopted that of Franklin.

And so the year 1785 closed with no improvement in the affairs of the western country.

The year 1786 was perhaps the most hopeless of the long collapse which followed upon the peace, — hopeless not so much from accumulating misfortunes, as from an aimless uncertainty. The affairs of the several States were more critical, or were thought to be more critical, than the condition of the whole confederacy. So each commonwealth demanded at home the services of its best men, and sent its less serviceable citizens to Congress. The business of that body lagged through the lack of assiduity in its members. A scant attendance either blocked work entirely, or, on the spur of an unlooked-for quorum, impulse rather than wisdom directed their counsels. Throughout the States the paper money problem disquieted trade, and the famous case of Trevett against Weedon in Rhode Island showed how the courts stood out against the populace. The Shays rebellion in Massachusetts had shown that the rottenness of the core could break out on the surface, while the promptness of Governor Bowdoin and General Lincoln in suppressing the insurrection gave some encouragement that the old spirit which had won independence still lingered.

Washington summed up the general apprehension when he said, "That experience has taught us that men will not adopt and carry into execution measures the best calculated for their own good, without the intervention of a coercive power." No such power existed. The treaty of Hopewell, on which the federal authority had staked its reputation for ability to deal with the Indians, was proving an empty act, and the later treaty which the same commissioner had made with the Choctaws and Chickasaws in January, 1786, was only less empty because it concerned bounds more remote from the whites; nevertheless, its provisions were not beyond the observation of Robertson and

the Cumberland people, who resented what they deemed federal interference with their rights. When Congress ratified both treaties in April, it had little effect but to make the federal purpose seem more impotent than before.

This antagonism of the central authority and the frontiersmen was naturally the occasion of a savage unrest, and as the spring opened, the exposed settlements were in great alarm. On the north, the tribes of the Wabash were giving way to a long-harbored enmity. The Shawnees, at a conference on the Miami, had but grudgingly acknowledged the new Republic, while their promises of peace lasted no longer than there was white man's rum to drink. So the western settlements were beset on all sides. Patrick Henry sent the appeal of Virginia to Congress for help, and in July its secretary informed him that two companies of infantry had been sent to the falls of the Ohio to coöperate with the militia. Henry urged upon the Virginia delegates in Congress that the only way to prevent "loss and disgrace" was to rush upon the hostile towns. The result of a spasm of energy on the part of some Kentucky colonels was that in the face of the political turmoils which the settlements were experiencing, as we shall see, a thousand men gathered at the rapids of the Ohio, and were organized by George Rogers Clark for a dash upon the Wabash towns. The expedition, which was made in the autumn of 1786, proved a failure. Clark, now but a shadow of his former self, could not control his men, and with an exhausted commissariat, and having accomplished nothing in proportion to the outlay which had been incurred, he turned back with a disordered rabble. His disgrace was in some measure offset when Colonel Logan, with five hundred mounted riflemen, by way of diverting the savages from retaliatory movements, slipped hastily among them and disconcerted them by the rapidity of his havoc. This and a dash of Sevier at the south, later to be mentioned, were the only relief of a pitiful season of Indian war. During it all, the federal government, by the aid it gave here and elsewhere, met drafts on its treasury for five times the amount which its Indian department had required in any previous year since the Revolutionary War had closed. In the autumn, Congress made a new effort to control the Indian affairs, when, on November 29, Dr. James White was made its agent for the southern tribes. Virginia at once

yielded to the federal action by withdrawing her own agent, General Martin, though this officer was still retained by North Carolina in his old service.

Amid this bustle of savage war, which was beating the frontiers on all sides, the communities of the Tennessee, Cumberland, and Kentucky were still struggling with their political problems, and Congress was warming in debate over the question of the Mississippi.

Let us turn first to the latter anxiety. Miró, in his capital of New Orleans, now a motley town of some five thousand souls, in which the French masses were far from being content under their Spanish masters, was pursuing a policy of trade that stretched far out into the American territory, as the peace of 1783 had defined it. As director of this trade, Miró had a divided purpose. He felt that he must not gather too large gains by imposing upon the tribes prices which the Americans could cut down, for he well understood how the Indians could be led to hostile alliances by reason of better bargains.

Miró's organization of this trade was a successful one. He carried on a considerable part of it up the Mississippi, beyond the Arkansas to the Illinois, and here, among the Sacs, his factors contended in rivalry with the Canadians coming down from Mackinac. From Mobile, now an active little settlement of some seven hundred and fifty people, he sent some sixty thousand dollars' worth of goods north to the Choctaws and Chickasaws. From Pensacola he distributed about forty thousand dollars' worth of goods among the Creeks and Cherokees; but Miró found it good policy to relinquish to McGillivray some share of the profits, while allowing that chief a pension of six hundred dollars beside. From all these channels, it was calculated that the Spaniards reaped a profit of about a quarter of the outlay.

This trade up the Mississippi necessarily brought the Spanish agents into contact with the adventurous Kentuckians who dared to traffic down its current, and it could only be a question of time before some violent rencontre would take place. Natchez, at this time, was a place of some fifteen hundred inhabitants. It lay within the bounds claimed by the Americans, but was still occupied by Spain. This possession was a standing challenge to the unruly frontiersmen, and even on the seaboard

an expedition would have been formed to capture it, could a certain swaggerer, John Sullivan by name, have commanded the following which his ambition coveted.

There were still some lingering English in Natchez who had been engaged in trade there, when Miró, in June, 1786, warned them of the necessity of leaving or becoming Spanish subjects. In this he was acting under orders from Madrid, by which he was told to allow them an interval to close up their affairs. Just about the same time, an Ohio flatboat, laden with flour and kickshaws, floated to the landing. Spanish officers seized the vessel and confiscated the cargo. The owner was allowed to journey homeward, and as he went he told, with such embellishment as his injured sense suggested, the story of this Spanish outrage. The news, spreading like wildfire, reached Clark at Vincennes, while on the expedition which he made so ruinous; and here, in retaliation and to appease the cupidity of his men, he seized the stock of a Spanish trader in the town. The news of Clark's indiscretion reached Wilkinson in December, while he and his adherents were waiting at Danville for the convention to gather, to which reference will be later made. Wilkinson, already in correspondence with Miró, and looking forward to a complicity in trade with the Spanish governor, seized the restless interval to frame a remonstrance against Clark's act, and signing it with others, it was dispatched to Williamsburg, accompanied by affidavit affirming the unfitness of Clark for command, arising from habits of drink. The memorial pointed out the danger that such lawless conduct would create, and how the fortunes of the west were put in jeopardy. These representations had, in due time, their effect.

Meanwhile Jay, struggling with Gardoqui, had been embarrassed by the positive position which Congress had taken as to the occlusion of the Mississippi in its vote of June 3, 1784. So in May, 1786, Jay had asked Congress to appoint a committee to counsel with him; and on this committee, indicating the predominating views of Congress, were Rufus King and Colonel Pettit of Pennsylvania, who shared Jay's opinions, while Monroe, sure to be outvoted, was made a third member, and represented the southern interests. With the backing of a majority of his advisers, Jay, on August 3, reported to Congress a plan

involving the closing of the Great River for a term of years, as a price for commercial advantages. The scheme immediately aroused the indignant opposition of the southern members. Grayson of Virginia protested. Madison wrote in heat to Jefferson, and wondered if New England would sacrifice her fisheries for the tobacco trade. Monroe fancied he saw in the opposition of New York a purpose to profit by the closing of the river so as to gain time to develop western communications by the Hudson. Washington, however, still adhered to his dilatory policy. The debates in Congress which followed showed that it was a contest between the North and South, with the Middle States in the balance. Jay carried seven States, and there were five against him. The Articles of Confederation required nine States to decide such questions, and with a clear majority of two for rescinding the vote of June 8, 1784, it became a question whether the articles or a majority should control. If pressed to an issue, it might cause serious danger to the confederation itself. Monroe wrote to Patrick Henry on August 12 that the majority, if they could not force the minority to concede their point, intended to dismember the Union and set up an eastern confederacy. He was furthermore moved to suggest that the South should use force to prevent Pennsylvania going with the North. Madison was more moderate, and trusted to time to convince the Eastern States that, as carriers of the country, the Mississippi was really of paramount importance to them. The year (1786) closed in a ferment. The North was told that it understood the South and the West no better than England understood the seaboard when she brought on the Revolution, and that the West had no intention of cultivating its soil for the benefit of Spain. The West claimed that it could put twenty thousand troops in the field to protect its interest, and that it could recruit this force from two to four thousand yearly.

If not united on the Mississippi question, Congress had no divisions on maintaining the bounds which Great Britain had conceded in the treaty of 1783, and on August 30 Jay was instructed to stand by its provisions. A few weeks later, when the incident at Natchez became known, and Clark's retaliatory act was reported, feelings ran so high that Jay and his friends did not think it prudent to be too urgent. Madison and those

working for a convention to reform the government had become conscious that the Mississippi question was creating a sentiment antagonistic to any movement to reinforce a central government. He accordingly brought the question before the Virginia Assembly, and late in November that body gave an unequivocal expression of its views in opposition. It was apparent now, as the winter came on, that a hasty step on the part of Jay and his friends must produce irretrievable disaster, not only on the seaboard but through the west, where the proceedings of Congress had been narrowly watched.

To go back a little. In January, 1786, Virginia had agreed to an act of separation from Kentucky, if the act should be accepted by a convention to be held in September. She also made it a condition that Congress should admit the new State to the Union after September, 1787. When this action became known in Kentucky, it is probable that among the body of the people there was a general assent to its provisions. Not so, however, with some ambitious designers who had already begun to look to the advantages of Spanish trade; and as the election of delegates approached, it became evident that measures would be set on foot, intended to move the community beyond a mere acquiescence in the conditions of the parent State. The occurrence at Natchez and the debates in Congress were opportune aids to such schemers. Wilkinson entered upon the stage to remove what he called the ignorance of the people. "They shall be informed," he said, "or I will wear out all the stirrups at every station." The chief contest was to come in the district where Wilkinson was the candidate of the absolute Separatists. He was opposed in the canvass by Humphrey Marshall, and took unfair means for victory, as Wilkinson's opponents said. The revolutionists carried the election "two hundred and forty ahead," as he wrote. "I spoke three and a half hours. I pleased myself and everybody else except my dead opponents." As the time for the convention approached, Wilkinson wrote (August 18) to a friend: "Our convention will send an agent to Congress in November to solicit our admission into the confederacy, and to employ the ablest counsel in the State to advocate our cause. I could be this man, with £1,000 for the trip, if I could take it." He was thus quite ready to anticipate the date

which the Virginia Assembly had prescribed, but was not yet prepared for that complete independence which he was yet to advocate, after his interview with Miró the following year. Mere commercial success seemed now his ardent hope, and he was buying tobacco in large quantities. "I look forward to independence," he said, with villainous glee, "and the highest reputation in this western world."

When the convention met in September, it was apparent that the draft upon its members, which the expeditions of Clark and Logan had made, was going to prevent a quorum for some time at least. The convention thus failing of an organization, Wilkinson and his friends found time to draw up a representation in censure of Clark's acts at Vincennes, which was dispatched to the Virginia Assembly. So the year (1786) passed out in this respect in comparative inaction.

Now, to glance at the Franklin communities. They were growing more and more distraught. The anti-Separatists had set up a magistracy representative of North Carolina, and the two factions brawled at each other. Every attempt at a conference was met by an unbending adhesion to their respective principles. To darken the sky still more, some reckless hordes of Cherokees and Chickasaws hovered about the exposed stations, and bid defiance to any restraint of their head men, who, on the first of August, had made a new concession to the whites in granting other lands between the Blue Ridge and the navigable rivers. Things finally got to such a pass with the marauders that Sevier mustered a band of one hundred and sixty horsemen, and made a dash which scattered their forces.

So, a third year (1786) of the uneasy peace closed beyond the mountains with little chance of confirmed tranquillity. An attempt had been made in July to control more effectually public sentiment by the starting of a newspaper, *The Pittsburg Gazette*, at the forks of the Ohio; and to strengthen the bonds of union with the parent State, the settlers had opened a road from Louisville to Charleston on the Kanawha. But in December, some disaffected spirits prepared and circulated a manifesto, that "Great Britain stands ready with open arms to receive and support us." It was a sign that the coming year was to have new developments.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE SPANISH QUESTION.

1787-1789.

SIX years had passed since the colonies had become a recognized Republic. It was daily becoming a more and more serious question if the country could disentangle itself from the difficulties which environed it. There were divided counsels among those who had done the most to achieve its independence. Patrick Henry still believed in the confederation, for the good it had done, and thought the South in discarding its articles would lose a safeguard. George Mason was suspicious of the growing power of the North. Under such champions as these, Virginia was likely to unite as one body and lead a compacted South, if the question of the Mississippi was pushed much farther by the commercial North. Madison and Washington represented more moderate sentiments, — the one felt that a stronger union must be attained at some risks of southern rights; the other had little sympathy with the feverish resentment of Patrick Henry. Jefferson was sure that the West, while it had such a dominion in view as the navigation of the Mississippi would secure, could not be held back by the North.

The vast bulk of the American people lay within two hundred and fifty miles of the Atlantic coast, — possibly four millions in all. Beyond the mountains, and excited over this question of Spanish arrogance, lay but a small fraction of this population. This relatively scant body of people was almost entirely south of the Ohio, for the region to the north could hardly be called settled as yet, though the French along the Illinois and Wabash were mixed with a small proportion of English and Scotch. Living beyond the Mississippi, and mainly towards its mouth, and in the adjacent Floridas, were perhaps thirty or forty thousand French and Spaniards, not without jealousies of each other, and by no means confident of maintaining a successful

front against the banded rifles of the Kentucky and the Tennessee.

Miró and Gardoqui, each aiming at the same result, but hardly less jealous of each other than the discordant parties of Louisiana, knew very well that there were two important factors in this problem of the west, viewed from the Spanish side. One was the active loyalty of McGillivray and the sympathy of the southern tribes, whose adherence must be secured by gifts and favoring traffic. It was not long before the Chickasaws disclosed to General Martin, the Indian agent of Carolina, that Spanish emissaries were intriguing for their trade.

The other factor was the disaffection of the western people towards the federal union, which Navarro, the Spanish intendant, was trying to make the most of by holding out lures for migration to the Spanish territory. The policy of Miró and the intendant was hardly more compatible than those of the governor and Gardoqui. It was the hope of Navarro to show a bold front towards the American frontiersmen; Miró believed in seducing them by the relaxation of commercial requirements at New Orleans.

The Mississippi question had become, in the western mind, inextricably mixed with the danger which it was thought a stronger government, the likely outgrowth of the proposed federal convention, would impose on the south. The substitution of a majority rule, a probable result of such a change of government, for a two-thirds' rule, now their protection in all questions like that between the new Republic and Spain, could but portend the downfall of their southern influence. The part of the west nearest the seaboard, and likely to maintain by waterways an intercourse with the coast, as was the case with what is now West Virginia, was little affected by the pressing exigency of the Mississippi question. But as one went farther beyond the Kanawha, indifference gave place to excited feeling when the Spanish demands were mentioned. This was distinctly seen a year or two later, when the proposed Federal Constitution was under debate. While ninety-seven per cent. of the nearer west was pledged to the support of that instrument, ninety per cent. of the Kentucky settlements were as strongly adverse. Yet even in the most settled parts of Kentucky, commercial reasons, as they did in the tide-water districts, stood for adhesion,

and the two votes which Kentucky gave for the constitution in the Virginia convention came from Jefferson County, the best compacted of the settlements.

With all this western discontent, the people were very far from unanimity on any remedial plan. Some were strenuous for forcing Congress to legislate in their interests. Others strove for absolute independence, with or without the alliance of Spain. Still others looked to union with Louisiana, whether that province remained Spanish or French. The most audacious spirits talked of attacking New Orleans, and wresting Louisiana from Spain to use it as a counter influence against northern overbearing. It was a difficult task to reconcile all these opposing views. There was one man who thought that he could mesh all in his own net, and he was the vain, smooth, and dashing Wilkinson.

The convention at Danville, in which he expected to be a power, and which for want of a quorum had failed of an organization, finally got to work in January, 1787. This delay had disarranged the plan which Virginia in her enabling act had set, and opened the way for revolutionary measures; but the members proved temperate despite Wilkinson's adverse persuasions, and simply voted to ask Virginia to rearrange her dates, while Kentucky waited in patience. This sober negation was a signal triumph of good temper, for there can be little doubt that the new-fledged political club of Danville, a gathering of representative spirits, had reflected the current aspiration when, at a meeting on January 6, 1787, they had voted that immediate separation from Virginia would tend to the benefit of Kentucky. Whether from ignorance or for mischief, there had come rumors that Jay's measure of closing the Mississippi had become a law, and to spread this untruth a circular was given out in some quarters in March, which also kept concealed the really strenuous efforts made by the parent State to promote the western interests. All such forced manœuvres were but a part of the policy of the Wilkinson faction to coerce public opinion. To increase the disquiet, Gardoqui was at the same time making incautious advances to such western leaders of opinion as he could reach. Madison, in March, 1787, disclosed the evidence of this to Jefferson, expressing dread of the consequence of such appeals to the wild ambition of the frontiers. Nor were the reports which reached him of British intrigue less disquiet-

ing, for he knew that emissaries from Canada "had been feeling the pulse of some of the western settlements." It was pretty certain, too, that there were those south of the Ohio who met them with listening ears. Meanwhile, Gardoqui had been in conference with the Virginia delegates, who had been charged to deliver to him the not uncertain opinions of their Assembly, — demands which we have seen Wilkinson found it convenient to ignore. The minister and his interlocutors had indulged to their liking in menace and expostulation, but to little effect.

By March, 1787, these incidents and alarming reports from the west had brought Jay's project to at least a temporary stand. Madison did not view with unconcern the trail which the debates in Congress on the Mississippi question had laid on the southern consciousness. "Mr. Henry's disgust exceeds all measure," he wrote to Jefferson, and at times it seemed as if the movement towards a federal convention, which he had so much at heart, had received an irrevocable setback.

On April 11, 1787, Jay finally reported to Congress the draft of an agreement with Gardoqui for the closing of the Mississippi, as an accompaniment of a commercial treaty with Spain. It was at once apparent that Congress had lost much of its sympathy for the project, and after an acrimonious debate on the 23d, in which the Northern States were charged with trying to protect their vacant lands against the competition of the west, the rival feelings began to subside, and Jay soon grew quite of the mind to make, either by treaty or force, Spain yield to the inevitable.

So the burning question passed; and for the next eighteen months we hear little of it, except as it offered a ready excuse to the intriguers in their efforts to sway the western people in their own private interests. But for this, it would have been accepted as finally disposed of by Congress till at least the ambitious hopes of the west could find more propitious times. The trials of savage warfare and the seething condition of western internal politics were not favorable, at present, to any decisive aggression on the power of Spain.

The Franklin movement was nearing a collapse. There was a hope in March that Evan Shelby, representing North Carolina, might effect a compromise with Sevier, but all signs failed.

It next looked as if the Chickamaugas might entrap the luckless governor, and his last appeal to Benjamin Franklin had failed. The Holston Separatists seemed cowed, and in the nick of time (May 21) a firm and judicious address from Governor Caswell satisfied most people that the end of the upstart commonwealth had come.

In Kentucky, the convention met in May, 1787, and the tricks of the intriguers were discovered when it was learned that there was no warrant for the circular of March. Soberer counsels prevailed, and the members accepted anew the trials of patience.

Wilkinson, with a growing consciousness of his loss of political power, had turned to fostering his own pecuniary gains. In the preceding autumn (1786), he had visited Natchez, and had opened friendly relations with Gayoso, the Spanish commander. He had established them in part by an intimation that if Kentucky felt it necessary, she might invite England to descend with her the Mississippi and effect a joint occupancy of Louisiana and New Mexico.

Some time in the winter, Steuben had applied to Gardoqui for a passport to enable a gentleman to visit New Orleans, but the request was refused. Steuben's friend was Wilkinson, who at a later day explained that, under the guise of a commercial venture, his real object was to open confidential communications with Miró. Gardoqui's refusal did not daunt him, and gathering together his flour, bacon, butter, and tobacco, he had everything ready to send a flotilla down the river in the spring. In June, 1787, his barges were tied up to the banks at New Orleans, without an attempt of any Spanish officer to seize them. There is some mystery as to the way in which Wilkinson secured this prompt exemption. It is not improbable that Gayoso's reports to Miró had made the Spanish governor timid, and that he had learned that Gardoqui, who was not accomplishing all he wished, needed more time for further efforts before a rupture with the Republic was forced. If Miró hesitated at all, Wilkinson seems to have succeeded in teaching him that there was more profit in trade than in war. He speedily exemplified his maxim by driving such bargains with the Spanish merchants that he sold his tobacco for five hundred

times its cost. Whether Wilkinson deceived the governor or betrayed his country mattered little to himself as long as he accomplished his object in ensnaring Miró in his commercial plot, through which a division of profits was to enrich both.

The sanguine American had already entered upon ambitious projects in Kentucky, for which bountiful returns in trade were quite necessary. In October, 1786, he had bought the site of the future Frankfort, and had secured the passage of a bill in the Virginia Assembly to erect a town upon it. He was to have a fine house of his own there, and to make improvements suited to establish the new settlement as the headquarters of his business operations. Indeed, its situation admirably fitted the place to become the scene of busy labors in the construction of barges for the river trade.

Gardoqui, in Philadelphia, had kept a jealous eye upon Miró's activity in New Orleans, and in the previous January the Spanish governor had found the minister's emissaries watching his movements. If there was to be any sharing of profits, Gardoqui was not inclined to be forgotten, and to propitiate him Miró had shipped a lading of three thousand barrels of flour to Philadelphia.

In all this Wilkinson was shrewd, and supposed he permanently covered his tracks, as he did to his contemporaries, but researches at Madrid at a later day revealed his rascality. He is said to have filled his pockets with \$35,000 from his venture, and with these gains he took ship for Philadelphia. He carried away also a permit for further trade, which was renewed in 1788 and 1790, with all the advantages which came from the power to bribe by it whoever was prompted by avarice to sell his independence. Before Wilkinson was ready to leave, Miró obtained from him an outline of what the Spanish faction proposed to do in Kentucky. In September, Miró transmitted it to Madrid, where it tells a damning tale to-day. The sleek American did not quite succeed in inspiring confidence, for both Miró and Navarro were themselves too much entangled in the plot to be conscious of rectitude; nor was he altogether trustful of it in an accomplice. They accordingly in November, just as Wilkinson was setting sail, and not certain of the turn of affairs, appealed to the home government for aid in fortifying the line of the Mississippi, whereby to hold back

from the mines of Mexico "a poor, daring, and ambitious people, like the Americans," for as such Navarro, whose phrase this is, not inaptly rated the people he was dealing with.

Wilkinson, on his way home, passed through Richmond just after Christmas, 1787. He here heard of the outcome of the federal convention. The result alarmed him, and he declared that the first Congress under the new government would pass Jay's measure and settle the destiny of the west.

Before following Wilkinson over the mountains for other intrigues, let us glance a moment at the condition in which, on his return in the early months of 1788, he found Kentucky. The revolutionist party had, in the preceding August, established at Lexington *The Kentucky Gazette*, as an organ in their interests. It appeared on a half-sheet of coarse paper, ten inches by nineteen, with the imprint of John Bradford, who two years before had come to Kentucky, a man of some six-and-thirty years. The press had been carried from Philadelphia to Pittsburg, and thence floated down the river to Limestone, and so transported by packhorses to Lexington. By a mishap on the way the type "fell into pi," as the publisher announced in his first issue.

This initial number of the revolutionary organ was barely circulated before, on September 17, 1787, the convention of which so much was expected, and for which a remarkable patience had been exercised, came together. Its opinion was now unanimous for separation from Virginia, and the necessary vote to propitiate Congress to accept the new State was passed, — all being done in accordance with the requirements of the enabling act of Virginia. It seemed now fairly certain that the dignity of Statehood was at hand. The recent setting up, in July, of the northwest territory at Marietta was deemed an earnest of the purpose of Congress to apportion the western country into States.

Looking to a similar movement south of Kentucky, the unfortunate Franklin experiment had delayed the final cession of the North Carolina lands. These lay still farther south, and stretched to the Mississippi in a strip of territory which, by some interpreters of the South Carolina charter, belonged to that

State. Georgia, however, was thought to have at least as good a title to it. It was a question where the due west line began, and as the Savannah had different tributaries at the northwest, the point selected by each was to give as much territory as possible to its own jurisdiction. South Carolina claimed to run the line from the junction of the Tugaloo and Keowee rivers, where they form the Savannah. Georgia claimed the source of the Keowee as the real head of the Savannah, and that the line should start westward at that fountain. The claims of the two States were before Congress in May, 1786, for adjudication, and the decision had not been reached when South Carolina, on March 8, 1787, made a cession of her rights, and on August 9, Congress accepted it.

The year 1787 had, from the exasperation of the Indians, been a restless one throughout the regions watered by the affluents of the Gulf, as well as upon the adjacent waters which flowed into the Atlantic. Savannah had even been threatened, and new defenses were planned. The Tennessee region had been hard pressed under the assaults of the Creeks, and Robertson was forced to ask assistance of Kentucky and Sevier. Finding, as he said, that the Creeks "talked two tongues," he had marched in June, 1787, against the savage strongholds near the Muscle Shoals, and had found among their villages some French traders, who had supplied them with arms, and he had other proofs that emissaries from the French on the Wabash had for two years been inciting them against the Cumberland people. There had been some Indians murdered near the Clinch River, and Governor Randolph of Virginia sought as best he could to stop the retaliatory countermarches, and to hold Logan and Crockett in check. Amid all this savagery, James White and James Conner visited the site of Knoxville, and located here a warrant for land which they had received for service in the revolutionary army. So a new western town was started.

Early in 1788, Wilkinson was back among his Kentucky friends, nursing his secret. If not disclosed to his nearest confederates to its full extent, it was to be better understood, many years later, when Miró's dispatch of January 8, 1788, to his

government was found, and it appeared how traitorously the wily Kentuckian had bargained away the western settlements. His correspondence with Miró in the spring of this year (1788), which was sent down the river by boat, and has also been preserved, shows how he attempted to augment the hopes of the Spanish governor by assuring him that all was well; that there was no likelihood of Congress thwarting their plans; and that he had succeeded in blinding Washington, "the future king of America," as he called him. With these assurances, Miró had little difficulty in writing to Madrid that the frontier colonies were secure for Spain.

Well he might think so, for both from Cumberland and the Holston, as well as from Kentucky, came the welcome tidings. In the Cumberland district, Robertson and McGillivray had indeed been running a tilt at each other. The Cumberland leader, supposing that Spanish intrigue had aroused the Creeks and the Chickamaugas, had made, as we have seen, a dash upon them at the Muscle Shoals. Miró had protested against Robertson's suspicions, and McGillivray had taken his revenge upon the whites. After this bloody satisfaction, that half-breed Creek intimated to Robertson that if he would consider the account closed, he was quite willing to bury the hatchet. Whereupon reconciliation went so far that in the spring of 1788, McGillivray informed Miró that Robertson and the Cumberland people were preparing to make friends with the Creeks and throw themselves into the arms of Spain. This meant a substantial triumph of Spanish interests, for Nashville, the Cumberland capital, which had grown to be a settlement of eighty or ninety log huts gathered about a court-house, had become the rallying-point for some five thousand hardy pioneers. These were scattered along eighty odd miles of the river bank, and constituted a self-sustaining community, thrown upon its own resources, and separated by a trackless wilderness from the dwellers on the Kentucky. With the settlement about Jonesboro', one hundred and eighty-three miles away, these Cumberland people had more intercourse, but still it was not very close. The track lay through a dangerous country, in which Martin had had many a struggle with the irascible Chickamaugas; but the way was soon made safer, when the trail was improved, and armed patrols passed to and fro. It

was over this trail that the North Carolina judges came at times, under the escort of such a guard, to administer backwoods justice in the court-house at Nashville.

Passing over this route from North Carolina, young Andrew Jackson, now in his twenty-first year, and armed with a commission as public prosecutor, had stopped on his way at Jonesboro', where he found the legitimate government restored and Sevier a fugitive. Hard pressed in his disappointment, that luckless magistrate had courted the authorities of Georgia, and proposed to occupy a part of its territory on the great bend of the Tennessee with such followers as he could make adhere to his fortunes. This failed. At times he thought that he could plunge into an Indian war, or lead an attack on the Spaniards, and in this way prolong his power. Then he thought he could do better to offer his services to Miró and Gardoqui, as he did on September 12, 1788, and throw himself and his State "into the arms of his Spanish Majesty," just at a time when Congress, rising to the exigency, had determined (September 16) to insist at all hazards on the navigation of the Mississippi. McGillivray got wind of Sevier's purpose, and confirmed the Spanish authorities in the hopes which Sevier raised. With all this tergiversation, Sevier had seemingly no heart to turn upon the parent State, and when Gardoqui sent Dr. James White to open terms of agreement with Sevier, the latter is said to have informed Shelby of the plot that Gardoqui was proposing.

So Sevier lived on for a while in this uncertainty. At last, trusting to his popularity to save him, he put himself within reach of one Tipton, an old enemy, and in October he was arrested and carried before a judge. There is a story, admitting of embellishments, which goes to show that he was rescued under the eyes of the judge and suffered to vanish into the devious ways of the wilderness, and that the youthful Jackson stood by and witnessed the escape. This was the tale which Jackson told to amuse the loungers when, a short time afterwards, he reached Nashville; but he carried more important tidings when he took to the Cumberland settlers the story of the adoption of the new Federal Constitution, and disclosed the preparations which were making, when he left the seaboard, for the election of Washington as the first President.

After March, 1788, Miró had been left alone in New Orleans,

Navarro having departed for Spain with reports. While the governor was still worrying over seven hundred hungry souls who had been burned out in New Orleans and thrown upon the resources of his granaries, he had some satisfaction in believing that he had at last got into close touch with different sections of the American southwest. He would not have been so complacent in his joy if he had known that his rival, Gardoqui, at about the same time, had received orders from Madrid to play into Wilkinson's hands.

The critical time for Kentucky had come in June, 1788, just as Miró, at New Orleans, was receiving renewed assurances from Wilkinson, brought by a flotilla which that speculator had dispatched from Frankfort. On the 2d of that month, Congress had voted to make Kentucky a State of the Union, and had appointed a committee to draft the bill. This was no sooner done than, on July 2, 1788, the news of New Hampshire's adoption (June 21) of the constitution came. This counted the ninth State in the column, and made the trial of the new government a certainty.

Virginia had been for some time considering whether she also should accede, and the question in her convention was turning largely upon what would be the effect on the West and the navigation of the Mississippi by the operation of the new constitution. It had long been felt that the risk was great, and that the acceding of Virginia was doubtful. Washington, in April, thought that the widespread apprehension in Kentucky would swing Virginia into opposition. At that time, it was supposed that nine of the fourteen Kentucky members of the Virginia convention had committed themselves against the new constitution. When the convention met, it proved that seven members instead of nine stood out, and rallied with the rest about Grayson and Henry. These leaders, however, proved unequal to force a majority of the convention to agree with them, and on June 26, Virginia, to make a tenth State, by a sufficient majority in the convention, had wheeled into line before the news from New Hampshire had come.

It seemed now in Congress that Virginia, having been committed to the federal experiment, and the old Congress having become moribund, it was best to leave the question of setting up Kentucky as a State to the approaching government.

Accordingly, on July 2, the day on which the ninth State was known to have been secured, the committee which had been appointed to grant an enabling act asked to be discharged.

This outcome caused a sore disappointment in Kentucky. Public sentiment was inclined to charge the majority of Congress with jealousy of the west. It was alleged that its members had a direct purpose of delay till, under the new order of things, Vermont could be brought into the Union to offset the new Southern State.

This apparently was the conviction of John Brown, one of the representatives in Congress from Kentucky, and in this frame of mind he had had an interview with Gardoqui. This agent had intimated to the Kentuckian that Spain was ready to bargain with his constituents for the navigation of the Mississippi. Brown disclosed by letter the proposition to some friends in Kentucky, and probably took Madison into the secret. It is not certain that Gardoqui was as guarded, and in the attempt to vindicate Brown's loyalty, which has been made of late years by his grandson, it is said that the Spanish agent made no secret of his purpose. It seems certain that Gardoqui's proposition never took the form of a settled understanding. On the other hand, it is not known that it elicited from Brown any repugnance. He may have kept silence the better to draw Gardoqui into actions which could be used to force Congress to uphold vigorously Kentucky's demands of Spain and her requirements of Statehood. Brown had indeed already committed himself as an advocate of the independence of Kentucky within the Federal Union. In April and May, Madison had persuaded him that the Mississippi question stood a better chance of solution under the new government than under the old. Jefferson had told him that "the navigation of the Mississippi was, perhaps, the strongest trial to which the justice of the federal government could be put." In July, Brown had written to his Kentucky friends that Spain would not give up the Mississippi as long as Kentucky was a part of the United States, and there is small doubt of Brown's serious apprehensions. There is little question that Gardoqui, in some way, brought similar importunate claims to Henry Innes and George Nicholas, two other influential Kentuckians. The extent to which these three friends went at Gardoqui's bidding shows them at

least to have been indiscreet, while it is just as certain that the conduct of Wilkinson and Judge Sebastian, in the way in which such advances were met by them, proved themselves unmistakable traitors. Sebastian made a bold acknowledgment in the end. Wilkinson sneakingly sought ever after to cover his tracks.

When, on July 29, the Kentucky convention met, Wilkinson made a show of causing Brown's suspicions of Congress to be disclosed; but he did not think it prudent to reveal Brown's account of Gardoqui's insinuating promises. A considerable




NEW MADRID.

[From Collet's *Atlas*.]

part of the convention, irritated by the procrastination of Congress, was ready to follow Wilkinson and Sebastian in declaring for the immediate independence of Kentucky, but the majority was against it. The conservative stability of the Scotch-Irish did much to produce the result, though the efforts of the eastern merchants to close the Mississippi, and the avowed purpose to seat the new government in New York, instead of further south, brought contrary influences to bear.

The Wilkinson faction finally succeeded in getting another convention ordered for November, but before it met there were two new phases of the complex political condition rapidly developing, and they need consideration.

NOTE.—The map on the two following pages is from a "Map of the Northern and Middle States" in Jedediah Morse's *American Geography*, Elizabethtown, 1789, engraved by Amos Doolittle. It was repeated in the Boston, 1793, edition.





It had been an object of Spain to induce the American frontiersmen to settle on lands beyond the Mississippi. Miró had invited Robertson to this end. Gardoqui had sent emissaries to the western country to disclose a like plan. His agents found little willingness to accept such offers, though some adventurous spirits like Steuben and George Rogers Clark were ready to lend their influence.

In July, 1788, Spanish troops had been sent to fortify New Madrid, a position on the river some distance below St. Louis. As a part of the scheme to strengthen the line of the Mississippi against piratical inroads of the Americans, Natchez was further fortified, and a fleet of patrol boats was soon placed on the river.

Colonel George Morgan of New Jersey, a revolutionary soldier, had of late been trying to induce Congress to help him found a colony near Kaskaskia. This pending, Gardoqui sought him with an offer of conceding twelve or fifteen million acres of land at New Madrid. On October 3, 1788, the terms were settled. It was expected that his followers would be Protestants, and guarantees against religious interference were made. Free trade down the river satisfied the commercial requirements. The position of New Madrid, nearly opposite the mouth of the Ohio, gave earnest of a large town. Morgan issued a circular setting forth the advantages of the plan. It promised land at an eighth of a dollar an acre, with aid in building dwellings. It set forth the richness of the country, the abundance of buffalo and other game, which, if furnished by contractors, would cost a penny the pound. Free transportation down the Ohio of all household effects would be given. Schoolmasters would accompany the emigrants.

One of these circulars coming to the hands of Madison, he wrote to Washington (March 26, 1789) that it contained "the most authentic and precise evidence of the Spanish project that has come to my knowledge." He also wrote to Jefferson that "no doubt the project has the sanction of Gardoqui," and the Mississippi is "the bait for a defection of the western people."

This movement of Gardoqui was but one of the rival measures which estranged Miró from the Spanish agent at the seat of government, and neither the latter nor Wilkinson was satisfied with the prospect. It was too evidently a sinister stroke at

the secret plans of the Spanish faction in Kentucky. Wilkinson had just obtained (August) a renewal of his license from Miró, and a cargo of dry goods had been sent up the river to him, accompanied by the prudent advice from his confederate not to put too high a price upon his wares, for fear of diminishing among the Kentuckians the advantages of Spanish intercourse.

The other new phase of western condition, to which reference has been made, on being developed in the autumn of 1788, was not on the side of the Mississippi, but on that of Canada. There was a faction, as has been indicated, among the Kentucky politicians, who looked rather to France than to Spain for the solution of their difficulties. It was hoped that France would assert her right to Louisiana, and invite the west to a share in it. Some such representation had been made to the French ministry, when it came to the notice of the English. It was through some one at Detroit that Lord Dorchester's attention was first called to the chance of making common cause with the disaffected west. The same informant told the Canadian governor of the movement then gathering head for the occupation of the Muskingum country. A hint was also given of that disloyal spirit which the secret service books of Sir Henry Clinton have fastened, justly or unjustly, upon a soldier of the Revolution who was at this time a leader in the Ohio movement. This correspondent of Dorchester adds that "a General Parsons among them has made advances to establish commercial interests with Canada." If this could happen north of the Ohio, there was a glimmering hope that some similar leader might be found south of the Ohio, to be clandestinely beckoned into toils. Very likely this secret informer in Detroit was a half-pay British officer, Colonel John Connolly, a Pennsylvanian by birth, who in 1775 had served the royal cause under Lord Dunmore. For this he had suffered a long imprisonment. He had also a distinct personal grievance against the Americans for the confiscation of some property at the falls of the Ohio. He saw, or thought he saw, how it was the commercial instinct of the east, particularly of New England, which had started the new life on the Ohio, and had sent adventurous people, possessed "of a universal facility," to fill up "this tempting, though remote country."

Connolly was such a person as Dorchester needed to probe the secret impulses of the settlers south of the Ohio. He left Detroit in October, and, proceeding by the Miami, reached Louisville in time to witness the canvass which was then going on among the electors of the new convention. In this he saw the Spanish and anti-Spanish factions striving for mastery. He heard much of the outspoken advocacy of Wilkinson on the Separatist side.

While Connolly thus looked on, he gave out that he was on the spot simply to see after his own interests in confiscated property. He admitted his real object cautiously, and probably never committed himself to many persons. Among those whom he approached was Colonel Thomas Marshall, who very promptly reminded him that if Lord Dorchester meant kindness, he had best first stop the raids of the Indians on the frontiers. Later, on November 18, 1788, or thereabouts, Connolly met Wilkinson at his own house. To him he disclosed his full plans. Ten thousand men were to be sent from Canada down the Mississippi, while a British fleet forced the river on the Gulf side.

Wilkinson was not more pleased with seeing his own plans foiled by this new scheme than he had been with Gardoqui's projects. Accordingly, by the aid of confederates, he caused a feigned personal attack to be made on Connolly, which made the spy apprehensive of assassination, and prompted him to leave hastily for Detroit.

Connolly, who on reflection thought he had escaped a private plot, and that really half the Kentuckians were ready for his scheme, made a rather sanguine report to Dorchester. The governor's letters to Sydney show that certainly there had been some considerable response to his overtures. The late John Mason Brown, in his vindication of John Brown, brings to light, from the English archives, a paper of reflections from one of these seeming clandestine partisans. A few weeks after Connolly's disappearance, both Marshall and Harry Innes communicated to Washington what they knew of Connolly's doings.

While Connolly was still in Kentucky, the convention, whose preliminary canvass he had been watching at Louisville, met at Danville on November 3. It had appeared at one time as if

Wilkinson would be rejected in his candidature, but his skillful dissembling saved him, while his confederates were defeated.

The convention adopted an address to Congress, in which it was said: "As it is the natural right of the people of this country to navigate the Mississippi, so they have also a right, derived from treaties and national compacts," and these rights "we conjure you to procure."

Brown, with an air of knowing more than he expressed, advised the convention to wait patiently until what they wanted came. What he meant by this enigma is clear enough, when Oliver Pollock informs Miró that there is, in Brown's opinion, no salvation for Kentucky but in swinging over to Spain.

A motion was made to send a temperate and respectful address to the Virginia Assembly, urging an act of separation. Wilkinson tried in vain to substitute a vote instructing the delegates in the Assembly; and then read to the convention a memorial which he said he had left with Miró to be sent to Madrid. From the best evidence obtainable Wilkinson in this paper had unreservedly committed himself to the Spanish plot. In all these steps his purpose, by his own confession to Miró, was to foster a spirit of revolt, and to irritate Congress to some incautious act. When such views obtained as Governor Clinton had openly professed to Gardoqui, namely, that the peopling of the West from the East was a national calamity, it was not difficult to hope for Congress to be equally indiscreet. To help on such a plot, Wilkinson told Miró that he looked to Spain to sow other seeds of discord between the East and the West, and Miró sent his friend five thousand dollars to use in tampering with the conscience of the unyielding.

As a blind, Wilkinson further moved to ask Congress to take decided action against Spain, and it was so agreed.

Before the year closed, Wilkinson had begun to think that, after all, his plans might irretrievably fail. Such a mischance was perhaps hinted at by his confederate, Dunn, to whom St. Clair, now on the Ohio with a show of military authority, and knowing Wilkinson's intrigues, was writing in a warning vein, and begging him to "detach Wilkinson from the Spanish party." In this conjunction Wilkinson and his friends sent a petition to Gardoqui for a grant of land on the Yazoo and the Mississippi; and writing to Miró about it, he informed him that his

purpose was merely to secure a place of refuge for himself and his adherents, in case it should become necessary to have one.

This measure off his mind, Wilkinson made haste to show Gardoqui how important a factor he might become in thwarting British intrigue, by informing that Spanish agent (January 1, 1789) that the emissaries from Detroit were still active in the west. Just at the same time, Robertson, thinking to propitiate Miró by naming a district on the Cumberland after him, wrote (January 11, 1789), as did later General Robert Smith (March 4), that the time was approaching for the Cumberland people to join with Spain. Wilkinson almost simultaneously was dispatching a new flotilla of twenty flatboats to continue his commercial connection with New Orleans. So it seemed to the Spanish intriguers north and south that there were to be renewed efforts in behalf of Spain, before her American confederates slunk away to the Yazoo.

The inauguration of the new government at New York, set for March, was not far distant, and time would, therefore, before long show what its effect was to be on Wilkinson's purposes. Washington, with the interval rapidly shortening before great responsibilities would devolve upon him, and fully informed of what was doing in the west, caused a warning to be inserted in the *Alexandria Gazette* that this Spanish intrigue "was pregnant with much mischief." Later, in March, 1789, not long before he was to be inaugurated, he wrote to Innes: "I have little doubt but that a perseverance in temperate measures will produce a national policy mutually advantageous to all parts of the American Republic." It was significant of a steady hand ready to grasp the helm.

From a letter addressed by Wilkinson to Miró, on February 12, 1789, we learn just how the situation seemed to that conspirator, or rather how he chose to make it seem to his confederate. He assured him that the leading men in Kentucky, with the exception of Colonels Marshall and Muter, were committed to "the important objects to which we aim;" and that some delay was inevitable till the new government had assembled and declared itself, and that if it would be in the way of resentment, the securing of the Yazoo grant might prove timely. Meanwhile, he trusted that Spain would not relax her efforts to sow dissension in the west. He recounted the circumstances of Con-

nolly's mission and of his ignominious flight. He said there is a current rumor that England is trying to restore Gibraltar to Spain at the price of New Orleans and the Floridas.

Two days later (February 14, 1789), Wilkinson dispatched a second letter. In this he regrets that Gardoqui, instead of Miró, had been given the power to treat with Kentucky, and hopes that the Yazoo country will enable him and Miró to defeat the plans of Gardoqui and Morgan at New Madrid. Miró, as it appears from a remonstrance which he sent on May 20 to Madrid, did not conceal his fears that Gardoqui had been overreached by Morgan, and that the true object of the American was to plant a new American State west of the Mississippi. With this apprehension, Miró later (July) ordered the commandant at New Madrid to strengthen his defenses, while he did ostensibly what he could for the comfort of the new colony.

There might well be ground for fear on Miró's part that with all his magnificent vision of an extended Spanish dominion, he was himself, as he deemed Gardoqui to be, dealing with traitors, who at any moment might turn upon him. His position was certainly a trying one. Sent to govern a province, his government had dispatched a covert enemy, with powers that warranted him to invade this province and set up other jurisdictions. Amid all this perplexity came in May the news of the death of the Spanish king and the accession of Charles IV., and he knew not what change of policy.

The Mississippi, although coveted, was in fact the weak side of Louisiana, for it opened a path to her enemies, both up and down its course. The river once passed and in control, the mines of New Mexico were within the invaders' grasp. New Orleans, with its five thousand people, sheltering a disaffected French preponderance, was a prize for any daring commander. The forty-two thousand inhabitants of Louisiana had little better cohesion to make a defensive front.

It had been, if it was not now, clear to Miró's mind that the two main supports of his hopes were Wilkinson and McGillivray, — the one to seduce the west, the other, supposed to hold more or less control over the seventy thousand Indians of the southwest, to make them serve as a barrier to Spanish territory.

To add to Miró's perplexities, he had become, through the communications of Wilkinson and Pollock, aware of the rival

intrigues of France and England. France had given up Louisiana to Spain because she had failed to secure the returns she wished from its trade and mines. Since then, the American subduers of the wilderness had shown her that the true wealth of the Great Valley was not in its deposits or in its furs, but in its agricultural products. This development was relied upon to arouse French cupidity. It was said that not an acre had been cleared about Natchez but by Americans, who were now supplying the markets of New Orleans from their farms, — now reported, with probable exaggeration, by one observer as three thousand in number, averaging four hundred acres each. Productiveness like this made something more of the country than a bulwark of the New Mexican mines. The French must remember, it was set forth, that by gaining the west, they would gain supremacy in the market for flax, hemp, and wool, and could drive all tobaccos out of the trade by their own. There were thirty thousand old subjects of France, they were reminded, who stood ready to welcome them in place of their Spanish masters. Beside these, they could depend on the sympathy and aid of the French on the Wabash and in Canada, and open an asylum to the disaffected, who were already flying from the French shores before the seething agitations of the Revolution.

In aid of this French scheme, some interested persons in Kentucky had transmitted to the French representative in New York a memoir upon the condition of the western country, calculated to affect the Gallic imagination. Fortunately, it did not bring the direful effects which Barlow's promises had produced on the Ohio. Indeed, Kentucky at this time had much more to offer to immigrants than the territory north of the Ohio. The migration of settlers was so rapid and so large that it is difficult to reach a conservative estimate of it. The Ohio and the road from Limestone and the Wilderness Road were crowded with the trains of pioneers. During the twelve months divided between 1788 and 1789, to take no account of the overland movements, twenty thousand persons had passed down the Ohio, past Fort Harmar, in eight or nine hundred boats. With them were counted seven thousand horses, three thousand cows, nine hundred sheep, and six hundred wagons, — and all were, with few exceptions, bound for the Kentucky settlements.

There were at this time, as contrasted with the scant popula-

tion north of the Ohio, not a great deal short of one hundred thousand souls in the settlements of Kentucky, Cumberland, and Watauga. What disturbed Miró most, and offered the greatest inducement to the French and English factions, was that more than twenty thousand riflemen, a large part mounted, were ready to belt their fringed shirts for any emergency. Kentucky alone, it was thought, could send ten thousand militia to a point of danger, and her mounted patrols were always alert in the traveled ways.

In urging an alliance with France, its advocates claimed that the Alleghanies forbade for the west all communication with the Atlantic; that the unity of the Republic "was broken by the mountains;" that the success of the seaboard could not contribute to the prosperity of the west. "The west, in short, requires a protector. The first who will stretch out its arms to it will have the greatest acquisition that could be desired in the New World."

It is not probable that this project of a French alliance, looming as it did at times in excitable minds, ever made much progress. Its real effect was to thwart and incite by turns the energies of both the English and the Spanish.

The British scheme had more of reality in it; but it also failed of maturity. That there were in the west supporters of an English connection, beyond the numbers which Connolly encountered, would seem to be evident from the correspondence of Dorchester with the home government. In one of the governor's dispatches (April 11, 1789) he transmitted some "desultory reflections of a gentleman of Kentucky," which, if not the work of Wilkinson, was in quite his manner, and would have emphasized that intriguer's faithlessness to Miró, had he known of it. The writer says that "the politics of the western country must speedily eventuate in an appeal to Spain or Britain." In transmitting this paper, Dorchester wrote that the factions in Kentucky that promised best looked to an alliance with Great Britain, for the purpose of detaching that region from the Union and capturing New Orleans. The people urge, said Dorchester in effect, that Spain had helped the United States against England, and that there was now the chance to pay them off. Still, they wanted no active assistance till New Orleans was captured. Having thus put the case, Dorchester

asked the ministry how far he could safely go in responding to such appeals.

In this, as in other problems, the newly installed federal government was likely to prove an antagonist to deal with, different from the defunct confederation. Grenville seems to have suspected this, and cautioned Dorchester against active interference. Wilkinson was well aware of the changed conditions, and on September 17, 1789, he wrote to Miró, in a pitiable and self-convicting spirit: "I have voluntarily alienated myself from the United States, and am not yet accepted by Spain. I have rejected the proffered honors and rewards of Great Britain, while declining the preëminence which courted my acceptance in the United States. I have given my time, my property, and every exertion of my faculties to promote the interests of the Spanish monarchy. By this conduct I have hazarded the indignation of the American Union."

While this despondency was growing upon him, Wilkinson had failed of an election to the convention, which met on July 20, 1789. Without his leadership the Separatist faction hardly dared assert itself. The new proposition of Virginia which came before the convention had some objectionable provisions as to the public lands, and it was found necessary to take further time to settle the differences. So, the convention adjourning, Kentucky was not yet a State; but the Spanish question had lost a great deal of its importance, and was for a while about dropping out of local politics.

CHAPTER XVII.

UNCERTAINTIES IN THE SOUTHWEST.


1790.

WHEN the new federal government was put in operation, there was one Northern and one Southern State still without the Union. In November, 1789, North Carolina had adopted the constitution. Many questions touching the western country south of Kentucky could not be considered till North Carolina had thus acted. This region rounded out the country, in conception at least, to the Mississippi, and although Rhode Island still remained recusant, not acceding till May, 1790, Oliver Wolcott might well say, because of Rhode Island's insignificance, that the "accession of North Carolina has blasted the hopes of the anti-federalists." With small delay, on February 25, 1790, through a deed signed by her senators, North Carolina ceded to the United States the region now called Tennessee, a territory then reckoned as extending east and west three hundred and sixty miles, and north and south over a degree and a half of latitude. The occupants of this territory, now some thirty thousand more or less, were not consulted, and the Indian title still covered it, except at the east, where the Franklin experiment had been tried, and towards the west, where some two thousand square miles surrounded Nashville as a political centre. Within the cession lay lands assured to the Chickasaws by the treaty of Hopewell (January 10, 1783), and others confirmed to the Cherokees by the treaty of November 28, 1785, which were still further to be increased by the treaty of Holston, July 2, 1791. The lands thus preserved to the tribes made about five million acres in the east and central regions, with about half as much more towards the Mississippi. In addition, North Carolina had already pledged considerable areas to her revolutionary soldiers, to individual grantees, and for the redemption of her scrip, so that the United States got little or nothing

under the cession beyond the jurisdiction over the forty-five thousand square miles which constituted the territory. Indeed, it was thought that North Carolina in her previous grants had exceeded the area of the country by half a million acres.

On April 2, Congress accepted the cession, and in May, that body set up the ceded territory, to which was presumably added the narrow east and west strip already made over by South Carolina, as "the Territory south of the river Ohio." This act created a governor, and also three judges, who were to yield to a territorial assembly when the population could show a body of five thousand voters. The new government was to be guided by provisions similar to those of the ordinance of 1787, except that slavery was not prohibited. William Blount, a North Carolinian of popular yet dignified manners, who enjoyed the confidence of the people, was made governor, reaching his post in October. The territory was divided into two military districts, the eastern of which was placed under Sevier, now made brigadier-general, and the western under Robertson, to whom was accorded a like rank.

As to the country south of the new government, there was a conflict of claims between the United States and Georgia. The federal government insisted that it was acquired from Great Britain by the treaty of 1782, the mother country having yielded thereby the title which she assumed under the proclamation of 1763 in making it a part of west Florida. When she thus took it from that region and allowed it to the United States, it was her purpose, if Lord Lansdowne's confession is to be believed, to make discord thereby between the young Republic and the house of Bourbon. Whether intending or not, she succeeded in that purpose. Georgia contended for prior rights to this debatable region under her charter, and she was now holding it, as the county of Bourbon, bounded on the south by the international line of 31° , and on the north by the Yazoo River. Georgia's pretension of acquiring the Indian title within this territory was adjudged to be illegal, since the right of préemption was reserved to the United States under the Federal Constitution which Georgia had accepted. She had refused to guarantee the title, however, to large tracts of lands in the Yazoo country, which she had granted, in the first in-



[From Jedediah Morse's *American Gazetteer*, Boston, 1797.]

stance, to a company formed in Charleston, and known as the South Carolina Company, and later to other companies known as the Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia companies. These grants had been made in December, 1789, that to the South Carolina Company embracing ten million acres, that to the Virginia Company eleven million four hundred thousand acres, and that to the Tennessee Company four million acres. She threw the burden of protecting the settlers upon the companies, and this opened complications with Spain, further affecting the question of the navigation of the Mississippi.

Of the territory thus handed over to another military direction, the Choctaws and Chickasaws laid claim to parts of it, and throughout the whole of it, Spain professed that she had jurisdiction.

One Dr. James O'Fallon, a man about forty-five, and an adventurer, was made agent of the South Carolina Company. He wrote on May 24, 1790, from Lexington to Miró, stating that he was prepared to treat for making this debatable country a province of Spain, and hinting that if their negotiations succeeded, other western communities were prepared to take similar steps. He said that within eighteen months he should have at his beck some ten thousand men, capable of bearing arms, and that in June he would visit New Orleans for a conference.

Miró could not fail to see Wilkinson's hand in all this, and O'Fallon had indeed been in conference with that so far disappointed treason-monger, who had been watching the movement, as affording a new field for his intrigues. As early as January, 1790, he had tried to ingratiate himself with O'Fallon and his associates, pleading his ability to induce the Spanish authorities to quiet the adverse interests of the Choctaws. In June, 1790, writing from Frankfort, Wilkinson notified Miró that O'Fallon's plans were in the Spanish interests, though the man himself was somewhat vain and flighty. "I am, nevertheless," wrote Wilkinson, "inclined to put faith in him."

O'Fallon's scheme was to organize a force in Kentucky, and, floating with it down the Mississippi, to take possession of the country, with George Rogers Clark, as rumor went, in military command. It was given out that the federal authorities favored the undertaking, and would adopt the military establishment. Wilkinson and Sevier, with a body of disappointed Franklin men, were expected to follow and make the settlement.

In this state of affairs, Miró wrote to Madrid (August 10), describing the land of the South Carolina Company as extending from eighteen miles above Natchez to thirty miles above the Yazoo, all of which, as he represented, was within the Spanish jurisdiction. He doubted the policy of harboring on Spanish territory a separate community with its own military organization. It does not appear that he was aware that the company, in order to secure settlers, had given out a purpose to make in due time an American State of their colony, and it

may well be doubted if the projectors had any such real intention. Miró, who was never quite sure of Spain's maintaining herself on the Mississippi, had enough suspicion of the company's avowed aim to fear that it would become an aggressive enemy, unless Spain should in some way obtain control. Wilkinson, with that devilish leer which he knew how to employ upon occasions, had intimated that the best way to secure this control was to make the Choctaws so harass the settlements that the colonists would turn to Miró for protection. In the same letter the governor informed the minister at Madrid that he had already taken steps to act on Wilkinson's advice.

The lands of the Virginia Company lay north of those of the South Carolina Company, being a stretch of a hundred and twenty miles along the river and running to $34^{\circ} 40'$ north latitude, and so comprising what he calls a part of the hunting-ground of the Chickasaws, a tribe in the main friendly to the whites, but not always controlling their young bucks. Still farther north were the lands of the Tennessee Company. All the companies' territories extended one hundred and twenty miles back from the river. To the lands of the latter company, Miró acknowledged the Spanish claim to be less certain.

In one way these new developments gave Miró some hope. He felt that Wilkinson, who had so far talked much and done little, might now find a better field for his intrigue. The governor complained of the small gain which Morgan had made farther up the river, and charged him with preferring rather to enjoy his ease in New Jersey than to endure the hardships of the new colony. He thought further that the trade which Wilkinson had been suffered to develop between Kentucky and New Orleans had worked to embarrass the rival scheme at New Madrid.

Miró told the minister that if O'Fallon's proposition was refused, the alternative for Spain was to push in settlers in such numbers as to hold the region, and he adds that if the Americans oppose, he will use the Indians as Wilkinson had suggested.


There were other chances which Miró was glad to recognize, for the Creek half-breed, McGillivray, who we shall see had just been invited to New York, had written to the governor in

May, 1790, that though he was indeed going thither to conclude a peace with the Americans, he had no intention of deserting his Spanish friends, and was even prepared in due time to assist the Spaniards in attacking the South Carolina intruders. Miró took courage from this as he wrote to McGillivray in August, 1790.

But the movement of O'Fallon was not to come to any such conclusion, for a finishing blow had been dealt in New York just at the time when McGillivray was amusing Knox and his fellow negotiators. In August, 1790, Washington, who was kept informed of the military preparations in Kentucky, issued a proclamation, signifying his intention to suppress by force any hostile movement against the Spanish. So it was that, in the spring of 1791, the project was abandoned. On March 22, Jefferson had instructed George Nicholas to arrest O'Fallon. By this time Hamilton's scheme of finance had so carried up the national and state scrip that it could be used to better advantage than in buying Yazoo lands, and there were no securities for the adventurers to work with; and furthermore the national government was preparing to protect the Indians against state machinations in the disposal of the Indians' lands. So the companies and O'Fallon vanished from sight. In the following August, the agent of the South Carolina Company, who had been placed at Walnut Hill, abandoned his post, and hostilities on the Mississippi were averted.

It is now time to look after McGillivray and his treaty. The Spanish traders in Mobile, since the English surrendered the Indian traffic in 1782, had never been able to keep it up to the prosperous condition in which they received it; but such as it was they found the readiest channel for it in ascending the Mobile and Alabama rivers, — sluggish streams that offered no great obstacles. By an upper affluent, the Tombigbee, they reached a village of the Chickasaws near its source, and thence, by a three-mile portage through a region ceded for trading-posts by the treaty of Hopewell, they could get into the basin of the Tennessee. Thither passed trader and warrior with equal ease. Chickasaw, Choctaw, Creek, and Cherokee, coming

NOTE. — The opposite map, showing the country between Mobile and Pensacola and the Tennessee River, is a section of Samuel Lewis's *Map of the United States*, 1796.




from different directions, had often combined here for fatal forays along the Tennessee and Cumberland settlements, or had scattered in scalping parties to appear and disappear in a night. The most restless of the savages were the Chickamaugas, a small and independent band of Cherokees, youthful bucks themselves, and likely to be joined at times by the roving youngsters of the other tribes. They had caused Colonel Martin, in his efforts to keep the frontiers quiet, more anxiety than any of the other tribes, and he had, under varying fortunes, advanced upon them and retired time and again. Of late, Knox, the secretary of war, had kept the local forces as much on the defensive as could be done, while he hoped that the provocations to war would cease. It was the hostility of this ruthless band, after Sevier had lost his hold upon the abortive Franklin commonwealth, which had induced the settlers south of the Holston and French Broad rivers to unite for protection, despite any appeal for forbearance.

It is not easy to reach any satisfactory estimate of the numbers at this time of these southern tribes. There were, perhaps, two thousand five hundred warriors among the Cherokees, and they came in closer contact with the Americans than any others, and had of late been talking of migrating beyond the Mississippi. They had easily learned the timely art, when the whites pushed them too hard, of sending complaints to the authorities. "We are drove as it were into the sea," they said on one occasion. "We have hardly land sufficient to stand upon. We are neither fish nor birds. We cannot live in the water, nor in the air!" They were fond of making treaties, and not very faithful in the observance of them.

The Creeks were more numerous, and spent their varying rage more readily upon the Georgians, who, with the Spaniards in Florida, were their nearest neighbors on the east and south. The Choctaws were supposed to be much more numerous than the nearer tribes, but their remoteness generally prevented more than small parties of vagrant warriors joining the other tribes. The Chickasaws were as a rule the most tractable of all. They were a handsome race, and rode a fine breed of horses.

NOTE. — The opposite map of the Creek country, and the home of McGillivray, is from a map of Georgia in *Carey's American Atlas*, Philadelphia, 1795.



The year 1790 had opened with some warnings of a new combination among the southern Indians. One William Augustus Bowles, a young English vagabond, who had been in the English army during the Revolution, had for some years espoused the English, Spanish, or American interests indifferently, and had played fast and loose with savage and civilized life by turns. He now compacted portions of the Creeks and Cherokees, and induced them to send him and some of their tribesmen to England, bearing an address to the British king. The party managed to reach the Bahamas, where Lord Dunmore furnished them a passage to Halifax, and in July, 1790, they were at Quebec. Here Dorchester tried to detain them, but they insisted on going to London, where they presented the address, and promised to put their tribes under British protection, and asked for arms and other help. Meanwhile, among the factions of those tribes, where an active rival of Bowles was more powerful, an effort had been made during 1789 to unite them in a league against the whites. This plot, in August, 1789, had come to the knowledge of Colonel Arthur Campbell, and he had communicated the news to Washington.

This other leader, whom we have already mentioned as the son of a Scotch trader by a Creek woman, whose father had been French, had already made the name of Alexander McGillivray notorious along the border, for, during the Revolutionary War, he had, like Bowles, been active in the royal interest. His losses by confiscation in that contest had spurred him with a revenge which of late years had been well known to the borderers. He was a man of an active intellect, and not lacking in educational training. In physical bearing he was a noticeable figure: spare of limb, but lofty in stature, while under a beetling brow he moved with great alertness a pair of large and lustrous eyes. He had an Indian's wary artfulness, a Frenchman's grace of demeanor, and something of the Scotchman's canniness and love of trade. He was under binding obligations to the Spaniards, and as we have seen in his communication with Miró, he did not mean to forget them, while he was ready to settle with their rivals, hoping in each case to serve his own interests. As a go-between in the Indian trade he had his price, and the London house of Strahan & Co., acting in Pensacola, found him convenient in negotiating for trading permits

with the Spanish officials, who were said to receive more than £12,000 a year from that commercial house. It is hardly to be denied that McGillivray got a good store from both of the bargainers. He had before this sought to make the Georgians buy at a good price an immunity from the raids of his people, and on their refusal he had taught them that his price was much less than the cost of war.

In this pass, Georgia, whose frontiers faced the Creeks all along the Altamaha and Oconee, had appealed to the general government for aid, at a time when rumors multiplied in New York that Spain was inciting the Creeks, and the English the Shawnees, to make a general war.

Knox saw in a Creek war a pretty certain forerunner of one with Spain, and having some intimations of McGillivray's greed, importuned Washington to invite that leader to come to the seat of government. At the same time he prepared for a failure by dispatching troops to the Georgia frontiers. The messenger of peace was Colonel Willet. The invitation was accepted, and in June McGillivray and twenty-eight of the principal men of the Creeks, marching through the New York streets under an escort of Tammany sachems, were conducted to General Knox's house, where McGillivray was lodged.

As in all Indian negotiations, the interchange of views went on slowly, amid untoward rumors. Mirò, with his usual suspicion, which was not wholly removed by McGillivray's parting letter, was thought to have sent an agent after the Creeks to spy out their acts in New York and prevent action hostile to Spain by a free distribution of gifts. It was at the same time believed that an Iroquois agent had cautioned McGillivray of the risks he was taking, and had tried to lead him to an alliance with the northern tribes.

But no allurements could turn the greedy ambassador from his purpose after the government had disclosed to him their generous intentions. In consideration of the Creeks' recognition of the United States as their guardians, and acknowledging the protection "of no other nation whatsoever," the American negotiators confirmed to the Creek chieftain and his friends the sole privilege of trade with that tribe, and agreed to make good with \$100,000 that leader's losses in the Revolutionary War. The government ceded back to the Creeks certain territo-

ries which had made the Oconee the line of the whites, and which Georgia had paid for. This act later aroused the indignation of Patrick Henry, who had invested in some of these same lands, and who, as he professed, had hoped to find a refuge there from the despotism which he sometimes believed was to transplant the republicanism of his country.

The authorities further created McGillivray a brigadier-general in the American army, with a yearly stipend of \$1,200. So, in good humor, that chieftain doffed his new uniform and signed the treaty. It mattered little to him that, at the same moment, he held both from the Spanish and English governments other commissions. Washington, as he said, had greatly honored him in giving him some books and his own epaulets, which he took with him on his home journey by sea, landing at St. Mary's in Georgia.

While in New York, McGillivray wrote to Lord Dorchester : "In the present treaty I have been obliged to give up something in order to secure the rest, and guarding at the same time against what might shake my treaty with Spain." Such double-faced professions, however, did not succeed. The treaty with Spain had, for a large faction of the Creeks, been imperiled too greatly ; and the United States had bargained with a deceiver. The hostilities at the south saw little abatement, and Spain continued to have an ally in the irate Creeks.

But these Indian affairs suffered an eclipse in the sudden apparition of war along the Mississippi, and the McGillivray treaty was doubtless hastened by it, for the United States was at once brought face to face with a serious problem, in the solution of which she needed a free hand. It is necessary to go back a little and see how the Mississippi question seemed hastening to a conclusion at the time the Spanish complication with England turned the federal government from an aggressive to a waiting mood.

Gardoqui, on returning to Spain in 1789, had given there the impression that the navigation of the Mississippi had ceased to be a burning question on the American seaboard. He gave as a reason for this apathy that the drain upon the coast population, through the opening of the river, would cause a setting back of the prosperity of the older States. There was also a

prevalence of fear that the free river passage to the sea of tobacco, now becoming an important staple in Kentucky, would bring a powerful competitor into the market for the product of Virginia and Maryland, whose soil was already becoming exhausted.

With these views accepted, there could but be in Spain an imperfect comprehension of the real attitude of the western country, and there was doubtless in some parts of the American east hardly better information. Nor was there an adequate conception of revived Spanish efforts to stop the Kentucky boats on the river. Miró at New Orleans could hardly have failed to observe the growing prosperity of the Americans about Natchez. Brissot had said, with French enthusiasm, that "the French and Spaniards settled at the Natchez have not for a century cultivated a single acre, while the Americans furnish the greater part of the provisions for New Orleans." We have seen how the attempts of the South Carolina Company to extend this activity above Natchez had excited the governor's apprehensions.

The fact was that the Declaration of Independence had failed to make quite the same sort of self-centred Americans west of the mountains as had been created on their eastern slope. The western life was breeding a more dauntless and aggressive race, which rejoiced rather in obstacles, and placed upon a higher plane than human law the rights which they felt belonged to them by nature. They were not a little impatient to have their right to an open navigation of the Mississippi based upon treaty obligations, as acquired from France by England in 1763, and transmitted to the Republic from the mother country in 1782. They looked by preference to the inalienable rights of their position on the upper waters of the Great River, as carrying an incontestable claim to a free passage to the ocean. What Thomas Walcott, journeying on the Ohio in 1790, heard in a debating club in Marietta gave an unmistakable indication of the prevailing temper. There was, as he says, a diversity of sentiment as to the treatment of Spanish arrogance, while all were of one mind in the certainty, within a few years, of the river being opened "by strength or force, if not by right or treaty."

By 1790, the danger which had been felt, of accomplishing

this result by some pact of the western leaders with Spain, had practically vanished before the rising power of the constitutional Republic, which had marshaled men in new ranks, making bold those who had been timid, and conservative those who had been aggressive. It was this change that had caused Wilkinson to tremble for his power. When he saw Washington putting in office at the west the known enemies of Spain, he had grasped the hand of O'Fallon almost in despair. Conceiving that Congress suspected him, he had written to Miró: "My situation is extremely painful, since, abhorring duplicity, I must dissemble." Miró, on his part, was aware that all Wilkinson's abettors, save Sebastian, had fallen away from him. The latter was by this time reduced to begging a gratuity from the Spanish governor, who seemed by no means sure that the time had not come for pensioning each of the confederate traitors, in order that he might use one as a spy upon the other.

In this condition of things the intriguers could well be left to spoil their own game, and the federal government were freer far than the confederation had been to deal with the pretenses of Spain, both as to the river and as to the territory which she coveted to the east of it. From the time when she was conniving with France to deprive the United States, by the Treaty of Independence, of a large part of the western country, Spain had indeed abated something from the claims which would have given her all west of a line drawn from the St. Mary's River to the Muscle Shoals, and down the Tennessee and Ohio to the Mississippi. Later, she had sought to accomplish her purpose by the conspiracies of Wilkinson. While these were pending with diminishing chances of success, Spain had been practicing all that vexatious hesitancy which has always characterized her diplomacy. The time had come for this to cease, as Jefferson thought, and in August, 1790, he instructed Carmichael, then the American representative in Madrid, to bring matters to a crisis, urged thereto, doubtless, as we shall see, by the precarious relations which had arisen between Spain and England. Jefferson's instructions were to assume the right of navigating the Mississippi, and to raise a question only about a port of deposit near its mouth. At the same time, he advised Short, in Paris, to persuade Montmarin, the Spanish ambassador in that capital, to further the American suit. In the

heads which Jefferson drew up for Carmichael's guidance (August 22), he says that more than half the American territory is in the Mississippi basin, where two hundred thousand people, of whom forty thousand can bear arms, are impatient of Spanish delays. If we cannot by argument force Spain to a conclusion, he adds, we must either lose this western people, who will seek other alliances, or we must, as we shall, wrest what we want from her. If Spain will only give us New Orleans and Florida, he adds further, she should see that we are in a position to help her protect what lies beyond the Mississippi. This was a direct bid for a Spanish alliance in the sudden complications which had arisen upon the action of a few Spanish ships on the Pacific coast, and, in September, false rumors prevailed in New York that Spain had made the concession.

To understand this Pacific entanglement, it is necessary to take a brief retrospect.

The fur trade of the northwest coast was a prize for which Spain and England had long been contending. The efforts to find an overland passage had been far more striking with the English, while the Spaniards had for the most part pushed up the coast from California.

As early as 1775, Cadotte, who had long been a trader at the Sault Ste. Marie, had explored with Alexander Henry northwest of Lake Superior, and, in their wandering, had fallen in with one Peter Pond. This adventurer was, according to some accounts, a native of Boston, but was probably born, as Ledyard had been, in Connecticut. He was strong in body, eager for hazards, intelligent in spirit, with a knack for scientific observation, and an eye for mercantile profit without many scruples as to the method of it. He had, in April, 1785, in behalf of the North West Company of Montreal, a fur-trading organization, addressed a memorial to Governor Hamilton at Quebec, proposing to undertake, in connection with other members of that company, the exploration of "the whole extent of that unknown country between the latitudes of 54° and 67° to the Pacific Ocean." He informed the governor that he had learned from the Indians that the Russians had already established a trading station on that coast, and that other posts were sure to

be established there by Americans, who had been shipmates of Captain Cook. He further said that if the delivery of the lake posts, as contemplated in the treaty of 1782, was ever made, the way would be opened for enterprising Americans to reach by the Lake Superior route that distant region, and reinforce their countrymen, who had sought it by water. For these reasons he urged upon Hamilton the necessity of protecting the North West Company in the undertakings which they had outlined.

The explorations of Pond about Lake Athabasca had convinced him, as his map, which has come down to us, shows, that the western end of that lake was not very far distant from the Pacific. The accounts of Cook's voyage had just then been published (1784-85), and a comparison of Cook's charts and this map, by differences of longitude, seemed to show that the fresh and salt waters were within a hundred miles of each other. On a map preserved in the Marine at Paris, and which is given by Brynmner in his *Canadian Archives Report* for 1890, and which is said to be a copy of Pond's drawing made by Crève-cœur for La Rochefoucault, the coast of "Prince William Sound, as laid down by Captain Cook," is separated from the affluents of "Aranbaska Lake" by a coast range, beyond which, as the legend reads, the Indians say they have seen bearded men. As signifying an inviting route to the western sea, Pond had reported the climate of Athabasca as moderate, and said it was owing to the ocean winds, which we, in our day, recognize as the chinooks.

Pond, as we have intimated, was not averse to playing off one master against another, and while he was assuring Hamilton that his interests were for Britain, he seems to have sent another copy of his map to Congress, which fell into Crève-cœur's hand, and upon a copy which he made, that traveler wrote of its author: "This extraordinary man has resided seventeen years in those countries, and from his own discoveries, as well as from the reports of the Indians, he assures himself of having at last discovered a passage to the [western] sea." This memorandum is dated, "New York, 1 March, 1785."

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page is a section of Pond's map (as reproduced in Brynmner's *Canadian Archives*, 1890), showing the Grand Portage and the source of the Mississippi. The river "Winipique" connects Lake Winnipeg with the Lake of the Woods.



But Pond's ambition to reach the Pacific had not been accomplished when, in 1790, Vancouver was on that coast, establishing new claims for England. He passed, without knowing it, the mouth of the great river that heads near the springs of the Missouri. It was left for the Boston ship "Columbia," under Captain Kendrick, in the same season, to enter that river and bestow the name of his vessel upon it.

Not far from the same time, Spain and England, the two great European rivals for North America, who were each intent on contracting the limits of the young Republic, came into collision on the western coast of Vancouver's Island. Spain, by virtue of Balboa's discovery in 1513, and subsequent explorations up the coast, and England, by reason of Drake's assumption of New Albion in 1579, and the recent explorations of Cook and others, set their respective claims to this region in sharp conflict. Spain, being at the moment more powerful at Nootka Sound, seized some English vessels trading there. It was this act that was now likely to bring the armed forces of the rivals to leveling muskets on the Mississippi, and to open a conflict of which the United States, with grudges against each of the contestants, might find it difficult to be a passive observer.

When the news of the seizure at Nootka reached England, and it was known that the Spanish authorities had simply released the captured ships without making reparation, the English king, on May 5, 1790, announced in Parliament that war with Spain was imminent. Great activity followed in the dockyards and arsenals. Louisiana was at once recognized as the most vulnerable part of the Spanish empire. To engage the western Indians for a campaign against New Orleans by the river, large stores of gifts were hastily sent to Canada. Dorchester was, at the same time, instructed to secure if possible the active aid of the United States, and, in case this failed, he was told to play upon the passions of some of the disaffected regions of the Republic. While the northern and southern factions of the country were being brought to a sharp issue on the question of a site for a capital, and were seeking at the same time to play off Vermont and Kentucky against each other in the balance of power, by fixing periods for their admission to the Union, the British government was seeking to make a breach



NORTHWEST COAST.

[Showing Nootka Sound as on the main land, when really on the outer coast of Vancouver's Island; also Mackenzie's track and the supposed waters west of Lake Superior and Hudson's Bay. The map is a part of a "Chart of the N. W. Coast of America, showing discoveries lately made," in Jedediah Morse's *American Universal Geography*, Boston, 1st ed., 1789; 4th ed., 1802.]

between each of those States and the Union. It was thought that the discontent in Vermont, not wholly stilled by the outcome of Yorktown, was rendered at this juncture peculiarly susceptible while she was appealing to a laggard Congress to give her sisterhood in the Union. So Dorchester was instructed to open communication with such as he could approach.

A convention in the Kentucky country was about determining to take final measures for securing Statehood, — it was to take place in July, — but it was not certain that the majority for it would be large. To take advantage of any such indifference, Dorchester was further instructed to picture to the Kentuckians the advantages which would accrue if they accepted the help of England to force the Spaniards from the Mississippi. There was also, Dorchester was expected to show, an unmistakable gain for them in an English alliance in opening the lakes and the St. Lawrence for the export of their produce. Such were the terms of Grenville's dispatches to the Canadian governor in May, 1790, at the time that preparations were making in England for a Spanish war.

The conditions on all sides were perplexing. Great Britain was anxious lest war with Spain would give the Americans an opportunity to wrest from their feeble garrisons the lake posts, and there was danger that such hostilities might lead to the dispatch of a crowd of privateers from the American ports. There was a chance that the military power of the Republic would have more than it could do to protect and hold in allegiance the western country, and Dorchester's information from the Ohio region was encouraging to British hopes. He learned that the "discontented Continental soldiers" at the Muskingum colony were "attached to the United States by no other tie than personal regard for the President, considering themselves sacrificed by Congress, and defrauded even in the sales of the lands they occupy;" and this feeling, said a correspondent, gave them "an extreme tenderness toward the British government."

Early in the year, Dorchester had sent to the States an emissary on an ostensibly friendly errand, but really to spy out the feelings of the people, and to ascertain what preparations were in hand for any armed excursion. This messenger was a certain Major Beckwith, and his instructions were dated on June

27. He was specially directed to learn the chances of the United States joining England in the threatened war, and the likelihood of their resisting the persuasions of Spain to rely upon her aid in attacking the lake posts. Dorchester had an American correspondent, who was assuring him that General Knox would be only too glad to attack the Spanish posts on the upper Mississippi, while an English fleet forced the river from the Gulf. This letter-writer had outlined a further plan of a joint expedition to the Santa Fé region, the west being counted on to recruit an adequate force from its three hundred thousand inhabitants. This occupation of the Spanish mines was a favorite aim with Dorchester, and he had in contemplation to found a base for such an expedition on the Mississippi, north of the Missouri, whence it was only eight days' march to Santa Fé, through a country fit for military operations. It was certain that Spain feared such an attack, and was striving to strengthen her Indian alliances beyond the Mississippi, and was seeking to induce the Indians on the east of that river to migrate to the other bank, and her persuasion had had some influence among the Cherokees.

The policy of the United States, so far as Washington's cabinet was to form it, rested in councils far from harmonious. Hamilton could not forget the irritating vacillation of Spain during the Revolution, and her inimical conduct ever since. He thought she had no reason to expect that the United States would shield her from British enmity. He was, on one point at least, in sympathy with Jefferson in contending that Spain must either open the Mississippi or take the consequences. "If Great Britain sides with us," he said, "and France with Spain, there will be a revolution in our foreign politics." When Beckwith sought to sound him, Hamilton was cautious, and rather vaguely promised an alliance with England "as far as may be consistent with honor."

Jefferson's anti-English views were too notorious for England to expect any countenance from him. Dorchester had been warned of this, though his American correspondent assured him that the Americans, as a body, were "by no means favorable to Spanish interests." It was Jefferson's belief that a Spanish war — with the Americans neutral — would be sure to throw both Louisiana and Florida into the hands of Britain.

This would mean, he contended, that England, possessing the west bank of the Mississippi, would control the trade of the east bank, and hold the navigation of that river as the price and lure of an alliance with the western States. It would, moreover, surround the Republic on all the land sides with British power and with British fleets at the seaward. It was, perhaps, some consolation to him, in a possible alliance of the States with England, that, in the division of the spoils of war, Florida might fall to the Americans. His expectation was that France could not help being drawn into the war on the side of Spain, and if the States could maintain neutrality he saw a chance of "the New World fattening on the follies of the Old." If American neutrality could not be preserved, he much preferred that the Republic should take sides with Spain. For this end he was ready to guarantee the trans-Mississippi region to Spain, if she would cede New Orleans and Florida to the United States. He thought that to enter upon the war in this way would induce a popular support, and that Spain should agree to subsidize the Americans, if such a stand brought on a conflict with England. To prepare for such a consummation, Jefferson instructed Carmichael to let the Spanish court understand that, if such a plan was not acceded to, there might be great difficulty in restraining the west. Such a guarantee of the distant west was not, fortunately, in the way when Jefferson himself, not many years later, bargained for this same Louisiana, and forgot how he had so recently professed that the United States would not for ages have occasion "to cross the Mississippi."

There was one consideration which, in case of war, had caused Washington much uneasiness. It was whether Dorchester would, with or without permission, cross the American territory to reach the Mississippi, in an effort to descend to New Orleans. The President consulted his cabinet in August on the stand to take in case Dorchester should ask permission. His advisers were at variance, as before. Hamilton was for allowing the passage rather than hazard hostilities. Jefferson said that, while circumstances did not warrant giving the negative which the request deserved, it was best to avoid an answer, and if the passage was made, to treasure the memory of it against a time

of England's distress. Adams, the Vice-President, differed only from Jefferson in advising a dignified refusal and waiting till an indemnity could be enforced.

The dilemma of Spain was the most serious of all. She recognized that the United States might assist her, but she was not prepared to pay the cost, and she knew what risks she was running of an Anglo-American alliance, with the aim of forcing the Mississippi.

So the Spanish policy was to shuffle as long as it would be prudent; to embroil France if she could; to organize an Indian expedition against the Pacific posts of the English, and take advantage of developments.

Affairs in this way could not drift long, with such a determined adversary as England, and on October 28 Florida Blanca yielded to the British demands, and so avoided war, in concluding the convention of Nootka, wherein he acknowledged the equal rights of England on the Pacific coast. When, on November 12, the ratifications were exchanged, England ceased to be a factor in the Mississippi question.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE CONDITIONS OF 1790.

THE federal government in coming to power found the North and the South not unequally matched. Pennsylvania and the States northward showed about two million inhabitants, and there was an equal population in Maryland with the farther south. It was thought that the valuation of the thirteen States was approximately \$800,000,000, and this aggregate was nearly equally divided between the two sections. In some aspects of business activity, they were also nearly equal, and the \$5,000,000 exports of the North could be set against a corresponding sum for the South. In domestic trade the North doubtless held some preponderance, for the one hundred and fifty thousand tons of shipping engaged in fishing and in coastwise traffic was mainly owned and employed in the North, and this section claimed a large part of the three hundred and sixty thousand tons engaged in the foreign trade.

The territory which was assured to the United States by the treaty of independence, but which was as yet, west of the mountains, but precariously held for the most part, was variously reckoned, according to the imperfect estimates of the time, as between eight and nine hundred thousand square miles. Of this imperial domain, not far from two thirds was unoccupied except by vagrant Indians. The great bulk of the four million people, whom the world was learning to call Americans, occupied a region stretching along the Atlantic seaboard. It extended back to a line which roughly followed the crest of the somewhat disjointed Appalachian range, and measured from Maine to Florida not far from three thousand miles. This more compactly settled territory which the French maps represented as the United States, and in this were followed by some English maps, contained not far from two hundred and twenty-five thousand square miles, or probably a scant quarter of the

entire acreage of the Republic. Of the gross population of four million, considerably less than half a million souls were scattered occupants of the remaining three quarters of the national domain. There was great uncertainty in estimating this outlying population. Some placed it as low as two hundred and fifty thousand, while others reckoned it at over four hundred thousand, and it was thought it had the capability of doubling, through immigration and the prevalence of large families, in fifteen years. Burke had said of it, when Parliament was struggling with the problem of controlling it: "Your children do not grow faster from infancy to manhood, than the Americans spread from families to communities, and from villages to nations." Much the larger part of this western population was settled in confined areas, isolated by stretches of wilderness, and thickest along the streams in West Virginia, western Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Tennessee. There were only the beginnings of settlements north of the Ohio, except as one moved on to the Wabash, the Illinois, and the Mississippi, where the mongrel communities, originally French, at Vincennes and Kaskaskia, were encountered, mixed with Canadian traders and Spanish interlopers. This isolated class offered a life little consonant with that which the American pioneers were establishing in the intervening country.

There is the same uncertainty in apportioning this aggregate over-mountain population among the several districts. Perhaps there were seventy thousand, or as some reckoned nearer one hundred thousand, which found a centre in Pittsburg. This Pennsylvania folk stretched up the Alleghany and Monongahela, and their lateral valleys, and there was some talk of their ultimately acquiring Statehood. Kentucky, which with respect to soil and climate was usually spoken of as more favored than any other American region, claimed to have about seventy-four thousand inhabitants, including twelve or thirteen thousand blacks. It is still more difficult to determine the population of Tennessee, divided between the Holston and Cumberland regions. The enumeration has gone as high as eighty thousand and as low as thirty or forty thousand.

The immigrants to these regions south of the Ohio had probably, in the largest numbers, come from Virginia, now the most populous of the thirteen States. The impoverishing of Vir-

ginia soil by tobacco was serving to increase the spread of her people beyond the mountains. The current was not yet wholly checked, which in the middle of the century had brought other pioneers from Pennsylvania and Maryland through the valley of the Shenandoah on the way to the Kanawha and beyond.

The opening of the river route from the Monongahela to Limestone on the Ohio, "the most beautiful river" of the world, as it was customary to call it, had diverted a large part of the stream of adventurous settlers, but they mostly went to Kentucky, for there was still difficulty in the land questions on the Muskingum, which was preventing its full share of the intending settlers. Further south, an emigrant stream was constantly passing from Carolina.

There was possibly a preponderance of English blood in all these diversified currents; but the Scotch-Irish and the Germans were numerous enough to give a strengthening fibre in this mingling of ethnic strains. There was, in this south-western race, little mixture of the New England stock, though a few families from Connecticut and Massachusetts had made a mark among them. This northern element, however, was just beginning to assert itself north of the Ohio, in communities destined to become more mixed in blood than those south of that river. The Ohio Company, as we have seen, had taken shape in the New England spirit. The region between the two Miamis was controlled by the racial quality of the middle States. The lands reserved for bounties to the Virginia soldiers, something over four million acres, and more open to Indian attacks than other parts of the northwest, invited still other individualities. When Chillicothe was founded, Kentucky and Tennessee sent thither a restless horde. In this there was good blood mixed with less desirable strains coming from the poorer elements of Holston and Carolina. It was left for New England to restore a good average when the Western Reserve along Lake Erie came to be settled, its reputation for having a damp and cold soil tending to deter immigration for some years.

It is generally computed that there were, in 1790, nearly four thousand three hundred people, other than Indians, north of the Ohio. Of these there were about a thousand in and around Marietta, to be increased during the year by more than

one hundred and thirty new families. The hostility of the Indians prevented their hunters going far beyond the support of their armed guards, and the buffalo by this time had disappeared from Kentucky, except about the sources of some of the rivers, and were rarely to be found north of the Ohio, unless in similar feeding-grounds near the fountains of the northern tributaries of that river. So a scarcity of food was not an unusual condition, and, during the early months of 1790, there had been danger of famine but for the kind help of a Virginia hunter and farmer, who was settled on the opposite side of the Ohio. The next year, however, the crop proved a good one.

On the lands of Judge Symmes, between the Great and Little Miami, there were reckoned to be one thousand three hundred souls. St. Clair, in January, had visited these settlements, and set them up as the county of Hamilton, and made at Cincinnati the seat of government for the shire.

The settlement on the Wabash was supposed to have about a thousand souls, among whom St. Clair early in the year had been, and had found them thriftless. They were dreading a scarcity of food, and the governor relieved them. He officially confirmed their occupancy of the lands, which had been originally secured to them under the French rule. Another thousand of this trans-Ohio population was to be found in the other old French settlement at Kaskaskia and in the adjacent region. St. Clair had found these also fearing a famine, and he had issued orders to prevent the Spanish, in St. Louis, crossing the river to kill buffalo and to carry off the timber. This scarcity of food had driven off a good many to join Morgan's settlement at New Madrid, and it was the general complaint that much of their distress was owing to the failure of Virginia to pay for the supplies which they had furnished to George Rogers Clark twelve years before. These difficulties were increased by the obscuring of land titles, which a transfer of allegiance had produced, and St. Clair had had poor success in endeavors to remedy the evil. He found that the passage of supplies by ascending the Mississippi from the Ohio was jeopardized by the velocity of the current, and he at once urged upon the federal government the construction of a road for a distance of fifty or sixty miles, leaving the Ohio at Fort Massac, so that the region

could be better brought into communication with the crops of Kentucky. There was urgent need of some such closer connection, for St. Louis, now a flourishing village, was drawing away the old settlers of Kaskaskia and Cahokia. This was particularly the case with slave-owners, for there was a widespread belief that the ordinance of 1787 would eventually work the emancipation of their blacks. It was charged that Morgan was encouraging this view in order to obtain accessions to his colony. To place the federal interests in this distant region under more efficient supervision, St. Clair, on leaving for his headquarters in June, 1790, placed them under the immediate control of Winthrop Sargent, the secretary of the Northwest Territory.

In turning from this older alien element and ascending the Ohio, the newer and luckless French colony, for whose coming Putnam had been preparing, did not escape St. Clair's attention. He says he found about four hundred souls here, "not usefully employed and much discontented." There were a hundred more at Muskingum, and another hundred at Buffalo Creek, waiting to move on with the opening season. The beginnings of this movement have been recounted in an earlier chapter.

The Scioto Company, of which Joel Barlow, as already explained, was now the principal agent in Europe, had aimed to attract the longings and cupidity of the French people by presenting what he called the allurements of the American wilderness. The French government suspected the snare, and endeavored to warn the eager victims by caricatures, as we have seen, but to little purpose. By wanton promises, Barlow succeeded in selling a hundred thousand acres of what he professed was the company's domain to hundreds of deluded clients. Among them were ten persons of some notoriety, if not consideration, who had been founders of the National Assembly. There was a reckless folly in these people, who were seeking to escape from France, quite equal to that of those who were beginning to make that country the abhorrence of Europe. Brissot, who was also a member of the Assembly, and who had been in America two years before, was chattering in the cafés in the vein in which he was the next year, in a published book, to help on the movement. He warned the loyal aristocrats, who

showed a tendency to fly from what was coming, that in thus seeking "to preserve their titles, their honors, and their privileges, they would fall into a new society [in America], where the titles



J. P. BRISSOT,

[From *The Commerce of America with Europe*, by Brissot de Warville, etc., London, 1794.]

of pride and chance are despised and even unknown." He pointed out how Barlow's enterprise appealed rather to the poor, "who are deprived of the means of subsistence by the revolution," and who would find open to them "an asylum where they could obtain a property." So this infatuated Frenchman seconded the debased purposes of the Scioto schem-

ers, and went on generalizing, after his somewhat amusing practice, from evidence insufficient but useful in his task. Barlow, meanwhile, was busy oiling his machinery. On February 28, 1790, he wrote to St. Clair to bring to his "notice and protection a number of industrious and honest emigrants," who were seeking new homes on the Ohio, "under the direction of Messrs. Barth and Thiebault." Knox, similarly informed, somewhat later, on May 19, told St. Clair that these Frenchmen were to settle on lands "contracted for by Messrs. Cutler & Co.," and asked the governor to protect them. Barlow further, with a refined cruelty, wrote to Duer, his principal in New York, urging him not to omit any measures which could create good first impressions in these misguided wanderers, for twenty thousand more, as he said, would soon follow the pioneers. He asked him to have houses ready for them on a spot opposite the mouth of the Kanawha, against the arrival of these forerunners. On this representation, Rufus Putnam, lending himself blindly to a nefarious scheme, which subsequently cost him \$2,000 for uncompensated outlays, in the late winter, while in New York, contracted on behalf of the Scioto Company with one Major John Burnham to go with a party and erect cottages on the spot which Barlow had designated, then known by the Indian name of Chicamago, but later called, as Putnam says, Gallipolis, a name soon contracted to Gallipolis. In May, 1790, just at the time when Knox was commending these foreign adventurers to the care of St. Clair, Burnham arrived at Marietta with fifty men and a store of provisions to last till December, when it was expected the work would be done. On June 4, Putnam gave him his instructions. He was to learn from Colonel R. J. Meigs on the spot where he was to place the four ranges of huts which he was to build. They were to be reared of round logs, with clay in the chinks, and with chimneys of like construction. Each range or block was to have at the end a large room for meetings and dancing.

Some days later, this working party reached the site of the future settlement, supposed then, by some at least, to be within the area which Cutler had gained for the Scioto Company. To whomever it belonged, it was wholly unfit for occupancy, with all the germs of disease about it.

While this work was progressing on the Ohio, there was

among saner observers little confidence in the future of the undertaking. Oliver Wolcott, who was a classmate of Barlow, and doubtless knew him well enough to distrust him, wrote of the movement: "In consequence of the Bill of Rights, agreed to by the National Assembly, an association has been formed for settling a colony in the western country. About one hundred Frenchmen have arrived with the national cockades in their hats, fully convinced that it is one of their natural rights to go into the woods of America and cut down trees for a living."

The first comers had indeed just arrived in the Potomac, six hundred souls in all, in five ships, which had left Havre just before New Year's. After a dreary passage of three months, these luckless vessels tied up at Alexandria on the Potomac. It was a motley crowd which they bore, and probably never forerunners of a colonizing scheme were so ill fitted in all but gayety of spirits for the task which was before them. There were carvers and artists with no annual salon to look forward for. There were gilders and friseurs with no expectation of a drawing-room. There were carriage-makers going to a country without a road. There were artisans to make tools without a farmer to wield them.

It was summer before this extraordinary crowd started their caravans over the mountains, or at least such part of them as had not had their eyes opened and refused to go. Those that proceeded were discontented, and showed a refractory spirit. The provisions that were furnished them proved poor, and if they tried to procure other supplies of the farmers on the way, quarrels were pretty sure to ensue. As they passed the Seven Ranges, there were no signs of the civilization for which Barlow's lying map had prepared them. Once at the end of their journey, they discovered that their title-deeds covered lands which the grantors did not have to convey, and they perhaps remembered the truth of the Parisian caricatures. They found Burnham and his laborers looking to Putnam for their pay, and the company with which they had dealt was nowhere.

It is difficult to place the entire responsibility of this shameful deceit. Barlow, as an agent, may perhaps have exceeded his instructions, though there is no evidence in his correspondence with his principals to show that they did anything to check his

rampant performances. If the Ohio Company is to be exculpated, it was certainly Cutler's overdrawn descriptions which were depended upon to delude the poor souls. Barlow's definite instructions from Duer and his associates have never been made known. The truth seems to be that these speculators, some of the first people of the land, as Cutler with some satisfaction called them, had counted upon buying continental securities, while depressed under the weakness of the confederation, and using them at face for meeting their obligations for the land. The inauguration of the new government checked the depression and then enhanced the value of such notes, so that they could no longer be bought at the expected discount. This frustrated the schemers' plans. To make some amends to the deluded settlers, Duer and the Ohio Company agreed upon a transfer of some two hundred thousand acres from the company, upon which, in fact, by a miscalculation, the huts had been placed by Meigs and Burnham, but even this restitution in the end was futile, for Duer soon after became bankrupt, and everything was awry.

For a time, however, it seemed as if the trustful Frenchmen got something for their money, and, occupying the fragile habitations which had been prepared, Gallipolis was fairly begun. But the fettered handicraftsmen, setting to their task, only found that their numbers grew less as the hardier of them became weary and deserted. It was no easy job to fell the enormous sycamores which stood where they needed to plant their fields. When the trees one by one fell, they found no way so easy of getting rid of the massive trunks as to dig trenches and bury them. Then their supplies grew scant, and famine stared them in the face. They were sometimes warned by the whoops of prowling savages, and they were beginning to think that these children of a benignant nature, which the French philosophers had told them about, were not after all the most innocent of neighbors. So they encountered shocks to their sentiments, and blows as to their physical natures.

As autumn came on, they got all the comfort they could from the gracious messages of the governor, who dared to express to them the hope that, amid their trials, they had still found independence and happiness. He assured them that the rascality of the shameless deceivers would be punished by law, and that

the colonists would in the end have justice. He begged them to be patient a little longer, till arrangements for their security could be made, and the comfort of their community assured. St. Clair expressed his own views unreservedly to Knox on November 26, that "an interested speculation of a few men, pursued with too great avidity, will reflect some disgrace on the American character, while it involves numbers in absolute ruin in a foreign land."

All this meant that there was need of much better discernment in the use of these Ohio lands than the recipients of the ordinance of 1787 had devised, and that the precluding of chicanery should go along for honesty with the prevention of servitude. Hamilton had seen the evil easily to accompany the large speculative mania which Cutler and his colleagues stood for, and strove, but for the present unsuccessfully, to better the conditions in the disposition of these public lands. On July 22, 1790, he made a report for unifying and controlling the sales, in which he proposed a general land office at the seat of government, with one local office in the northwest and another in the southwest, where sales could be made to actual settlers of not over a hundred acres to each. The Indian titles were first to be quieted. Tracts were then to be set aside to satisfy subscribers to the loans. Townships ten miles square were to be offered for competition. There might in some cases be special contracts. But the main restraint was to be a fixed sum of thirty cents per acre, one quarter cash, with security for the rest. It was an effort to control as much as possible speculative values. In his report on the public credit, Hamilton had declared that cultivated lands in most of the States had fallen in value since the Revolution from twenty-five to fifty per cent., and in the remoter south still more. Western lands, he says, had been heretofore sold at a dollar an acre; but this price was paid in depreciated paper, worth scarce a seventh of its face. But Congress was not yet ready for a movement as Hamilton proposed, and the owners of earlier grants were ready at all times to thwart any plans which would make the government their rival in the land market.

The public lands of the west, from the time when the States had been urged to make cession of them, had been looked

upon as a source of income to meet the interest and promote the payment of the national debt. So they played no insignificant part in shaping the financial policy of the new federal government. The movement instituted by Hamilton for resuscitating the credit of the government was complicated by political and sectional interests. The debt of the Union as a whole, resulting mainly from the war, was somewhere about \$54,000,000. Of this there were \$12,000,000 held in foreign lands, and this it was Hamilton's plan to pay at once. There were \$42,000,000 of the government securities held by the people, and this was to be funded. In addition, there were \$25,000,000, which constituted the outstanding debt of the individual States, and it was Hamilton's purpose that the federal government should assume this, with all its varying proportions among the States, and fund it also. On the policy of assuming these state obligations there was strong opposition on the part of those who were already grouping themselves on the side of state rights, and who saw in the measure only a scheme for increasing the paternalism of the government. The debates of Congress were showing the mutual distrust of these antagonistic factions. The repelling influences of radical and conservative dispositions in domestic matters found other grounds for difference in the commotions which were now agitating France, and which had come home to the sensibilities of people in the untoward events which had founded Gallipolis. The so-called federal faction rested their plea for breaking the alliance with France on the downfall of the government of that country, which had made the treaty of 1778. Hamilton was the champion of this position, as he was of the funding bill and of the using of the public lands for revenue. Jefferson, with French tastes and sympathies, as his enemies charged, was the natural opponent of Hamilton's "mercenary phalanx." The organs of these respective parties were the *Gazette of the United States*, as conducted by Fenno, in the interests of neutrality if not of English favor, and the *National Gazette*, which, under Freneau, outdid its rival in the bitterness which hypocrisy, intrigue, and falsehood combined to exemplify in Jefferson at a period of his life over which his admirers may well throw a veil. The blunt John Adams printed in Fenno's paper those *Discourses on Davila* in which the Jeffersonians found a plea for mon-

archy, abetting what Jefferson called Hamilton's monarchism "bottomed in corruption." It was not long before like distinctions were again sharply drawn, when the English packet brought over Edmund Burke's *Reflections on the French Revolution*, and when Tom Paine's *Rights of Man*, in May, 1791, found an echo in the hearts of the American sympathizers with France, who, as Jefferson said, welcomed the pamphlet of Paine as "likely in a single stroke to wipe out all the unconstitutional doctrines which the bell-wether [of the Federalists], Davila, has been preaching for a twelvemonth."

While the question of sustaining or abandoning France caused perhaps warmer controversy in political circles, there was meanwhile no lack of ardor in the way in which Congress had discussed the question of a site for the new federal city. The question was decided by the most conspicuous example of political log-rolling which had yet disgusted the soberer citizens of the new Republic. This compromise prevented, as such plans are usually intended to prevent, a tension of political feeling that might turn threats into action. Severance of the Union was already intimated, and Washington pertinently asked "if the Eastern and Northern States are dangerous in the Union, will they be less so in separation?"

In May, 1790, the Senate rejected a bill to place the capital on the eastern branch of the Potomac. To prevent a site being selected farther north, and to sustain an earlier vote for placing the seat of government in "due regard to the particular situation of the western country," the Senate, on June 28, considered a bill for forming a district ten miles square, on the Potomac, as the place for the federal city. It was at this point, and to reconcile the opposing demands of the two sections of the country, that the political bargain, just mentioned, was made. The future home of the government was determined to the advantage of the South, and as a recompense the debts of the States were assumed by the central government, to the gain of the North. So it was that Hamilton's funding bill passed both Houses, and on July 9, 1790, became a law; and at the same time the residence of Congress was established at Philadelphia till December, 1800, when the new capital was to be occupied.

The bill, both as regards the financial scheme in touching the importance of western lands, and in respect to the location of

the capital, was in some sense a victory for the west. There were some, however, like Imlay, who regretted the permanency of the choice of the Potomac and thought the federal city should ultimately be transferred to the Great Valley, and find a home, for instance, near the Falls of St. Anthony.

As against the Potomac, the advantages of a site on the Susquehanna were the most promising, because of the claims which were urged of its affording easier communication over the mountains with the west. It was shown that the distance from tide-water at Alexandria on the Potomac to the Monongahela and Pittsburg — the usual portal of the west — was three hundred and four miles with thirty-one miles of portage. Imlay says that it is asserted on the best authorities that the land carriage by this route may be reduced by further canalization of the rivers to less than twenty miles. This was the natural route from Baltimore and Richmond, and if the Ohio was reached by land only, it took a varying time, from ten to twenty days, to pass the mountains from the principal seaboard towns.

From tide-water on the Susquehanna to Fort Pitt was two hundred and seventy-five miles, and if the route was carried up the Juniata, there was the easiest mountain pass of all, making a portage of twenty-three miles. Another but less favorable passage went by the west branch of the Susquehanna, leading to Toby's Creek and the Alleghany, and thence to the Ohio.

There was still a way by which those passing west, either from Richmond or Philadelphia, entered the valley of the Shenandoah, and proceeded to Fort Chissel on the Kanawha, near the North Carolina line. Thence the road led through Cumberland Gap. It was the usual path by which those who sought a land carriage entered the leafy regions of Kentucky and so passed on to the rapids of the Ohio, now the liveliest spot in the west, and to Vincennes and Kaskaskia beyond. It was generally conceded at this time that Alexandria was nearer by one hundred and fifty miles to Kentucky than Philadelphia was, and twenty to thirty miles nearer than Baltimore was, and this last city was west of the real centre of population of the whole country. Philadelphia was now maintaining a weekly post by the Cumberland Gap with the Kentucky settlements, and it traversed a road that in one place for a hundred miles was without a house, and the average rate was about twenty miles a day. If this

route shared the streams of travel westward with the water passage by the Ohio, the return by land was more usual in avoidance of the struggle against the current of that river.

Those who were bound for the Tennessee country, after striking the valley of the Holston, instead of turning to the right for Cumberland Gap, followed down that river to Fort Campbell, near where the Holston and Clinch unite to form the Tennessee, and then struck northwesterly over the mountains to the Cumberland valley and so on to Nashville. The distance from Fort Campbell was a little short of two hundred miles. Winterbotham, a contemporary writer, speaks of this route as "a pleasant passage for carriages, as there will be only the Cumberland Mountain to pass, and that is easy of ascent, and beyond it the road is generally level and firm, and abounding with fine springs of water." Other descriptions of the time are not so attractive, and they tell of glowing ravines where patrols were sometimes met, and as night came on, there was something startling in the click of the hoofs of the traders' pack-horses, hurrying to find a night's rest. The occasional log huts are spoken of as filthy, with the roughest household furniture, for it was not till 1796 that frame houses began to appear along the way.

At Nashville, the traveler found the inevitable whiskey-tap in its one variety store. The people were just beginning to open trade with New Orleans, sending thither, mainly by water, and running the gauntlet of the river pirates, the products of the region, — dried beef, hides, tallow, furs, corn, tobacco, and flax. Those who were not traders were apt to follow the hunter's trace, which ran from Nashville to Natchez, through the territory of the friendly Chickasaws. The portages which connected the Tennessee with the Florida rivers sometimes brought from the south the Spanish traders of Mobile and Pensacola.

The routes thus far enumerated were generally adapted to indicate the Potomac as the best site for the proposed federal city, to which the water carriage on the Ohio was not so favorable. This easier passage to the two hundred thousand square miles, constituting the valley of the Ohio and its tributaries, was found by either the Alleghany or the Monongahela, and was now without a rival. The route westward by the Mohawk, across the valley of the Genesee to Niagara, was slow in devel-

oping, and the retention of the posts on the northern lakes operated against a passage by Oswego and the Great Lakes.

The Ohio boat, now become a familiar object in western experience, was an anomalous construction of various sizes and shapes. It had sometimes a keel, but, on account of the difficulties of the return voyage, it was oftener built as cheaply as possible, with flat bottom and square corners. It was sometimes constructed with stories, having a level or hipped roof atop, and was steered by a long sweep at the stern. The usual



OHIO FLATBOAT.

[From Collet's *Atlas*.]

cost of these cheaper builds was five dollars a ton, and a boat twelve feet beam and forty feet long — a common size — measured about forty tons. Some of them were arranged for stalling domestic animals, and others afforded rough conveniences for domestic life, as the temporary homes of journeying immigrants. The trading-boats sometimes passed on to a distant market, or tied up at the landings as they went for a local traffic. When his merchandise was disposed of, the trader usually sold his boat, and, on his next visit, he would find its plank and boards matched in new tenements or hucksters' booths, within the young town. It was of such material that Fort Harmar and other stockades had been built in part, the living forest supplying the rest.

The cost of transportation from Philadelphia over the mountains, and thence by boat to Louisville, was reckoned at the rate of £1,600 for forty tons; but for the river passage alone, smaller merchandise was counted at a shilling per hundred-weight, or five shillings per ton for a bulky mass. Toulmin,

buying a boat at Redstone, on the Monongahela, for £6-9-0, in which he carried 13 horses, 21 negroes, 13 whites, and £100 worth of merchandise, took a fair sample of these trading outfits. It was different with coarse articles, but fine manufactures could often, at this time, be sent from Philadelphia over the mountains, and be exposed for sale in the rough booths of the river settlements, where rent and taxes were of no account, at prices not much beyond those asked in Chestnut or Market streets on the Delaware; and Philadelphia fashions, it was said, were in vogue in Frankfort in three months after they appeared in the Pennsylvania capital. The days of barter were passing, as money was brought in by immigrants, or was brought up from New Orleans by the traders; but still, slaves, horses, cattle, and pigs were not infrequently exchanged for calicoes, chintzes, and other fabrics.

The most favorable season for these river passages was between February and May, when the Ohio and Mississippi ran with full channel. The flatboats then sped along from Pittsburgh to the Louisville rapids in eight or nine days. If they passed on to the Mississippi, they were sure to find it a headlong stream, even well into the summer, but during July it began to decrease in volume of water. It did not, however, at any time, rise to that height which it would have attained had all of its sixty considerable affluents poured their spring tides into its bed at once. A devastating overflow was, in fact, prevented by these incoming rivers being affected by their local freshets at varying intervals. Recent calculations have shown that in high-water season the Mississippi might, by the simultaneous swelling of its branches, pour into the Gulf three million cubic feet of water a second, whereas, in fact, the outpour, because of this sequence of floods, is only about one million eight hundred thousand cubic feet. The velocity of the current from the mouth of the Ohio to Baton Rouge is from four and a half to five and a half feet per second, with full banks, and much swifter thence on to New Orleans. In such a current as this, the river boats made the run from the Ohio rapids to New Orleans in about twenty days. The usual practice of the pilots, to insure safety, was to cross from one concave shore to the other (reversing in going upstream), and to trust to the current when there was doubt about the channel.

At New Orleans, the trader usually sold his produce and the boat which had brought it. Going to Havana with his gains, he returned by sea to Philadelphia or Baltimore. There he put his money into fine fabrics, and returned home over the mountains and joined his family, from which he had been absent from four to six months.

The smaller boats sometimes made the return trip by the river. There were often south winds to help them stem the current, and experienced boatmen knew how to take advantage of the eddying up-currents at the river bends. Such boats were sometimes back in Louisville in forty days. It was estimated that the coarse lading of ten boats of sixty tons each would purchase for the return a bulk of finer commodities which might be carried upstream in three boats of five tons each. Ascending the river was, however, too costly as yet to make it the rule, but it was beginning to be believed that from New Orleans to Louisville "by mechanical boats," the cost could be reduced to one tenth. Fitch's steamboat on the Delaware was, however, hauled up to rot this very summer, and the poor, disappointed inventor hardly dreamed of the time when a more perfect vessel, with river obstructions removed, should go in a single trip from Pittsburg to Fort Benton, in Montana, a distance of four thousand three hundred and thirty-three miles, crossing very nearly the entire Mississippi drainage system, with its area of one million two hundred and sixty thousand square miles. But in August of the next year (1791) new improvements in steam-engines were patented by Fitch, Rumsey, and Stevens of Hoboken, and decided steps were registered in the solution of the great river problem.

CHAPTER XIX.

HARMAR'S AND ST. CLAIR'S CAMPAIGNS.

1790-1791.

THE continued retention of the posts and the hostility of the Indians, closely connected as both the Americans and the Indians felt, and as the British generally denied, was for the federal government the perplexing question in the northwest in the beginning of 1791. Jay, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs under the confederation, had, as we have seen, contended that the American breaches of the treaty of 1782 were at least equal to those of the British, and that there was no good ground for amicable settlement as long as either contestant failed to purge his record. Jay was now Chief Justice of the Republic. It was possible that some test case might come before him, and the prospect was not a pleasant one to the ardent republicans. Jefferson was satisfied that the English ministry had no intention of surrendering the posts, and was content to let the matter rest till the United States were strong enough to force an evacuation. Gouverneur Morris and the Duke of Leeds had been corresponding in London without result. That American representative had also intimated to Pitt that the real reason of the delay was the fur trade, and that the depriving American merchants of that trade had prevented the profits which might have liquidated the British debts. It was true that some of the States were unconverted to Jay's views. In Georgia, British debts were still confiscated. In Virginia, there were strong legal and social combinations against the creditors, and Marshall and Henry were active in the debtors' behalf.

On the British side there was the strong support of the Canadian fur traders, who lost no opportunity of pressing their interests upon the government. One of these, who described himself as an "Indian interpreter and trader," Long by name, had just published (1791) his *Voyages and Travels*, and in it he said: "It is an undoubted fact that, in case of a dispute

with the Americans, the posts would make but a feeble resistance" without the aid of the Six Nations, "and, deprived of the posts, the fur trade would surely be lost to this country," and he contended for "the propriety of keeping" them. At times these traders feared that the course of diplomacy might restore the posts. They were always ready under such apprehensions to press for an interval of five years in which to collect and withdraw their property. The offense to the Americans was not only that the posts on the territory which had been won by treaty were used in this lucrative traffic, but that the British traders, as St. Clair represented to his government, presumed to traverse territory not within the influence of these posts in pursuit of this same trade. The Great Northern Company of Canada had, through Todd & Company, secured from Carondelet permission to trade on the western bank of the Mississippi in its upper parts, though it seems probable that the Spanish governor had no conception with whom he was dealing in conferring this privilege. The result was that British traders passed to and fro, preferably by the Wisconsin as the shorter route, but also by the Chicago portage, and in both cases across American soil in reaching these trans-Mississippi regions to which the post at Prairie du Chien was the usual portal. It was pointed out at the time how Vigo, the old abettor of George Rogers Clark, in making his trips between St. Louis and Pittsburgh, had shown that the river route was much cheaper than the lake route was by way of these portages. It was indicated how profitable the Americans might make the business if they could get possession of it. They were at present forced to conduct a faint rivalry from Vincennes.

There is no question that an Indian war was detrimental to the British trading interests by diminishing the supply of skins. There was, accordingly, little to be gained in bankrupting the merchants of Detroit and Mackinac by an official incitement to war. Yet it was, on the other hand, conceived to be for the advantage of the British government to divert American attention from any attempt to assail the posts by keeping it occupied with movements of the savages, and so to threaten a war, if not actually provoking an outbreak. It was a dangerous policy and likely to get beyond control.

It had been very apparent towards the end of 1789 that war

was coming, and Washington had instructed St. Clair to be prepared by summoning a thousand militia from Virginia and five hundred from Pennsylvania. There were at this time a few fortified posts in the northwest, — Fort Knox at Vincennes, Fort Washington at Cincinnati, Fort Steuben, twenty-two miles above Wheeling, and Fort Harmar. Not one of them had more than a few score defenders.

Early in the year (1790), while St. Clair was on the lower Ohio, he had instructed Hamtramck, commanding at Vincennes, to try to propitiate the Indians neighboring to that post; but the effort failed there, as it did elsewhere along the Ohio valley. During the spring of 1790, there were alarms all the way from Pittsburg to the Mississippi. Boats were constantly intercepted on the Ohio, and mostly near the mouth of the Scioto. There was here on the Kentucky side a high rock, which served the Indians as a lookout, whence they could scan the river up and down. Harmar, in April, 1790, had sent a force to strike the Scioto some distance up, and swoop down upon this nest of marauders, but it had little effect. The stories of this wild foraging carried dismay far and wide. Zeisberger, at the Moravian station of New Salem, — then on the traveled route between Pittsburg and Detroit, — heard of the ravages in April, and ascribed this murderous activity to the Cherokees. The stories reached St. Clair at Cahokia on the 1st of May, 1790, when he wrote to the secretary of war that hostilities seemed inevitable. He charged the British authorities with instigating the trouble, and thought it not possible to stop the river depredations by patrol boats, inasmuch as the trade with New Orleans had drained Kentucky of the provisions which a patrolling force would require.

When St. Clair started up the river in June, 1790, he was satisfied that the intrigues of Brant had succeeded among the Wabash tribes, and that they would conspire with the Miamis for a general war. In this frame of mind the governor reached Fort Washington on July 13, 1790. Two days later, he made a demand on Kentucky for troops, with the determination to take the offensive. Judge Innes at the same time wrote to Knox that unless something of that kind was done, the Kentuckians were "determined to avenge themselves," and the discontent was for a while farther increased by a rumor that the govern-

ment had determined to abandon the Ohio country. St. Clair's activity soon satisfied the distrustful that an effort would at least be made to protect the settlements. The governor now authorized Richard Butler, commanding in Alleghany County, to summon the militia of the nearest counties in Pennsylvania and Virginia to protect that region, and distract the Indians thereabouts, while Harmar was advancing up the Miami in a campaign which had been decided upon. On August 23, 1790, St. Clair reported his plans to Knox, and told him that Hamtramck had at the same time been instructed to advance on the side of the Wabash. Harmar's force was ordered to assemble at Fort Washington on September 15. As this day approached, it was evident that delays would occur, for Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania was sluggish in sending forward his quota. Knox, meanwhile, was suggesting to St. Clair to keep in mind the founding of a fort on the upper Miami with a garrison of seven hundred and fifty men, and to support it by auxiliary posts on the Scioto and Maumee. The difficulty which confronted Knox was that eighteen hundred men would be necessary to carry the plan fully out and maintain communications, while the government had no more than four hundred regulars to spare for the object. He anxiously asked St. Clair if his militia could be depended upon to supply the rest.

There was, at the same time, a division among Washington's advisers on the question of assuring the English commander at Detroit that Harmar's movements were not directed against that post. Jefferson feared that if Dorchester's anxiety in that respect was quieted, he would be freer to prepare to attack the Spaniards on the Mississippi, in the impending war with Spain, though it was possible without such a notice he might suspect the sudden armament was intended to contest his passage across American territory to reach the Mississippi. The final result of weighing opinions was that St. Clair was instructed to communicate with the British at Detroit, and on September 19 he sent such a letter from Marietta, in which he expressed a hope that the English traders might be restrained from giving aid to the Indians.

The English had already been making up their minds, as Dorchester had written in March to Grenville, that the posts were really the object of the American campaign, no matter

what their profession. The Canadian governor thought, as his letters show, that it was the American plan to advance by the Potomac to the Ohio, and then proceed against Erie and Detroit. "The possession, also," he added, "of the great approaches to Canada by the Mohawk and Oswego and up the Sorel would make them masters of the country." He urged the sending to Canada of four thousand more soldiers, for though he could repair and strengthen the upper posts against an Indian attack, Niagara was the only one which could repel the Americans. As the summer came on and brought the danger of a Spanish war, there was a disposition in London to think Dorchester's prognostications reasonable, particularly when the minister learned from him that Congress had voted to raise five thousand foot and sixteen companies of artillery to reinforce the western army, though the Senate had indeed reduced the number to three thousand infantry. This made matters look serious to the British ministry, — the game was becoming hazardous, — and in August Dorchester was advised to prevent the Indians ravaging the American settlements, for "if the United States send an army against the Indians, embarrassments will follow." Dorchester, in further advices, represented St. Clair as a man of firmness and experience, but of no great ability, while Harmar was frequently intoxicated.

So under this drunken leader, as British rumor had it, the little army was gathering at Fort Washington. The militia did not promise well, with their bad equipments, and there were also signs of insubordination. By October 1, Harmar sent forward an advance guard to open the road. Three days later, the general followed with his main body. His whole force consisted of three hundred and twenty regulars and one thousand one hundred and thirty-three militia. The rumor that had gone north gave him a much larger army, and McKee had notified Sir John Johnson that the Indians could not stand before it. It was reported to Zeisberger that the numbers were eight thousand, and the smallest reckoning they had at Detroit gave him two thousand. The result was that the Indians nowhere made a stand, and Harmar, in sixteen days, reached the Miami and Delaware villages, near where the St. Mary's and St. Joseph's rivers unite to form the Maumee. Here he found their three hundred huts deserted, and the storehouses of the

Detroit traders bared of their goods, which the Indians had assisted in carrying away. He however found twenty thousand bushels of corn, which, with the huts, he burned.

Thus far, Harmar had accomplished what in Indian warfare was often thought to count for something, and this mere destruction was the ground of St. Clair's claim that the expedition was successful in delivering a "terrible stroke" to the enemy. Hamtramck, who had the same sort of success in his movement farther west, knew better the significance of such easy warfare. "The Indians can never be subdued by burning their houses and corn," he said, "for they make themselves perfectly comfortable on meat alone, and they can build houses with as much facility as a bird does his nest."

If his devastations did not count for all he wished, Harmar's later blunders really negated his doubtful achievements. His troops were, on the whole, but unpromising soldiers, many too old for campaigning and more too young, and he heedlessly committed them to work which only the best disciplined men could do. He sent out, beyond support, three several detachments, and gave Little Turtle, with better knowledge of the numbers he now had to deal with, a chance to overwhelm them in detail, and a loss of one hundred and eighty was speedily inflicted. The main body saw no foe, but after November 4, when they began their disorderly retreat, it might have suffered as much as the flanking parties, had the Ottawas not withdrawn from the savage horde. As it was, Harmar took back a larger part of his force than could have been expected, to winter them in scattered posts along the river, so as to prevent the ravages of famine.

McKee, on the British side, professed to look upon the fighting which had taken place as a victory, and as a trial of arms it undoubtedly was; but such partial success did not quiet his apprehensions, and he promptly appealed to Sir John Johnson for aid, if the tribes were to be held together east of the Mississippi. This indicates a considerable extremity on the enemy's side. Had Knox's advice been followed, and a stockade built on the Miami, Harmar might have saved the men which he heedlessly exposed, and have gained a vantage-ground for a treaty. The obstacles to the permanence of a reconciliation with the Indians were, however, as yet great, and Hamtramck

did not exaggerate the risks when he said to St. Clair, in December, 1790: "The people of our frontiers will certainly be the first to break any treaty. The people of Kentucky will carry on private expeditions and kill Indians wherever they meet them, and I do not believe there is a jury in all Kentucky who would punish a man for it," — an opinion that Washington himself certainly shared, when he affirmed that the "frontier settlers entertain the opinion that there is not the same crime (or indeed no crime at all) in killing an Indian as in killing a white man."

The Indians, when they counted losses and gains in the late campaign, showed no signs of distrust of their ability to press their adversaries still harder. They apparently got encouragement from their allied whites, and McKee, whom St. Clair charged with furnishing ammunition to the bands which attacked Harmar's detached parties, was, with Simon Girty's support, hot for further fighting. So it was decided to renew marauding in December, 1790.

The first attack came on the evening of January 2, 1791, when a body of Delawares and Wyandots dashed upon a small settlement at Big Bottom, dependent upon Marietta, but forty miles up the Muskingum. Here they killed twelve persons, and leaving their mangled bodies on the ground they suddenly withdrew, carrying off four prisoners. The sad tidings reached Marietta the next morning, and Putnam began to call in the settlers and make ready for warm work. There were twenty regulars in Fort Harmar, and the settlements within reach could muster about three hundred men. Belpre, twelve miles down the Ohio, had not yet been alarmed, but hovering parties of Indians were seen the same day about Waterford, at Wolf Creek.


The next warning came on the 10th, at Dunlap Station, on the east bank of the Miami, when Girty appeared with three hundred warriors. The inhabitants had been advised of their approach, and summoned aid from Cincinnati. Just as it arrived, the enemy withdrew. During February, 1791, the settlements along the Alleghany suffered severely, and by March fleets of Indian canoes were assailing flatboats along the Ohio. It was just at this time that Nathaniel Massie,

who, as a surveyor of bounty lands, had picked out a site on the north bank of the river, twelve miles above Limestone, was laying in stockade and blockhouse the foundations of the later Manchester, the pioneer Virginia settlement on that side of the river.

Meanwhile, both at Quebec and Philadelphia, the authorities were intent on military preparations. Dorchester, fearing that Harmar's advance was but preliminary to an attack on Detroit, issued orders in January, 1791, to the western commanders to be alert and promptly confront the Americans if they approached. At the same time, Washington notified Congress, in December, 1790, that he intended another expedition at the west, and laid before Congress a plan for raising three thousand troops, to be placed under St. Clair for active work. When Congress had approved, Knox asked Pickering to accept the position of quartermaster of a western department, and push the details, but he declined. In doing so, however, he expressed his conviction that the tribes could be taught to respect the reserved power of the Republic. Washington, buoyed in his hopes by the restoration of the public credit, and depending on the increasing resources of the country, felt equally sure that the Indians could be made to understand that the "enmity of the United States is as much to be dreaded as their friendship is to be desired." Jefferson had scant sympathy with any military measures, and wrote to Monroe: "I hope we shall drub the Indians well this summer, and then change our plan from war to bribery," for the expenses of a summer's campaign will buy "presents for half a century."

While the government was thus over-confident, Knox, on March 9, 1791, issued orders to General Charles Scott of Kentucky to move suddenly against the Kickapoos and other Wabash tribes, to prevent their joining the Miamis, against whom the main attack was to be made. It was equally desirable that similar or other methods should at the east distract the Indians of New York, and keep them at least neutral. To this end, Pickering was asked to put himself in communication with Brant, while Governor Clinton was urged to win over that

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page, showing by the black dots Moravian settlements, is from G. H. Loekiel's *Mission of the United Brethren*, London, 1794.



Mohawk chief by a gift, for he was known to have informed Kirkland, the missionary among his people, that he had determined to head a western confederacy in forcing the Americans south and east of the Ohio. These measures were at once seized upon by the British to prove to the Indians that the professions of peace on the part of the Americans were insincere. Brant was known, in May, 1791, to have gone west with a following, but with what intent was not known. On June 4, 1791, however, he wrote back to Sir John Johnson that he had decided to join in the coming fight. He had probably heard by this time that Scott had, on May 19, crossed the Ohio with eight hundred mounted Kentuckians, and was advancing on the Wabash towns. Scott's coming had been heralded, and when he reached their towns, one hundred and fifty miles away, he found them deserted, and so encountered no serious opposition in burning them. He killed a score or two of Indians, and captured a somewhat larger number. When, retreating, he reached the rapids at Louisville, he had been absent about thirty days. There could be no peace after this. In June, 1791, while Knox, in Philadelphia, was confident that war was begun, the Indians were gathering in large numbers. Zeisberger, then at the mouth of the Detroit River, was informed that four thousand had assembled, and he was made anxious lest his peaceful Moravian converts would be forced to join them.

It is not easy to determine how to apportion the responsibility of the savage war to which the Americans now seemed to be committed. The tribes had a standing grievance against the Americans in the treaty of Fort Stanwix of 1784, and yet Washington pointed out to Cornplanter, who with other Seneca chiefs had come to Philadelphia in December, 1790, that the very release of lands, of which they complained, had been confirmed by them in the treaty of Fort Harmar in 1789. "Therefore the lines must remain established," said the President. Cornplanter had, during this conference, urged that certain lands should be restored; but Washington, taught by the claims which the Indians presented that the treaty of 1784 had been made by irresponsible chiefs, readily suspected that any yielding now to the Senecas would encourage similar demands from other factions of the tribes. There was indeed just now a new grievance, in that Robert Morris had bought

for £100,000 the rights of Gorham and Phelps to the lands sold by Massachusetts in western New York, and Washington had already looked forward to trouble about the Indian title, and was not unprepared for Cornplanter's accusation of fraud. Indeed, as Washington said to Hamilton, "land-jobbing and the disorderly conduct of the borderers" were a constant source of irritation to the tribes; and to these were added the complications which came of individual States interfering in matters which belonged to the general government. The Kentuckians raided of their own account the Wabash region; the Tennesseans encroached upon lands at the Muscle Shoals; and New York had just in her Assembly voted to buy immunity from hostile depredations, thereby damaging the prestige of the federal authorities. So the evils which incited the savages to hostilities were not unaccompanied by uncontrollable mischief to the Republic itself from similar sources.

On the British side the story was not altogether a satisfactory one to the tribes, who were slow in forgetting that the treaty of 1782 had been concluded by the English without any recognition of their rights to ancestral lands, and that the promises of aid, which had been implied perhaps rather than actually promised, had rarely been fulfilled.

While Dorchester, in his communications with the Americans, professed to desire peace, and the fur merchants deprecated war, neither contemplated with satisfaction any success for the Americans which would hazard the British possession of the posts, or lead to the establishment of other lake stations, which would admit the Americans to the navigation of the lakes and affect the profits of the older posts. In these conditions, the movements of the Indians were watched with anxiety, and the encouragement given to them to worry the Americans, by such intriguers as Girty and McKee, was likely at any time to compromise the public peaceful professions of those in unmistakable authority. Harmar's report indicated that if he had chanced to capture the traders at the villages which he destroyed, there might have been complications which would force Dorchester to retaliation, and bring on a war. Dorchester himself perceived this, and with some apprehension he asked Sir John Johnson to discover the terms on which peace could be arranged between the Indians and the Americans.

But, inopportunately, it was just upon the eve of political change in Canada, which was to bring a new character to bear upon the overstrained relations of the two countries. In September, Dorchester was informed of the constitutional act of March, which had set up, as distinct from Lower Canada, the region west of the Ottawa, with ten thousand population, as a new government, grateful to the loyalists, and preserving such features of the Quebec Act as were not inconsistent, and placing in command John Graves Simcoe, whom the Americans had learned to hate in the Revolutionary War. He probably soon heard of the proposition of McKee to reëstablish the disused fort at the foot of the Maumee rapids as a necessary outpost of Detroit, though he was not yet prepared to undertake it.

From early spring, St. Clair had been preparing for his own work, hoping to get at it before autumn. In April, 1791, he reached Pittsburg, and endeavored to prevail upon the Senecas to join his army. A few days later, at Fort Harmar, he warned the Delawares that they must abide the consequences, if they interposed themselves between him and the Miamis; and it was probably about this time that he sent forward to the Miamis a speech which McKee said was intended to distract their councils.

By the middle of May, St. Clair was at Fort Washington, where his little army was to gather. Symmes, who looked upon the raw levies arrived from the seaboard towns, wrote to Elias Boudinot that "men who are to be purchased from prisons, wheelbarrows, and brothels at two dollars per month will never answer for fighting Indians." Such a force was not an inspiring one for a man like St. Clair, no longer young, subject to intervals of illness, and not as alert as he once was. If the men were poor and came slowly to the rendezvous, the material for supplies had passed no adequate inspection in being sent forward. The powder was bad. The saddles did not fit the horses. The oxen were poor and insufficient in number. With such things to worry him, St. Clair waited from June to September.

In August, fearful lest the Wabash Indians might have recovered from the effects of Scott's raid among them, and might gather with the other tribes athwart his route, which had been

too plainly indicated for the advance, he dispatched another force, as Knox had counseled, to repeat the blow. A body of mounted Kentuckians, five hundred and fifty strong, reported for this service at Fort Washington in July. Wilkinson, who had found Spanish intrigue getting tiresome, had sold his Frankfort property and accepted the command of these ardent volunteers. His enemies said it was a plan of the government to profit by his restless energy and divert it from mischievous action at home. On July 31, St. Clair gave him his instructions, and the next day he led his clanking horsemen out into the wilderness. The direction which he took seemed towards the Miami towns, and on this course he traveled four days and sixty miles, and then turned to the northwest. Passing now a broken country full of swamps, he fell upon Ouiatanon and other villages of Indians, with French traders among them, and devastated their cabins. His horses were badly used up, and but five days' provisions remained. He accordingly marched towards the Ohio rapids, as Scott had done, and reached them on August 21. Proceeding thence to Frankfort, three days later, he dispatched his report to St. Clair. When Washington heard of the results he said that the "enterprise, intrepidity, and good conduct of the Kentuckians were entitled to peculiar commendation."

The tidings of Wilkinson's success found St. Clair in deep anxiety. Every messenger from the east had brought urgent appeals for his advancing before the season was past for successful campaigning. His want of supplies, however, still detained him. He had now two regiments of regulars and some Kentucky militia, whom he might reasonably trust; but the boats from Pittsburg still brought him the wretched scourings of the eastern towns, towards completing the "two thousand levies for the term of six months" which Congress had ordered.

St. Clair's instructions, as often as he read them, gave him disquiet, in the presence of such recruits. He was to establish a "strong and permanent military post at the Miami village . . . for the purpose of awing and curbing the Indians, and as the only preventive of future hostilities," and he was to maintain such a garrison in it that he could upon occasion detach five or six hundred men on special service. He was warned in his instructions that such a post was "an important object of the

campaign," and to be founded in any event, and to be supplied with a six months' stock of provisions. It was left to his discretion whether he should employ Indians. In making a treaty at last, he was told to insist on keeping the tribes beyond the Wabash and Maumee, and, if he could, to divert the line to the Mississippi from the Au Panse branch of the Wabash. This would give a good stretch of country along the Ohio to the Americans, and dispossess few Indians beyond the Kickapoos. If this was insisted on, he was warned to manage it "tenderly." Still more cautiously must he treat the English, and it was held to be improper at present to "make any naval arrangements upon Lake Erie."

All this was the expectation of the government and the not over-confident hope of St. Clair. The plan had required three thousand effectives to be ready at Fort Washington by July 10, 1791; but the first regiment of two hundred and ninety-nine men did not arrive till the 15th. It was October before the general could count two thousand men, exclusive of the militia and the garrisons of Forts Washington and Hamilton, — the latter stockade having been begun on September 17, on the Great Miami. From this point, on October 4, General Butler, whose appointment had not been wholly acceptable, started with the advance, lumbering slowly on with his trains, five or six miles a day, through a bad country. On the 13th, the army stopped, and was occupied till the 24th in building a stockade, which he called Fort Jefferson, intended to shield his sick and hold his surplus supplies. The country about it was fertile, but it was too late in the year for his animals to get much refreshment out of it. When he started again, on the 28th, he soon discovered that the Indians were hanging on his flanks. There had been some desertions, and to check them he had executed one or two who had been retaken; but on October 31, a considerable body of militia slunk away, and St. Clair sent Major Hamtramck back with one of his regiments of regulars to prevent their robbing his supply trains. St. Clair had days of almost physical incapacity for his task, and General Butler, who was next in command, was scarcely better in health. The discipline and steadiness of the march would have suffered irretrievably, but for the exertions of the adjutant-general, Winthrop Sargent. It was Washing-

ton's criticism, when the miserable outcome was known, that there had been insufficient efforts to get information of the enemy, and that St. Clair's scouting system was inadequate. It is certain that the enemy was not long in discovering that St. Clair's scouts were not numerous, to say the least. He had been pointedly cautioned to be on his guard against surprise; and yet when he went into his last camp on November 3, on a branch of the Wabash, with a benumbing wind sweeping over icy ground, he was in the immediate neighborhood of his enemy, and with no chance of suddenly forming his line in case of an unexpected irruption. So it was not to be wondered at that, early on the morning of the 4th, some militia which he had bivouacked in advance beyond the stream, and too remote for instant support, were broken in upon and thrown into a panic. They fell hastily back upon the rest of the army. While he was endeavoring to form his lines within his camp, which was three hundred and fifty yards in length, the enemy swung around it, and when St. Clair found that his position was completely enveloped, he grew to a conception of the extent of the force which was opposed to him, though Armstrong, an old Indian fighter, was sure that five hundred savages, invisible as their habit was, could have produced all that St. Clair saw. The assailants from a thick cover poured a deadly fire upon the huddled and unprotected troops. St. Clair, with his gray hair streaming under his cocked hat, had horse after horse shot under him as he endeavored to make his force stand steady amid the frightful carnage. He had eight bullets pierce his garments, but not one grazed his skin. Butler was soon mortally wounded. The few guns of the Americans were rendered useless, when not a cannoneer could stand to them. The regulars lost every officer. The frenzied men, gaining manhood under the trial, tried to charge this way and that. The retreat of the Indians lured them on, when the wily savages would turn and surround them, party after party. Finally, there being no hope, the guns were spiked, and St. Clair gathered his men for a last charge to regain the road of retreat. He secured it; and for four miles the Indian fire blazed upon the flanks and in the rear. At last, over-eager for the spoils, dusky warriors drew off and began plundering what had been left behind. This saved the army from annihilation; but it did not prevent the men

throwing away their muskets, and St. Clair, near the rear of the line, found the ground covered with these rejected weapons as he passed along. He complained that the horse he rode "could not be pricked out of a walk," so it was impossible for him to ride forward and stop the waste.

The action began a half hour before sunrise, and the retreat was made at half-past nine. The estimates vary, but it is probable that St. Clair had in the fight not more than fourteen hundred men, and of these scarce half a hundred were unhurt. Very few beyond the killed and desperately wounded fell into the enemy's hands.

It is generally recognized that Little Turtle led the Indians. There was a small body of Mohawks present, but it is not probable that Brant was among them. Stone, his biographer, found a belief among the chief's descendants that he was in the fight; but there is no evidence of a more trustworthy kind. The Delawares, who had been stigmatized as women for lack of courage in past years, wiped out the disgrace by valiant deeds.

It was near thirty miles from the battlefield to Fort Jefferson, and the remnant of the army reached that post before night. Here St. Clair found Hamtramck and his command, and left about seventy of his wounded.

On November 9, he sent from Fort Washington a messenger with a dispatch, but rumors had already reached the government ten or eleven days earlier, and thirty days after the disaster. About the same time the news of the Indian side, traveling by the way of Vincennes, reached Frankfort, when it stirred Wilkinson's rampant energy, who was ready to strike the war-path on the Maumee or "perish in the attempt."

The Indian question had now become more serious than ever before, and there was great danger of the disaffection spreading among the Six Nations. Pickering, during the summer, had labored hard to propitiate them; but he had encountered the adverse influence of Brant. The activity of this chief was surprising. No sooner was he heard of at the Maumee rapids, conferring with the tribes, than he was reported at Niagara, in council with the British commander. His messengers, in the interim, were plying back and forth. All the while, as the letters now published show, warnings were coming from England,

and passed on to the upper posts, to prevent an outbreak. Perhaps the cabinet in London little knew how renegade mischief-makers were assuming among the Miamis to represent British purposes to aid them in a war, and the Canadian officials were constantly apprehending an attack on the posts, though Beckwith was writing to them from Philadelphia that the federal government disclaimed any such intention.

Before the news of St. Clair's defeat had reached Philadelphia, Jefferson and Hammond, the newly arrived British minister, had begun their bootless conferences. It was not long before it was apparent that Hammond had come merely to talk and keep watch. The two representatives were hopelessly at variance. They opposed each other on every aspect of the treaty of 1782. Hammond said that interest on the British debts constituted a part of the obligation. Jefferson denied it. Hammond represented and Jefferson disputed that the Americans had first broken the treaty. This kind of disputations fence was going on, when the news of St. Clair's defeat put a stop to it, and the American cabinet gave itself to other matters. Of course it was necessary to find a scapegoat for the ill luck at the west. The secretary of war was accused of neglect. The quartermaster had not done his duty. St. Clair had proved a failure. The news from the New England States showed that that section of the country at least was tired of the war. They believed with Pickering that pacifying the Indians cost less than killing them. The old problem of the responsibility of the British for aiding the savages came up again. Hammond promptly denied any complicity in his countrymen. It was a question whether a schedule of evidences, refuting Hammond's asseverations, should not be given to Thomas Pinckney, who was just starting for England. Certain acts were acknowledged by Hammond, but defended on the ground of charitable giving of food to famishing beings. Again, it was confessed guns and powder had been given, but it was a necessity of the Indian hunting season, while the Americans claimed that such gifts in times of peace were quite another thing when given in time of war, and they became a breach of neutrality. It did not make a bad matter better if, as the Americans contended, McKee scattered the munitions of war with his hands and talked peace as he did it. Nor was it less to be resented in

Sir John Johnson doing the same thing stately at the mouth of the Niagara.

The fact was, it was extremely difficult for the British government to treat the Indians as wards and administer to their needs, and not transgress the limits of neutrality as the Americans understood it. It was further, no doubt, true that friendly phrases uttered to the Indians by those wearing the British uniform were easily conceived to be a promise of help, by those anxious to receive it. As reports spread west, it was easy for the remoter tribes, especially if prompted to it, to imagine that to espouse the quarrel of the nearer people was the way to put off their own sacrifices to the whites. Rufus Putnam informed Knox that the Chippeways inclined to be neutral, but were played upon in this way till they embraced the cause of the Miamis.

When it came to the question of bounds between the Indians and the Americans, there is no doubt the English were prepared to do what could be done, without actually imperiling the peace, to advance the demands of the tribes, and even to demand larger sacrifices from the Republic. They talked much about the desirability of a territorial barrier to keep the reckless Americans and the heedless Britons apart. Some of the maps issued in London assumed this barrier as a part of the political geography of North America. It was Jefferson's opinion, from what Hammond had said, that the British government wanted a new line run, which should leave Lake Ontario by the Genesee, thence follow the Alleghany to Pittsburg, and so west in some way to the Mississippi. This would provide a barrier country and open the Mississippi to British access. If not this, their purpose was to gain that river by running the line from the Lake of the Woods to its sources, instead of due west to that river, which the treaty required, and which had proved a geographical impossibility. Perhaps a line even better for England could be secured, as Hammond sometimes claimed, by starting the westward line at Lake Superior instead. Some of the current maps of the English give this line as starting from the westernmost point of Lake Superior. Jefferson, on his side, claimed that the error of the treaty was remedied more simply by running the line due north from the sources

of the Mississippi, and that the right of England to share in the navigation of the Mississippi was inserted in the treaty merely to meet the contingency of Spain's yielding west Florida to England, in the general treaty made seven weeks later. Thus broadly were the British scanning the possibilities of a rectification of the Republic's northern boundary.

The Indian demand gave the tribes all the country north of the Ohio and west of the Muskingum and the Cayahoga. They claimed on every occasion that they had never parted with an acre of this territory by any fair treaty. The Americans cited the treaty of Fort Harmar, insisted it was not a fraudulent compact, and, as lands had been granted under it, the grantees must be protected. The British said that in any event the Americans had, by the treaty of 1782, only the right of preëmption to any lands south of the lakes which had not been bought of the tribes prior to 1782; and that the treaty gave the Indians the right to decline to sell, if they would. This view was a common one in the English maps, which ran the bounds of the United States along the Alleghanies. There is little doubt the Indians were taught sedulously this view of the treaty, for it protected the posts and perpetuated the British fur trade. It would seem that to sustain this view the new act creating Upper Canada had studiously avoided giving any bounds. This view also served the British in appeasing the savage discontent at the cruel way in which the interests of the Indians were abandoned by the British commissioners in negotiating the treaty. It is clear from the letters of Brant and Sir John Johnson that they understood the matter in the British way.

It was evident, then, that the combined interests of the British and Indians, in such a line by the Ohio, must be overcome by composition or force, before the Republic could achieve the territorial independence which was thought to be assured to her by the treaty of 1782.

CHAPTER XX.

THE NORTHWEST TRIBES AT LAST DEFEATED.

1792-1794.

BEFORE the dazing effect of St. Clair's defeat was dispelled, Knox had planned a legionary reorganization of the western army, on the basis of five thousand men, with a supplemental force of militia and scouts. While there was a probable necessity for such military provision, it was deemed prudent to ascertain if the intercession of the Six Nations could not end the northwestern difficulty without a further resort to arms. Before the close of 1791, Cornplanter, the Seneca leader, had been invited to Philadelphia, and Kirkland, the missionary, was sought to use his influence with Brant and the Mohawks to induce them to join the council. So pressure was brought to bear upon the two extremes of the New York confederates, in the hope to bring about the acquiescence of the entire league. On January 3, 1792, Kirkland wrote to Brant, urging him to accept the invitation, and giving promise of protection, a guarantee not altogether unnecessary, for Brant's name was associated with some of the most fiendish acts of the Revolution, whose effects were not yet forgotten. A month later, Brant declined (February 3), and later still (February 25), Knox added a new appeal.

Meanwhile, St. Clair had arrived in New York, ready to face the charges against him for his failure. He desired first a court-martial, but there were not officers enough available of suitable rank. He asked to retain his military commission until such inquiry as Congress should institute was over. This, however, as he was told by Washington, who remained throughout kind and considerate, was not practicable, as the law allowed but a single major-general, and his successor was imperatively needed to proceed to the northwest and take command. So, in April, St. Clair was induced to resign.

In February, 1792, Congress was canvassing the chances of a new campaign, and there was little heart for it among the eastern members, who never quite comprehended the western spirit. Oliver Wolcott was a good representative of those indifferent to the demands of the frontiers, and was quite willing to let them fight out their own salvation, and to run the risk of their making foreign alliances. "These western people," he said, "are a violent and unjust race in many respects, unrestrained by law and considerations of public policy." Washington was not quite so sweeping in his belief, but he felt that western urgency was very embarrassing. Among those who would make the western cause that of the country, there was a division of opinion between the desirability of fixed posts for awing the tribes, and the propriety of aggressive warfare. Washington was decidedly on the side of those who had no confidence in merely defensive measures.

The Indian department, in 1791, had spent \$27,000 in supporting the St. Clair campaign, which was ten times what had ever been appropriated before, and there was not a little apprehension in entering upon another year's warfare, likely to be more costly still, to find that in financial aspects the spring of 1792 was a discouraging one.

The speculative acts of Duer — and the enemies of Hamilton charged that that financial minister's funding policy had opened the way to stock-jobbing — had brought him to bankruptcy, to add still further to the blackness of the Gallipolis scandal. The magnate of the Scioto Company, and one of those eminently first people of the land whom Cutler rejoiced in, was now a prisoner for debt. For a result, as Pickering wrote, "New York was in an uproar, and all business at a stand." Jefferson, with a kind of satisfaction at the dilemma of the treasury, wrote, on March 16: "Duer, the king of the alley, is under a kind of check. The stock-sellers say he will rise again. The stock-buyers count him out, and the credit and fate of the nation seem to hang on the desperate throws and plunges of gambling scoundrels." Jefferson further affected to believe that the miseries of the South Sea bubble and the Mississippi scheme were as nothing, proportionally, to the drop in securities which was now going on. In the midst of this financial crash, Rufus Putnam and Cutler appeared in Philadelphia, seeking from

Congress their aid in two respects to prevent the collapse of the Ohio Company. They represented that during 1791 and 1792 they had spent \$11,350 in protecting themselves against the Indians, and they succeeded in inducing the government to assume a part of this. Their other plea touched the impending forfeiture of their lands, for their second payment of \$50,000 was due, and they had nothing with which to pay it. Their difficulty came in the main, as they urged, from their additional purchase of one million five hundred thousand acres, which they asked to be released from, for Colonel Duer and the other "first people," who had agreed to buy it of them, had not done so, and Richard Platt, their treasurer, was in jail, also, with a shortage of \$80,000 in his accounts. They asked, also, that the charge for land per acre which had been agreed upon should be reduced, as the government was offering land at lower rates, and they could not compete with it. They made a pitiful plea of the consideration they should experience as pioneers, and it had its effect. But the poor aliens at Gallipolis grubbed on without such consideration. The Indians yelped in their ears, they got no letters from home, and it seemed to their mind a question whether revolutionary France or the "first people of America" were the most to be abhorred. In the spring of 1792, they began to scatter. Some went to Detroit, others fled to Kaskaskia. Those that stayed grew hollow-eyed, nervous, and hungry, while Duer relished his prison fare, and Cutler talked botany with those he met.

While such was the unprosperous outlook to the world, the President and his little cabinet were, during March, 1792, discussing the vexed problems that confronted them. When some one raised the question of employing Indians, Washington replied that they must be with us, or they would be sure to be against us. He would use them as scouts to embarrass the enemy's spies, and prevent their getting near enough to our troops to learn their numbers and purposes.

When Jefferson proposed to build a fort at Presqu'Isle on Lake Erie, — the modern town of Erie, — so as to indicate the American right to the navigation of that lake, and interpose an obstacle thereby to the communication of the Senecas with the western tribes, he opened a question that for two years stood

in the way of pacifying Brant. The project was sure at all times to arouse a disposition in the British "to repel force by force," who looked upon it as fatal to their supremacy in those waters. At this moment, Hamilton and Knox objected to it as likely to hurry the country into a war with England. Washington remarked that the fulfillment of such a plan was best left to a time when the United States could devote a large force to maintain such a post. Jefferson, in pursuance of his plan, was suggesting at the same time to Hammond that the two countries could agree upon the naval force which was to be kept on the lakes.

The question came up again a little later, when Rufus Putnam, with little regard to available resources, sent in a plan of a line of posts, beginning at Big Beaver Creek, on the Ohio, and extending to Cayahoga Creek. He had traversed the country, and said it was the easiest communication to maintain between the Ohio and the lake, fit for a land carriage throughout, except where a causeway would have to be built through seven or eight miles of swampy land. Such a passage would not, he contended, be subject to the interruption at dry seasons which a water-way was sure to encounter. At the northerly end of this route, where is now the modern Cleveland, he had planned a strong fort and naval rendezvous, as the best point for sending supplies by the cheapest way to the Maumee country: "The sooner we show ourselves on the shores of Lake Erie, the better," he added. Washington easily pushed the plan aside as involving a division of the proposed legionary force, which was not likely to be more than enough for the main stroke farther west, since it was as yet by no means sure that recruits would be found in abundance. Beside, it was certainly Washington's opinion that defensive posts along a line had but little military effect upon such a scattered foe as the Indian tribes.

We have seen that one Peter Pond had within a year or two been trying to gain at the same time the favor of both the British and Americans. He had still more recently tried to reach the west by Niagara, but had been turned back by the British. He now appeared in Philadelphia, and made some startling statements to the government. He assured them that all efforts to establish a peace with the Indians would fail unless they would accept the mediation of England. He professed to

believe that this would have to be accomplished by a joint commission of three, representing respectively the Indians and the two governments, and that when the line of separation was determined, the British would guarantee its preservation to the Indians. Hamilton had little faith in Pond, as he well might have, and there was still less trust in his story of the intention of the British to settle a thousand families in the Illinois country. The idea of British mediation in any way was an ungrateful one to the cabinet, and they promptly dismissed it in their counsels. A little later, Morris, in England, heard a rumor of the United States asking England to intercede, and communicated it to Washington. He replied with something like indignation that any suggestion of it would be promptly dismissed.

As the time approached for the coming of the Senecas to confer with the President and his advisers, it was decided at a cabinet meeting that the Indian embassy "should be well treated, but not over-trusted." Red Jacket and his fellows reached Philadelphia on March 13, 1792, under the escort of Kirkland. It was soon apparent that whatever friendly disposition the visitors might manifest, a prevalence of it among the tribes at home could not be depended upon. Red Jacket, in accounting for this widespread distrust among his people, charged it upon the fact that the Six Nations were not asked to have any hand in the treaty of separation in 1782. He further told Pickering, who conducted most of the conferences with them, that the western Indians did not understand how the British and the Americans, "important and proud as they both were," having made a treaty, did not abide by it. Pickering said that the Miami and Wabash Indians had always been averse to a treaty, while the treaties entered upon with the other tribes were fairly made on both sides, and had been justly kept. The United States having thus acquired lands and made grants of them, they were under the necessity of protecting the grantees. It was said in reply that the agreement at Fort McIntosh was not a fair one, as those who represented the Indians were not authorized. Further, there had been a studied purpose to exclude the Six Nations from these western treaties. This was, Red Jacket affirmed, another cause of their grievance.

As was usual in such conferences, both sides uttered their beliefs, and that was about all, except, after Washington had,

on April 25, made them a farewell speech, they had a last session on April 30, 1792, and departed with the promise to send a deputation to the western tribes. Brant, as we have seen, had declined to join in the deliberations, but, on May 27, he wrote to Knox that if later he found the Miamis approved it, he would consider the invitation afresh.

While these interviews with the Senecas were going on, Washington had been running over the names of officers, experienced in the late war, to find a successor to St. Clair. His first choice was Henry Lee of Virginia, and this gentleman desired the appointment; but he was the junior in rank to those whom Washington wished to make his brigadiers, and the appointment was passed by in avoidance of resulting jealousies and refusals. Washington confessed he had never been so embarrassed in making any appointments. When the matter was discussed in the cabinet, Jefferson records that the President looked upon Wayne as "brave and nothing else." Washington's studied and written estimate of Wayne, at this time, is fortunately preserved. He considered him "more active and enterprising than judicious and cautious. No economist it is feared. Open to flattery, vain; easily imposed upon and liable to be drawn into scrapes." Such a character — and there is no doubt that such was a prevalent opinion of "Mad Anthony" — did not indeed promise well for the critical junction at the northwest, with England, if not in open, at least in equivocal relations with the enemy. Lee, when he heard of the result, expressed to the President his surprise, and told him the appointment had, in Virginia, created disgust. The choice was, in fact, not a little influenced by the restrictions of military etiquette and the necessity of harmonizing interests and securing good lieutenants. So in reply to Lee, Washington not so much vindicated his selection, as apologized for it. "Wayne," he wrote, "has many good points as an officer, and it is to be hoped that time, reflection, good advice, and above all a due sense of the importance of the trust will correct his foibles, or cast a shade over them." It grew apparent in the next few months that Washington was not without anxiety lest results should reflect on his sagacity, and he kept Knox promptly to the task of cautioning the new commander.

The appointment naturally caused the English some solici-

tude, considering how easily an Indian war could induce inadvertences that might jeopardize the relations of the two peoples. Hammond wrote of the new leader that he was "the most active, vigilant, and enterprising officer in the American army, but his talents are purely military," and he felt, as he wrote to Simcoe, that Wayne might be tempted to attack the British posts, since success in such an act would be sure to make him the successor of Washington.

The selection of Wilkinson as the first of the four brigadiers was a bolder step, perhaps, than the choice of Wayne. When last heard from he had gone with one hundred and fifty mounted Kentucky volunteers to bury the mutilated dead on St. Clair's bloody field, and the act was one of the daring sort to which Wilkinson was quite equal. Washington, in discussing him in the cabinet, had evidently recalled his dubious career in Kentucky, for Jefferson's summary of the talk makes the President call him "brave, enterprising to excess; but many unapprovable points in his character." His written estimate avoids this shadow, when he calls Wilkinson "lively, sensible, pompous, and ambitious."

There had been an attempt to give the same rank to Colonel Marinus Willet, an officer of large experience in forest warfare, for he had been with Sullivan and had opposed St. Leger. He, however, shared the doubt of many northern men — being a New Yorker — of the advisability of an Indian war, and refused the appointment. In doing so, he gave an opinion that he had never known it to fail of success, when the Indians were attacked in a charge, with shouts louder than their own yell. Wayne wisely profited, as we shall see, by this veteran's experience.

Meanwhile, to bring the British minister to some distinct expression of opinion as regards the posts, Jefferson on May 29, 1792, intimated to that gentleman that, while in managing with the state governments so complicated a matter as the recovery of the British debts some time must necessarily be consumed, it was a very short business for England to set things right on her side by surrendering the posts, which, as he said in one of his letters, was occasioning daily cost of "blood and treasure" to the United States. The story of the initial infraction of the treaty, whether it was to be charged to Eng-

land or to the States, had become stale, but Jefferson rehearsed it. Hamilton, reverting to the debts, admitted that they were now only a question south of the Potomac, and that there were £2,000,000 still due in Virginia. The correspondence shows how the two failed to agree in most points, and that they were at variance on the rights of the British traders to follow their business on American soil. Nothing came of this recrimination, and Hammond alleging that European complications were causing delay in the considerations in London, and other objects coming in view, the matter was for a while dropped.

Putnam, another of the new brigadiers, had been characterized by Washington as possessing a "strong mind, and as a discreet man. No question has ever been made — that has come to my knowledge — of his want of firmness. In short, there is nothing conspicuous in his character, and he is but little known out of his own State and a narrow circle." Soon after his appointment, he was selected to follow up a mission to the Miamis, which had already been sent forward by a decision of the cabinet. On reaching Pittsburg in June, 1792, he found Wayne there, busily working at the problems before him. Passing down the river, Putnam met at Fort Washington tidings of the murder of Captain Alexander Truman, of the First Infantry, and his companions, who had gone ahead to reach the Miamis. After this, it was deemed foolhardy to follow in their track, and on July 5 Putnam sent back to Knox an urgent opinion that an attempt be made to treat with the Wabash Indians instead. Hamtramck was still in command at Vincennes, but it was Washington's opinion that a negotiator of "more dignified character" should be sent, and Putnam was authorized to proceed. He engaged Heckewelder, the missionary, to accompany him, and on September 13 they reached Vincennes. Ten days later, they entered upon negotiation, and after three days of belts and speeches, a conclusion was reached, by which the Pottawattamies and other tribes put themselves under the protection of the United States. The great point gained was that it interposed a body of friendly Indians between the hostile Miamis and the southern Indians, who were accustomed to bring their aid, by a detour through the west. Putnam had gone rather farther than the Senate in the end was ready to approve, in that he had guaranteed to these remote tribes the safe possession of their lands.

These possible abettors of the Miamis on their western flank being thus placated, much depended, if there was to be peace, on an intercession with the Six Nations to secure their aid on the eastern flank of the Miami confederacy. The vital point in this endeavor was to gain the interest of Brant, who in the winter had declined coöperation, but was later persuaded by Kirkland to resist the dissuasive efforts of Sir John Johnson. Washington records Brant's arrival in Philadelphia on June 20, 1792, not far from the time that the misfortune to Truman was taking place. The President expressed the hope that the government could impress the chieftain with its equitable intentions. If Brant's own words can be believed, he was offered a thousand guineas and double the amount he was receiving annually from the British government, if he would adhere to the American side.

During his stay in Philadelphia, Brant dined with the English minister, but without causing any comment. The cabinet was pleased with his peaceful disposition, and he promised to go himself to the western allies and intercede for the fulfillment of the Muskingum treaty. This was hopeful, but the expectation was unstable. No sooner, on his return to Niagara, had he come in contact with adverse interests, than he wrote to Knox (July 26, 1792) that he could do nothing at the Maumee council, if the United States insisted upon the Fort Harmar treaty. Three days later, he communicated with McKee, asking if he should carry the American proposition to the Indian council. McKee, who informed Simcoe that he had himself urged the Indians to accept a similar restriction of their demands, told Brant to go to the council, but to have no hope of getting it to agree to the Fort Harmar line. Simcoe, who was full of the idea that the United States meant to attack the posts, had arrived at Niagara in August, and his views were not modified by what he heard. Brant, falling ill, was obliged to transmit his message by his son.

Some weeks later, in September, 1792, the formal embassy of the Six Nations, in accordance with the agreement of the Senecas in Philadelphia, left Niagara under the lead of Cornplanter and Red Jacket. The council of the Miami confederates had been going on at the junction of the Auglaize and Maumee, with some interruption, since spring. McKee and

Simon Girty had been much of the time in attendance, dealing out powder and hatchets to the scalping parties, which at intervals came and went on their miserable errands.

The Shawnees, prominent in the council, had notified the Six Nations that they would receive no peace proposition except through them, and so the Senecas had come with some expectation of better treatment than they got. Cornplanter and Red Jacket found the smoke of the council fire curling aloft amid the October leaves. Representatives of many tribes, all the way from Lake Ontario to Lake Superior, and even from west of the Mississippi, sat crouched beneath the blue veil that went twisting upward. When the speaker rose, there were sharp lines soon drawn in their opinions. The Shawnees were unequivocally for war, and the eyes of Simon Girty, the only white man admitted to their conference, gleamed with satisfaction. Amid all the tedious and reiterative verbiage customary in such sittings, it was evident that the mission of the Six Nations was unpropitious. When Red Jacket in his speech counseled peace, there were murmurs of distrust. So, after all was said, the urgent appeals of Cornplanter and his followers produced no other result than that the final plunge into general hostility would be delayed till the Six Nations could arrange with the United States for another council at the Maumee rapids in the spring of 1793, if, in the mean while, the federal government would withdraw their troops south of the Ohio.

On the 12th of October, 1792, the council broke up. By the middle of November, Red Jacket was at Buffalo Creek ready to transmit to Philadelphia the decision of the confederated tribes. It was hardly a question with some Mohicans, who had returned from the Maumee with the Senecas, that war was inevitable.

When Brant was in Philadelphia, Washington had forecast the alternative. "If they will not listen to the voice of peace," he said, "the sword must decide the dispute; and we are, though very reluctantly, vigorously preparing to meet the event." These preparations had been going on all summer. Enlistments had not been brisk, and Washington had occasion not only to urge more active measures, but to check the enrolling of what he called "boys and miscreants," for St. Clair's experience was not to be forgotten. The President had watched

anxiously the reports of Wayne to the secretary of war. He knew how much success depended upon a well-drilled force, and upon the cordial coöperation of the commander's officers. Knox had told him of the assiduity of Wilkinson, and he took occasion to let that brigadier know how much he appreciated his "zeal and ability." He cautioned Wayne, however he might avoid lavish expenditures in other matters, "not to be sparing of powder and lead to make his soldiers marksmen."

Wayne at one time submitted plans of what Washington called "desultory strokes" upon St. Joseph and Sandusky, as calculated to distract the enemy, and to retaliate for the marauding which we have seen McKee and Girty were encouraging at Auglaize. Washington, however, had little commendation for strokes at a venture, which might lose more men than the recruiting could replace. More important, as the President thought, was it to get correct information by scouts, either from the Indians or English, of the force to be encountered, so that when the time came for advancing there might be no groping in the dark. He also felt constrained to counsel a stricter supervision of the contractors at Pittsburg, so that the complaints which St. Clair had made might not be repeated. Here was the need of the care of an "economist," for John Pope, a traveler of this time, says that goods of every description are "dearer in Pittsburg than in Kentucky, owing to a combination of scoundrels who infest the place."

All through the summer, the levies, either on their way to Pittsburg or in camp there, had lost by desertions, and it was too difficult to enroll men to suffer this to go on. So, as the autumn advanced, it was under consideration to move the army onward to some spot better guarded against the chances of escape, and where the surrounding country had the features suited to practice the men in forest paths. Washington had been inclined to divide the force between Cincinnati, Marietta, and some spot not far from Pittsburg, where Wayne himself could remain in easy communication with the government. Finally, however, it was determined to make a winter camp at a point about twenty-seven miles below Pittsburg, and in November, 1792, we find the President cautioning Wayne against

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page, of Pittsburg and vicinity, is from Victor Collot's *Journey in North America*, Paris, 1826, *Atlas*, plate 8.



needless outlay in the barracks. When in the same month Washington met Congress, he confessed that recruiting had so fallen off that some additional stimulus must be devised.

While these military preparations were going on, it remained the policy of the federal government to avert, if possible, the actual clash of arms. The proposition of the Miami confederacy at their last council opened the way, and there was the same channel of communication as before in the professed willingness of the Six Nations to intercede. Washington had little hope of appeasing the Indians, so long, he said, as they were "under an influence which is hostile to the rising greatness of these States," as the neighboring British were supposed to be. The intercourse which the members of the government had had with Hammond had not, to say the least, removed the impression of latent hostility, and of a purpose to interpose, if possible, a barrier territory, appertaining to the Indians, by some new disposition of bounds in qualification of the treaty of 1782. Hammond was but a young man, perhaps not as discreet as he should be, and he doubtless had a difficult part to play, and it may be that he did not deserve all the suspicion under which he lay at the time, and which has affected the disposition of American historians since. Jefferson bluntly told him that the public was not ready to accept his denial of England's complicity in the enmity of the Indians; though in diplomatic deference, the American government might not be so distrustful.

In December, 1792, the cabinet had decidedly disclaimed any intention of accepting British mediation. If at that time they had understood Simcoe's character as well as they did later, they might not have agreed to allow his presence at the negotiations to be renewed. Simcoe was at the time firm in the belief that the Americans would make the intended conference an occasion to assert their rights to the navigation of Lake Erie, by conveying the provisions which their commissioners required over its waters in their own vessels. He accordingly sought instructions as to what conduct he should pursue in maintaining what he called British naval superiority on the lake. Clarke, who was acting at Quebec in the absence of Dorchester, emphatically shared Simcoe's views, and the issue was ultimately avoided by a proposal of the Canadian government to furnish what supplies were required.

The President, who had failed to induce Charles Carroll of Carrollton and Charles Thomson, the old clerk of the earlier Congress, to act as commissioners to the Indians, finally selected Benjamin Lincoln, Beverly Randolph, and Timothy Pickering. They were confirmed by the Senate, March 1, 1793. It was understood that some \$50,000 worth of presents would be put at their disposal, with authority to contribute annually \$10,000, beside \$2,000 to the head chiefs, as compensation for the acceptance by the Indians of the terms of the Fort Harmar treaty of 1789. To afford some play in their conciliatory measures, the cabinet had already expressed an opinion that if peace could better be secured by it, the commissioners might consent to a line short of the Fort Harmar line, provided it kept secure all lands which the government had already appropriated, granted, or reserved. This was yielding what the disputed treaty had, in Jefferson's opinion, brought within the American jurisdiction, and he alone of the President's advisers contended that the concession was unconstitutional. His alternative was to retain jurisdiction, but to agree not to settle the unappropriated territory. It was his opinion, also, that any line was liable to error of description, because of the insufficient knowledge of the country, and that Hutchins's map, on which the treaty agreements had been marked, did not show the lines with any exactness, except where the bounds were brought to the Ohio River.


On May 17, 1793, Randolph and Pickering reached Niagara, and Lincoln, who had been engaged in forwarding supplies, joined them eight days later. Here they learned of the declaration of war in England against France, and were well aware how it was going to embarrass the government's councils in Philadelphia, and might affect the situation on the Canadian bounds. To add to their anxieties, Brant had gone forward on May 5 to attend the preliminary council, before they had had a chance to confer with him. Just about this time we learn from Zeisberger that the Mohawk chief, with eight canoes, was passing through the Thames country, on his way to the Maumee.

It was understood that the commissioners were to await at Niagara a summons to the conference. Simcoe was gracious, and for a while their days passed pleasantly. When it became known that the Miamis had sent messengers to express their

inflexible purpose to insist upon the Ohio as the boundary, and the commissioners had revealed to their host a determination as resolute to stand by the Fort Harmar treaty, the British commander saw that there was little chance of war being averted. Brant always held afterwards, with probably some knowledge of what the commissioners might on necessity yield, that, except for English interference, an accommodation might have been reached. We now know from Simcoe's letter that he profoundly distrusted the American purposes, and believed that the commissioners were really aiming to alienate the Six Nations both from the English and from the western tribes.

Just as the Americans were to embark, on June 26, for Sandusky, some messengers from the Maumee arrived, complaining that Wayne was making hostile demonstrations while the question of peace or war was still undecided, and some days later the commissioners communicated a wish to the secretary of war that Wayne should be further cautioned. On embarking, the Americans found that Butler and McKee had been detailed to accompany them, as they had wished. They had only proceeded to Fort Erie, when they became wind-bound. On shore there was a stockade inclosing a few rough buildings, and outside a blockhouse, used for the king's stores. Lying there on July 5, Brant and fifty chiefs arrived from the Maumee, and, desiring a conference, it was decided to return to Niagara for better accommodations, and to hold the interview in Simcoe's house. The meeting was quickly over, and Simcoe's letters tell us that, on July 7, Brant started with his mind nearly made up to recommend the yielding by the Indians of the settled lands north of the Ohio. A week later, the commissioners followed, and landed, on July 21, on the Canada side of the mouth of the Detroit River. Here they found a deputation from the council, bearing a straight inquiry if the Americans would yield to the Ohio line, and the question was as pointedly answered in the negative. It was soon intimated, however, that if the Indians would confirm the Fort Harmar line, and yield up the territory granted to George Rogers Clark at the Ohio rapids, the commissioners would not ask for any

NOTE. — The view on the opposite page from Lake Ontario, looking into Niagara River, was taken by the wife of Governor Simcoe in 1794. Fort Niagara is on the left. It is from D. B. Read's *Life and Times of Simcoe*, Toronto, 1890.



right in the soil beyond these limits, but only the right of pre-emption. A Wyandot acted as spokesman, and stood firm for the Ohio.

The next day, the 22d, the commissioners notified the council that they were ready for a meeting. From what we know of the proceedings of the Indians when this message was received, it is apparent that the discussions were very angry. The Shawnees, Twightwees, and Delawares pronounced loudly for war. Brant tells us that all hope of diverting them from it was lost, when messengers arrived from the Creeks announcing renewed encroachments of the whites on their lands. Simcoe later professed to believe that Brant, in his advocacy of moderation, was in reality striving to embroil England and the United States, and Brant in return charged the English with the responsibility, because they promised aid to the Indians if they would resist American encroachments to the last.

Instead of inviting the commissioners to the council, the tribes sent, on July 29, a deputation, with Simon Girty as interpreter, and on the 30th the whole question at issue and the past history of their respective grievances were rehearsed. Girty, speaking for the Indians, insisted that the provisions of the Fort Stanwix treaty should be the basis of an agreement. The commissioners replied that the Stanwix treaty was made twenty-five years aback, and that it was modified when the treaty of 1782 placed the bounds of the United States on the line of the lakes. This was hardly a happy reference, when a standing grievance of the Indians was that the treaty of 1782 paid them no consideration whatever, and dealt out their lands as if they did not belong to them. Nor was it helpful to be told that the Indians who sided with Great Britain in the revolutionary contest must accept the consequent necessity of modifying the original treaty of Fort Stanwix. Such modifications had taken place in the later treaty of Fort Stanwix, and in those subsequently made with the Wyandots and Shawnees. To confirm all these by additional gratuities, the Indians were reminded that St. Clair had met six hundred Indians at Fort Harmar, and removed all objections. This having been done, and the ceded lands parceled out to white settlers, the United States were bound to keep faith with the grantees. To make the matter still smoother with the tribes, they were willing, if the

grant to Clark at the Ohio rapids be included, to add as a new gift an unprecedented sum of money and many goods.

These statements made no effect, and the conference ended. The next day the Indian delegates intimated that the commissioners had best go home, or at least such was the form of comment which Girty gave to their utterances. After some days the council sent a defiant answer in due form. They denied that the United States had any better right to buy their lands than the English had. They thought that the Americans, instead of offering money to them, had much better use it in buying out their grantees, so that they could turn the Indian land over to its true owners. During these later days of the conference, all efforts of Brant to induce Simcoe to interpose in favor of a compromise having failed, the commissioners had nothing to do but to declare that the end had come, and on the same day (August 16) they left Detroit for Fort Erie. At this point they dispatched a messenger to Wayne, who was waiting at Fort Washington, informing him of the failure to negotiate. The outcome was known in Philadelphia in September, and it was generally believed, as Wolcott said, that the failure was "in great measure owing to British influence." Washington shared this distrust, and, as early as February, had cautioned Knox not to relax his preparations for war.


Recruiting was going on slowly, and by March, 1793, Wayne had not received half his promised force. When the spring had fairly opened, he had moved his two thousand five hundred men down the river to Fort Washington, and sent a summons for the mounted volunteers of Kentucky, which a committee, consisting of Judge Innes, John Brown, Isaac Shelby, Benjamin Logan, and Charles Scott, had been organizing.

Wayne, as we have seen, had been directed to act on the defensive only, till he heard of the failure of the negotiations at the Detroit River. With this restraint he learned, not without irritation, of the raids which the Indians were making in every direction, but he prudently kept quiet. During the summer he had asked permission of Knox to send out a body of six hundred militia, away from the line of his proposed march, partly to deceive the enemy as to his intentions, and partly to distract their attention. The matter, as it happened, came before Washington and his advisers at the very meeting

at which they heard from the commissioners of their failure. They were in no humor to risk defeat by dividing the western army, and the same messenger who carried to its general a confirmation of the tidings, which he had already received, of

the fruitless task of the commissioners, took also a refusal to his proposal.

The Indians naturally knew of the failure in advance, and in September they fell upon one of Wayne's convoys and captured some horses. On October 6, Wayne wrote to Knox that the next day he should advance beyond Fort Jefferson to a position where he was to lay out a camp for winter quarters, and to be prepared to act as occasion required. The Kentucky volunteers were coming in slowly, and he could not report more than twenty-six



[This cut, taken from Howe's *Historical Collections of Ohio*, p. 142, shows the line of the stockade at Greenville, in relation to the modern town.]

hundred regulars, with some four hundred horse militia and guides, the rest being detailed for garrison duty along his communications. He had taken pride in his cavalry, and he had divided them into companies, according to the color of the horses, — sorrel, bay, chestnut, and gray, — and, as he wrote to Knox, he was anxious lest the Indians would bring on an action where dragoons could not manœuvre to advantage. William Priest, a traveler in the country at the time, says that "it is generally imagined that Wayne will meet the fate of Braddock and St. Clair, but a few military men I have discussed with are of another opinion, for the general is forming a body of cavalry on principles entirely new, from which much is expected."

His march was accordingly begun on October 7, 1793, and

six days later he was laying out a winter's camp, six miles beyond Fort Jefferson, which he named in honor of his old commander in the southern department in the revolutionary days, Fort Greenville or, as it was commonly written, Greenville.

If his marching force was not all that he had hoped for, Wayne felt that many months of discipline had made a large part of them tough and ready warriors, and that he had some months before him for seasoning them in all the hardship and skill of forest warfare. They already showed a marked proficiency in loading and firing on the run, and were not inapt in springing to their work with loud hallooes, as Willet had recommended. Wayne, however, was still conscious of a murmuring discontent in some of the fresher levies, and he charged it upon the "baleful leaven" of the democratic clubs, which Genet was just now patronizing in the east, and whose refractory spirit was making its way over the mountains.

The British scouts had reported his position as not two days distant from the Auglaize, and Dorchester heard of it and reported from Quebec to Dundas that, on October 18, Wayne had with him three thousand regulars, two thousand militia, and two hundred Indians, — a not unusual exaggeration.

All through the autumn and winter there was anxiety in Canada. In February, 1794, Dorchester informed Hammond that Wayne's language, as reported to him, showed that he had hostile designs against the English. Evidently to gain time, about the end of 1793, the Delawares had opened communication with Wayne, prevailed to do so "by sinister means," as McKee said. Nothing came of it, for Wayne insisted, as a preliminary, on the restoration of prisoners. Dorchester, in March, was evidently thinking that some coercion had been applied by the other tribes to make the Delawares firmer.

Wayne was aware of the influence which Simcoe was now exerting on the Indian councils, and we have Brant's testimony that the British had given the Indians powder, and had led them to suppose that in case of disaster they would succor them. Wayne examined the prisoners his scouts brought in to confirm such intelligence, if there was ground for it. He got little satisfaction, however. There were some who affirmed it, and others who denied it. There is no doubt, however, that Simcoe was wishing ardently for Wayne's defeat, and determined in any

event to prevent supplies reaching him by the lake from Presqu'Isle. He could not have been unprepared, later, to receive advices from Dundas that, in case Wayne was beaten, the opportunity should not be lost to secure a barrier territory between Canada and the Americans. Simcoe had not as yet received such implicit instructions, but he could easily divine them. A speech of Dorchester, which had reached Detroit, served an immediate purpose, but to arouse the Indians and to countenance Simcoe in active agencies in helping them, Dorchester had lately been in council with the ministry, and his words stood easily for their opinions. This speech was a reply, which he had made on February 10, 1794, to an Indian delegation. Kingsford, a recent historian of Canada, thinks that its indiscretions were but the natural revulsion which Dorchester felt when, fresh from England, he saw how great a hold the French Revolution had taken upon the Americans. Whether this was so or not, the speech was intemperate and incendiary, and when a report of it reached Philadelphia, Hammond sought to efface its effect by declaring that Dorchester had not been authorized to make it. It is certain that Dundas later rebuked the utterer for doing what was more likely "to provoke hostilities than to prevent them." The language of the harangue was so unguarded that there was a tendency even in Philadelphia to doubt its authenticity, — a belief that later misled Marshall and Sparks. Washington certainly accepted it, as did Clinton, who forwarded it to the President. It is now known to be preserved in the English archives, and Stone, the biographer of Brant, found a certified copy among the papers of that chief. Another copy was sent to Carondelet.

In this speech Dorchester charged the United States with bad faith in the boundary dispute; that all advance of settlements since 1783 were encroachments, which nullified the American right of preëmption. He said he should not be surprised if England and the United States were at war in the course of the present year, and in that case the warriors would have the chance to make a new line, and appropriate all improvements which the Americans had made within it.

Copies of the speech were circulated early in April, 1794, among the western Indians, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler being an active agent in the matter. Inspired by it, and acting indeed

under Dorchester's express orders, Simcoe, sharing Dorchester's lack of confidence in the American protestations, took three companies of regulars to the rapids of the Maumee, and there hastily constructed a fort, necessary, in his opinion, as an outpost of Detroit, and intended to be a check in the way of Wayne's advance. This is the reason which Simcoe gives, on April 11, in a letter written on the spot to Carondelet, who had asked him to join Spain in a campaign on the Mississippi, in resistance to the proposed French invasion of Louisiana. When Washington heard of this positive advance upon American territory, he called it the "most open and daring act" which the British had attempted, and in sending instructions to Wayne, Knox conveyed the order of Washington that if, in the course of the campaign it should become necessary to dislodge the garrison of this fort, Wayne must do so.

On June 7, some Indian prisoners were brought in, and from them Wayne learned of Simcoe's advance. They also reported that there were two thousand Indians at the Maumee rapids, and that, including militia, the British of Fort Miami garrison counted about four hundred. One of the captives said that the British had promised to have fifteen hundred men in the coming fight.

During June, 1794, Wayne was occupied with his daily drills. He exercised his men with sabre and bayonet, and kept out a cloud of scouts to prevent any spy of the enemy getting within observation. Besides using his backwoodsmen for this service, he had a few Chickasaws and Choctaws. His wood-choppers were opening roads here and there, and serving to deceive the Indians as to his intended march. He had already sent a detail to the field of St. Clair's defeat, and had built there a small fort, which, in recognition of his reoccupation of the ground, he called Fort Recovery. On the 26th, General Scott reached Greeneville with sixteen hundred mounted Kentuckians, and among them was William Clark, the brother of George Rogers Clark, and later known for his passage of the Rockies. On the 28th, he sent forward a party, and when near Fort Recovery, on the 30th, they were assailed by a rush of Indians upon some dragoons, who received the attack, charged in return, somewhat recklessly, and there was a considerable loss of horses, which Wayne could ill spare. It was thought that there were whites

among the enemy. In order to deceive the Indians, he turned west and went on to the St. Mary's River, where he built a fort, which he called Fort Adams. In July, he turned east, and marched seventy miles to the confluence of the Auglaize and the Maumee. Here, on August 8, he built Fort Defiance, in the midst of immense fields of corn. He was now within sixty miles of the British fort, and his route to it lay along the banks of the Maumee. He sent forward a converted Shawnee to announce his readiness to treat for peace. Little Turtle, the Indian leader, was not disinclined to accept the offer. His scouts had convinced him of the sleepless vigilance of Wayne. They had found it impossible to pierce the line of watchful spies by which the American commander concealed his force. Simcoe also had lost confidence in the ability of the Indians to withstand the Americans, and he had written to Dundas that, while he hoped for Wayne's defeat, he was by no means sure it would happen. "If Wayne attacks Detroit," he wrote, "you must be prepared to hear it is taken."

Just at the time that Simcoe was building Fort Miami, the legislature of Pennsylvania had directed the occupation of Presqu'Isle, and on March 1, 1794, Governor Mifflin had instructed Major Denny to raise a company of troops, and to proceed to that spot and protect the commissioners in laying out the town. He was enjoined to avoid every unfriendly act which could possibly irritate the Indians or excite the enmity of the British garrisons not far off. While the spring came on, it was apparent that the movement had excited the fears of Brant and his countrymen, and that there was danger of active opposition on the part of the British. It was even supposed that the American troops on the way to that point from Le Bœuf would be met and driven back. In the latter part of May, the federal government, fearing such complications, and understanding the hazard which Wayne was confronting, asked Governor Mifflin to suspend the movement. The request was looked upon as an interference with the rights of the legislature, which had simply ordered the occupation of their own territory, but Mifflin did not hesitate, and promptly issued orders in conformity with Washington's wishes, and at a later day the Assembly confirmed them. The federal government were nevertheless fearful lest the resentful spirit shared by the Indians and their

British friends might yet bring peril, and Knox, in writing to Mifflin on July 17, declared that there could be no certain avoidance of the danger while British policy controlled the Indians.

Matters were in this critical state when Wayne began his advance; and just before the American general delivered his final stroke, Simcoe, apprehensive of the worst, and ignorant of Washington's interposition at Presqu'Isle, was writing to his superiors that unless disaster overtook Wayne, nothing could prevent the American occupation of the southern shores of Lake Erie from Buffalo Creek to Miami Bay, when there would be an end to British supremacy on the lakes.

To revert to the hesitancy of Little Turtle. Had Brant been on the spot, that Indian leader might have had an abettor in his tendency to treat with Wayne, though the movement to occupy Presqu'Isle had done much to bring back the old antipathy of the Mohawks. Brant, at a distance, was disquieted over the rumors which reached him that it was going to be difficult to keep fast the Mackinac and other northwestern tribes who were threatening to leave. The messengers which the southern Indians had sent to offer encouragement to their northern friends had not been followed up by the arrival of southern warriors, and the Miami confederates, without Brant and his associates on the one side, and with the Wabash tribes indifferent on the other side, found they had little to depend upon except the British, whose help they remembered had failed them in critical junctures in the past. So the chiefs had delayed to respond to Wayne's invitation.

The Americans had nothing to gain by hesitation, and Wayne, on August 15, again advanced. His army now counted about two thousand six hundred men. He himself was not in good condition, for he was suffering from gout, and sat his horse swathed in flannel. On his staff, yielding him assistance, he had a hero of later savage warfare, a future President of the Republic, in William Henry Harrison.

The army was confident. In long drilling they had anticipated all possible conditions. They knew there was no chance of being enveloped as St. Clair had been. They knew that their flanks were guarded, and if a charge was ordered, the gap

between the van and its supports, and the hovering dragoons, would not permit their being cut off. In these and other possibilities, the army enjoyed that sense of security which comes from knowing the vigilance of its commander.

The next day, August 16, 1794, a messenger met the advance and delivered to Wayne a request that the Indians might have ten days in which to consider his proposals for peace. Wayne was not in a mood to dally. He hastily built a defense for the baggage which he intended to leave at that point, and moved on. On the 18th, he reached the upper end of the rapids. He threw up another breastwork to protect his provisions, and began to feel the enemy. He made up his mind there were from fifteen hundred to two thousand of them. McKee says they numbered one thousand three hundred. The British flag flaunted on the fort at the lower end of the rapids, and he knew not what he might have to encounter. Not far away, in a ground of their own choosing, encumbered with the trunks of trees which a whirlwind at some time had prostrated, and concealed by tall grasses which grew between, the enemy lay crouched.

The action began with the Indians rising upon a band of mounted volunteers who were ahead, floundering over a ground where horsemen were at a disadvantage. The first line of infantry, flanked by other cavalry, came promptly to their support. Their orders were to fire, charge, and continue firing as they ran. They put their practice in this difficult movement into play, and on they went, scrambling over and under the trunks, preserving a nearly even front. They gave the enemy no time to reload, and before the second line, with the support of Scott's Kentucky horse, could join in the contest, the Indians were in headlong retreat. It took forty minutes to press them back — with not a chance to recover themselves — for a distance of two miles into the immediate vicinity of the British fort. Less than a thousand of Wayne's soldiers had won the day.

There was no sign in the fort of any attempt to succor the savages. The hinges of the gates which were expected to open and receive the fugitives did not creak. The Indians had vanished in the forests, and, as the commander of the fort informed his superior, no one knew whither.

Wayne's loss in killed and wounded had been little over a hundred. There was never any report on the loss of the enemy. It is denied by the British writers that there were any whites in the fight. Against their general denial, there is Wayne's own testimony that British dead were found on the field. It has been asserted that a body of Detroit militia, seventy in number, commanded by a Captain Caldwell, participated in the action, and that four of them were killed. Brant, at a later day, said that he had procured the powder which was used from the British authorities at Quebec, and that he should have led his Mohawks in the fight had he not been sick and at a distance. So ended the battle of Fallen Timbers.

Major Campbell, in charge of the British fort, sent next day word to Detroit that an action had been fought "almost within reach of the guns of the fort." The same day, August 21, he sent a flag to the American commander, asking what he meant by such threatening action in sight of his Majesty's flag. Wayne at once replied that his guns talked for him, but he rather needlessly argued the point of the British encroachment in building a post on recognized territory of the United States. He closed with demanding its surrender. The next day Campbell replied that he could only receive orders to give up the fort from his own superiors, and threatened that if the insult to the British flag was continued, and the Americans came within range of his guns, he would open fire. There was a story started by a traveler, Isaac Weld, a year later, that Wayne rode up to the stockade with defiant bearing, so as to provoke a discharge, and give him a pretext for attacking. There is no other evidence of such an act. Wayne's last note was to ask the garrison to retire to some post which had existed at the time of the treaty of 1782. He wisely did not try to force such retirement, and Campbell bore himself with like restraint.

Wayne contented himself with destroying the traders' huts in the neighborhood, including those of McKee, without a motion on the part of Campbell. Simcoe is said at a later day to have taken upon himself the credit of preserving the peace, since Dorchester, as he averred, had instructed him to attack Wayne. It is known from a letter to Hammond in September that Dorchester was confident of a conflict, to be brought on by Wayne's attacking the fort.

After spending three days in completing the destruction of all property outside the fort, Wayne began a march by easy stages up the river. He swept away cornfields for fifty miles on each side of the stream. On reaching Fort Defiance, he put it in better condition for defense, and on August 28 sent off a dispatch to Knox. It was less than a month later that the first rumors of Wayne's success reached Philadelphia, on September 23, in advance of the official tidings.

From Fort Defiance, Wayne continued his march up the Maumee. He reached the confluence of the St. Mary and St. Joseph on September 17, and by the 22d he had completed Fort Wayne at that strategic point where the portage to the Wabash began. He put Major Hamtramck in command.

Simcoe, immediately upon the result of the campaign being known, had written to Brant that he hoped the Indians would "recover their spirits." He expected now by a conference at Fort Miami to help produce such a reaction. There he met McKee and Brant, and it was thought best to have a larger body in council at the mouth of the Detroit River on October 10.

Meanwhile, Wayne, at his new stockade, was listening to the speeches of other factions of the tribes, who had learned by recent events not to place much confidence in British promises. Not all these speeches were reassuring, for there was occasionally a chief who would warm at Wayne's renewed proposals of confirming the treaty of Fort Harmar, and at such occurrences Wayne grew anxious and sent messages to Philadelphia for reinforcements to be ready for any emergency.

The British conference at Detroit River came off as arranged. Simon Girty was present as usual, and helped in the distribution of the British gifts. Simcoe now told the Wyandots and the others that they must stand for the Ohio bounds as resolutely as ever, and he promised that if the Americans approached Fort Miami again, they should be fired upon. We have Simcoe's speech and testimony about his advice from those who heard it, and Brant supported his insidious views. He urged the Indians to convey in trust to the British all the land north of the Ohio which was in dispute between them and the Americans, so as to give the British the right to interfere in protecting it. He also treacherously counseled the patching

up of a temporary truce which would give both the English and the Indians the time for preparation which was needed, so as to renew the war with better promise in the spring.

Such advice, however, failed of the intended effect, and it was soon apparent that Wayne had secured by his victory a vantage-ground that he could use to effect. The Delawares had already approached him, and Dorchester, kept informed by Simcoe of the general disaffection towards English interests which Wayne's diplomacy was increasing, lost no time in informing the American general that Grenville and Jay, now negotiating a treaty of pacification in England, had reached a conclusion by which the military conditions should remain for the present unchanged. The fact was that the British government were more desirous of bringing to an end their critical relations with the United States than they were willing to disclose to the American envoy. This growing policy of amity proved a sore grievance to Simcoe, and he spent his energies during the closing months of 1794 in seeking to prevent such a consummation. He urged that Fort Miami should not be abandoned. He wrote to Hammond to stir him to a protest to the federal government against the demeanor of Wayne, who, in gaining the Indian favor, was thwarting some of Simcoe's cherished purposes. He wrote to the Lords of Trade offering them a plan for shutting out traders coming from the American seaboard, by establishing British depots along the portages to the Mississippi valley, and particularly by that at Chicago. He grew suspicious of Brant, and, to prevent his defection, sought permission to offer the Mohawk chief a pension for his family.

All this while, Wayne, who had reached Greeneville early in November, was receiving messages of peace from the same Wyandots that Simcoe had flattered at the Detroit River, and it was soon known that the tribes who had crossed the Mississippi, to fight under Little Turtle, had recrossed it to Spanish territory. Wayne's plans for a final settlement in the following season were progressing with few halts. So, as Simcoe showed himself a man grasping at straws, but doomed to disappointment, the year closed with Wayne growing more and more in stature as the arbiter of the red man's future.

CHAPTER XXI.

JAY'S TREATY AND THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF THE NORTHWEST SECURED.

1794-1796.

LATE in 1793, the British government had shown a disposition to approach the unsettled questions of the treaty of 1782. On December 15, Jefferson stated to Hammond that the American grievances, so far as they related to the western country, were, in the first place, the retention of the posts; next, the extension of British jurisdiction beyond the area of British possessions in 1782; and last, the obstacles placed by the authorities in Canada in the way of the American right of navigation on the lakes. The solution of these questions at issue was necessarily affected by the attitude which Spain and France were assuming towards the United States, — a discussion covered in other chapters. To side with England, which was a motive charged upon the federalists, was likely to bring on a war with France, in which Spain might or might not be an indifferent spectator, but it was hardly possible that England, at least, would allow her to remain so. To side with France would inevitably incite hostilities in England, and with England's coercion Spain was not likely to escape an alliance with her. This was a contingency which the federalists greatly deprecated, and the republicans were hardly ready to force. A war with England meant, indeed, a chance for privateering, and the starting of such manufactures as would, under the restrictions growing out of war, be ultimately productive for the North. What a British war meant to the South was a relief from the pressing burden of the English debts, — a certain gain that obscured remoter loss. "The Virginians," said Oliver Wolcott, "in general hate the English because they owe them money. They love the French from consanguinity of character." Hamilton and the federalist leaders saw in an English

war an almost certain loss of the country north of the Ohio and stretching to the Mississippi, because of the ease with which the Canadian forces could be aided from the West Indies. In such a contingency, all the efforts which Wayne was making to save that region to the Union would avail little against the establishment of that barrier Indian territory, which was Simcoe's dream. Such loss of territory must also give English merchants the control of the Indian trade, a consideration which had been pressed upon the Board of Trade.

In this complexity of chances there was much diversity of aim, even among those who resented the conduct of England. Jay grasped the situation. "Great Britain has acted unwisely and unjustly," he said (April 10, 1794), "and there is some danger of our acting intemperately." So people were easily grouping into three divisions. First, there were those who were for peace with England at all risks. Then, those who were for war, the sooner the better. Last, those who were irritated to a very frenzy, but were restrained from forcing an outbreak, if it could be avoided.

There was a danger that a prolonged uncertainty would end in war, and Washington, eager to secure peace even at some sacrifice, determined to try the effect of a special envoy to the British court. On April 6, 1794, he sent the name of John Jay to the Senate as such an envoy. Jay had in the past made no hesitation in affirming that the Americans had made the first breach of the treaty of 1782. So both the envoy and the mission were little less than repulsive to the ardent haters of England. With the admirers of France it was questionable if any advance towards England under existing circumstances was not a transgression of the treaty of 1778 with that power, — an obligation which the federalists denied. Randolph, as secretary of state, undertook to explain to Fauchet, the French minister, — and there soon transpired signs of an existing dubious intercourse between the two, — that it was necessary to negotiate with England to avoid a war which the States were not ready to encounter. John Adams, with a politician's eye, was at the same time supposing that the opposition to Jay arose from an apprehension that, if the mission was successful, Jay would be lifted into a dangerous competition with Jefferson.

The most active objection in Congress to confirming the

mission came from the South. This was largely for the alleged reason that an adjustment would benefit eastern commerce, and embarrass the South still more in the matter of the British debts. There was also a fear that immediate northern interests might be paramount to regaining the posts, and this was the plea of the South to the West for support. In the final vote, seven votes from Virginia, North and South Carolina, and Kentucky, with a single vote from New York, constituted the opposition, while eighteen votes, mainly from the North, secured the mission and committed Jay to a rather harassing task. The result was to thwart a proposed plan, which Madison and others had counted on, to extort redress from England. At near the same time, on an appealed case, the Supreme Court had decided that certain acts of the Virginia legislature, intended to relieve debtors to English merchants, were unconstitutional. Thus the southern project was doubly blocked.

Jay's instructions were signed on May 6, and at this time the federal government knew that Dorchester had made his threatening speech. They had not learned, however, of a result of that speech in the advance of Simcoe upon the Miami. If they had, Jay's instructions might have been more vigorous.

When Jay reached England, on June 8, he suspected that the two countries had only narrowly escaped war, and that Dorchester and Simcoe, in their recent acts, had been inspired by ministerial views. With better information we may now doubt if he had good grounds for his apprehension, and may rather believe that the ministry were only too ready for some sort of an accommodation. This appearance, to Jay's mind, arose in part from the fear, which he thought was entertained, that Wayne really intended to attack Detroit; while the more conciliatory spirit which he found in Grenville, when he first had his interviews with him, was to be traced to a change in continental affairs, which had suddenly become a cause of alarm to the ministry. Three days later (June 23), Jay learned from Dr. William Gordon, the historian of the American Revolution, then living in England, that the United States must not expect to secure the surrender of the posts. Jay, in reporting Gordon's views to Washington, confessed that he did not see the insuperable difficulties which alarmed Gordon. A week later (June 27), Jay and Grenville were fairly at their work. By

the middle of July, they had so advanced in mutual confidences that Jay assured the English minister that Wayne had no instructions to attack the posts, and Portland communicated the assurance at once (July 15) to Dorchester. Whereupon the two negotiators agreed that there should be nothing done, unfriendly in act, anywhere along the Canadian frontier. Jay so notified Washington on July 21, and the English sent to Dorchester a message which, we have seen, was transmitted from Quebec to Wayne.

After this the interchange of views went slowly on, all tending to establish, at last, a common ground. Jay was some fifteen weeks or more away from his government, counting the out and return voyages. He grew, in his isolation, confident that whatever he did would find inimical critics, and he wrote to the President that he trusted, whatever might happen, to "the wisdom, firmness, and integrity of the government."

There did not grow up in the States much confidence in Jay's accomplishing anything till some time in October, and then the French faction grew certain that he could but sacrifice the honor of the country. These revilers were convinced that Washington had failed to do what he could to rescue Tom Paine from the imprisonment into which Robespierre had thrown him, and that this indifference of the President was due to his fear that England, which hated Paine, might resent any sympathy for him. Under such circumstances, one readily understands why Paine, learning by rumor something of Jay's relations with Grenville, called it "a satire upon the Declaration of Independence," and such opinions were easily wafted across the waters.

On November 19, Portland wrote to Dorchester that the treaty had been signed, but that its contents would not be divulged till both governments had ratified it. Jay transmitted the same day to Oliver Ellsworth his opinion that he had exacted as much as could be procured. Copies of the treaty were sent off by different vessels on November 20 and 21. The first was thrown overboard at sea to prevent the French capturing it. The other ultimately reached its destination.

The British government, not yet possessed of Fauchet's intercepted dispatch, soon to be in their hands, had already taken their measure of Randolph, the American Secretary of State, and, because of his hard denunciations of English action, pro-

fessed to believe his temper would be inimical to peace, and at once notified Hammond to avoid intercourse with him, to compass his downfall if possible, and to seek Hamilton instead as the means of concerting action for the suppression of Indian hostilities along the frontiers.

Before any of the official communications could reach Philadelphia, a fast vessel, leaving Ramsgate, had arrived at Cape Ann, bringing word that the treaty had been signed; this was known in Boston on January 29, 1795. Nearly six weeks later, on March 7, the treaty itself was in the hands of Washington, and remained there, a secret possession, shared only by those closest to him, for three months. Jay reached New York on May 28, to find himself chosen governor of New York two days before. Summonses had already been sent for the assembling of the Senate on June 8, to take the treaty into consideration. Fauchet, ignorant of the outburst which his disclosures about Randolph was soon to produce, interceded with the government to prevent the presentation of the treaty to the Senate till his successor, Adet, with the views of the French government on the crisis, could arrive. The new French minister did not reach Philadelphia till June 13. At that time, the treaty was before the Senate, in the usual secret sessions, and that body was known to have assembled in nearly full numbers. There were rumors of the hard fate which had been planned for it, and the reports did not misrepresent the fact. The opposition was warm. There was no sure index to the ardent discontents in local sympathies. Of the western members, Humphrey Marshall stood for it; Blount was against it. It was, however, owing to the strenuous exertions of Hamilton and Rufus King that the instrument was saved, and then only by accepting an amendment that did not, moreover, particularly concern the west, but affected the trade with the West Indies. With this change, it took its final stages, on June 24, by a vote of twenty to ten, and on June 26 the Senate adjourned.

The treaty was to have been given to the public on July 1, but the *Aurora*, a newspaper inimical to the government, secured the substance of it, and printed it in imperfect shape on June 29. Two days later, the genuine text was accessible.

Before considering the uncertainty in Washington's mind, whether he should allow it to become a law, it will be well to

review at some length such of its provisions as affected the western country. The agreements respecting the commerce of the seaboard, and the establishment of commissions to adjudicate upon the debt, did not affect the people beyond the mountains except as they in some degree shared in the fortunes of the east. Of the \$25,000,000 to be placed as claims against the American debtors, a small part concerned the western people, and little was at stake with them when the whole business of the claims was brought to a close in 1804. In respect to the trade with Canada, the west had a principal interest, for by the provisions of the treaty the eastern merchants were in some measure shut out from it. It was, on the whole, a gain to the west, for it opened the St. Lawrence route to the sea for western produce, with low duties, and none for furs. It also promised that return merchandise could be brought to a large section of the west at less cost than transportation over the mountains would entail. It was Hamilton's opinion, about the rights accorded to the Indian traders to pass the boundary line in either direction for traffic, that the United States would profit more than Canada. He also believed that these provisions blocked "the dangerous project of Great Britain to confine the United States to the Ohio," and that they tended "most powerfully to establish the influence and authority of the general government over the western country." The objection which was pressed was that the Constitution was violated in taking from Congress the right to regulate trade, and vesting it in the treaty-making power. When, later, it was attempted to regulate this Indian trade another way by Wayne's negotiation, the paramount authority of Jay's treaty was allowed at the instance of Great Britain.


It was, indeed, true at this time, as General Collot, who was a little later inspecting these conditions, saw, that the tribes and fur-bearing animals south of the lakes and east of the Mississippi did not constitute the chief resource for what was properly called the fur trade. The favorable conditions were, in fact, to be found west of the Mississippi, in Spanish territory, to which access must be had through what the treaty of 1782 had recognized as American territory. It was from this country that the English house of Tode & Co., who had bought the right from the New Orleans government for £20,000, had, by making

fortified stations along the St. Peter and Des Moines rivers, almost completely driven the Spanish traders, notwithstanding the transporting of furs to New Orleans by the Mississippi was much easier than to take them to Montreal.

The Spanish had kept the Missouri River in their own hands, and, two miles from its mouth, they maintained a trading-post, St. Charles, which, with its hundred and more houses, was the remotest station in this direction. The river, as Collet said, had been explored upward more than six hundred leagues without finding any obstruction. Its current was said to be gentle till it received the Platte, which after their junction forced the stream rapidly along. That French traveler reached the conclusion that the Missouri must rise in a prolongation of the Cordilleras, which Mackenzie had called the Stony Mountains, while they were known to the tribes as the Yellow Mountains; and these mountains were reported to run parallel to the coast of the South Sea, a hundred or a hundred and twenty leagues distant. The notions then prevailing placed high up on the Missouri the Big Bellies (eight hundred warriors) and just below them the Mandans (three hundred warriors). Their trade was mainly by the Red River to the Indians about Hudson's Bay; but over the mountains, fifteen to twenty days distant, were the Crows, on a river which communicated with the South Sea.

Of the £19,000 in duties which were paid on American furs in London, a large part came from Spanish Louisiana, and nearly all from west and north of the lakes. This was partly occasioned by the fact that the Spanish traders, so far as they rivaled the English ones, were obliged to draw their supplies from Montreal, which they paid for in peltries. The English were particularly active on the St. Peter and Des Moines, where they came in contact with the Sioux. To reach the St. Peter the English passed from Lake Superior to the Goddard River, thence by a portage of nine miles to the St. Croix, and so to the Mississippi. They took the Green Bay and Wisconsin River route to reach the "Moins" River, which was of less importance in this trade than the St. Peter. The English had

NOTE. — The map on the opposite page is from Guthrie's *New System of Geography* in a "Map of the United States agreeable to the Peace of 1783," London, 1785-92. It shows the supposed islands of Lake Superior and the Grand Portage.



made their chief depot of supplies at Mackinac, but now that the treaty was to transfer this post, they were planning to maintain their connection with the trans-Mississippi country from St. Joseph's Island in the channel connecting Lakes Superior and Huron. Thence to Montreal, their usual route had lain by the old portage to the Ottawa from Lake Huron. Though the portages in this course were numerous, their canoeists could count more accurately on the time required in reaching Montreal by this course than by that of the lakes, since adverse winds on these waters sometimes delayed their boats, and made their arrival too late for shipment to England.

Under these circumstances, and knowing that the surrender of the posts would strengthen the American jurisdiction over the extreme limits of the Republic, Grenville had stubbornly contended for a rectification of the bounds west of Lake Superior, so that the Canadian traders could pass to upper Louisiana over British territory. This question was mated with another, namely, that of the British right to navigate the Mississippi, as provided by the treaty of 1782, and complicated also by the demands of Spain in the same direction.

The treaty of 1782 had drawn the northern boundary line of the United States due west from the Lake of the Woods along the 49th parallel, till it struck the headwaters of the Mississippi. The sources of that river, it was now known, were considerably south of that line, and therefore at no point did British territory touch the Mississippi, upon which the treaty gave her the right of navigation; for while America and Spain held the river at the north, the latter country possessed both banks at its mouth. It was Grenville's claim that since the treaty gave England a right upon the river, she was entitled to a rectification of the boundary so as to assure that right. Jay explained the grant of such a right on the river to have been allowed by the United States because, at the date of the treaty, it was supposed, as the secret article of the treaty indicated, that England, in the general treaty, then soon to follow, would secure, in the acquisition of west Florida, a boundary on the river at the south. That accession of territory not taking place, the Americans claimed that the right of navigating the river either lapsed, or, if it held, it must be considered as existing without a boundary on the river.

POND'S MAP.

[This map is reproduced from E. D. Neill's "Inaccurate Knowledge of the Sources of the Mississippi at the Close of the Last Century," one of the *Manchester College Contributions*, 3d series, No. 1. It is taken from Peter Pond's "Map of the Hudson's Bay Country, 1785," in the State Department at Washington, and Neill calls it "the first map after 1783 to show that the Mississippi did not reach any point west of the Lake of the Woods."]

The map which Grenville brought forward to illustrate his views was Faden's map of 1793. In this map the Mississippi was drawn as known only to about a degree above the Falls of St. Anthony. North of this point there were three branches, one of which must probably be the true Mississippi. One of these flowed from a marshy lake in 45° . A second flowed from White Bear Lake near 46° . Each of these were marked "Mississippi by conjecture." The third branch issued from Red Lake in 47° , and was called "Labontan's Mississippi." Jay objected to the acceptance of any tentative geography, and proposed a survey to gain precise knowledge. He contended that, as the American commissioners in 1782 had offered an alternative of the 45° and 49° , and the latter had been accepted, the decision must stand, and the Mississippi must either be shown to cross that parallel, or must be connected with it by the shortest line.

Jay persistently clung to his view, and Grenville yielded, consenting to a survey from one degree below the Falls of St. Anthony northward, leaving the definite connecting line for future consideration.

While the commissioners intending to make this survey were preparing for their work, they learned that the belief among the traders as to the upper waters of the Mississippi was of this sort: Following the river up beyond the Falls of St. Anthony a hundred leagues, you reached Crow Wing River on the left. Another hundred carried you to Sandy River on the right, up which those wishing to reach Lake Superior usually went. Still a hundred leagues more, and Leech Lake was reached, which was held to be the true source of the Mississippi, and it was fifty leagues southeast of the Lake of the Woods. These northwestern bounds, as described in the Quebec Bill in 1774, and repeated in Carleton's commission in 1775, had been uncertain, in that a due north line from the mouth of the Ohio was prescribed, without defining it as following the curves of the Mississippi, till it reached the southern bounds of the Hudson Bay Company.

How true, now, this trader's geography may have been was soon to be decided by a survey, which the North West Company ordered David Thompson to make, so as to determine how many of their posts were south of 49° , and consequently in American territory. In March, 1798, that surveyor started west on the 49th parallel. He first found two of the company's houses on the Red River south of that boundary. In April, he reached a four-mile carry, by which he entered upon a river which conducted him, thirty-two miles away, to Red Lake, where the North West Company had temporary trading-posts, at a spot found to be in $47^{\circ} 58' 15''$. There he found a portage of six miles, and, four days later, passing through a level country spotted with ponds and luxuriant with wild rice, he entered upon Turtle Lake, an expanse of water four miles square, but having lateral bays, which gave its outline a resemblance to that animal. This was then recognized as the source of the Mississippi, and in 1782 it had been supposed to lie farther north than the Lake of the Woods. This error has been accounted for by supposing that the fur traders, in ascending these upper waters of the Mississippi, reckoned as a league (three

miles) the time it took to smoke a pipe, while in reality only two miles were passed over in that time. Thompson found the north end of the lake to be in $47^{\circ} 38' 20''$, or one hundred and twenty-eight miles south of the point where the map-makers in 1782 had supposed it. There was another post of his company on Red Cedar Lake near by. In May, Thompson passed down the Mississippi, two hundred miles by the winding of the stream, to Sand Lake River, up which he turned towards Lake Superior, and in this neighborhood he found two other stations of the North West Company.

Thompson's wanderings had shown how many posts must be abandoned, as in American territory, and had also shown to the satisfaction of the waiting commissioners that Turtle Lake, as the source of the Mississippi, was something short of two degrees south of the 49° boundary. The acceptance of Thompson's observations then, and the acquisition of Louisiana a few years later, took from the extreme northwest line all international importance.

Hamilton, in May, 1794, had urged Jay to try to get England to help in the matter of forcing Spain to open the lower Mississippi "by giving her a participation in that navigation; but," he added, "with negotiations going on with Spain it must be managed carefully." Jay did not forget Hamilton's injunctions, and he conceded to England by the treaty her right to navigate the Mississippi, as it had stood in that of 1782, with the additional provision that all ports on the eastern side of the river, whether belonging to one party or the other, should be open to British traders in the same way that the seaboard ports were. While some held that this concession to England was a shrewd one, to gain her adhesion in treating with Spain for the opening of the river, it was looked upon by others as affording the British an opportunity of monopolizing the trade of the river under the cover of their gunboats.

This agreement of Jay and Grenville as to the joint use of the Mississippi gave great offense to Spain, and in her protests she was supported by the French Directory. Spain claimed that the right of navigation which England acquired by the treaty of Paris, in 1763, was surrendered when she gave up west Florida to Spain in 1782, a position which both England and the United States denied. "The Spaniards are feverish


with respect to the Mississippi article," wrote Wolcott to Hamilton in July, 1795.

The treaty offered another point of attack to its opponents, in that there was no specific agreement on the part of Grenville that English agents would in the future abstain from inciting the Indians to hostilities. Jay's instructions had directed him to require that, "in case of an Indian war, none but the usual supplies in peace should be furnished" by the English to their Indians and their allies. A contrary conduct had long been the subject of complaint by the American government. "The British government," the instructions further said, "having denied their abetting of the Indians, we must of course acquit them. But we have satisfactory proofs that British agents are guilty of stirring up and assisting with arms and ammunition the different tribes of Indians against us." To such complaints Grenville had given as emphatic a denial of complicity on the part of the government as ever Hammond had done, and he authorized Jay to assure the President that "no instructions to stimulate or promote hostilities by the Indians have been sent to the king's officers in Canada."

The negotiations for the giving up of the posts seem to have gone on without impediment, except as to the date for the final surrender. The victory of Wayne had, before the negotiations closed, rendered the question of a barrier territory nugatory. The actions of Simcoe, aimed at the accomplishment of such a reservation, had of late increased in daring. At the end of August, Washington had had occasion to bring a rash deed of that British agent to the attention of Jay.

During the summer, Colonel Williamson, who, as trustee of Sir William Pulteney, managed a large landed property in New York, which had been bought of Robert Morris in April, 1792, on the borders of Lake Ontario, had begun a settlement at Sodus Bay, forty miles west of Oswego. On August 16, Lieutenant Sheaffe, sent by Simcoe's orders, had appeared in the harbor and demanded the abandonment of the place. The party, on retiring, is said to have carried off some flour, and

NORR. — The opposite map of the Genesee country and the Niagara road is from Samuel Lewis's "State of New York," in *Carey's American Atlas*, Philadelphia, 1795.



Williamson made preparations to resist in case of further demands.

The ground assumed by Simcoe was that, while the negotiators in London were at work, the Americans should not have advanced their occupancy. When Washington heard of Simcoe's movement, he looked upon it as the first denial by the British of American rights to their own territory beyond the jurisdiction of the posts, and wrote to Jay that he considered it "the most open and daring act of the British agents in America." This served to bring Jay to this part of the negotiation with more nerve, perhaps, than he assumed on any other point, though his critics later blamed him for not pressing a claim of indemnity for the twelve years of the posts' detention. Jay doubtless saw the difficulty in this last particular, as Hamilton did in defending him, for it would have inevitably opened the question of the first infraction of the treaty of 1782, and induced a course of mutual crimination, a procedure surely to be avoided if an amicable ending was to be reached. Jay had stood for June 1, 1795, as the date of surrender; but Grenville could not be brought to any nearer date than on or before June 1, 1796. The interval was certainly not long, if the merchants were to be allowed time to close up their business and withdraw their merchandise, widely scattered, and we have seen what a number of stations the North West Company had planted in the American territory. It was certainly not too long a time if there was any justice in the claim, which the factors at Montreal had always made, that five years were necessary to bring their business to an end. There were political considerations, also, in giving the Indians an interval to get familiar with the prospect of a change, as conducing to an easier transfer when the time came.

The delay, however, afforded a text for other animadversions of the opponents of the treaty. It was said that the interval was sufficient for England to get loose from continental complications, and, these over, she would be in no better mood to give the posts up than she was in 1783. The posts not being distinctly named was another point of complaint, nor was there any definite explanation of what territorial jurisdiction the posts carried with them, and in case of further complications the whole barrier question might again arise. But these were con-

tingencies like any other easy to arise with treaties negotiated in bad faith, and hardly to be guarded against. The grants about Detroit, which the British had made, Jay had agreed to recognize ; but he demanded and gained from Grenville the absolute freedom for the Americans to occupy in the interim any lands not clearly within the survey of the post, and that, in effect, no such interference as that of Simcoe at Sodus Bay should again happen. There was also a provision for allowing residents in and about the posts to transfer their allegiance to the United States, if they desired to become, in this way, American citizens. This did not escape cavil, and it was pointed out that the Constitution provided for an " uniform rule of naturalization."

The sections of the treaty, which have now been examined, related closely to western interests and the possible application of them in the near future. They were but part of the considerations now brought under the attention of Washington, while he was determining his course of approval or disapproval. He soon became the centre of observation. From all sides remonstrances and petitions to affect his decision came in upon him. He told his friends that he had never before encountered so trying a crisis, nor one in which there was " more to be apprehended."

While his decision was pending, Washington retired for an interval of calm to Mount Vernon. Here he was followed by the insatiable correspondent. In a letter which he wrote at Mount Vernon, he gives an index of his feelings, showing that while there was that in the treaty to question, intemperate judgments found too much to criticise.

Meanwhile, in Boston, the merchants were fuming with passion at the thought of such a treaty ; but it was not long before it became known that Gore and Cabot were making headway in producing a revulsion of sentiment. It was reported that Jay had been hung in effigy in Philadelphia. In Virginia there was almost a revolution, and there was talk of taking the treaty-making power from the Senate and giving it to the people. Leading Virginians were accountable for such incendiarity. Monroe could speak of the pusillanimity of Jay. Madison could assert that the " dearest interests of our com-

merce and the most sacred dictates of national honor" had been sacrificed to an English connection. Jefferson believed that if the treaty became a law, it was a British triumph, and it could be endured only by a people impressed by the personal merits of the President. The legislature of Kentucky pronounced it unconstitutional. In South Carolina, Rutledge repeated the wild clamor.

The fact was, that the way in which the treaty was regarded had for the moment become the supreme test of party steadiness. The republicans gathered in opposition to it every element of dislike for England, and every faction of admirers of the French. The debtor class, looking to relief in a war with England, naturally swung to their side, and they gave a violence, cohesion, and stubbornness to their cause in the South which it did not have in the North.

Jefferson, in a letter to Ebeling of Göttingen, intended to affect that author's judgment in his intended book on the United States, sought to show that the republicans were not only the great mass of the people, and landholders and laborers to a man, but that their aggregated wealth surpassed that of the federalists. Thomas Cooper, a new sojourner in the country, wrote to a friend in England: "The conduct of your court has certainly given strength to the anti-federal party, among whom may now be ranked the majority of the people and the majority of the House of Representatives," and he probably reflected the belief of ardent republicans.

Jefferson, as the leader of the opponents of the treaty, feared more than anything else the ability and influence of Hamilton, and urged Madison to enter the lists against him. Hamilton, as the recognized champion of the treaty, made, perhaps, the most effective of his appeals for the treaty under the name of "Camillus." Wherever his arguments found lodgment, the belief grew and was strengthened that the rejecting of the treaty meant drifting into a war with England and a delay in settling the national account with Spain, since she was likely, in that event, to seek an alliance with Great Britain. At a later day, Hamilton spoke less temperately, and not so publicly, when he called the opposition "the mere ebullition of ignorance, of prejudice, and of faction," and he might well have said so of the aspersions of Callender, which, there was indeed much reason

to believe, were prompted, if not by the solicitation, at least by the countenance of Jefferson and Madison. Indeed, the country was in a bellicose mood, and there was little prospect of calmer councils. "The exasperation against England is great," said Rochefoucault-Liancourt, who was looking on; "it spreads through all ranks in society. In my opinion, Jay's negotiation will hardly be able to smother the glowing spark." William Priest, another traveler, said, "A war with England at this time would be very popular."

These were the burning feelings that prevailed when Washington, on August 11, returned to Philadelphia, and three days later discussed with his advisers the course to be taken. It had, perhaps, become more difficult now to reach a prudent determination than it had been at an earlier stage. There were two developments that urged action in different directions. One was an order of the British government to capture all neutral vessels carrying provisions to France. The other was the British interception of a dispatch from Fauchet, which had been transmitted to the American government. By this, which was for a while kept from Randolph's knowledge, it looked as if that secretary, who was the only one of the cabinet attached to the French interests, had been making applications of at least a questionable character to the French envoy for loans to certain debtors to England, so as to affect their conduct. It was the discovery of this seemingly treacherous conduct of one of his advisers that largely influenced the President to a prompt adhesion to the treaty. On August 14, the cabinet advised him to approve the treaty, and on the 18th, Washington signed it, and secured the counter-signature of Randolph, as secretary of state, before the latter was confronted with the evidence of his dealings with the French envoy. The signing of the treaty and the exposure of Randolph were charged by Jefferson, and have been assigned by later vindicators of Randolph to an impulse of servility in the President's mind, as well as to the strengthening of his prejudices by the intrigues of Pickering and Wolcott, who were making the most of palpable indiscretions of Randolph. On August 26, instructions were sent to John Quincy Adams, then at the Hague, to proceed to London and exchange ratifications, if the British would accept — as they did — the Senate's amendment. He was to

insist, also, on the withdrawal of the offensive provision order, but was not to push his objections to a degree that would endanger the treaty. Everything went well, and on October 28 the ratifications were exchanged, and on February 29, 1796, proclamation was made of the treaty's binding force.

Two days later, Washington notified Congress, and it was left to the House of Representatives to make the necessary appropriations of money to carry the treaty into effect. The President was congratulating himself that there had been a great change in public sentiment in favor of the treaty during the last two months, when suddenly an opposition on the part of a faction in the House, threatening to become a majority, developed itself, not altogether unexpectedly, however. It assumed the ground that, as coördinate with the President and Senate in making treaties, through its constitutional power to withhold appropriations at its pleasure, the House had a right to block a treaty by inaction when it disapproved its provisions. There was clearly an occasion in this seeming conflict in the constitution for a precedent, and the House seemed for a while likely to establish one, to have the force of a judicial decision, if that were possible. Jefferson had before this given his support to this recalcitrant party. To bring the matter to an issue, the House voted to request the President to transmit to it all the papers relating to the treaty. The President, advising with his cabinet, resolved to sustain his prerogative and refused the request. While Washington had the vote of the House under consideration, Pickering, on March 25, as secretary of war, and through the military committee of the House, submitted a plan for providing a force to occupy the posts equal to that of the British garrisons then holding them, in order that the Indians might not take any advantage of the transfer. The temper of the House seemed likely to render any such provision unnecessary, and before long it was known that Dorchester had ceased his preparations for evacuating, pending the uncertain fate of the treaty.

The House accordingly became the centre of interest, and here, at last, the question of peace or war was to be decided. The friends of the treaty set seriously to work, and felt the burden which was upon them. They had a good deal to help them in the obvious and close connection between Jay's treaty and that

which had been made with Spain for the opening of the Mississippi, later to be considered. The two treaties must stand or fall together. This feeling began to show itself beyond the mountains. Gallatin, whose connection with the whiskey rebellion in western Pennsylvania had been equivocal, to say the least, now, as representing the regenerated western spirit, showed a moderation which did much to restore confidence and place him in the forefront of his party. The great triumph, however, was won by Fisher Ames, a Massachusetts federalist, in a speech before the House on April 28, whose effect is kept alive even to-day among the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of those who heard it, and witnessed its effect throughout the land. Rochefoucault-Liancourt, who saw the contemporary influence of the speech, said: "It is, by men of his party from one end of the continent to the other, extolled as a piece of eloquence, which Demosthenes or Cicero would have found it difficult to equal," in taking a "dexterous advantage" of the attending circumstances.

When Ames took the floor, he felt with others that the opponents of the treaty were sure to carry their measure by a majority of two or three certainly, and perhaps by one of four or five. How he turned defeat into a victory, some extracts from his speech will show, but they will of course lack his impassioned voice, his finished elocution, and the tenderness which came of his palpable feebleness, nerving itself to a duty, at the risk of his life. It will be remembered that as an eastern man he had been thought to share that indifference towards the west which was often charged upon New England.

"Will it be whispered that the treaty has made me a new champion for the protection of the frontiers? It is known that my voice, as well as my vote, has been uniformly given for the ideas I have expressed. Protection is the right of the frontiers; it is our duty to give it. . . . The western inhabitants are not a silent and uncomplaining sacrifice. The voice of humanity issues from the shades of the wilderness. It exclaims that while one hand is held up to reject the treaty, the other grasps a tomahawk. . . . I retort especially to the convictions of the western gentlemen, whether, supposing no posts and no treaty, the settlers will remain in security. . . . No, sir, it will not be peace, but a sword; it will be no better than a lure to draw

victims within the reach of the tomahawk. . . . If I could find words for my emotions, I would swell my voice to such a note of remonstrance, it should reach every log house beyond the mountains. . . . Wake from your false security. You are a father, — the blood of your sons shall fatten your cornfields. You are a mother, — the warwhoop shall waken the sleep of the cradle."

"The refusal of the posts, inevitable if you reject the treaty, is a measure too decisive in its nature to be neutral in its consequences. From great causes we are to look for great effects. The price of western lands will fall. Settlers will not choose their habitations on a field of battle. . . . Vast tracts of wild lands will almost cease to be property. This loss will fall upon a fund expressly devoted to sink the national debt."

"The treaty alarm is purely one addressed to the imagination and prejudices. Objections that proceed upon error in fact or calculation may be traced and exposed. But such as are drawn from the imagination, or addressed to it, elude definition and return to domineer over the mind. . . . On a question of shame and honor, reason is sometimes useless and worse. I feel the decision in my pulse; if it throws no light upon the brain, it kindles a fire at the heart."

Ames spoke in a committee of the whole, and the body at once adjourned to avoid the immediate effect of the speech, which seemed to be overwhelming, though the cool rehearsal of some of its warmer passages fails of much effect now. Later, after the feelings were quieted, the committee were a tie, but the vote of the chairman sent it to the House, where, on April 30, the House gave the majority that Ames had despaired of acquiring in a vote of 51 to 49. The contest was over, and early in May the appropriation bill became a law.

On May 10, 1796, McHenry, the secretary of war, sent Captain Lewis to make arrangements with Dorchester for the transfer of the posts, and on May 27 Wilkinson, now commanding at Fort Greeneville, asked of the commander at Detroit the day when the American forces could enter that town.

At the end of May, orders were issued to the British commandants to evacuate the posts; but Lewis, now in Quebec, representing that the American troops were not yet ready for

the occupation, Dorchester agreed to wait their coming, and on June 1 and 2 issued orders accordingly. A few weeks later (July 9), that governor, who had been so long an actor in American history, embarked for England, and was succeeded three days later by Lieutenant-General Robert Prescott.

The British had already reduced their garrisons to a guard. On July 11, 1796, Fort Miami was handed over to Colonel Hamtramck. On the same day, Captain Moses Porter entered Detroit, and found it already evacuated. Some one had filled the well at the fort with stones, and had done other damage. Simon Girty is known to have stayed behind, after the British had crossed the river, and just in time to avoid the Americans he rushed his horse into the stream, and swam to the other side. Porter was so poorly supplied that, to maintain himself till succored, he was obliged to borrow provisions from the British beyond the river.

Oswego was left on the 15th. The American troops under Captain James Bruff, bound for Niagara, were delayed on the way, and when that fort was turned over, on August 11, nearly all the British garrison had left. It was not till October that Major Burbeck with a party, sent from Detroit, reached Mackinac, where a British officer and twenty men pulled down the last English flag on American territory. Wayne, in June, had been ordered to supervise the several surrenders. In November, when all was done, and he could congratulate himself on the natural sequel of the Fallen Timbers, he left Detroit for Presqu'Isle. When he reached there, he was prostrate with an agonizing attack of gout, and on December 15 he died at that post; and James Wilkinson — of all men — succeeded to his commanding station.

The determination of the British government to surrender the posts had struck deeply into the heart of Simcoe. We learn of his "displeasure," of his vindictive plotting with the Indians, and of his unbridled passion, "which overleaped all bounds of prudence and decency," in the talks which Rochefoucault-Liancourt reports having had with the governor, not long after, when that traveler visited Canada. He disclosed to that visitor his hopes of regaining some of the prestige which Jay's treaty had taken from Canada by developing a profitable corn trade, and by opening a route for the fur traders from Ontario to

Lake Huron, avoiding that by Lake Erie, and diverting trade from the United States. He was confident that the Genesee County must pour out its produce to the sea by way of the St. Lawrence. He looked forward to an inevitable war with the Americans, and dreamed of a naval station at Chatham on the Thames. Fortunately, his heated temper was cooled by a dash of Dorchester's soberer sense.

CHAPTER XXII.

WAYNE'S TREATY AND THE NEW NORTHWEST.

1794-1797.

WE need now to look back. It seemed for a while in the autumn of 1794 as if Wayne and his army might have to take part in the unwelcome task of quelling civil commotion in western Pennsylvania. Had he been called to it, his work of pacification beyond the Ohio might have been seriously retarded.

The funding policy of Hamilton had necessitated legislation to support it, and, in 1791, a tax had been imposed on whiskey. Certain concessions quieted the opposition to such a tax, which appeared in Virginia and North Carolina, but the population of Pennsylvania beyond the mountains, centring about Pittsburg, which had now begun rapidly to grow, were not to be satisfied by anything short of an absolute exemption. Their surplus grain, as Gallatin set forth for them in a manifesto, in view of their remote situation, only became transportable at a profit when it had passed the still; and a tax which was laid on them, and did not burden equally the seaboard, was an unjust one. These views, as Fisher Ames said, "had tainted a vast extent of country beside Pennsylvania."

An organized revolt began at Redstone on the Monongahela, in July, 1791, when, at a conference of distillers, the populace was excited, and officers sent to collect the tax were hustled and seized. When this was known, the government found a strong feeling developed elsewhere in support of law. "The wild men of the back country," wrote Wolcott, "will not have perseverance to oppose the steady, uniform pressure of law, and must finally submit."

This over-mountain population was a ragged one, and had some passionate blood in it. Wolcott, referring to a preponderance of Irish and Scotch-Irish among them, said: "It is a specimen of what we are to expect from European emigrants."

We have not yet got over such feelings. The leaders, instigated by the rancorous language which they heard, and perhaps somewhat alarmed at the determined support which the government was receiving on the seaboard, sent agents to Kentucky to secure support. It was said that their emissaries were dispatched to Canada for like purposes, and spies among them reported that there were Englishmen among their leaders. They were known to rob the mails in order to secure information. They might reasonably expect that dispatches would be sent to Wayne touching their actions, and warning him of possibilities. In his cabinet Washington first experienced the disquietude of Randolph and his lack of trust, when that member of it urged him to inactivity. Hamilton, on the contrary, counseled prompt and uncompromising force. During it all, Governor Mifflin was timid. In the summer of 1794, while the government was anxiously waiting news from Wayne and Jay, disturbing reports were continually coming from over the mountains. At intervals of seven weeks (August 7 and September 25), Washington issued two proclamations, warning the rioters of the consequences of their folly. Meanwhile he was collecting militia from Virginia, Maryland, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania. In October, the President himself joined the camp at Carlisle, and arrangements were made for entering the insurgent country through the mountain passes. General Collot, who a little later went over the ground, with his French feelings in sympathy with any disturbance that could make America turn to France, criticised the indecision of the insurgent chiefs, in that they neglected the opportunity of blocking the progress of the federal army by preoccupation of the defiles. But time had given a chance for passions to cool, and Washington, at the head of the approaching troops, disturbed the equanimity of the defiant hordes, and they sent a deputation to make terms. The President was struck with their subdued bearing, and the end came. Morgan was left for the winter with a body of two thousand five hundred men to be ready for any revival of the rebellious spirit, and Washington returned to his official duties to be prepared for other trials in the spring, when Jay's treaty darkened the atmosphere once more.

It is a curious commentary on the heated politics of the time, when we find Fauchet believing, with how much of Randolph's

countenance we may never know, that the government had instigated the revolt to divert the attacks which were making on it, and when Washington himself saw in the rebellion "the first formidable fruit of the democratic societies, brought forth too prematurely for their own views, which may contribute to the overthrow of them." Whatever the case, the timely suppression of the trouble left Wayne at Greeneville at liberty to devote himself to the pacification which it was his mission to accomplish.

The opening of 1795 showed a disposition on the part of an increasing number of the northwest Indians to sue for peace; but in Philadelphia the hope of a permanent settlement was not so sanguine. Pickering felt, with many others, that the disturbance in western Pennsylvania was rather quieted than quelled, and that there was no certainty as yet in the outcome of Jay's mission. Its failure meant war at no distant day. So he urged the maintenance of strong advanced posts in the Indian country, to be ready for any disastrous turn of affairs. Later news from Wayne was more assuring. By February 11, he had come to a preliminary agreement with the Shawnees, Delawares, and Miamis, and on the 22d he issued a proclamation announcing a cessation of hostilities. Wayne, buoyed by his satisfaction, neglected a duty in not communicating the fact of such a proclamation to St. Clair, who was still the civil governor of the northwest. That official only heard of it near the end of April, in a letter from Pickering, and he properly made complaint to the President.


Although there was a truce, there was still uncertainty, and further pacification was jeopardized by the incursions which some Kentuckians made across the river, throwing the Indians into a suspicious frame of mind. The less sanguine doubted if more than half the great body of the Indians were weaned from war, especially if they could be made to feel by the English agents that they would be helped in further resistance. The English, however, were themselves uneasy, and the French in Detroit were exciting the apprehensions of Simcoe, and were known to be urging the Indians to peace. Already their traders were sending supplies to Wayne, and rumors of the completion of a treaty in London, with the surrender of the posts

assured, were raising in French circles an expectation of large accessions to their numbers from France itself. In March, Simcoe had written to Portland that Wayne threatened to place a garrison in Sandusky. This again added to Simcoe's alarm as hazarding British supremacy on the lakes. Brant and McKee were actively at work to counteract French influence with the Indians; and Brant was later to feel that nothing could prevent Wayne concluding a peace. By June, Wayne felt that the only impediment to a treaty was the continued incursions of the lawless Kentuckians, and appealed to St. Clair to prevent them. Parties of red men had now begun to assemble round his camp, and he gave them his first talk on the 16th. By the middle of July, the concourse was large enough for formal proceedings. On the 20th, he read to them the treaty of Fort Harmar, and found that some of the remoter tribes had never heard of it. Little Turtle made a declaration for the Miamis about the territory which they claimed. He said that, beginning at Detroit, their boundary line stretched to the head of the Scioto, followed down that river and the Ohio to the Wabash, and pursuing this last stream, extended to the Chicago portage,—an area embracing the westerly half of Ohio, nearly all of Indiana, and the lower Michigan peninsula. Wayne, in reply, thought that other tribes than the Miamis had rights in this territory, and said that the United States were prepared to pay for such part of it as should be surrendered by the treaty. We may now follow the daily progress of the negotiation:—

July 23. At the end of the day Wayne gave them some liquor, but warned them “to keep their heads clear to attend to what I shall say to-morrow.”

July 24. Wayne told them that the “fifteen fires,” as they called the Union of States, had paid twice for land, once at Fort McIntosh ten years ago, and again at Fort Harmar six years since. He also told them that he asked for certain reservations for posts farther west than the main cession. He read Jay's treaty to them, showing how the Americans were soon to take possession of the lake posts. He told them they might rest to-morrow and have a double allowance of liquor because the hatchet was buried, and on the following day he would let them know what he demanded for bounds.

July 27. Wayne read his proposed treaty and enumerated the remote reservations which he wanted, merely "to connect the settlements and the people of the United States" by roads which the Americans could travel. He described these distant posts as not intended to annoy the Indians; but simply to furnish convenient trading places; and he explained that they



[Colonel Whittlesey's plan of the divisionary grants in Ohio, from the *Western Reserve Historical Society's Tract, No. 61* (1884).]

were all in the main such areas as the Indians had conveyed to the French, who in turn, in 1763, had surrendered them to the English, and by the English they were, in 1782, confirmed to the United States.

July 28. There were numerous Indian comments upon Wayne's propositions.

July 29. The Sandusky Indians presented a written memo-

rial, asking that what was conceded to the Indians might be granted in severalty to the different tribes. This was followed by some uneasy harangues on the part of the Indians in discontent at Wayne's demand for the remote reservations.

July 30. Wayne declined the proposition of the Sandusky tribe, and then addressed himself particularly to the Miamis, who alone had objected to his main line, as interfering with their hunting-grounds. Wayne firmly stood by his expressed demand, and told them they could hunt where they pleased, "as long as they demeaned themselves peaceably." After some further explanations, he read the treaty again, and put the question: "Do you approve these articles?" All answered one by one, "Yes," — Ottawas, Pottawattamies, Wyandots, Delawares, Shawnees, Miamis, Chippewas, Kickapoos, Weas, and the Eel River tribe.

The conference now broke up "to eat, drink, and rejoice," and to reassemble when the necessary copies of the treaty were engrossed.

On August 3, the tribes again assembled. Wayne once more read his commission, giving him power to treat with them, and went over the treaty for the last time. He then handed a parchment copy to the Wyandots, to be kept for the whole, and a paper copy to each tribe. The next day the presents were distributed, — \$20,000 worth of goods, with a promise of an annuity of \$9,500. As a last word he told them they were children, and no longer brothers.

The line which had been agreed upon, and which Ludlow later marked, gave the whites some 25,000 square miles of territory east and south of it, and between it and the Ohio. It began at a point on the latter river opposite the mouth of the Kentucky, and ran northerly, so as to include a long gore at the southeast corner of Indiana, to Fort Recovery. Here it turned east and was extended to the upper Muskingum, whence it followed the portage and the Cayahoga to Lake Erie. The reservations west of this line were sixteen in number, and measured each a few miles square. Those which were wrung from the Indians with most difficulty were that at Fort Wayne and that at the portage of the Maumee and Wabash near by. These parcels of land were the beginning of cessions which half a century later drove the Miamis beyond the Mississippi. A

reservation at the mouth of the Chicago River was six miles square, "where a fort formerly stood," probably a trading-post of the French, and where now stands the city of Chicago, which was begun the next year by a St. Domingo negro, Jean Baptiste Pont au Sable, who built a hut on the spot. The grant which Virginia had made to George Rogers Clark, opposite Louisville, was also reserved. Some of these detached cessions were at later dates included in larger grants, made by other treaties. The recognition by the United States of the Indian property in the soil, even though practically salable to the States under something like compulsion, was perhaps some recompense to the tribes for the English transfer to the Americans of the right of preëmption, by the treaty of 1783, without the concurrence of the original owners; but the Indians on their part were now required to recognize this right as lodged in the Americans only.

A distribution of commemorative medals was made on August 8, and on August 10, when the last conference was held, it was found there were 1,130 Indians present. A band of Cherokees settled on the upper waters of the Scioto had kept aloof. When, however, Wayne sent them a summons, they obeyed it, and promised to move back to their own country, south of the Ohio.

Tidings of these events were dispatched to St. Clair, and at Cincinnati, on August 25, 1795, he made proclamation that the Indian war was over.

The only drawback to Wayne's content was the fear that the turmoil in the House of Representatives over the treaty of Jay might end in its practical rejection, and on September 15 he wrote to Pickering that if the posts were not repossessed, as the London treaty provided, it "would have a powerful effect upon the Indian mind." Of the treaty which Wayne had effected, Washington said that "the adjustment of the terms and the satisfaction of the Indians were deemed an object no less of the policy than of the liberality of the United States," — a proposition, it must be observed, that McKee severely questioned, when he insisted that Wayne had made provisions in articles that were not communicated to the Indians. The source of this

NOTE. — The map on the following pages is "A Map of the Northwestern Territory," in Jedediah Moore's *The American Universal Geography*, p. 573, Boston, June, 1796. "The dotted squares are the reservations made by the Indians in 1795, and ceded to the United States."

UPPER CANADA

Map showing the Mississippi River and surrounding regions, including Lake Superior, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, Lake Erie, Lake Ontario, and Lake St. Clair. The map also depicts the Missouri River, the Arkansas River, and the Illinois River. Key locations marked include St. Louis, New Madrid, Vincennes, and various Indian settlements. The map is titled "UPPER CANADA" at the top.


New Madrid

A.



allegation diminishes its chances of truth. There was one outcome of the treaty, in which some reckless Americans joined, not less discreditable than the action charged by McKee, could this charge have been proved. Certain Michigan tribes, known to be aggrieved at the result, were cajoled by some Canadian merchants to make for a supposable half a million dollars the transfer of some twenty million acres in the lower Michigan peninsula. It was the part of the American sharers in the plot, led by one Robert Randall of Philadelphia, to obtain Congressional sanction by bribing members with the promise of a due proportion in the plunder. Randall's effrontery and the testimony of William Smith of South Carolina, who had been approached late in 1795, led to his arrest, and for his attempted bribery the speaker reprimanded him, and the project dropped.

In December, 1795, Washington, on meeting Congress, advised them of the treaty as securing "a durable tranquillity." It had indeed put an end to forty years of warfare in the valley of the Ohio, in which it had been reckoned that 5,000 whites had been either killed or captured. For three years past, if Hamilton's figures can be taken, these wars had cost a million a year. What had been charged specifically to the Indian department for five years had varied annually from \$13,000 to \$27,000. At the conclusion of Wayne's treaty, the United States had bound itself to pay to the Six Nations, Chickasaws, Cherokees, Creeks, and the northwestern tribes, an aggregate yearly sum of \$23,520, which attending charges would raise to \$30,000. These expenses were irritating to those who had not experienced the evils of the frontier life; but they bore a small






[This map is from Joseph Scott's *United States Gazetteer*, Philadelphia, 1795.]

proportion to the \$7,000,000, which was now the annual expense of maintaining the federal government. It was said that each

NOTE. — The map on the following pages is from Rufus Putnam's map of Ohio, and shows the Western Reserve and the reservations under Wayne's treaty.



citizen paid towards this greater sum, *per capita*, but one fifth of the burden imposed on every European subject.

It was not long before it became apparent that the tranquillity which Washington looked for was having its effect. The reign of civil content may have been irksome to a few, who, as one of them told Collot, sought the more distant West in order to escape "the plague of justice and law;" but it gave allurements to others, and the immigration into the valley so increased that, during 1795-96, the population of the northwest was thought to have risen to about 15,000.

The first settlement of any extent which the voyager down the Ohio found on the north bank was still that at Marietta. Jedediah Morse, the preacher at Charlestown, Massachusetts, who at this time was finding sales for repeated editions of his *Gazetteer*, speaks of the town's spacious streets, running at right angles, and its thousand house-lots, each 100 by 90 feet. Collot speaks of the surrounding landscape as "the most agreeable imaginable," with its stately trees, the tulip-tree and the magnolia and the climbing honeysuckle. He says the population consists of five or six hundred New England families and a few French who had straggled from Gallipolis.

The same observer, going thence to this last-named "wretched abode" of his countrymen, found 140 people there, the "wreck of the Scioto Company." Congress, in some atonement of others' wrong-doing, had made them a grant of seven acres to each family; but the land was so bad and unhealthy that Collot says it did not support them. To make further amends, in 1796 Congress added 250 acres more to each family, and located the grants near the Little Scioto.


In the country bordering on the Miami River, Cincinnati had grown to have 300 families, and, beside its log cabins, there were some fifteen frame houses. Collot thought the future of Newport, the hamlet across the river, was better assured than that of Cincinnati. Symmes had collected some families at the North Bend, and parties had gone up the Great Miami fifty miles, and settled Dayton. In all his disquietudes, St. Clair had found nothing so perplexing as the issuing by the land companies of divers warrants covering the same territory, and he charged the doings principally upon the irregularities of Symmes and Putnam, as managers of their speculative associa-

tion. It was a further disturbance of his sense of justice that, having been the occasion of these disputes, "these gentlemen are allowed to sit in judgment upon them" in their courts.

Upon the quieting of the country by the treaty of Greeneville, the Scotch-Irish from the Pennsylvania counties along the New York line and from the west ranges had come into the valley in large numbers. A colony of Swiss settled at the mouth of the Great Scioto. Associates from Kentucky and Virginia had gone farther up that river. One Farley, a Presbyterian minister from Bourbon County in Kentucky, had gone in 1795 up the stream with a party, and had a brush with some wandering Shawnees and Senecas, whom Wayne had not succeeded in drawing to Greeneville. Farley, finding the country to his liking, returned in 1796, and on April 1 built the first cabin at Chillicothe.

Wayne's treaty line had thrown all east of the Cayahoga into the hands of the whites for settlement. This opened the easterly part of that northern section of the State of Ohio claimed by Connecticut, and known as the Western Reserve. West of the Cayahoga line, Connecticut, as early as November, 1792, had set aside a large tract, known as the Firelands, to be devoted in due time to recompense the 1,870 claimants who had suffered from the British raids in Connecticut during the Revolution. Wayne's treaty, by throwing this tract into the Indian reservation, had put off the occupation of it.

A year later, Connecticut tried to sell the remaining parts of this property, but purchasers were not found till after Wayne's treaty had been made, when, in September, 1795, a number of Connecticut people, associating themselves, but without legal incorporation, as the Connecticut Land Company, bought the entire area, paying for it by a return mortgage for \$1,200,000, — a sum the basis of the school fund in that State to-day. The principal agent in the enterprise was Oliver Phelps, who eight years before had been engaged with Gorham in a similar speculation in Genesee lands, — selling them to Robert Morris in 1790, and Morris represented \$168,000 of this new investment. Six townships five miles square were at once sold to pay the cost of surveying, which was begun the same year. This plotting of townships was a departure from the plan of six miles square, which had already been established in the contiguous



THE MOHAWK AND WOOD CREEK ROUTE.

[Section of a "Carte des Troubles de l'Amérique," based on Sauthier and Ratzer, published at Paris by Le Rouge, 1778, showing the Mohawk, Wood Creek, and Lake Oneida route to Oswego and Lake Ontario. It shows the position of Fort Stanwix on the Portage. The streams running south from near Springfield are the sources of the eastern branch of the Susquehanna. The residence of Sir William Johnson near Johnstown is also shown.]

Seven Ranges, and which became the rule. The proprietors are stated in some accounts to have been 35, and in others 48 in number, representing in the aggregate 400 shares at \$3,000 each. Each member of the company drew his proportion by lot and held in severalty. The survey, when completed, showed less than 3,000,000 acres, when earlier, depending on an imperfect knowledge of the shore line of the lake, they had supposed they were bargaining for a third more, so that what they reckoned as costing 30 cents an acre was really purchased at 40 cents.

The question of jurisdiction was still in abeyance. It was for a while uncertain if the company could not in due time make their territory a State of the Union. Congress took the matter under consideration in January, 1796, but suspended action to 1798, the region in the mean while being included by St. Clair in the counties laid out to the south of it. Movements now proceeded which were ended in 1800 by the United States giving a title of the territory to Connecticut, reserving the jurisdiction, and that State transferred the title to the company.

A party of fifty pioneers, representing the company, left Connecticut in May, 1796. Their leader was Moses Cleave-land, a militia general of good repute, who was black enough in visage and sturdy enough in figure to seem of a different stock from his Yankee followers. He led them by way of Fort Stanwix and Wood Creek to Lake Ontario, and avoided the fort at Oswego, still held by the British. Reaching Buffalo, the party bargained with Brant and Red Jacket for the Indian title to the land beyond for \$2,500 in merchandise. On July 4, they were at Conneaut Creek, which, in recognition of the day, they named Port Independence, and made merry "with several pails of grog." From this point they sent out surveyors to determine the 41° of latitude, their southern line, and to establish the meridian which was the western bound of Pennsylvania, from which their township ranges were to count. Next, passing on by the lake, the party kept on the lookout for the mouth of the Cayahoga, on the eastern side of which, and within Wayne's treaty limits, they were intending to found a town. One day they discovered a sharp opening into the land, with a sand-bar and spreading water beyond. They passed the obstruction and, rowing along some marshes, found a spot where the Indians had evidently been accustomed to beach their canoes,

shelving edge of the lake. There had been in the neighborhood at some earlier day a few temporary huts, erected by white travelers, for the spot had formed one of the stations in the route between Pittsburg and Detroit. It was now, as was reckoned, the twelfth township, counting from the Pennsylvania line, and in the seventh range above the 41° — the site of the future Cleveland. Here, about the 1st of October, 1796, the new settlement took shape under the surveyor's stakes, with homestead lots on the lake, ten-acre lots farther back, and farms of a hundred acres still more distant, — the latter on the line in part of what is now the world-famous Euclid Avenue. The town grew slowly, for the sand-blocked river had proved malarious, and we may mark the stages of future development in the abandonment, in 1805, of the other bank of the river by the Indians, and the opening of the Ohio Canal in 1827.

There is little doubt that the delay in determining the question of jurisdiction had much to do with discouraging settlement. While the matter was still pending, Winthrop Sargent, who supposed that St. Clair was absent, and that he was acting-governor, had, in August, 1796, set up Wayne County, to include that portion of the Reserve west of the Cayahoga, together with the Michigan peninsula, but the right to federal supervision was denied. Again, in July, 1797, St. Clair himself included the eastern section in Jefferson County, with similar protests from the occupants to such an assumption of territorial jurisdiction. The title of the United States was assured, as we have seen, in 1800.

The report which Hamilton had made on July 20, 1790, on a plan for disposing of the western lands, was little considered at the time, but now that the treaty of Greeneville had quieted the west, it was again brought up in Congress. There was at first some contention upon the provisions of the new bill, and, as one of the members of Congress wrote, its fate depended on the reconciling "crude schemes and local views." By the exertions of Gallatin and others, an act was finally passed, on May 18, 1796, providing for the surveying of townships six miles square, and the selling of lands in sections. It was largely based on the act of 1785. Hamilton had advised putting the price at a dollar an acre; but the act put the price at two dollars, and

sought to make some recompense to poorer people by allowing a system of credit. The sales, however, were small, and within a year less than \$5,000 was received into the public treasury,



[The annexed map is from Joseph Scott's *United States Gazetteer*, Philadelphia, 1796, — the earliest of such books.]

and for forty years the expenses of maintaining the system exceeded the returns. The same act of 1796 created the office of Surveyor-General, and the appointment fell, in October, to Rufus Putnam. There had been a tract set aside for paying the bounties for military service in the Revolution. This lay between the Scioto and the Seven Ranges, south of Wayne's

treaty line and north of a line running in about the latitude of the city of Columbus. This was one of the regions now surveyed.

The preparing of these western lands for sale and settlement had kept alive the project of connecting the coast with the Ohio valley, which, under Washington's influence, had taken their earlier shape in the years following the close of the Revolutionary War. Rufus King wrote to Gouverneur Morris, in September, 1792: "You hear of companies formed and forming in all the States for the improvement of our inland navigation, and thus the most distant lands will become almost as valuable as those nearest to our markets." Hamilton said, in 1795, that "to maintain connection between the Atlantic and the western country is the knotty point in our affairs, as well as a primary object of our policy."

For some years, a project of connecting the Hudson and the lakes had been the subject of discussion, and had elicited sundry pamphlets. In March, 1792, a canal company had been incorporated with this in view. The retention of the posts had kept the project in abeyance, and when Cleaveland, in 1795, had taken the route by Fort Stanwix to reach Ontario, he had followed what promised, it was then thought, to be the course of such a connection. The route this way was from New York by boat to Albany, by road to Schenectady, by boat to Utica and Oswego (except the portage at Fort Stanwix); then three days on Lake Ontario, a portage at Niagara, two days on Lake Erie to Presqu'Isle, portage to Le Bœuf, and the boat to Pittsburg. The distance thus computed was eight hundred and ninety-one miles, and more than twenty-two days were taken; while land carriage from Philadelphia, three hundred miles, took eighteen or twenty days; but a hundredweight of merchandise could be carried a little cheaper from New York. The Hudson route, however, had the disadvantage of being somewhat obstructed from July to October, when the streams were low.

Nearly all the travel so far, however, had been by the overmountain route from Philadelphia and Baltimore. It took forty days, sometimes increased to sixty days, for a wagon to go from either of these places to Pittsburg and return. Pittsburg was now a town of about one hundred and fifty houses, brick and wood, and after Wayne's treaty had opened the way


vania to the mountain passes. While the distance from Philadelphia to Pittsburg in an air line was two hundred and seventy miles, the road extended it to three hundred and fourteen.

For some years the route west by the Potomac had been improved by progressive canalizing of that river. The land carriage from Fort Cumberland, which had been for some time about fifty miles, on to Redstone, was likely soon to be reduced to twenty miles. Further up the Potomac, from the mouth of Savage River, there was a trail to Cheat River, which people talked of reducing to seventeen miles. "Produce from the Ohio," said Wansey, an English traveler at this time, "can be sent cheaper to Alexandria than English goods can be delivered in London from Northampton." The fur dealers said that Alexandria was four hundred miles nearer the Indian wilds than any other shipping port on the Atlantic. The route from Baltimore to the Ohio was increased from two hundred and twenty-four miles as the bird flies to two hundred and seventy-five by the course followed. In 1796, Collot made some computations of the cost of carrying European products up the Mississippi as compared with the Potomac and other over-mountain routes. He found that it cost 36 per cent. more in charges and thirty-five days more in time by the land route to the middle west; and if St. Louis was the objective port, the excess was 43 per cent. in cost. From New Orleans to the mouth of the Ohio was one thousand two hundred miles, and boats carrying twenty-five tons and managed by twenty men consumed ninety days in the round trip. It required ten days more, if St. Louis was the goal. Putting it another way, Collot says that goods can be conveyed from Philadelphia to Kentucky at a cost of 33 per cent. on the value of the goods, and from New Orleans to Illinois at a charge of only 4 to 4½ per cent.

On the Ohio there was an almost incessant procession of flat-boats passing down with merchandise. In 1796, a thousand such craft passed Marietta. Every month a passenger boat left Pittsburg for Cincinnati. Its cabins were bullet proof, and six single-pounder guns were trailed over its gunwales.

In 1794, while Pickering was acting as Postmaster-General, Rufus Putnam arranged with him for a regular mail service on the Ohio. The post-bags were carried by horsemen every

NOTE. — The opposite map of routes west from Alexandria and Lancaster (Philadelphia) is from a map in La Rochefoucault-Liancourt's *Travels*, London, 1799.




fortnight, from Pittsburg to Wheeling, which was now a town of twelve or fifteen frame and log houses, protected by a small stockaded fort. Here the mail was transferred to a boat, and, after stopping at Marietta and Gallipolis, the craft passed on to Limestone. This river port, which had long been used, was a hamlet built on a high and uneven bank at the foot of a considerable hill. Its harbor was the mouth of a small creek, where a few Kentucky boats were usually lying, and were occasionally broken up to furnish the plank for more houses. From Limestone the pouches were carried inland to the Kentucky settlements. In 1797, an overland route to Limestone was opened from Wheeling by Ebenezer Zane, in payment for six hundred and forty acres of land which Congress had granted him north of the Ohio.

The mail boat, which was a vessel twenty-four feet long, manned by a steersman and four oarsmen, next passed on to Cincinnati. These boats, like the passenger ones, were armed against Indian attacks, but there was little or no interruption by savage marauders after 1794. It took six days to run from Wheeling to Cincinnati, being an average of sixty miles a day; twice as much time was consumed in returning.

The western country was at this time entered at three different points, for the Niagara route had hardly become a commercial one, and since Pickering pacified the Six Nations at Canandaigua, in November, 1794, there had been obstacles to its occupancy. These three portals were the sources respectively of the Ohio (Alleghany and Monongahela), Kanawha, and Tennessee. The routes converging upon these springs were seven in number. Two of them united at Pittsburg. One of these, starting from Philadelphia, struck by different portages the Alleghany River, which was a stream clearer and a little more rapid than the Monongahela, and its current increased from two and a half miles an hour to four or five, according to the state of the water. The other route, which ended at Pittsburg, left Baltimore or Alexandria and passed from the Potomac to the Monongahela. It was an attractive route. The river had firm banks, and was topped with a variety of trees, — buttonwood, hickory, oak, walnut, sugar-maple, and beech, — all growing to large sizes for their kind. Wherever

the hills fell back from the stream, it was fringed by fertile bottoms. From Fort Cumberland by wagon to Brownsville was eighty miles, and the carrying distance was much less by



PITTSBURG AND WHEELING.

[From a "General Map of the Course of the Ohio from its Source to its Junction with the Mississippi," in Collet's *Atlas*.]

portages to the branches of the Monongahela. Rochefoucault-Liancourt says: "Being situated nearer the rivers Youghiogeny and Mocongahel [Monongahela], Baltimore possesses a part of the trade of the back country, if Pennsylvania supplies most of the stores."


The other routes from Virginia were to the head of Green-

brier River and so down the Kanawha to the Ohio; and through Cumberland Gap, by the Wilderness Road, as Boone tracked it in 1775, using so much skill in avoiding the water-courses that the modern engineers have put the railroad over much the same course. In 1795, the Virginia Assembly passed "an act opening a wagon road to Cumberland Gap," appropriating £2,000 to construct a way suitable for wagons carrying loads of one ton; and in the summer of 1795, large trains of emigrants were passing this way.

The Virginia road to Knoxville passed the same way, without turning to the right at the Holston settlements as the Kentucky way did, and so went on to Nashville. This road was joined by another from North Carolina; and at the French Broad River, it was united with still another road from South Carolina. The Georgia road left Augusta and fell into this route from South Carolina.

The application of artificial power to the propulsion of boats was still a constant dream. Morse, in his *Gazetteer*, thought it probable that "steamboats would be found of infinite service in all our extensive river navigation." In 1792, Earl Stanhope, in England, had contrived a duck's foot paddle, shutting with the forward motion and opening with the return, and he had driven it by steam. In the autumn of the same year, Ormsbee at Providence, in Rhode Island, moved a boat three or four miles an hour on the same principle, calling the motors goose feet. Robert Fulton sought to substitute the simpler dipping paddle. Two years later (1794), Samuel Morey, a New Hampshire man, who had been experimenting since 1790, moved a boat with a stern wheel five miles an hour, from Hartford to New York, and in June, 1797, he propelled a side-wheel boat on the Delaware. Fitch, the earlier mover in this problem, who had gone, as we have seen, to England, had now returned to America, a believer in the screw propeller. Its principle had first been proposed by the mathematician Daniel Bernoulli in 1752, and it is described by David Bushnell in a letter to Jefferson in 1787, showing how a submarine boat worked by a screw had been earlier used by him in an attempt to blow up a Brit-

NOTE. — The opposite map from Morse's *Universal Geography*, Boston, 1793, shows the conception then prevailing of the interlocking waters of the Chesapeake, Lake Ontario, and the Ohio.



ish fifty-gun ship in New York harbor. This side of the steam navigation problem had already engaged the attention of Watt, Franklin, Pancton, and others. In 1796, Fitch tried a screw propeller in a yawl, on a fresh-water pond in New York city, near where Canal Street now is. Moving to Kentucky, we find him still experimenting with a model boat, three feet long, on a creek near Bardstown. Here he died in 1799, and he is buried by the scene of his last efforts, near the banks of the Ohio. In 1798, Stevens was engaged, with the sympathy of Chancellor Livingston, Nicholas T. Roosevelt, and Isambard Brunel (the last an exiled French royalist and later famous in engineering work), in experimenting on steam propulsion on the Passaic River. He used a boat of thirty tons, and drew water from the bottom of the boat and expelled it astern. In this, and in the use of elliptical paddles, his efforts failed of success. So the century went out, with the dream of Cutler and Morse still unfulfilled.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE UNREST OF THE SOUTHWEST.

1791-1794.

THE year 1791 was one of hesitancy in the southwest. Congress, in February, had admitted Kentucky to the Union, but her actual entrance was set for June of the next year. Vermont was almost immediately received, to adjust the balance of North and South.

Zachary Cox had, in 1785, begun a settlement at the Muscle Shoals of the Tennessee River (in northern Alabama), and early in 1791, Sevier and others of the ejected Franklinites, under the authority of the Tennessee Company, made ready to occupy the country just south of the shoals, where Georgia, December 21, 1789, had made that body a grant of 3,500,000 acres. Rumors of their purpose stirred the Cherokees, and there was danger of a general Indian outbreak. Knox early protested against the daring independence of the Tennesseans, and the President warned them of the risks they ran. He told them that the federal government could not and would not protect them against the angry Indians. Nevertheless, the company advertised for settlers. The President now appealed to the Attorney-General to devise some remedy against such flagrant acts, for every new irritation of the southwestern tribes was sure to extend to their Spanish neighbors, with whom the government was still trying to settle the momentous question of the Mississippi.


The convention of Nootka had relieved Spain of immediate apprehension of a war with England, and Miró was getting tired of the unproductive Kentucky intrigue. The federal government was loath to stir the slumbering embers. While it had no purpose to press the vexed question to a rupture, it was but too conscious how any moment might awake the Spanish passions. In March, 1791, Jefferson wrote to Carmichael at

Madrid that at any time such an "accident," as the seizure of American boats on the Mississippi, might "put further parley beyond our power." He at the same time thought to calm the Kentucky discontent by writing to Innes that the government only awaited an opportunity to bring the Spanish negotiations to a point. "I can assure you of the most determined zeal of our chief magistrate," he said. "The nail will be driven as far as it will go peaceably, and further, the moment that circumstances become favorable." On May 30, 1791, Innes wrote back to Jefferson that such assurances "have in a great measure silenced our complaints."

It was at the same time a question how far France could be depended upon to exert her influence on the Spanish ministers. Lafayette had assured Washington (June 6) that "France will do everything in her power to bring Spain to reason, but will have a difficult and probably unsuccessful task." Events in France, however, were moving too rapidly.

On July 2, 1791, Governor Blount, who had already been authorized (August 11, 1790) to act, met the Cherokee chiefs on the Holston at White's Fort. Over five hundred families had of late years settled on lands guaranteed to the Cherokees by the treaty of Hopewell, and the purpose of the new treaty, which Blount hoped to make, was to bring these families within the jurisdiction of the whites. There was the usual dilatory diplomacy before the Indians finally consented to place themselves under the protection of the United States. They agreed to allow the whites free use of the road across their territory to the more distant settlements, and promised that travelers upon it should not be molested, and that no harm should come to any one navigating the Tennessee. By the bounds that were determined along a winding and disjointed line, which was the source of later trouble, and which Ellicott was ordered to trace, the Cherokees abandoned much of the land which the whites had usurped. The treaty, in fact, confirmed the whites in the possession of all the Tennessee country, except a tract lying between the Holston and the Cumberland, and other regions lying either in the southeast or towards the Mississippi. In

NOTE. — The opposite "Map of the Tennessee government by Genl. D. Smith and others," is in *Carey's American Atlas*, Philadelphia, 1795. It shows the road connecting Knoxville going west with Nashville and going east with the Holston settlements. The Kentucky road is the dotted line which crosses the Clinch River going north.



the autumn Congress ratified the treaty. Spanish intrigues, aimed to unite the southwestern tribes as a barrier against the Americans, prevented a like acceptance on the part of all the sections of the Cherokee tribes, and the more western settlements soon, as we shall see, suffered from savage marauders.

On the spot where Blount had made the treaty he very soon laid out a town for his capital, and bearing in remembrance the secretary of war, it was named Knoxville. It was surveyed in sixty-four lots, priced at \$800 each. In the autumn, the *Knoxville Gazette* was started (November 5), which did good service, at a little later day, in cherishing loyalty and keeping the Tennessee settlers proof against the Jacobin fever.

Of the conditions at this time along the Mississippi and in Florida, we fortunately have the impressions of an intelligent traveler, John Pope, who, in 1791, recorded his observations, as he descended the river in a boat whose crew—to show the diversity of life on the river—was made up of “one Irishman, one Anspacher, one Kentuckian, one person born at sea, one Virginian, and one Welchman.”

At New Madrid the Spanish commander complained that the governor at New Orleans did not sufficiently support him; and to Pope his “excellent train of artillery” appeared to be the chief defense which he had. It was doubtful if, at this time, the entire Spanish force between the Gulf and St. Louis, and at a post on the Missouri, numbered more than two or three thousand men. As he drew near Natchez, Pope found the country “pretty thickly inhabited by Virginians, Carolinians, Georgians, and some few stragglers from the Eastern States.” On the Bayou Pierre, an inlet from the river, thirty miles in length and twenty wide, he found a population “composed generally of people who have moved and still continue to move in elevated stations.” He describes Natchez as having about a hundred houses. The fort commands the river a mile up and two miles down, but on its “back part it is pregnable to a dozen men.” Going on board the barge of Gayoso, the governor of the town, he was regaled “with delicious wines.” He speaks of Gayoso’s “majestic deportment, softened by manners the most engaging and polite.” Below Natchez he saw the “seat” of Mr. Ellis, a Virginian, near which lay three large tobacco-boats unlaunched. After this, “slight, airy, whitewashed buildings become more

common on the eastern side, and are in general occupied by people from the United States." Then came "country seats," "beauteous farms, and elegant buildings."

At New Orleans, now a town of less than six thousand inhabitants, Pope found that private adventurers from New York, Philadelphia, and Baltimore were carrying on a tolerable trade, and could undersell the natives, while making a hundred per cent. profit. Passing on to Pensacola, he says: "The upper and lower Creek nation trade at this place, where they are uniformly imposed upon by a Mr. Panton, who has monopolized their trade. The poor Indians barter their deer skins at fourteen pence sterling per pound for salt at nine shillings sterling per bushel. Panton is part owner of the salt works on the island of Providence, and has brought the salt to Pensacola in his own bottoms at the average expense of about three pence per bushel. I think his goods at Mobile, Pensacola, and St. Marks are usually vended at about five hundred per cent. on their prime cost."

From Pensacola, Pope, in the early summer of 1791, went inland to visit McGillivray, at his house on the Cousee River, five miles above its junction with the Tallapoosa, where together they form the Alabama. This half-breed chieftain had an upper plantation, six miles higher up the stream. Here the traveler found him superintending the erection of a log house with dormer windows, on the spot where McGillivray's father, a Scotch trader, had lived amid his apple-trees, which were still standing. Pope describes this tall, spare, erect man, with his large dark eyes, sunk beneath overhanging brows, as showing signs of "a dissipation which marked his juvenile days and sapped a constitution originally delicate and feeble. He possesses an atticism of diction, aided by a liberal education, a great fund of wit and humor, meliorated by a perfect good nature and politeness." Pope describes his host's table as affording a generous diet, with wines and other ardent spirits. He possessed, as other visitors showed, some fifty or sixty negro slaves, three hundred cattle, and a large stock of horses and lesser animals.

McGillivray always protested that he did all he could to make his tribesmen carry out the treaty which he had made in New York, but that he failed by the intrigues of the Spaniards among his countrymen. "This perpetual dictator," as Pope

calls him, "who in time of war sub-delegates a number of chieftains for the direction of all military operations," soon passes out of our story, for, to anticipate a little, he contracted a fever at Mobile, where he was consulting with these same intriguing Spanish, and died at Pensacola, on February 17, 1793, and was buried in the garden of that William Panton who, with McGillivray's own connivance, had unmercifully bled his fellow-tribesmen.

The year (1791) closed with a change in the control at New Orleans. Miró had left, and on December 30 he was succeeded by Carondelet, who had been transferred from the governorship of San Salvador, in Guatemala. It was not long before the inevitable and irrepressible intrigue of the Spanish nature began to show itself in the influence which Carondelet exerted on those of the Cherokees who were discontented with the recent treaty. Reports were coming to Blount of intended inroads upon the Cumberland settlements, and he cautioned Robertson to be on his guard, and to prevent any provocations on the part of the whites. The federal government, meanwhile, tried, by increasing their subsidy from \$1,000 to \$1,500, to appease the recalcitrant Cherokees by a supplementary treaty at Philadelphia in February, whither an Indian delegation had gone. The savages were well received by Knox, and the President wrote to the governor of South Carolina, where there had been some discontent manifested at the enforced moderation of the federal government, that he looked for good results among the other southern Indians from this conciliatory reception of the Cherokees. It was deemed in Philadelphia a fortunate occurrence that these southern tribesmen were so acceptably engaged in that city when news of St. Clair's defeat was received there, for otherwise the ill tidings might have aroused the Indians along the southern border. Although the Cherokees had returned in a friendly mood, and Blount had been led to hope for peace, there was still small confidence in the Cumberland region that the amicable humor of the Indians would last long, after the discouraging tidings from the Ohio country were given time to produce an effect. Accordingly, Robertson was urged by the settlers to prepare for the worst. In May, 1792, though Blount had confidence "in the black paint sprinkled with flour" which the Cherokees wore in token of good intention, the governor


yielded to Robertson's apprehensions, and ordered out two companies of militia to protect the frontiers, but with injunctions not to cross the Indian frontiers. In the same month, Robertson himself was wounded by prowling savages while at work on his farm, and the danger seemed serious. Some of these marauders were Delawares from beyond the Mississippi, and when Robertson complained of them to the commander at New Madrid, he was told that the Spanish authorities could not be responsible for vagrant savages of the Spanish jurisdiction, if they went beyond their reach.

Matters, to those who were in the secret, were, at the same time, far from satisfactory for the Spanish governor. The influence of Bowles, as a rival among the tribes of McGillivray, was, to the mind of Carondelet, dangerous enough for him to arrest his sway by treachery. That renegade was accordingly invited to New Orleans, only to be apprehended and sent a prisoner to Spain. If McGillivray, in whose loyalty Carondelet had confidence, had thus got rid of an enemy, he was too conscious of his own waning ascendancy among his people not to seize eagerly an opportunity, which the Spanish governor offered him, of leadership in a new confederation of the Indians. With characteristic duplicity, he was, at the same moment, flattering Blount with a promise of leading two thousand Creeks to a conference with American agents.

As the summer went on, James Seagrove, the Indian agent of the government, made clear to the authorities at Philadelphia what he called the "simplicity and treachery" of McGillivray, and was in turn instructed to countermine that chieftain's influence with the Creeks. The complicity of the Spanish in all this was everywhere believed among the whites, and it was a question if the Spanish governor should not be told that this intriguing with the Creek leader could not be longer borne.

At Mobile, whose defense Carondelet thought of more importance than that of Pensacola, the Spaniards held Fort Charlotte, and there was another armed station at Pensacola. Their military occupation extended up the Tombigbee, and near their Fort Stephen, on that river, a body of English-speaking settlers were engaged in raising indigo. These constituted the outpost of Spanish influence, and not a white man was permanently settled between them and the Cumberland region. Here roamed

the Creeks, and in the early summer of 1792, it was known that Spanish emissaries were passing among these Indians and inciting them against the Americans, rendering it difficult for Ellicott to make any progress in running the treaty line of the previous year. There were also reports of Spanish traders



THE CHICKASAW COUNTRY.

[From a *Chart of the Sources of the Mobile and the River Yazoo*. The Boar River is a branch of the Tennessee. The letter D stands for "carrying-place three miles only in length to join the Tennessee and Mobile Rivers."]


trafficking on American soil. These stories reaching Philadelphia, Jefferson, in September, 1792, urged Washington to authorize counter movements on Spanish soil.

The Spanish posts at Natchez and at Chickasaw Bluff had no such protection from barrier tribes, for the Chickasaws were more or less friendly with the Cumberland people, who were likely, as the Spaniards felt, to attack those posts. Feuds were arising between the Chickasaws and the Creeks, and, in case of a Spanish war, it seemed likely those tribes would be on different sides. With this in view, the Spanish governor had, on May, 14, 1792, brought together representatives of the

southern Indians, to bring about, if possible, an alliance with them, so as to make them breast the American advances. When these inimical steps were brought to the attention of the Spanish agent in Philadelphia, he told Jefferson that the conditions naturally arose from the disputes of jurisdiction, and from the umbrage which the Indians generally felt because some had put themselves under American protection.

Almost simultaneous with this Spanish treaty, Blount had once more met the Cherokees. Little Turtle, their spokesman, expressed dissatisfaction because the line which Ellicott was running was going to cut off their hunting-grounds. In the conference, no farther immunity was made certain than that Blount and Pickens and their party, descending the river to Nashville to hold a conference with the Chickasaws and Choctaws, would not be molested. By September, 1792, it was feared that war had not been prevented, and Blount was ready to let Robertson forestall an attack from the Cherokee towns by marching against them, when it was learned the hostile purpose was dropped. This professed forbearance was apparently a ruse to disarm the settlers, for, on September 30, six hundred Chickamaugas and Creeks dashed upon Buchanan's Station, and brought war to the settlers' doors. For all this, Blount required Robertson to maintain the defensive, and to wait for Congress to declare a war. The brigadier-general of the eastern posts, Sevier, had little faith in defensive war, and when Blount ordered out the Watauga militia to protect Ellicott, — who was so far favoring the Indians as to leave some of their villages on the Indian side which the treaty line placed with the whites, — there was likelihood of a general war, if Sevier's dash prevailed.

While the Tennessee region was suffering this uncertainty, the movement in Kentucky for Statehood had resulted, in April, 1792, in a convention at Danville, to frame a constitution. This was the tenth coming together of the people in their long striving after autonomy, in which they had shown a marked steadiness in the face of excitement. Though so near the end, the soberer members found still some ground for alarm, and Innes expressed their doubts when he declared some uneasiness at the disposition shown to put the work of constructing



their fundamental law too exclusively into the hands of "plain, honest farmers." The draft presented to the convention was the work of George Nicholas, the representative of the newer comers, rather than of the older leaders of the territory. The instrument followed on broad lines the Federal Constitution, but made the principle of government a little more democratic. It gave manhood suffrage, but gave no recognition of public education. Though allowing the possibility of emancipation, it saved slavery by declaring "all men, when they form a social compact, equal." This constitution was ratified in May, and Isaac Shelby was made the first governor.

Kentucky, "more extravagantly described than any other part of the United States," as one observer said, was commonly thought at this time to contain perhaps seventy thousand whites, and, when the blacks were included, the over-confident carried the population much higher. In the boastful talk about forcing the Mississippi, it was not infrequently held that there were thirty thousand men in the new State capable of bearing arms. There is no doubt that the Spanish stood in dread of some ebullition of passion which would hurl a large force against their settlements on the Mississippi, and the Kentuckians were spoken of, in connection with the Cumberland settlers, as "restless, poor, ambitious, and capable of the most daring enterprises," and Carondelet was fearful of their ultimate attempts to cross the Mississippi. In Kentucky, more than in Tennessee, the population was being tempered by the arrival of some gentle Virginian stock among them, and was passing out of the inchoate roughness of a pioneer condition, though, up to a very recent time, Cooper, the traveler, was probably right in saying that no part of Kentucky, except a few miles round Lexington, was perfectly safe from Indian raids. The victory of Wayne was rapidly having its effect, in rendering the Wilderness Road safe without a mounted guard, and little was beginning to be heard of assaults on the armed packet-boats of the Ohio.

It was estimated that the emigration from the settled portions of the States east of the mountains to the west was become from forty to fifty thousand a year; but Kentucky was not getting now the share of it which she formerly did. The

NOTE. — The opposite map, following Elihu Barker's large map of Kentucky, is from *Carey's American Atlas*, Philadelphia, 1795, and shows the road connections of Frankfort, Danville, and Lexington with the Ohio and Cumberland rivers.




confusion of land titles through overlapping grants and shiftless recording was doing much to repel the thrifty farmer. Larger bodies of emigrants went by the northern routes and stopped in the Genesee country, where perhaps the climate was not so inviting, but the soil was nearly as rich, and there were better means of taking produce to market. The opposition of New York laws to aliens holding lands was working, however, some detriment to settlement within its borders. The enterprise of Pennsylvania in opening roads and canals, and bringing new regions in the valley of the Susquehanna into occupancy, was another impediment to Kentucky's increase. The treaty of Greeneville in quieting the northwest was, moreover, bringing the region north of the Ohio into direct rivalry.

Kentucky, nevertheless, still had great advantages in rich and enduring soil. Everywhere the winter rotted the autumn's leaves, and in the spring there was clean turf beneath the trees. A Kentucky farmer, with perhaps pardonable warmth, told William Priest that he was obliged to plant his land six or seven years with hemp or tobacco before it was sufficiently poor to bear wheat. Grass grew with a surprising rankness. Clover grazed the horses' knees as they galloped through a sea of blossoms. Oaks, locusts, and beeches spread to enormous sizes. Where the trees would shade his crops, the farmer cleared his ground, which meant that he cut the trunks two feet above the soil, and grubbed out what was between the mutilated boles. If a seaboard farmer traversed the country, they pointed out land that would yield one hundred bushels of corn to the acre, and everywhere the crop was from fifty to eighty, or three times what the New Englander had been used to. Crèvecoeur said that "a hundred families barely existing in some parts of Scotland will here in six years cause an annual exportation of ten thousand bushels of wheat." Again, scrutinizing the component parts of the population, he says: "Out of twelve families of emigrants of each country, generally seven Scotch will succeed, nine German, and four Irish. The Scotch are frugal and laborious, but their wives cannot work so hard as German women. The Irish love to drink and to quarrel, and soon take to the gun, which is the ruin of everything."

The lawless profligacy of the border, which the Irish had

done so much to maintain, and that assimilation of traits which entangles the evils of the savage with the vices of the white, was now beginning in Kentucky to disappear. The rogue who stole horses and altered ear-clips of the cattle and sheep was less often seen in the town. The bankrupt from the seaboard was sooner suspected, and was the less likely to gather the idlers at the trading-stores. The hunter, with his torn moccasins and dingy leggings, his shirt blood-stained, and his coon-skin cap



[This map, from Henry Toulmin's *Description of Kentucky*, 1792, shows the counties of Kentucky at that time, namely; Fa = Fayette; Bo = Bourbon; Ma = Madison; Me = Mercer; Je = Jefferson; Ne = Nelson; Li = Lincoln. The towns are: 1, Lexington; 2, Boonesborough; 3, St. Asaph; 4, Louisville; 5, Harrodsburg. The Cherokee River, the modern Tennessee, is described as "navigable 900 miles," and the upper part of it (Te) is called "Tenassee river, a branch of the Cherokee."]

ragged and greasy, still came to the settlement for his powder and salt, and enticed Michael and Pat to the frontiers; but his visits were less frequent, and he did not linger to make part of a life which had grown away from him. The storekeeper, hampered by barter, gave the tone to the community, while he devised the cutting of Spanish dollars into triangular eighths to supply the need of small change. The Rev. John Hurt, of Lexington, told Wansey that Kentucky was the place to make fortunes in trade. He instanced two men who started there with less than £200 apiece, and by keeping store, they were now (1794) worth £30,000. They were Scotch-Irish, one might assume, and that race had just planted some new seed in the founding of Blount College close by Knoxville, now the Uni-

versity of Tennessee, in the country lying to the south of Kentucky and sharing most of its characteristics. Both regions were animated by one controlling impulse in their claims upon the free navigation of the Mississippi.

On December 6, 1791, the Spanish minister intimated to Jefferson that the authorities at Madrid were ready to treat for the settlement of their disputes. Short, at the Hague, was directed to join Carmichael in Madrid. On January 25, 1792, Jefferson informed the Spanish minister that the commissioners had been appointed, and on March 18 their instructions were ready for transmission. The trend of Jefferson's argument in these directions was that Spain, in the treaty of January 20, 1783, had agreed to restore without compensation all north of 31° of latitude, — the line of earlier charters, proclamations, and treaties, — and that the United States, by the Treaty of Independence, received the rights of England north of that parallel, and that the bounds of the secret clause of the latter treaty were not applicable because England had not obtained Florida, as might have been the case, in the treaty with Spain. As to the navigation of the Mississippi, that had been conceded by Spain to England in the treaty of 1763, and the United States had succeeded to the rights of Great Britain. Further, the right to use the mouth of a river belonged by the law of nature and of nations to the country holding the upper waters, and this right was not complete without a port of deposit. A right, Jefferson contended, was not to be confounded with a grant made to the most favored nation, and stood independent of any agreement. If Spain asked any compensation for the concession, the commissioners were instructed to offset such a demand by a claim of damages for nine years of exclusion from the river.

There was in the councils of the President not a little disagreement as to what concessions it might be well in the end to make, as was to be expected where Jefferson and Hamilton were in the circle of advisers. Hamilton was more urgent than his rival for delaying a war with Spain, though he saw, as all did, that a conflict was inevitable in the end, unless the point could be carried by negotiation. He urged an alliance with England as likely to ward off an outbreak, and thought it could

be made for England's advantage by rectifying the northwest boundary line in a way to throw some portions of the upper Mississippi within British territory. This accorded with demands which England had often hinted at, and made later in the negotiation with Jay, as serving to make the provisions of the treaty of 1782 intelligible, inasmuch as a right to navigate the Mississippi, as that treaty gave, with no access to it, was unintelligible. Jefferson firmly objected to the alienation of any part of the territory of the United States on any conditions. Hamilton claimed that exigencies might easily sanction it. The question naturally aroused the antipathies of the two antagonistic factions into which the American people were rapidly dividing, and Randolph, as a sympathizer with the French, fell readily in with the views of Jefferson, while Knox sided with Hamilton. In New England, at this time, it would doubtless have been found on a poll that a withdrawal from the Union was more in favor than an alliance with France against England; and Timothy Dwight, the president of Yale College, was so confident in this sentiment that he supposed that ninety-nine New Englanders out of a hundred held it. Washington carried a steady hand, and, though much inclined to take part with Hamilton against Jefferson, he told his cabinet that an English alliance for this end, giving the British a foothold on the Mississippi, was a remedy worse than the disease.

The year 1793 brought new disturbing elements into play. News of the execution of Louis XVI. on January 21 had reached New Orleans only to arouse in the French Creoles their latent republican sympathies. This alarmed Carondelet, and he began strengthening the outworks of the city, and laying out schemes for an extended defense of the province. The French sympathizers were closely in touch with the agitation already manifest among the Kentucky discontents, and there were rumors of a projected descent of an armed flotilla directed to unseat the Spanish authorities. It was known on the seaboard that letters were passing to Tom Paine, now a member of the National Assembly in Paris; and two persons whom we have already encountered were supposed to be movers in these mischievous schemes against Spain. One was Dr. O'Fallon, not suppressed by the failure of his Natchez projects. The other

was George Rogers Clark, seeking with his shattered energy to emerge from what a contemporary observer called "a profound slumber for upwards of four years." Jefferson some time before had written to Innes that "no man alive rated Clark higher than I did, and would again were he to become once more what I knew him."

In view of these reports, already circulating, the President's cabinet, on March 10, determined on issuing a proclamation against any such warlike demonstration towards Spain, and Wayne was instructed to throw troops into Fort Massac, so as to intercept any armed invaders of Spanish territory. While the President's advisers were considering if the French Revolution had annulled the obligations of the United States to France under the treaty of 1778, Genet, the new minister of the French Republic, armed with three hundred blank commissions, as was reported, arrived on April 8, 1793, at Charleston, on board a French frigate. Before he left Carolina, he began issuing his commissions to cruisers against the enemies of France. Philadelphia newspapers of April contained both the President's proclamation and notices of Genet's arriving in that city. During May, 1793, that arrogant visitor was issuing other commissions and enjoying the excitement and jubilation with which his coming had been hailed. Jefferson grew warm in speaking of "the old spirit of 1776, rekindling. The newspapers from Boston to Charleston," he said, "prove this, and even the monocrat papers are obliged to publish the most furious philippics against England." Jefferson, again in a letter to Monroe, June 4, assorts the people: "The old Tories joined by our merchants, who trade on British capital, and the idle rich, are with the kings. All other descriptions with the French." Madison, writing to Jefferson of the President's proclamation, "unconstitutional" and "pusillanimous," as the latter believed it, said: "It is mortifying that the President should have anything to apprehend from the success of liberty in another country, since he owes his preëminence to the success of it in his own." The President disregarded the aspersions and found comfort in Hamilton's counsels.


Genet was soon planning to give coherency to the passions, already seething beyond the mountains, under the influence of the inflammatory discussions of the Jacobin clubs, which French

adherents had been forming. A Frenchman, sojourning in Philadelphia, became his willing tool. André Michaux, a man of scientific attainments, had before this been selected by the American Philosophical Society to explore the valley of the Missouri in order to find a short and convenient passage to the Pacific. "It would seem by the maps," as his proposed instructions read, "as if the river called Oregon interlocked with the Missouri for a considerable distance;" and in popular conception, as evinced by Morse's *Geography* of 1794, the two rivers were not kept asunder by any mountain ridge. Michaux was directed after reaching the Pacific to return by the same or some other route, and to avoid, both in going and returning, the Spanish settlements. The Spanish had always jealously guarded their trade in the Missouri valley, but had so far only partially succeeded in keeping the British out, and the next year, Carondelet was complaining that the London fur companies operating in this region were making a hundred per cent. profit. It was, nevertheless, a subject of complaint by Dorchester that English traders were interfered with even when a hundred miles and more away from Spanish posts.

This unfruitful project of the Philosophical Society fell in opportunely with the interest in westward search, which was now engaging the attention of geographers. Vancouver had gone to the Pacific, in 1791, with instructions looking to his sailing east, perhaps as far as the Lake of the Woods, by a supposable passage, which might in some way be found to connect with the Atlantic. In April, 1792, he had reached the northwest coast. On May 11, ensuing, Captain Gray in the Boston ship "Columbia," following Vancouver's track, had found what the latter missed, and had entered and ascended, for some twenty miles, a great river which he named after his ship. It was in part, by virtue of this exploration, that the United States ultimately assumed jurisdiction over this river's course for seven hundred and fifty-two miles, till by the treaty of 1846, the upper three hundred miles was given over to Brit-

NOTE. — The map on the following two pages is from the Spanish Archives, procured by Mr. Clarence W. Bowen, and given to Harvard College Library. It is a section of an *Idea Topografica de los Altos del Missisipi y del Missouri*, Año de 1785, with corrections to 1794. The British and Spanish flags show stations of those peoples, and the dotted lines are the English trading routes. The small squares are trading stations. The triangular ones are nomadic tribes; the round spots are fixed tribes. It shows the Spanish notions regarding the connection of Lake Superior, Lake of the Woods, Lake Winnipeg, and Hudson's Bay.





ish control. The tributaries of the Columbia add six hundred additional miles to its navigable waters. Some three hundred and fifty thousand square miles of its valley sends its drainage ultimately to the sea, beyond where Vancouver saw the forbidding surf which kept him from entering the river, and enough of this vast area lies south of the 49° of latitude to make a fifteenth part of the total area of the present United States. This territory was a factor in American civilization hardly comprehended, when Michaux was contemplating an effort to reach that region overland.

The Spaniards, under Galiano and Valdéz, had already, in 1792, abandoned the search for a passage from the Pacific through North America; and it was left for an English adventurer, Alexander Mackenzie, to be the first to traverse this great valley from the inland side. In June, 1793, Mackenzie was at the crown of the Rockies, known as Peace River pass. He here hit upon the first easily traversable route over the mountains, north of that at the headwaters of the Gila, and he had been the first white man to stand where the waters parted for the Atlantic and for the Pacific. On July 22, 1793, he cut his name on a rock overhanging the sea, in latitude 53° 21' in British Columbia. Thus within ten years from the time when England, by the treaty of Paris (1782-83), confined herself to the north of the Great Lakes, her flag had been carried to the Pacific.

While this English pioneer was thus approaching the sea, Michaux, his would-be rival, had abandoned the rôle of an explorer for that of a political intriguer. Falling under the influence of Genet, he had lent himself to the Jacobin schemes, and to further their western plans, Genet had asked Jefferson to recognize Michaux as a consul of France to reside in Kentucky. This project failing, the French minister devised for his new ally, still preserving the appearance of a scientific wanderer, a direct mission to the western people. On July 5, he showed to the secretary of state the instructions under which it was proposed that Michaux should act. There was no concealment in this document, and it was unblushingly declared that Michaux was to raise from the Kentuckians a force to attack New Orleans, and was also to send an address to the French in Canada to rise and throw off the British yoke. There was some reserve

in the fact that the proposed invading force was to rendezvous beyond the Mississippi, and outside of American jurisdiction, and in this Jefferson recognized a prudent provision. He was incautious enough, however, to give Michaux credentials to Governor Shelby, and others were obtained for presentation to Clark and Wilkinson.



RIVER OF THE WEST.

[A section of "An exact map of North America," in William Russell's *History of America*, vol. ii. p. 106, London, 1778. It connects Lake Winnipeg and the Lake of the Woods with Lake Superior.]

Michaux's journal of his western progress, giving for the most part his scientific observations, has been edited by Charles S. Sargent in the *Proceedings* of the American Philosophical Society (1889). It gives something that the botanist finds of use, but the historian gets in the record only stray glimpses of this agent's real business.

The movement had all the effrontery which went with Genet's acts. This emissary told Wansey, the traveler, at a later day,

that all he did was not beyond what those who commissioned him, Roland and Brissot, expected him to do, and this was to the end of embroiling, if possible, the United States in a war with England and Spain. Genet further openly proposed to Jefferson that he could depend on two leaders in Kentucky to march an army of liberators to New Orleans, and one of these was George Rogers Clark, who in the previous February had written to Genet, offering his services. It is said that the agents of Genet, who carried west the commissions under which Clark was to act, were accredited by letters from John Brown, who had been involved in Wilkinson's earlier schemes. These leaders had asked Genet for an advance of £3,000, but that minister did not find it convenient to furnish such a sum. The grand aim of all was to set up Louisiana as an independent ally of both the United States and France.

There is no need to follow Michaux's itinerary very closely. On August 14, he left Pittsburg, and on the 24th he moaned over the misery of a small remnant of his countrymen remaining at Gallipolis; and at Limestone he left the river for the interior settlements.

Just at this time, the Spanish agent in Philadelphia gave the President information of the proposed expedition of Clark, and Jefferson was instructed to warn Shelby to be on his guard; but the Kentucky governor was either timorous or a sympathizer, and he replied that he knew nothing of any such expedition. In September, Michaux was at Lexington and at Danville, and had various conferences with those to whom he had taken letters. On the 17th, he saw Clark at Louisville, who professed to believe that the scheme had been abandoned, it was so long since he had heard anything. The failure to forward the money which had been asked may have had something to do with Clark's ignorance, and with his picturing the difficulties in the path. There were better prospects when, in October, some money was received, and the blank commissions came to hand. On October 6, Michaux had returned to Danville. His journal is now provokingly meagre; but Colonel George Nicholas advanced a plan of having a French fleet first seize the mouth of the Mississippi, and this force having declared the country French, the Americans were to be invited to descend the river, fighting their way if it became necessary.

The federal government was now (October) so far alarmed that Jefferson wrote to the backward Shelby, directing him to use military force if the courts were powerless to stop the proceedings, and St. Clair was at the same time ordered to hold some militia in readiness. On November 6, Jefferson repeated his injunctions to Shelby, and asked him to remember that the government could best settle the Mississippi question by negotiations then going on. On the next day, St. Clair wrote to Shelby a letter, which was probably to reach him in advance of the other, telling him of the gathering of French officers at the falls of the Ohio, and urging him to act promptly.

Meanwhile rumors of the Jacobins' intentions were reaching Carondelet in an exaggerated form. His alarm increasing, on January 2, 1794, the Spanish governor dispatched a letter to Simcoe, giving that British commander at Detroit the extravagant stories which had reached New Orleans. Carondelet informed him that a million dollars had been raised for the expedition under Clark, who had undertaken to raise five thousand men for the enterprise. He pointed out how it would be for the interest of England that Spain should secure a foothold in the Illinois country. Simcoe later (April 11) replied that, while he agreed with the views of Carondelet, there was no chance for his coöperation, since, indeed, with Wayne preparing for an advance, the Canadian governor had enough to occupy him.

Three weeks before Carondelet had written this anxious letter, Michaux, returning from the west through the Holston country, had reached Philadelphia (December 12, 1793), and in a month's time he was conferring with Brown and Orr, Kentucky members of the House, "on the disposition of the federal government and the execution of General Clark's plan." This was on January 12, 1794. On the 24th, Michaux sent \$400 to Clark, — so pitiful the contrast with Carondelet's supposed sums, — and wrote letters to his Kentucky friends. Before these missives reached Clark and his friends, this American "general of the legion of the French Republic" had valiantly published in *The Centinel of the North West*, a paper printed at Cincinnati, on January 25, his proposals for raising troops, — two thousand were talked of, — promising each one thousand acres of land, two thousand if they served a year, and

three thousand if for two years. They were also assured of a due share of all lawful plunder. It was understood that the general was gathering flatboats at the falls for a jubilant voyage down the Mississippi.

Jefferson, who more and more had found himself outside the President's confidence, had at the opening of the year withdrawn from his advisers to give place to another republican, Randolph. The government, after all its efforts to check this western movement, had felt sensibly the weakness of Shelby, whose elevation had not induced to render him conservative. The letters of the Kentucky governor to Randolph continued to be couched in the language of evasion. Instead of giving adhesion to the requests of the government, he preferred to discuss the unquestionable rights of the west to the navigation of the Mississippi. He went on repeating the tales of Spanish instigation of the Indians, which went without saying; but he showed no patience with the government's efforts to accomplish by peaceful diplomacy the results which he wished for.

The animosity in Kentucky against the government was indeed undisguised, and Shelby's course, with the support of popular sentiment, was in contrast with the assiduity of Blount in Tennessee, who supported Robertson in checking all symptoms of reaction. In Kentucky, every action of the administration was scrutinized for a symptom of inimical predisposition, and there was good ground, it was thought, for apprehension, when, in April, 1794, it was announced that Jay, an enemy of western interests, had been selected for the mission to England.

As the spring progressed, there was an increasing anxiety in government circles. Wolcott believed that an expedition had already started. Letters from St. Clair confirmed the stories of the excited condition in Kentucky. He repeated to the secretary of state the rumors which he had heard of a French fleet to coöperate, — doubtless the spreading of Nicholas's views. He wrote of letters to Clark from the eastern Jacobins passing through the hands of a certain "Monsieur Micheau" at Lexington, and that \$2,000 had been sent to Clark.

St. Clair, during these days, was often writing to Washington of the precarious condition of the western country. He thought that the British were intriguing with certain Kentuckians to

force that region into a Spanish war ; but he was at the same time confident that if the United States and Spain drifted into a conflict, England would be found on the side of Spain, as Carondelet and Simcoe had proposed. Spain, he contended, had good reason to tremble for the Mexican mines, and Carondelet was urging the better fortifying of the line of the Mississippi. It was certain, in St. Clair's view, that Carondelet and some leaders of opinion in Kentucky were in accord. Morgan, in St. Clair's judgment, "possessed a very great degree both of activity and insinuation, and is not much restrained by principle," and was depended upon by Carondelet to lure emigrants over the Mississippi. In another of his letters, St. Clair represents that Morgan's "exertions are turned to Kentucky, where there are a very great number of people who have been disappointed in obtaining land, and are ready to go to any place where it can be easily obtained. Many will make the experiment. If it continues to be one of their maxims to prevent the free navigation of the Mississippi, the situation [New Madrid] directly opposite the mouth of the Ohio seems not to be ill chosen with a view to it. The Spanish commanders on the Mississippi are also assiduously endeavoring to induce the ancient French inhabitants to abandon their country, and they have succeeded with great numbers." St. Clair recommends, as a corrective of this, that the government should sell its lands on the Mississippi and the Illinois at low prices.

During the preceding summer, Genet's doings had become so high-handed in every way, both in his aims at the west and in similar but abortive efforts to attack Florida from the side of Georgia and South Carolina, — where probably there was some popular enthusiasm for the venture, — that even Jefferson, then in the cabinet, had seen the necessity of getting rid of his pestilent influence. So, on August 15, 1793, he had written to Morris in Paris, to demand that the French Republic should recall its minister. On the arrival of Fauchet, as Genet's successor, the western expedition was countermanded, and on March 29, 1794, Randolph wrote to the Kentucky authorities, saying, "The present minister of the French Republic has publicly disavowed and recalled the commissions which have been granted." In the fear that the Jacobin threats in the west would involve the country in a war with Spain, a bill had before this been intro-

duced into Congress, calling for the raising of 25,000 men for the defense of the southwest, but on Fauchet's disavowal of further incitements, the bill had been withdrawn. It was soon, however, clear that the passionate appeals at the west would take some time to lose their effect, and the government heard with some alarm that subscriptions were still pledged in Lexington for money, and that the President's proclamation was in many places suppressed. On May 24, when a convention gathered at Lexington, the Jacobin fever still ran high, and it was helped by the tone of the *Kentucky Gazette*. In June, Congress made it punishable by fine and imprisonment for a citizen to engage in any hostile enterprise against a foreign state, a provision soon to be further enforced in Jay's treaty. When the Jacobins spoke of it now as aimed at the French sympathizers, they were not pleased to be told that it had been also a provision of the treaty with France in 1778.

A comparison of the views of Hamilton and Randolph at this time shows how the two antagonistic parties of the cabinet were brought into pretty close conjunction in their apprehensions. Hamilton wrote to Jay, in May, 1794, that the navigation of the Mississippi, if secured, will be "an infinitely strong link of union between the western country and the Atlantic States. As its preservation will depend on the naval resources of the Atlantic States, the western country cannot but feel that this essential interest depends on its remaining firmly united with them." Randolph's letter was addressed to Jefferson, in August: "The people of Kentucky, either contemning or ignorant of the consequences, are restrained from hostility by a pack-thread. They demand a conclusion of the negotiation, or a categorical answer from Spain. . . . What if the government of Kentucky should force us either to support them in their hostilities against Spain, or to disavow and renounce them. War at this moment with Spain would not be war with Spain alone. The lopping off of Kentucky from the Union is dreadful to contemplate, even if it should not attach itself to some other power." There was indeed a strong apprehension that England might succeed in entangling the Kentuckians. Simcoe was soon to write to the Lords of Trade (September 1): "It is generally understood that above half the inhabitants of Kentucky and the western waters are already inclined to a con-

nection with Great Britain." Thurston, a Kentucky observer, had just before written to Washington that a powerful faction was scheming to place that country under British protection.

With these suppressed murmurings threatening to become open shouts in the autumn of 1794, we need, before passing on to the fulfillments of 1795, to turn back to the spring of 1793, and watch other ominous signs, which made these two years in the southwest exceptionally trying in their precarious conditions, since there was no question, in which the relations of Spain and the United States were involved, that did not intimately concern the danger of an Indian war. The federal government could never be safely unprepared. When it was determined in May, 1793, to reinforce the federal troops in this endangered region, the government possessed abundant evidence of the complicity of Carondelet in the unrest of the Creeks, and it is now known that he was strenuously urging his government to let him band all the Indians in the interests of Spain. Jefferson sent the proofs of Carondelet's intrigues with the tribes to Carmichael at Madrid. The better to learn exactly what was going on in New Orleans, where branches of American commercial houses were become not uncommon, Jefferson was, in May, 1793, looking "for an intelligent and prudent native" to reside in that city, while, under cover of business, he could get opportunities to spy upon the intentions of Carondelet. In June, the government had learned that 1,500 men had been sent from Spain to Louisiana, and that Spanish posts on the upper Mississippi had been strengthened. A few days later (June 23), he wrote to Madison of the "inevitableness of a war with the Creeks, and the probability — I might say certainty — of a war with Spain." Some Ohio traders, who had gone down the Mississippi in their flatboats, and had returned to Philadelphia by water, were at the same time interrogated by Knox for information, and at the close of the month, Jefferson was in possession of new evidence of Spanish instigation of the Creeks, which he transmitted to Carmichael. Later on, the administration was urged by Georgians and Carolinians to authorize the mobilizing of four or five thousand militia under General Pickens to attack the Creeks in the autumn. The government hesitated for fear of provoking a Spanish and perhaps an Eng-


lish war ; and upon the project of sending a secret agent to the Choctaws to induce them to join the Chickasaws against the Creeks, and so distract the latter, the cabinet was divided. Meanwhile Robertson was furnishing arms to the Chickasaws, and when Carondelet remonstrated with the government at Philadelphia, the tie in the cabinet vote enabled them to deny rendering any aid, and to assert that their influence was for peace.

In eastern Tennessee there was less restraint. Every issue of the *Knoxville Gazette* clamored for a war of extermination against the Creeks. Some of that tribe crossing the river in September, Sevier mustered his militia, and drove them back by a midnight attack, and, following them to their villages, burned them, and laid waste their fields. This was Sevier's last Indian campaign, and it brought peace to the borders of east Tennessee. The invasion of the Indian territory had been in defiance of the orders from Philadelphia ; but Andrew Jackson, three years later, then a new representative from Tennessee, succeeded in getting the general government to reimburse the local authorities for the cost of it.

Washington, in addressing Congress at the end of the year 1793, told them that the Chickamaugas were still uneasy, and doubted if anything like a steady peace could be maintained with the southwestern tribes till there was some system of organized trade with them arranged, to prevent the provocations to which they were at present subjected. He added, in another speech, that if the Creeks were to be sustained by the Spanish in their claims to bound on the Cumberland, and if the authorities at New Orleans persisted in a right to arbitrate between the United States and the Indians inhabiting American territory, it was clear that an issue must come with Spain. He informed Congress that he had sent a messenger to Madrid to learn how far the government at Madrid sustained Carondelet in these pretensions.

A review of the next year, 1794, shows us pretty much the same troublesome conditions on this southwestern border. The chief perplexity was in the fact that the irresponsible frontiers-

NOTE. — The opposite "Map of the Tennessee government, by Genl. D. Smith and others," is from *Carey's American Atlas*, Philadelphia, 1795. It shows the Indian towns on the Tennessee, and their relation to Nashville and the Cumberland settlements. Cf. the map in Reid's *American Atlas*, New York, 1796.



men caused much of the mischief. La Rochefoucault-Liancourt, who, a little later, went through this country, found it "allowed on all sides that the whites are in the wrong four times out of five." Unfairness in traffic had driven the Indian trade largely from the Georgian border to Pensacola, and the lawlessness of the borderers in inciting the enmity of some thirty-five thousand Indians, now supposed to be the combined numbers of the Creeks, Cherokees, and Choctaws, threw a serious responsibility upon the Americans, whatever may have been the complicity of the Spaniards. These thirty-five thousand Indians were said to be able to show twelve thousand warriors, old and young, and the mastery of the Creeks was indicated by their furnishing nearly half of this fighting force.

The conditions which generally prevailed were that the Cherokees were the general rovers now plundering on the borders of Carolina and Georgia, now on the north against the Cumberland settlers, under the lead usually of the local Chickamaugas, or joining in combined onsets on the Chickasaws. The Creeks by their numbers strengthened almost every assault. The Choctaws, nearer the Spanish, at New Orleans, did not so often appear, except by their strolling bucks. Back of it all was, as the Americans believed, and doubtless with right, the influence of Carondelet and his agents. It was said, perhaps in exaggeration, that the Spanish largesses paid to these tribes were something like \$55,000 a year, a sum nearly the equal of the revenue of Louisiana. The Indian confederation was broken by the friendliness of the Chickasaws for the whites, and it was Carondelet's constant aim to rend this somewhat fitful alliance.

While this was the obstacle in the way of the Spanish governor, the nearest representative of the American government, Blount, at Knoxville, was quite as much tried to carry out the instructions of the secretary of war to prevent unauthorized attacks and retaliative inroads by the American settlers. In the spring of 1794, it appeared to the territorial assembly at Knoxville that such restraint was no longer judicious, and they petitioned the general government for open war with the Creeks. On June 6, Rufus King reported in Congress a bill for an offensive campaign against the Creeks and Cherokees. Instead of action upon it, Knox very soon entertained a deputation of Cherokees at Philadelphia, and reopened the question of the

boundaries which had been established by the treaty of July 2, 1791. They complained that the line, as marked, was as crooked as Blount's heart, and insisted upon a straight one which would have sacrificed sundry white settlements. The old line was left, however, to be amended a few years later, and, as a peace offering, Knox agreed to add \$5,000 worth of goods annually to the largess the Cherokees had already received.

In September, 1794, the federal government not acting promptly in giving permission for an active campaign, Robertson ordered Major Orr to march with five hundred mounted Kentucky and Tennessee militia against the lower Cherokee towns. A small body of federal troops, who were ranging in the mountains, joined the expedition. Orr left Nashville on September 7, and, guided by a young man who had been a prisoner among the Chickamaugas, he took a circuitous mountain path, and on the 13th, swooped down upon two Indian villages in succession, and killed seventy of their defenders, having only two of his own men wounded. Blount and the federal government complain of the disobedience of orders, but the Nickajack expedition — as it was called — was too necessary to be made a subject of serious complaint. The Indians soon sued for peace, and as in the case of Sevier's expedition, Robertson's prompt action brought peace to the frontiers in that part of the territory, and in a similar way, as in Sevier's case, the insubordination was later vindicated by Congressional approval. On December 8, Washington informed Congress that both Creeks and Cherokees had confirmed existing treaties, and had restored prisoners and property. He added that the continuance of peace was hazarded by the constant and wanton murders of tribesmen committed along the Georgian frontiers. Edmund Pendleton shortly afterwards (December 30, 1794) drew the President's attention to the impolicy of the largess system, and no doubt spoke the truth when he said: "The old counselors among the Indians will profess to be at peace, and continue to receive their annuity, while their young men continue their depredations, and the others will say they cannot restrain them." The gift system, undoubtedly, as Washington saw, had this objection; but the President could not bring himself to believe that the tribes did not in justice demand some recompense for the injury which had been done them.

CHAPTER XXIV.

PINCKNEY'S TREATY AND THE KENTUCKY INTRIGUE.

1795-1796.

ALTHOUGH when Jefferson left the circle of the President's advisers at the opening of 1794, the movement of the federal government for a treaty with Spain on the basis of a free navigation of the Mississippi had taken shape looking to the appointment of a special commissioner to Madrid, it was not till the following autumn that the choice of such an agent was seriously considered, and then it was Patrick Henry who was the selection of the President. Henry refused the trust on account of his precarious health, and it was not till November 24 that this preliminary motion was effected by the transference of Thomas Pinckney, then in London, to the court of Madrid. This done, Washington hastened in December, 1794, to allay the continued irritation of Kentucky by writing to Innes that the initiatory steps for a treaty with Spain had been made. On February 15, 1795, Randolph instructed Monroe, then in Paris, "to seize any favorable moment" to bring the Mississippi question to an issue. Before Monroe could have received these injunctions, Tom Paine, in the convention, tried to secure the help of France by proposing that the freedom of that river should be made a condition of peace between France and Spain. The treaty made by Jay, however, was too offensive to France to make her representatives anxious to abet any interests of the American Republic. They were, moreover, aggrieved at being, as they thought, rather cavalierly treated in not being early informed of the provisions of the Jay treaty. It was nine or ten months after the rumors of its conditions reached them before, in the autumn of 1795, the American papers brought them the full text of the treaty.

While thus, in the appointment of Pinckney, the negotiations were fairly inaugurated in Europe, the old question of the

Yazoo grants was revived in a way threatening new complications with Spain by forestalling the decisions of the negotiators. All efforts of holders under earlier grants to effect some compromise by consolidation had failed, and the whole matter, in the autumn of 1794, had seemed doomed to oblivion. But as matters now stood, there were four claimants somehow to be reconciled before these Yazoo projects could be put on a satisfactory basis. Spain still claimed to latitude $32^{\circ} 30'$, and her claim, it was supposed, would be pressed with Pinckney. The federal government contended that the treaty of 1782 had given it the right to this contested region, and this right had been in part strengthened through the cession by South Carolina, in 1787, of that long, narrow strip lying between the extension of the northern boundary of Georgia and the south line of Tennessee, unless indeed that strip had been included already in the "territory south of the Ohio." Against this claim of the United States Georgia had rested her case on the royal commission to Governor Wright, and the federal rejection of her cession of the country in 1788. Counting upon her rights as Georgia understood them, her legislature had, in December, 1794, regranted some thirty million acres for \$500,000, at a price of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ cents an acre, to the four companies which had been the earlier recipients of the region, and this bill, amended in some respects to suit the governor's views, became by his signature a law on January 7, 1795. Thus passed to the control of these companies a large part of the present States of Alabama and Mississippi. These companies under their new names were the Upper Mississippi Company, which received a region in the northwest extending twenty-five miles south of the Tennessee boundary; the Tennessee Company, which obtained much the same area as was given to it in 1789; the Georgia Mississippi Company, which covered the southwestern region extending from $31^{\circ} 18'$ to $32^{\circ} 40'$ north latitude; and the Georgia Company, the largest of all, which received seventeen million acres lying between $32^{\circ} 40'$ and 34° , but east of the Tombigbee River, its southern line running upon the 31st parallel. Its extension east and west was from the Alabama River to the Mississippi. It was soon discovered that every vote but one in the legislature which had made these imperial grants came from members in one or another of the companies, and cries of corruption were

raised in all quarters of the State. It turned out also that many federal and state officials were complicated in the business. The terms of the grant made the lands free from taxation, and when settled they were to be entitled to representation in the legislature. That the governor had not vetoed the act was thought to have been due rather to his complacency than to any pecuniary connection of his own with the measure. There was a hope that a constitutional convention which was summoned for the following May would be able to right the wrong; but the same interest which had swerved the legislature from rectitude prevailed there, and the question was relegated to the next legislature, where there was not the same chance that the grantees could be protected. General James Jackson, who was in the federal senate, resigned his station to be elected to the coming legislature, and he carried a rescinding act through that body; but ultimately all innocent purchasers from the companies were duly protected.

Such a scandal further invalidating titles of lands still in dispute with Spain was an unfortunate conjunction at this stage of the negotiation at Madrid, and it is not perhaps surprising that Carondelet, on the Spanish side, sought further to arrest an amicable settlement. He had already made some show, by ceasing to incite the Indians, in acquiescing in the diplomatic movement; but in the uncertainty attending the negotiations, he had determined to secure the long-sought vantage-ground in Kentucky which Spain had always desired. He was not unmindful of the chance that the Kentuckians in their restlessness might yield either to France or England, and was not quite sure which event Spain should most distrust. The Jacobins in the United States had already begun to play upon the patriotic impulses of their compatriots in Louisiana, and he had found handbills urging them to rise against their Spanish oppressors circulating in New Orleans. These same incendiary appeals contrasted the servile condition of the French Creoles with the freedom in Kentucky, and warned the French Louisianians to expect an armed flotilla to aid them in their revolt.

New Orleans at this time was not well prepared to withstand a vigorous assault. Collot, a French military observer, whom we have already encountered, and who was arrested later by Carondelet, described its forts as diminutive and badly placed

to ward off an attack from without, though they might prove to be sufficient to quell a revolt. This last had probably been the governor's purpose in placing them. Five hundred men, sword in hand, could carry any one of them, as Collot claimed, and the guns of each could be turned, when captured, upon the others. None of them could hold more than a hundred and fifty defenders. The seaward defenses of the town were better. Fort Plaquemines, eighteen miles from the mouth of the Mississippi, was indeed settling on the piles on which it was built; but its parapet was eighteen feet thick and lined with brick. It had twenty-four guns, and could house three hundred men, though only a hundred were now in it. The land within range of its guns was not practicable for any protection to the besiegers, and the river at this point was twelve to fourteen hundred yards wide.

The province of Louisiana was just beginning to show signs of a commercial future, and if the money which was spent on largesses to the Indians could be turned to internal improvements, this business progress could be easily developed. The culture of indigo had, owing to a blight, been largely abandoned, but a more important industry was just developing in the reintroduction of the sugar-cane. An Illinois Creole, Etienne de Boré, on his plantation six miles above New Orleans, had shown such a success in its growth that in a few years the products increased to five million pounds of sugar, two hundred thousand gallons of rum, and two hundred and fifty thousand gallons of molasses. Almost coincident with this new agricultural development, Eli Whitney, by the invention of the cotton-gin, which under the law of April 10, 1790, he had patented on March 4, 1794, had caused the exportation of cotton to advance enormously, from two hundred thousand pounds in 1791 to eighteen million pounds in 1800. Collot, who had not found the Whitney invention in operation in 1795, said that the seeds were still separated by a coarse mill, which breaks the fibre and diminishes its value a quarter, but he adds, "A better machine has been introduced into the United States, which is no doubt susceptible of greater perfection, and the cotton has already resumed its old price."

The west, to be prosperous, shared with Louisiana the necessity of putting an end both to the endless marauding of the

Indians and to the uncertainty of the civil government. The Indian question had practically now come to a composition of the feud existing between the Chickasaws and the Creeks. Both Robertson and the Spanish commander at Natchez exerted themselves as mediators, and in the early summer of 1795, these two tribes came to an agreement which, barring the outbursts of some irrepressible bucks on each side, quieted the Indian country. News of Wayne's victory in the north served to increase the disinclination to war, and after some months there was, for the first time in a long period, substantial peace in the southwest, and in October, 1795, Washington congratulated Hamilton on the prevalence of "peace from one end of our frontiers to the other."

This condition relieved the people of Tennessee from the necessity of the military escort to which they had been accustomed in attending their conventions, and a disposition to prepare for entering the Union becoming manifest, Blount ordered a special cession of the territorial assembly for June 29, 1795, to consider the question of Statehood. A census was ordered to see if the sixty thousand persons, counting free people and "three fifths of all others," — the United States Constitution had given them the phrase, — necessary, under the precedence of the ordinance of 1787, to pass from a territorial condition, could be made out. If not, it was a question whether a lesser number would warrant their taking initiatory steps in the same direction. The count showed a population of seventy-seven thousand two hundred and sixty-three, while the vote for Statehood had been six thousand five hundred and four with two thousand five hundred and sixty-two in the negative, the latter mostly in middle Tennessee. So Blount issued a call for a constitutional convention to meet on January 11, 1796, though it was problematical if by that time the Spanish negotiations would have decided the question of the Mississippi. The prospect had induced new currents of emigration from the east; a new road had been cut over the Cumberland Mountains, and in the autumn of the previous year thirty or forty wagons went over it to establish new homes. A traveler that way in 1796 reports that between Nashville and Knoxville he met one hundred and seventy-five wagons, and seventeen or eighteen hundred bathorses, carrying emigrants and their property to the Cumberland settlements.

Carondelet's hopes for some new distractions, which might tend to the Spanish interest, rested not on these stabler communities of the Cumberland, but on the more restless settlements on the Kentucky. In June, 1795, that Spanish governor addressed a letter to Judge Sebastian, at Frankfort, offering to send Colorel Gayoso to New Madrid, to meet those whom Sebastian might send there to discuss the question of the Mississippi, — an effort necessarily subversive of the policy which the two governments had now entered upon at Madrid of coming to a conclusion by agreement on this vexed question. Later, and before he had received the letter of June, Sebastian was again apprised of the intention of Gayoso to be in New Madrid in October. That the meeting was held of course compromises Sebastian and his friends, as representatives of the United States, to an equal degree with Carondelet. Even if, as the Americans professed, they entered upon these private negotiations for business interests only, the matter was none the less one for the federal government to manage.

Gayoso went north from Natchez with other ostensible objects than to deal with the renegades whom he sought. He stopped at the Chickasaw Bluffs and bargained with the Indian owners for a tract of land along the river, six miles long and from a half mile to a mile broad, and on this he built and garrisoned a fort. When General Wayne heard of this occupation of American soil, he demanded an explanation, and Gayoso answered from "On board the Vigilant before New Madrid, 2nd October, 1795," that he had a right to treat with an independent tribe, and cited an agreement of the United States with the Chickasaws as to their bounds. He accompanied this with protestations of friendship. A few days before, he had written to St. Clair, then at Kaskaskia, asking for a conference to further the reciprocal interests of the two countries. From New Madrid, after thus trying to blind St. Clair, he sent Thomas Power — an Irishman, speaking French, Spanish, and English, naturalized in Spain, who professed to be a wandering naturalist — to open intercourse with Sebastian and his friends. This done, Power passed on to Cincinnati, and saw Wilkinson, then at Fort Washington, and wearing the American uniform. This renegade American general now wrote to Carondelet, recommending that the Spanish governor should

resume his shipments up the river in order to restore confidence ; that he should fortify the mouth of the Ohio against any possible English inroad ; that he should establish a bank in Kentucky with American directors ; and that he should employ George Rogers Clark and his followers in the Spanish service. It will be recollected that the French Republic had no further use of Clark and his soldiers of fortune. Sebastian went to New Madrid, but was not able to come to any agreement on the commercial ventures, which were to be a part of their plot, and he invited Judge Innes and William Murray to take part in the discussion. Being unable to agree with Gayoso, this official and Sebastian, in October, left New Madrid and proceeded to New Orleans, to lay the problems before Carondelet, reaching there in January, 1796. Before their conferences were over, news reached New Orleans of the conclusion of a treaty with Spain ; and the intriguers were forced to resort to other schemes. As these were in contravention of the treaty which had alarmed them, it is necessary now to follow the events which led to that pacification, and the conclusions which were reached, perfidious though they were on the part of Spain.

On December 8, 1795, the President had said to Congress that they might hope for a speedy conclusion of a satisfactory treaty with Spain, and before the terms of it were known, they were accurately prefigured to the public.

Pinckney had reached Madrid on June 28, 1795, but it was not till August 10 — such were the obstacles and prevarications usually inherent in Spanish diplomacy — that the American commissioner was allowed to lay his propositions before the Prince of Peace, who had been appointed to deal with him. This grandee then submitted the impossibility of going forward, as he had not yet received any answer to the proposition which he had sent to the United States, to sell the right to navigate the Mississippi for a consideration, if the American Republic would guarantee the Spanish territorial possessions on its banks. Pinckney replied that his countrymen would never purchase a right, and that it was out of the question for them to make such a guarantee. He then rehearsed the old arguments. Spain had never questioned the provisions of the treaty of 1782 at the time she made with England the general treaty of Janu-

ary 20, 1783, and nothing but the bounds of 1782 could ever satisfy the United States, as the same bounds had satisfied England in 1763, with the provision of a free navigation of the Mississippi from source to mouth, as inherent now as then.

The summer dragged on with little or no progress, and in October, disgusted and chagrined, Pinckney demanded his passports. The work upon which no progress had been made in four months was now suddenly done in three days, and the treaty was signed on October 27, 1795. The next day Pinckney wrote to his own government that the threatening relations of England and the United States had obstructed the negotiations as well as the peaceful attitude of Great Britain towards Spain.

The text of the treaty arrived in Philadelphia on February 22, 1796, and the Senate promptly ratified it.

The bounds by the Mississippi and on Florida were exactly what the Americans had claimed under the treaty of independence. Spain made no provision for rendering valid the grants she had made north of 31°, and they were left to the decision of the United States. It was provided that a joint commission should meet at Natchez, six months after ratification, to run the lines.

The navigation of the Mississippi, from source to mouth, was fully assured for both parties. Pinckney sought to save a conflict with Jay's treaty by inserting that, beside the two contracting powers, "others, by special convention," could enjoy the same right. Spain insisted that the grant to England in the Jay treaty of right to navigate the Mississippi was of no avail, as the United States only derived such a right by the present treaty.

The port of New Orleans was established for three years as a place of deposit, with no duties chargeable, and after that interval the same or other place of deposit should be allowed.

Both parties agreed to restrain the Indians on either side of the dividing line, and to use force if necessary. It was on the pretense that Spain did not impede an invasion of Georgia by the Seminoles, in 1815, that Monroe ordered Andrew Jackson at that time to pursue them over the Spanish line.

Spain agreed to evacuate all ports held by her on American territory within six months, and the United States were put under similar obligations, if conditions required it.

Ratifications of this treaty of San Lorenzo el real were exchanged on April 26, 1796, and on August 2 it was duly proclaimed.

So decisive an abandonment of her old policy by Spain, as this treaty evinced, naturally raised the question of the sincerity of the Spanish government. Pinckney and Hamilton thought that the sudden change in the Spanish temper came from an apprehension that the United States and England, as a result of Jay's treaty, were preparing for a joint declaration of war against France and Spain. Such a fear may have prevailed in the French council, and Spain and the French Directory were now in close contact. It was said that the Spanish king yielded reluctantly, and had no real intention of carrying the treaty out, if circumstances and delays could help him to retain the Spanish posts on the Mississippi. It was known that Gayoso later boasted that the treaty would never be put in force, and Carondelet acted, both in his subsequent conduct and in the propositions he forwarded by Sebastian to Kentucky, — as we shall see, — as if he was of like belief. It was also believed that Spain hoped to pacify the United States while she dallied with the provisions of the treaty long enough to profit from a neutral territory being interposed between Louisiana and a British attack. Talleyrand saw nothing but misfortune in Spain's abandonment of the east bank of the Mississippi, and looked in the end for a countervail to France in the cession of Florida and Louisiana.

Washington, when the treaty had been carried through the Senate, expressed the hope that it would prove "soothing to the inhabitants of the western waters, who were beginning to grow restive and clamorous." He little knew that Judge Innes, in whom he had confided all along to quiet the discontent, was deep in the nefarious plot of Sebastian, — the former being a circuit judge of the United States, and the other the chief justice of Kentucky. The infamous Sebastian engaged to give his services to Spain, to subserve her interests and subvert those of his own country, for a yearly pension of \$2,000, and he received the stipend regularly.

After thus debasing himself, Sebastian, accompanied by Power, in the spring of 1796, sailed from New Orleans for

Philadelphia, and thence passed westward with the following propositions from Carondelet: To prepare Kentucky for a revolution, and to give them money to organize the project, \$100,000 will be sent to Kentucky. When independence is declared, Fort Massac shall be occupied by Spanish troops, and \$100,000 shall be applied in supporting the garrison. The northern bounds of Spanish territory are to be a line running west from the mouth of the Yazoo River to the Tombigbee, while all north of such a line shall, except the reservation recently fortified at the Chickasaw Bluff, belong to the revolted State, which shall enter into a defensive alliance with Spain. The new treaty of San Lorenzo shall not be observed; but the new State shall enjoy the navigation of the Mississippi. Ten thousand dollars were to be sent in sugar barrels up the river to Wilkinson, now the general-in-chief of the American army!

Power was obliged to return to New Orleans with the report that the Spanish treaty had indisposed the Kentucky intriguers to further machinations. Wilkinson, however, was not forgotten, and if we are to believe a vindicator of that faithless personage, this money in sugar barrels was only his return from a tobacco venture. The specie was sent by two messengers. One got safely through. The other was murdered by his own boatmen, but neither Wilkinson nor Judge Innes thought it prudent to bring the felons to justice, and they were hurried off beyond the Mississippi.

The late John Mason Brown of Louisville, in an elaborate attempt to vindicate his grandfather, John Brown, the Kentucky senator, from complicity in these Spanish conspiracies, satisfied himself that he successfully defended Innes and all except Wilkinson and Sebastian from the charges of baseness. "Lifted," he says, "to its last analysis, the story shows that certainly there were not more than two conspirators, Wilkinson and Sebastian. It does not seem that they communicated. They were base money-takers, both of them, but they made no proselytes, nor tried to." It is to be hoped that this explanation is true, but evidence is against it.

CHAPTER XXV.

THE UNITED STATES COMPLETED.

1796-1798.

SPAIN had, indeed, during the course of 1796, entered upon a system of delay very characteristic of her national humor, in carrying out the provisions of the treaty of San Lorenzo; but its ratification (April, 1796) had postponed, if it had not averted, danger from that quarter. But in the place of one disquietude had come another. French arrogance, which had received a temporary check by the suppression of Clark's expedition and by the futility of Carondelet's ulterior plans, made evident early in the year, was again asserting itself. With the uncertain drift of diplomacy and through the wafting of passions, the federal government was never quite sure that the provisions of Jay's treaty might not at any time become an obstacle to the continuance of the enforced and somewhat disheartening truce with England which, in April, was finally to be made operative. The public grew calmer because it was not informed; and such events as the new treaty with Algiers, entered into just before the treaty with Spain, seemed to the casual observer indicative of a new success in European relations. In February, 1796, Congress congratulated Washington on his birthday, with more warmth because it was generally felt that he was entering very shortly upon his last year in office. The President himself was taking a more roseate view of public affairs than seemed warranted, and in March, 1796, he was writing to a friend: "If the people have not abundant cause to rejoice at the happiness they enjoy, I know of no country that has. We have settled all our disputes, and are at peace with all nations." This was true, but the prospect of a continuance of peace was not flattering. Pickering, at about the same moment, was prematurely planning for the garrisoning of Natchez, and preparing to meet a new outbreak of the Creeks, between the enmity

of whom and the retention of the Spanish posts he had not far to reach for reasons.

Early in the year, the nearest white neighbors of that tribe had made a notable movement in their convention at Knoxville on January 11, 1796. Completing its business on February 6, it had announced to the world a constitution, based on that of North Carolina, but more republican, as Jefferson said, than any before framed, though in some particulars respecting the taxation of lands it has been held to be too favorable to the rich. It had been made without any enabling act of Congress, and in defiance of the right of Congress to order the census which preceded it, and to determine whether the territory should be made an autonomy within the Union or without it. It had created a new State, ready for union, if Congress wanted it, but a new State in any event. The convention had had some remarkable men in it. Blount, who had sat in the federal convention of 1787, presided over it, and he was destined to be its senator in Congress. James Robertson had been called to the chair whenever the convention resolved itself into a committee of the whole. Andrew Jackson was there, soon to ride eight hundred miles on horseback to Philadelphia, and to claim a seat in the State's behalf in the national House of Representatives. He was better known now than when he looked on and saw the escape of Sevier from his enemies at the backwoods court-house. Tipton, one of those enemies, was now here, his associate in the convention; but Sevier was not there, though destined in a few weeks to be their chosen governor, and, later still, to be turned to by Washington's successor as a brigadier in the *quasi* war with France. The constitution gave and legalized the name of Tennessee to the incipient commonwealth. By Blount's agency the vexed and perennial question of the Mississippi, which was so near its settlement, was formulated as a fundamental law: "An equal participation of the free navigation of the Mississippi is one of the inherent rights of the citizens of this State; it cannot, therefore, be conceded to any prince, potentate, power, person or persons whatever."

By the end of March, 1796, the State had assembled its first legislature, and by it the new constitution was forwarded to the President, who on April 8 laid it before Congress. A month of hesitancy passed. The federalists, led by Rufus King,

rallied against its acceptance. They saw in it a trick to secure another electoral vote for Jefferson in the coming count. One of this party wrote: "The people of that country have cashiered the temporary government, and self-created themselves into a State. One of their spurious senators has arrived, and has claimed his seat. No doubt this is one twig of the electioneering cabal for Mr. Jefferson." Aaron Burr, who had been in the Senate since 1791, led the party of advocates, and led them successfully. The bill for the admission of the new State came to a vote on May 6, but Burr's margin of victory was narrow. The President kept the question in doubt for some weeks, but finally approved the act on June 1.

Another fateful question came, in the same early months of 1796, to an issue. The legislature of Georgia, which was to wipe out the Yazoo scandal, convened in January, and a strong party in favor of canceling the vicious grants developed itself. Meanwhile, the corporate speculators had in many cases sold their rights under the threatened grants, and those of the Upper Mississippi Company were transferred to a company in South Carolina. The other companies sent agents to New England, and many prominent men invested in their shares, and Boston alone is said to have placed \$2,000,000 in this way. With the prospect of trouble from innocent purchasers, or from others not so guileless, the legislature, on February 13, passed a rescinding act, accompanying their decision with proofs of the corruption and evidences of the unconstitutionality of the slaughtered grants. To give the end something of melodramatic effect, the old act was publicly burned, the fire being ignited by a burning-glass, in the effort to link the deprecation of heaven with that of the vindicators of justice. It is not necessary now to trace out the sequel. Jackson, the champion of the vindicators, says that he was "fired at in the papers, abused in the coffee-houses, and furnished a target for all the Yazoo scrip-holders, — but [he added] I have the people yet with me." His leadership led him into duels, and in one of them he was finally killed in 1806. Meanwhile, the new purchasers organized for prosecuting their claims, and when Georgia finally ceded the territory to the United States, in 1802, the justice of their demands was left to the determination of Congress.

It was in the spring of 1796 that Adet, now the French minister in Philadelphia, entered actively upon his scheme of wresting the western country from the Union. He selected for his agents to traverse that region two Frenchmen: one, General Victor Collot, who is described, in the instructions for his apprehension, as being six feet tall, forty years of age, and speaking English very well. The other — Warin, or Warren, as the same instructions name him — is described as over six feet high, thirty years old, lately a sub-engineer in the American service, and speaking English tolerably. The expenses of the mission of these spies were to be borne by the French government. They were to observe the military posts and make general observations on the country, which Collot's journal has preserved for us. They were to select a spot for a military depot, and to make a list of influential persons whom they encountered. They were to sound the people on an alliance with France, and to point out how natural it would be for those beyond the mountains to seek a French connection. They were also told to express a preference for the election of Jefferson to the presidency, and this was natural. It was the belief that Gallatin, whose career in the whiskey insurrection had not been forgotten, had taken a map by Hutchins and marked out a route for these emissaries, even if he had not suggested the movement to Adet. The whole project was a part of the resentment of France at the Jay treaty, which was held to have annulled the treaty of 1778. It was supposed to be in the interest of annexing Louisiana to France, and to give her this larger domination in the Mississippi valley, — a scheme that Talleyrand, equal to any depth of infamy, had, as we have seen, formulated.

In May, McHenry, now in the cabinet, informed St. Clair of the departure of these spies, and hoped he would discover ground for seizing their papers. About the same time, the republican faction were credited with an attempt, ostensibly for economy's sake, to abolish the major-generalship of the army, but really with the purpose of getting rid of Wayne and putting Wilkinson as the senior brigadier at the head of the army, as a more manageable person than Wayne. The death of the latter before the end of the year brought Wilkinson to the top more naturally, and the French faction doubtless knew him to be as purchasable by France as by Spain.

The French government, in March, 1796, had lodged with Monroe, in Paris, their complaints of the Jay treaty; and when the tidings of the House's action, on April 30, in sustaining the treaty, reached France, the authorities of the seaports began a series of aggressions and condemnations of American vessels. By October, the exasperated Directory were determined on more offensive measures. Monroe advised the leaders that a war with the United States would throw the Americans into the arms of England, and set back the cause of liberty. This minister heard in August that France was planning a treaty with Spain, by which Louisiana and Florida would be surrendered to French influence, and Canada was to be attacked, so as to surround the United States with alien interests. Monroe questioned the government, which promptly denied it.

Meanwhile, Adet's spies were working in the west. Collot, in Kentucky, had fallen in with Judge Breckenridge, and was endeavoring to convince him how a French alliance could withstand the authority of the United States. Passing on by the route which had been marked out for him, Collot made observation of the portage between the Wabash and Maumee, where wagons were regularly conveying passengers, and saw how it "ought to be fortified, if the northwestern States ever make a schism." Descending the Ohio, he stopped at Fort Massac, and found it occupied by a hundred men, and eight twelve-pounders mounted in its four bastions. The channel, being on the opposite side of the river, showed him how it could be passed in the night. Caught making sketches, the commander, Captain Pike, arrested him, and he was only allowed to proceed by having an officer in company as long as he kept on American soil. Passing up to the Illinois settlements, where he had hoped to discover the French eager for his counsels, he was chagrined to find that the people had no qualities of the French but courage. Collot, Michaux, and Volney give a poor account of these degenerate French. "They live and look like savages," says one. "Their thrifty American neighbors had got the upper hand of them," says a second. Collot even says they had forgotten the succession of the calendar; that they stubbornly adhered to old customs; that they did not recognize their privations; that they were buried in superstitious ignorance, and lived the lives of indolent drunkards.

At St. Louis, Collot learned that both Carondelet and Pickering had ordered his arrest, so that he was safe on neither side of the river. An American judge at Kaskaskia, he said, had "spread the most idle and injurious tales respecting the French nation, and particularly respecting myself."

St. Louis struck him as commanding in position the Mississippi and the route to the Pacific by the Missouri, "with more facility, more safety, and with more economy for trade and navigation than any other given point in North America." Of its six hundred population, two hundred were able to bear arms, and all were French. They were, in the main, happy laborers, less degenerate than those he had seen in the Illinois region, and among them were prosperous merchants. The fort had been strengthened at the time of Genet's proposed raid, and the garrison of seventeen men now in it was ordered to retreat, if necessary, to New Madrid.

Looking to a French irruption on the mines of Santa Fé, he found that it was practicable for two converging forces to fall upon them. One would ascend the Great Osage branch of the Missouri, and the other the Arkansas. The valley where Santa Fé was situated would bring the two armies near together, the one sixty miles and the other a hundred miles and more from the coveted goal.

While Collot was thus marking out the lines of a French invasion of the Mississippi valley, Washington, in his farewell address (September 17, 1796), was uttering a sober warning to the western intriguers. The east finds, he says, and will still more find, in the west, "a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home," while the west will obtain from the east "the supplies requisite to its growth and comfort. . . . It owes the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions to the Atlantic side of the Union. . . . Any other tenure by which the west can hold this advantage, either by its own strength or by connections with a foreign power, must be precarious. . . . The inhabitants of our western country have seen in the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicions propagated among them of a policy in the general government and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi." He

urges them to be deaf to advisers who would connect them with aliens.

As the autumn advanced, the relations between Spain and England, which had long been strained, and which had so much induced the treaty of San Lorenzo, grew more and more irritable. A year or so before, Jefferson had written to Morris in London to intimate to the British government that a balance of power was as necessary in America as in Europe, and any disturbance of it by England's seizing Louisiana in case of a rupture with Spain would cause extreme uneasiness in America. It was a common rumor at this time that an expedition from Montreal would be started against Louisiana, if the Spanish should venture on a war. Collot heard of it on the Mississippi as to consist of two thousand British regulars, fifteen hundred militia, and a body of Indians, and he had given Gayoso warning of it at Natchez. During the summer, an English spy had been examining the Ohio River, and it was a question if England would respect American territory in case of a determination to attack Louisiana. St. Clair wrote from Pittsburg, on September 6, about this emissary: "Connolly has left the country, after making, it is said, an accurate survey of the Ohio, and sounding its depths in a number of places. He was stopped at Massac and his papers examined by the commanding officer," and at the same time there were reports of English agents in Tennessee and Kentucky organizing military forces.

War was declared by Spain against England on October 7, and not long after the declaration was received in London, Portland wrote to Simcoe (October 24) to inquire what could be depended upon in Kentucky and the west. The current questions now became complicated. Would England, with or without the sympathy of the United States, make a descent of the Mississippi upon New Orleans? Would the Spanish, with or without the aid of the French, ascend the Mississippi, make another attempt to wrest the west from the Union, and dash upon Canada? The last country was full of rumors of French intentions, and Governor Prescott, in October, 1796, issued a warning proclamation. The possession by this time of the lake posts surrendered under the Jay treaty, which was the cause of this French animosity, put the United States in a position to resist either expedition, northward or southward, if it should seem best.

The immediate effect upon the United States of this Anglo-Spanish war was the excuse which Carondelet found in it to delay the surrender of Natchez and the other Mississippi posts, and to block the purpose of Andrew Ellicott, who had been designated by the President as the American commissioner for running the lines determined by the treaty of San Lorenzo. Ellicott had left Philadelphia on September 16, 1796, and near the end of October, he embarked all his stores and wagons on the Ohio. It was a low state of the river, and when he turned into the Mississippi, on December 18, he found himself surrounded by floating ice. He did not begin his further descent till January 21, 1797, when a detachment of American troops accompanied his flotilla. At New Madrid, before its crumbling fort, he was stopped and shown a letter from Carondelet directing the commandant to detain him till the forts were evacuated, which could not be done, as his excuse was, till the river had risen. He went on. At Chickasaw Bluff there was the same politeness and the same wide-eyed wonder when the treaty of San Lorenzo was mentioned. There were armed galleys hovering about in a rather inquisitive way. At Walnut Hills a cannon-shot stopped them, and he found the same politeness and ignorance. On February 22, 1797, he met a messenger from Gayoso, who commanded at Natchez, saying that the evacuation had been delayed by the want of suitable vessels. The Spanish governor advised him to leave his armament behind, if he proposed to come on to Natchez. Ellicott went on without his troops and reached Natchez on the 24th. Entering upon a conference, he finally secured a promise to begin the survey on March 19; and he sent forward a notice of his arrival to Carondelet. Gayoso asked him to pull down the American flag flying over his camp, but he refused.

On March 1, 1797, Carondelet arrived. He presented a new excuse for not evacuating the posts. It was not clear in his mind whether he should surrender the forts as they were, or should dismantle them first, and he must submit the question to the authorities in Madrid.

There was, in Natchez, with its hundred variegated wooden houses, a mixed population of about four thousand, divided in sympathies, — a Spanish party, an English party, and an American one. The Spanish party was really insignificant. The

English party was made up of original British settlers, who had been joined by Tories from the States during the Revolution. The American party was mainly people whom the States for one reason or another had ejected from their communities. In the district about the town there may have been ten thousand souls, capable with the town of furnishing two thousand militia foot, and two hundred dragoons.

It appearing that Gayoso was strengthening the fort and remounting guns, Ellicott had offers of volunteers, coming from among the nine tenths of the people who were rejoicing in the prospect of relief from Spanish rule. While Ellicott hesitated about assuming any military control, he was determined to send up the river for his troops. It was not best to let the Spanish commander get too strong a hold upon the post. There was no neighboring height from which a cannonade could dispossess him of the post, and New Orleans, a hundred leagues away, was within reach for succor. Gayoso objected to having the American troops at hand, but Ellicott was firm, only that he was willing they should bivouac a few miles up from the town. Lieutenant Pope, who was in command of the escort, had been strengthening it by enlistments up the river, as he could find willing Americans in the neighborhood of Fort Massac, where he had stopped. He had had orders from Wayne not to move forward till he had tidings of the evacuation; but Ellicott's demand was pressing, and he descended the river, reaching the neighborhood of Natchez on April 24, 1797.

It was now apparent that Spanish agents were working upon the Chickasaws and Choctaws to secure their aid in what looked like a struggle for possession; but Ellicott was as wary as his opponent, and courted the Choctaws till he felt sure of their neutrality. At this point there was a new reason given by the Spaniards — not offered before — for delay, which was that news had been received of a contemplated British descent of the river, and they must be met before they reached New Orleans. Gayoso in fact had first heard of this intended British attack from Collot, when he passed down the river the previous year. At that time, Collot had a marvelous tale to rehearse. One Chisholm — an Englishman, whom one shall soon know something about — was raising a force in Tennessee, which, with the aid of the Creeks and Cherokees and fifteen

hundred Tories at Natchez, was to attack the Spanish, while the British from Canada, in company with Brant and his Indians, were to descend the Mississippi. It was now just about the time when, as Collot then said, the American invaders would be gathering at Knoxville, where they had the countenance of the Governor of Tennessee.

The Spanish surveyor arriving at this juncture, and the surveying party having no necessity of witnessing the Anglo-Spanish conflict, Ellicott thought there was a chance to begin his work. Gayoso, who was now strengthening his works at Walnut Hills, thought otherwise, and notified Ellicott, on May 11, that the survey must be put off; and this decision was confirmed by a proclamation which Carondelet himself issued on May 24. Ellicott protested, and enrollments of the townspeople began as if serious business was intended. A fortnight later, on June 7, 1797, a committee of the citizens assumed control of the town, all parties agreeing to be peaceable. Gayoso acquiesced, since he could not do otherwise, and exhorted the populace to keep quiet till the differences could be settled. This revolutionary tribunal was displaced in a few days by another appointed by Gayoso at Ellicott's dictation, and Carondelet confirmed the choice. This was one of the last acts of Carondelet, for he was soon on his way to Quito to assume another charge, and Gayoso ruled in his place, receiving his commission on July 26, 1797.

This departing, short, fat, choleric, but good-humored governor was not to know the failure of another of his wily plans. He had, in May, 1797, once more sent his old emissary, Thomas Power, to Wilkinson, to ask him to keep back any additional American force, because he intended to hold Natchez till the British danger was passed, and he could hear from Madrid. Power was also to let the old Kentucky discontents understand that Spain had no intention of observing the San Lorenzo treaty, and that if they would swing that State away from the Union, Spain was ready to make the most favorable terms with them. It was the old story. Kentucky constancy to Spanish interest was to be tested very shortly in an attack on Fort Mastic. The time, however, had passed for even a show of assent, and when Power reached Detroit, where Wilkinson was, that general made an appearance of arresting him, and hurried him

out of danger. This was in September, 1797; in the following January, Power was back in New Orleans reporting his failure to Gayoso.

While Power and Wilkinson, conscious that the end of Spanish machinations in the west had come, were talking over at Detroit the failure of their hopes, Ellicott, at Natchez, was receiving (September, 1797) from his government the disclosure of another plan, to link the turbulent west with British aid in an attempt to wrest New Orleans and the adjacent regions from the hands of Spain. This intelligence was accompanied by the announcement that Blount, now a senator from Tennessee, and shown to be a prime mover in this treasonable scheme, had been expelled the previous July by his associates in Congress, with but a single dissentient voice, and had hurried away from Philadelphia to escape further condemnation. Ellicott, on the receipt of this news, threw a new responsibility upon his committee of safety at Natchez, when he left it to its vigilance to detect and thwart any lingering treason in connection with the same plot, which might exist in that neighborhood, of which, as we have seen, Collot had heard a vague rumor the previous year.

This dying spasm of western discontent needs to be elucidated. Blount had probably numerous accomplices. They have been reckoned at about thirty, upon whom more or less suspicion rested. They included a certain schemer, one Dr. Romaine, Colonel Orr of Tennessee, Colonel Whitely of Kentucky, and a dubious personage, named Chisholm. On April 21, 1797, Blount had written to Carey, the official interpreter of the Cherokees, in a way which showed that the southern Indians were to be used in an attack on New Orleans, while a British fleet ascended the Mississippi, and a force of four thousand frontiersmen, directed by Blount and aided by Colonel Anthony Hutchins, a hot-headed officer of the English service, who was somewhat popular in the Natchez country, were to descend that river.

After the plan was known, there was a diversity of opinion as to the end the plot was intended to subserve. Some, as one said, supposed the real object was to alarm the Spaniards, and when the intriguers had created serious apprehension in the Spanish mind, the movers were to offer their services to arrest

or oppose the progress of the plan, and place the Spanish authorities under such obligations as to reap immense advantages to themselves. The truth was probably more apparent, for the project was most likely intended to forestall a plot of France to secure possession of Florida and Louisiana, which Talleyrand had urged as an offset to the effects of Jay's treaty. A transfer of the trans-Mississippi region to France was held to be inimical to the interests of the land speculators of the west, who thought, by placing that region under the trusteeship of England, to enhance the reciprocal advantages of an independent state, holding both banks of the Mississippi. It had for a long time been suspected that France was negotiating with Spain to renew her old hold on the Mississippi. As early as November, 1796, Oliver Wolcott felt convinced that the transfer had been secretly effected "with the object of having an influence over the western country." Rufus King, in London, was growing to think that the persistent grasp of Spain on the river posts was an indication that this had taken place. Liston, the British minister in Philadelphia, writing to Governor Prescott of Canada, warned him that France was not to be content with Louisiana, but was longing also for her old dominion over the country north of the Great Lakes. He believed that Adet had sent thither a skulking emissary, who was passing under the name of Burns, and was seeking to excite the Canadians to revolt. The dread of this in Canada grew so before the year closed that it was feared that Lower and Upper Canada would be assailed, on the one hand from Vermont and on the other from the west, where Collot was numbering the western Indians and thought to instigate them to the attack. Rumor laid out a broad plan of attack. A French fleet was to ascend the St. Lawrence in July, 1797, while the Jacobins were to muster the invading force along the American frontier. In March, Liston found everything dark. "The damned French rogues," he wrote, "are playing the devil with this country, as they have done with all the world; but when things are at the worst, they must mend."

Just before this, Pickering had written (February, 1797) to Rufus King that the change in sovereignty over Louisiana would be fraught with danger to the United States. The election of John Adams to the presidency the previous November

(1796) and the defeat of Jefferson, the friend of France, in spite of Adet's warning that a republican defeat would estrange his country, had moved the French Directory to action meant, as Barlow reported, "to be little short of a declaration of war." In the spring of 1797, it was known that the Directory had ordered Pinckney away from Paris. Hamilton wrote back to King, on April 8, that "it portends too much a final rupture as the only alternative to an ignominious submission." Adet at this time, leaving for France, said there would be no war, but the federalists believed he only intended to prevent the Americans preparing for a conflict. Fisher Ames was urging a bold front. Robert Goodloe Harper, in a pamphlet, was going over the story of the past insincerity of France, and felicitously divining her treachery in the days of the American Revolution, in the way that abundant evidence, divulged in later days, has established it. As the summer began, Pickering was impressed with the French intentions, and on June 27, 1797, he wrote to King: "We are not without apprehension that France means to regain Louisiana and to renew the ancient plan of her monarch, of circumscribing and encircling what now constitute the Atlantic States," — thus reinforcing the view of Harper. The French view was exactly expressed by Rochefoucault-Liancourt, when he said that "the possession of Louisiana by the French would set bounds to the childish avarice of the Americans, who wish to grasp at everything."

It was this prevailing belief, going back to the previous autumn (1796), that had aroused Blount to the opportunity which he desired to make of advantage to the west. His movements and those of his associates, even before he wrote his letter in April to Carey, had been brought to the notice of Yrujo, the Spanish minister, and he had directed to it the attention of Pickering. He added evidences, not only of a purpose to attack New Orleans, but of a plan to invade Florida from Georgia, while another force from Canada fell upon St. Louis and New Madrid.

The situation all around was perplexing for the administration. Spain was pursuing a dubious course on the Mississippi. There were Franco-western designs on Canada. There were Anglo-western aims at New Orleans.

Liston, the British minister, when appealed to, acknowledged

that he had been approached by irresponsible persons in regard to a British attack on New Orleans; but he said he had thrown discredit on it, and had referred the proposition, with his disapproval, to his government. The ministry's response not coming, one John Chisholm, a Scotch adventurer, who has been already referred to, and who had conferred with Liston, had been, in March, 1797, sent to London by that minister, who had not only paid the fellow's passage-money, but had also, it was later believed, given him two sets of letters. One set was to accredit him on account of this nefarious business, and was prepared to be thrown overboard in case of necessity; and the other set concerned some ostensible mercantile transactions. King, in London, was warned to keep watch on Chisholm, and he soon reported that he was leading a scandalous life, and that the British government for a while paid his petty obligations, but that later he was thrown into jail for debt. Grenville, however, protested to King that the ministry had promptly rejected the whole proposition.

Meanwhile, Blount's letter, and his expulsion from the Senate in July, had set everybody in America wondering how widespread the defection was. Between the revelation of the plot and the final act of the Senate, Wolcott, on July 4, 1797, had written: "Our western frontiers are threatened with a new Indian war. French and Spanish emissaries swarm through the country. There is reason to believe that a western or ultramontane republic is meditated. . . . It is certain that overtures have been made to the British government for support, and there is every reason to believe, short of positive proof, that similar overtures have been made to Spain and France. The British will not now support the project." The opposite parties, now evenly balanced, as the election of Adams by a bare majority showed, and bitterer than ever against each other, scanned eagerly the names which were hinted at as associated with Blount. The federalists were rejoiced to find them all Jacobins. Boudinot expressed their opinions: "All who have been mentioned as concerned in the business are violent Jacobins, professed enemies to Great Britain, and who have been continual advocates for the French, and always vociferating a British faction. . . . We are not without fear that this may be a scheme of the democrats and Frenchified Americans to ruin

England in the American opinion, and give the Spaniards an excuse to break their treaty with us."

It is always unsafe to be determinate on diplomatic mysteries, nor is there evidence that what Hawkesworth represented to King at a later day as the purpose of the British ministry was closely connected with this Blount undertaking. His lordship said that the ministry had indeed considered a project of seizing Louisiana, and might perhaps have used the British army then in Egypt for the object. Their purpose, he professed, was not so much acquisition of territory as to find in the success of the expedition a ground for securing other advantages at the peace. Colonel Trumbull, who was at this time in England, wrote to urge the United States' seizing Louisiana and Florida, and emancipating Mexico. *He at the same time expressed the opinion that the federal government might count on the English navy to blockade on the Gulf, while the Americans did the work by land.

After the Blount plot had been discovered, the summer passed in Philadelphia with as much uncertainty as before. Pickering and Yrujo kept up their correspondence, and finally, in August, the Spanish minister wrote what Jay called "a factious and indecent letter," which led Pickering to say that only a change in the Spanish humor could restore confidence and lead the United States to forget the past. The old suspicion still prevailed, and the procrastinating policy of Gayoso with Elliott was held to be only a putting off to allow France to assert a sovereignty in Louisiana, which it was presumed she had already acquired. In November, 1797, King, in London, reported to Pickering that the Prince of Peace had lately declared that the Directory of France had demanded Louisiana, and that the court of Spain found "itself no longer in a condition to refuse." This was what Hamilton declared "plundering at discretion."

The news was indeed premature, for the treaty of San Ildefonso was three years off, and fortunately there was an interval left in which Spain could redeem her honor with the United States, and lead America, in Pickering's phrase, to forget the past. In November, Colonel Grandprie, who, under orders from Madrid, had arrived in November in Natchez, to take command, was ignored by the committee, and when, in December,

1797, fresh United States troops, under Captain Guyon, joined Ellicott at Natchez, it was a warning to Gayoso that he could not overlook. Events now moved rapidly, as they usually do when Spanish obstinacy gives way to fear. In January, 1798, Gayoso issued orders for the evacuation of Natchez, Walnut Hills, and the other posts north of 31°. Ellicott was notified on January 10. After the usual Spanish torpidity, finally, on March 30, under the cover of the night, and leaving everything uninjured, the Spanish troops filed out, and the next morning the American flag was run up. The Spanish troops retired downstream, and there was no place but Baton Rouge left for Gayoso to make a stand against an up-river approach. This place was but thirty miles above Iberville River, which bounded New Orleans inland on the north.

The American Republic was now, after fifteen years' waiting, in possession of the territory in the southwest awarded to it by the Treaty of Independence. We have seen that it had waited thirteen years in the north to get control of the lake posts. Congress at once (April, 1798) set up the Mississippi Territory, covering the territory so long in dispute, and Winthrop Sargent, turning over the secretaryship of the northwest territory to William Henry Harrison, was sent to organize the government. He arrived at Natchez on August 6. Three weeks later (August 26), Wilkinson, as general of the American army, and bearing in his bosom the secrets that made his prominence a blot both on himself and his government, arrived at Natchez with a little army of occupation. Meanwhile, Ellicott had left, on April 9, to begin his survey, and for two years was engaged in the work.

So ends the story of the rounding out of the territorial integrity of the Republic, as Franklin, Adams, and Jay had secured it in 1782, against the mischievous indirection of her enemies, French, Spanish, and British.

With a country completed in its bounds, the American character needed a corresponding rounding of its traits. Jay, in a letter to Trumbull, October 27, 1797, had divined its necessities: "As to politics, we are in a better state than we were; but we are not yet in a sound state. I think that nation is not in a sound state whose parties are excited by objects

interesting only to a foreign power. I wish to see our people more Americanized, if I may use that expression ; until we feel and act as an independent nation, we shall always suffer from foreign influence." Hamilton wrote to King in a similar spirit : " The conduct of France " — and he might have added of Spain and Britain — " has been a very powerful medicine for the political diseases of the country. I think the community improves in soundness."

Not long before this, Tench Coxe, of Philadelphia, made a survey of the condition to which the United States had attained : " The public debt is smaller in proportion to the present wealth and population than the public debt of any other civilized nation. The United States, including the operations of the individual States, have sunk a much greater proportion of the public debt in the last ten years than any nation in the world. The expenses of the government are very much less in proportion to wealth and numbers than those of any nation in Europe." The United States, with its rightful proportions secured, was now fairly started on an independent career.

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
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
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